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Preface 
This book is built on my decades of professional activity in teacher education. Since 
1975, in several different tertiary institutions, in Australia and Papua New Guinea, I 
have trained pre-service teachers, and instructed graduate teachers in many subject 
areas. Beginning in Secondary mathematics education, and then Primary mathematics 
education, I later branched out into Remedial education across the curriculum, 
Literacy education, assessment across the curriculum, giftedness, Logo computer 
programming, the uses of children’s literature across the curriculum, and other areas 
that interested me. 
 
In 1993 I began attending the Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to Research 
in Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental Education, at Deakin University, 
organised by the then School of Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental 
Education in the Faculty of Education. Amazed by the diversity of research 
methodologies and fields of research, I wondered if I was capable of any kind of 
research. Then I began to wonder if any of the things I was already doing as part of 
my on-going professional activity (much of it teaching, supported by wide reading, 
critical analysis, and writing instructional materials) constituted research. Slowly I 
came to conclusion that, in my own ways, without ever competing for research funds, 
or taking time away from my teaching to go “into the field” and “collect research 
data” (the dominant paradigm for other researchers) I was actually a researcher. Many 
of the articles I wrote and published in professional (not research) journals were in 
fact reports on my own researching. 
 
This led me to dare to offer my own papers at some of the continuing the Symposia 
on Contemporary Approaches to Research in Mathematics, Science, Health and 
Environmental Education. Some of the major “chapters” in this book are versions of 
these Symposia papers. 
 
Other materials compiled here reflect other aspects of my research-like professional 
activity. 
 
If any one “chapter”, or page, or idea is helpful to anyone else, I will regard the 
compiling of this book as having been worthwhile. 
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Abstract 
Many school teachers at Primary and Secondary levels are involved in professional development, 
curriculum innovation and similar tasks related to teaching, reporting and accountability which 
seem remote from ideas of 'educational research'. However by exploring the nature of Action 
Research and other research models it is possible to suggest ways that teachers can reflect more 
critically and constructively on professional activities to which they are unavoidably committed. A 
typical 'topic for informal investigation' is used as the basis for discussing such possibilities. 
Particular attention is focussed on clarifying the teaching and learning being attempted, to ensure 
that clear and informative data can be gathered and analysed. 
 
How can project investigations at school, or about school, be turned into solid research? 
Increasingly teachers are asked to implement new ideas, new techniques of teaching, new 
curricula, and new methods of reporting. Teachers are also professionally responsible, 
accountable to their students, the parents of their students, to colleagues, and to their 
employers. They have little choice about introducing changes in their teaching. As a 
result of developments in technology, for example, teachers must bow to the pressures for 
curriculum changes which exist in the whole community. Out in the real world, fountain 
pens give way to ballpoints, and handwriting is increasingly challenged by the need to 
develop keyboard-based communication skills, not to mention widespread community 
acceptance of calculators, computer-based cash registers, and computers. How can 
teachers try to ensure that educational changes in their schools are being implemented as 
effectively as possible? Such questions need careful investigation and reporting – 
research. 
 
Action research is critical practice 
First, at the simplest level we can try to provide an account of what we are doing as 
clearly as possible. The result is a descriptive case study: this is what I did, this is why I 
did it, this is what I used, and this is what I noticed happening. Such a report might be 
extended by including an account of what I used to do, and why I thought it might be 
useful to change from this. With a little polishing this kind of simple anecdotal 
description can be turned into a more developed form of action research. What kind of 
research is this? How does it relate to ordinary events that occur in ordinary schools? 
 
Action research has been rather grandiosely defined as 'research undertaken by 
practitioners in order that they may attempt to solve their local, practical problems by 
using the methods of science' (Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh, 1972, p 36). In this definition, 
the relevance of the 'methods of science' (with its empahisis on scientific objectivity and 
its formal stages of 'scientific method': defining a problem, stating a hypothesis, deducing 
consequences of the hypothesis, collecting and analysing data generated in an attempt to 
test the hypothesis, evaluating the hypothesis in the light of the test: Ary et al. p 37) may 
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be questioned. One of the pioneers of action research, S.M. Corey, was less concerned 
with science and emphasized that research about schools (or comparable organizations) 
should be carried out in schools, by those who may have to carry out any changes that 
may result from the research (Corey 1954 p 8, cited in Ary at al. p 44). 
 
In fact action research was first proposed by the social psychologist Kurt Lewin (for 
example, 1946) as a process of cyclic study, diagnosis and therapeutic intervention which 
resembles a doctor's attempt to help a patient through successive cyclic stages of first 
ideas, fact finding, planning, therapeutic action steps, monitoring, evaluating, replanning, 
and so on (Lewin's cycle is described in Burns 1990 p 253). In Australia, action research 
has been recommended enthusiastically by Kemmis and McTaggart who defined it as:  
a form of collective self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in 
social situations in order to improve the productivity, rationality and 
justice of their social or educational practices, as well as the understanding 
of these practices, and the situations in which these practices are carried 
out (1988 pp 5–6).  
Doesn't this sound like the kind of thing teachers do all the time as they sit in staffrooms, 
talking shop, trying to sort out what they are doing, and how to do it better? The only 
remaining steps, apart from talking about it, is to document the institutional setting, the 
issues, and the talk as clearly as possible. (See also McTaggart 1991, and Kemmis 1994.)   
 
Unlike the intended objectivity of a scientist, psychologist or doctor dispassionately 
observing and evaluating events in the laboratory or processes in the patient, the teachers 
and educational professionals who carry out action research are themselves participants in 
the events they are attempting to deal with, identifying 'strategies of planned action which 
are implemented, and then systematically submitted to observation, reflection and 
change ... [and] integrally involved in all of these activities (Kemmis and Grundy 1981, 
cited in Burns 1990 p 252).  
 
Not only is objectivity difficult, in action research, so is any attempt to control all 
possible variables in order to gain scientific experimental rigour, and the ability to 
identify significant factors with certainty. Teachers use 'research methods to study 
classroom problems', a teacher 'conducts the study or has an important role in the research 
process', and, 'because the focus is on a solution to a local problem... rigorous research 
control is not essential' (McMillan and Schumacher 1993 p 21). Indeed a control group of 
school children which is given no treatment at all is obviously out of the question in an 
institution where professionals are paid to deliver some kind of observable service to their 
clients. 
 
Given these definitions and descriptions, action research may be best thought of as 
normal professional work relating to a particular problem or research question, with a 
more focussed research-slant, actively probing definitions and assumptions, raising 
questions, examining different kinds of evidence, and implementing different kinds of 
practice in an attempt to find answers to the questions, and eventually achieve a solution 
to the initial problem. Equally action research can be used to investigate or critically 
describe the possibly unchanging (for the moment) status quo in a classroom or school, as 
Kemmis and McTaggart imply when they speak of action research investigating existing 
practices and situations.  
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Kemmis and McTaggart's 'Planner' (1988) identifies four interacting major stages in 
action research: reconaissance, planning, enacting and observing, and reflecting. 
Following Lewin, they point out that action research is participatory, and proceeds in 
systematic but flexible cycles, starting small, investigating small changes, using 
collaborative theorising and critical reflection. They suggest several guiding questions 
that can link the stages, at the same time distinguishing three overlapping domains within 
which the research falls: language and discourse, activities and practice, and social 
relationships and forms of organisation (Kemmis 1994).  
 
Ferres offers the following questions as a guide for teachers (or other participant 
researchers) considering related background (reconnaissance) studies, and their own 
experience and conclusions (reflecting):  
• Which known research findings match our understandings, our experiences, and our 
observations? 
• How might we organise the key ideas in our work? 
• What interpretations and conclusions from our own experiences might we add to this 
other research we have collected? 
Both of these questions relate directly to forming 
• strategies and environments for effective learning (by the participants, and other 
teachers) 
• plans for working in professional development groups (1996).   
 
The goal of action research is quite simply the goal of education – to improve educational 
practice, or ensure it is as good as possible. Action researchers are participants, and 
cannot pretend to be scrupulously objective. But they can be as honest as possible about 
their biases, or their guiding assumptions. They can be scrupulous in their efforts to 
define and discuss with clarity and precision. They can also invite the contributions of 
outside observers and analysts, and place their best efforts open to the frank scrutiny of a 
wider public.  
 
Linking action research with experimental approaches 
With just a little planning we can even turn project investigations at school, or about 
school into a kind of pilot-study research project, possibly even with an experimental or 
quasi-experimental basis. The following comments may help ordinary teachers or 
students achieve any one of these three possibilities, with little further effort beyond 
ordinary day-to-day work activities. The pay-off is that teachers will then be in a far 
stronger position to discuss their work, to take real charge of their own curriculum, and to 
give a professional account of their working activities. Kemmis notes that action research 
'creates an immediate sense of responsibility for the improvement of practice' (1994). 
 
Frequently students, at secondary levels through to undergraduate tertiary levels, and 
even post-graduate levels, attempt to carry out a piece of work which tries to answer 
some question about their own student learning, or the learning of themselves and a group 
of peers, or to evaluate a piece of curriculum, or report on the stages they went through 
attempting to solve some mathematics or other problem. For school students this may 
arise via self-reporting, journal-keeping, and typical VCE CAT investigations where a 
folio, logbook, diary or journal is kept of successive drafts of student work, perhaps 
including the student's reflections on these successive drafts. For tertiary level students 
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this kind of work is typical of university assessment tasks, research projects, and minor 
and major thesis research.  
 
For teachers in schools who are not directly involved in tertiary study or research, this 
kind of tentative problem solving work arises during personal and collaborative staff 
professional development projects. Since the central support mechanisms of the 
Education Departments and government agencies around Australia were dismantled or 
disabled or demolished, because of staff cuts, funding cuts, and magic words such as 
'rationalising', 'down-sizing', 'devolution' and 'school-based curriculum', teachers have 
been forced to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Once upon a time there were 
Inspectors, and Subject Specialist Consultants, and Curriculum and Research Branch 
experts, and Task Groups. Now there is chaotic anarchic free-for-all. In such a work 
climate, clearly teachers need to keep as clear a head on their shoulders as possible. 
Maintaining good notes and records of the work they are doing, of their questions and 
concerns, is an invaluable way of doing this, and forms the basis for any eventual 
'research report'.  
 
Implementing curriculum change – a typical example 
Consider a hypothetical example of a curriculum development project at school such as a 
new teaching activity about to be introduced. For the purposes of this discussion it will be 
given a plausible, and intriguing formal title. But exactly the same project could be 
initiated at a school by a keen teacher with no clear sense of a project being present at all, 
simply, new teaching materials and activities starting to be used in classrooms:  
'Using Computer Software to Enhance Learning in the Space Strand of the 
Mathematics Curriculum and Standards Framework'.  
Indeed it is easy to imagine a teacher, or team of teachers, attempting to use a new 
collection of computers and some newly acquired software, wondering just what might 
come out of this, and feeling a little uncertain about what they will do, and what will 
happen. Will they be able to monitor what they are doing? How would any of this apply 
to the rather intimidating, but mandatory(?) CSF? Alternatively, rather than focussing on 
the CSF strand of Space, we might consider possible uses of computer technology and 
software in the strands of Number, Measurement, Chance and Data, and so on. Related 
topics might arise through questions about the possible role of calculators, or the new-
fangled Internet, or other new technologies, or even the simple introduction of a new 
textbook, or series of reading materials, or a new method for teaching spelling, or a new 
handwriting style. 
 
The focus of the hypothetical example is clearly stated in its title: using computers to help 
children learn to think and work better with spatial aspects of the current mathematics 
curriculum. In fact, merely giving a title to an otherwise ordinary school teaching activity, 
such as introducing some new materials or beginning with a new textbook, helps to focus 
on the research-like problem solving nature of such ordinary teaching. I am going to try 
out this: I wonder how it will work? Next, we might want to be more specific, and pin 
down exactly who we are working with. Will we concentrate on a small group, or a whole 
class, or several classes, or year levels? Will the school setting be an urban Primary 
school, a rural Primary school? We might even work with children outside of an ordinary 
school setting, such as an after-school program, a holiday enrichment program, or 
individual 'coaching'? Will the students in the project be volunteers, nominees, or 
compulsorily drafted? 
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'Experiments' in education 
How will we set about our work? Will we build some kind of computer and technology 
use into an otherwise ordinary curriculum, and then simply describe what happens? Will 
we attempt to compare one group of students who have an ordinary curriculum with a 
different group who have a computer-based curriculum? Here we are really considering 
aspects of what is known as experimental design, or perhaps quasi-experimental if 
formal experimental controls and technical restrictions of the strict scientific approach are 
considered to be impracticable or not feasible for some other reason, such as the ethical 
limitations on the way we can experiment in the curriculum and its delivery with one 
group, while deliberately restricting the curriculum input and teacher-support provided 
for another (controlled) group. (For example, Campbell and Stanley 1963; and McMillan 
and Schumacher 1993 chapter 9.) 
 
What do we mean by 'experimental' and 'quasi-experimental'? Some research purists 
claim that the term 'experimental' should only used when the researcher randomly  
allocates the so called 'experimental subjects' to different experimental or trial groups. 
But the researchers or teachers may actually have no say over which student is in which 
class. Nor would we be able to consider the possible effects of interaction between friends 
if group allocation randomly splits up the normal student-selected social groupings, and 
the disorientation of broken friendship bonds might effect our study. The design of an 
'experiment' also requires a so called 'control' group for comparison purposes. In such a 
'control' group nothing special happens, perhaps other than routine curriculum and 
classroom activities, except for initial and final experimental 'testing' of some sort.  
 
As an example of a very neat experimental design, consider Peter Sullivan's miniature 
study (Sullivan 1983; Gough 1984). Forty-four students who had completed mathematics 
up to Grade 10 in Papua New Guinea were enrolling in a pre-employment technical 
course. Part of this course involved some basic arithmetic and mathematics which might 
have been assumed to have been covered in earlier school years. But previous experience 
showed that whenever such students were given a pre-test of basic skills they appeared to 
need considerable extra remediation in order to be brought up to a satisfactory  standard. 
Sullivan administered the pre-test, as usual. But then he randomly divided the students 
into four equal-sized groups, in an attempt to explore the usefulness or otherwise of the 
remediation classes that almost all of them seemed to need, according to the rather dismal 
results of the pre-test. 
 
The first group was taught the standard Basic skills course by a mathematics lecturer. The 
second group was given an equivalent arithmetic course taught by a trade lecturer. The 
third group had their errors on the pre-test carefully explained, but otherwise received no 
further assistance. The fourth group (the control) had their pre-test papers returned, but 
undertook no kind of mathematics teaching or remediation. All groups were told they 
were going to be given a second version of the pre-test, and they were told that the results 
of this post-test would count towards their pre-employment course. After the post-test, 
careful statistical tests investigated possible differences between the students. 
 
In fact there was a small uniform overall improvement between pre- and post-test for all 
groups, but there were no significant differences between the four groups. This 
improvement was also found to hold when a second post-test was given eight weeks later 
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to measure longer-term skill retention. Having carefully controlled the relevant variables 
(the different treatments each group received, or did not receive, combined with random 
allocation to a group) it was possible to see that the specially designed Basic skills course 
was no more effective as remediation than doing nothing at all, except testing once, and 
then testing again, knowing that the second time would count. Amazing, and neat. 
 
Research purists want scientific rigour in their research, and the control of variables. But 
almost always scientific rigour has no place in a school, or is too technically restrictive. 
How can we attempt to control for such variables as the time of day when a lesson occurs 
(some research suggests students learn mathematics or any school subject better in the 
early morning, and better still after some minutes of aerobic exercise, rather than after 
lunch) when the school timetable is not able to be altered by the researchers? What about 
the variables involved in different teachers taking different classes? Even if we limit our 
study so that only one teacher teaches all the experimental groups, we are unable to 
control for the different prior influences of previous teachers, or the impact of other 
teachers at other times during a school day, or even the effect of the students' parents 
outside of school hours. Of course if we restrict our research to one-teacher schools, to 
increase our control over teacher-related experimental variables, we would then be unable 
to generalise any results, experimentally established for one-teacher schools, and draw 
conclusions that might apply to schools with more than one teacher. Damned if we do, 
and damned if we don't. 
 
Moreover the do-nothing requirements of a control group may not be ethically justified 
when working with humans. Is it fair, for example, to allow one class in a school to have 
eight-hour-a-day access to one computer for each student, when the class next-door has 
no computer at all, or only one hour-per-day access to one computer for the whole class? 
In such cases, we may relax the purists' standards and perform semi-scientific or quasi-
experimental work. This need for a more humanely relaxed, indeed professionally 
responsible, approach to experimentation and research, a more realistically oriented 
experimental response to the human needs of teaching and learning in ordinary 
classrooms, led originally to the development of the concept of 'action research'. 
 
The absolute control of scientific experiments that can be exercised over, say, laboratory 
rats, has nothing or very little to do with the naturalistic uncontrolled and extremely 
complex setting of a school, itself set within a much larger and naturally varying social 
context. No wonder quasi-experimental and action research, or simply descriptive case 
studies have so much value for the important goal of improving school practice. 
 
'Learning' and the need to measure change 
Once we have the broad design settled, how can we begin to experiment, measure, and 
accumulate research data? In a teaching climate where the profession as a whole is 
opposed to 'testing' of students, softer options are often suggested. However, observation 
and interview alone, though these may  seem to be avoiding the bogeyman of testing, can 
only describe what appears to be happening during the period being studied. They are 
unable to measure change in behaviour, or even indicate whether or not any change is 
occurring. But learning is precisely a matter of 'change'. That is, such a test-free approach 
to the study offers neither quantitative (measurable) nor qualitative (describable) data on 
children's 'learning' about the ways they are actually changing. It only reports on some of 
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the children's activities and the associated curriculum development that led to those 
activities.  
 
The only way we can try to say anything about whether or not children (or students, 
generally) have learned is by being to able to identify the way they have changed, and the 
extent that they have changed. How can we know when change occurs? This is only 
possible if we have information about the way the children were at the beginning, and we 
then compare this with the way they now are at the end. We actually need to be able to do 
a simple kind of subtraction: 
    What the children know at the end 
-  What the children know at the beginning 
=  What they have learned in between 
 
If all we are dealing with is description, rather than any kind of test-like measurement or 
other data, then we need a clear, detailed description of what the children know at the 
start, and, after lots of description of what is happening during the period being studied, 
we then need a clear, detailed description of the way the children have ended up. By 
careful comparison between the beginning-description and the end-description, we can 
identify those new kinds of behaviour and changes in understanding that have (we 
presume, and hope) resulted from the time and effort spent during the period of study. (It 
is always possible that the children may have changed for reasons that have nothing to do 
with our attempts to 'teach' or facilitate learning.) This comparison is the equivalent of the 
arithmetic process of subtraction (indeed, subtraction depends on underlying comparison, 
and is a process of reporting on the quantified results of comparing quantities). These 
'new' things are evidence of the change in the individual which simply is  'learning'. 
 
If, as well as descriptions, we have more quantifiable evidence, such as performance on 
work sheets, responses to attitude questionaires and scales, and even 'tests' of some sort, 
then the comparisons we need to make, to establish whether or not there have been 
changes, and if so, to establish how big the changes might have been, are easier to make, 
and more objective, although naturally constrained within the limitations that attend any 
reliance on pencil-and-paper work, right or wrong answers, time-limits, and so on. The 
human detail we can obtain in large amounts by interview, observation and subjective 
description (possibly guided by checklists and pro forma observation records), is 
balanced against the directness and hardness of other kinds of data that can be obtained 
from written and computer records of student work.   
 
Is this learning 'enhanced' or 'ordinary' learning? 
However, the key question in this sample topic 'Has learning been enhanced?', or even the 
related question 'Has learning occurred?', can not be easily answered by such a study 
without further careful thought.  
 
What does 'enhancing' mean? Surely it means that some situation has been improved 
beyond what would have otherwise been possible. Attempting to investigate 
'enhancement' (of spatial thinking, or some other aspect of mathematics, or other 
curriculum area) through the use of computers would require some consideration of 
alternatives to any use of computer technology as a possible way of producing 
technologically 'unenhanced' learning. This might, in the case of spatial thinking for 
example, involve pencil-and-paper activities, scissors-and-cardboard constructions, use of 
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birds-eye-view and plan diagrams and blocks or other building materials, map-making 
and map-interpreting, and other non-computer-based spatial thinking activities. The level 
of learning outcomes from these alternative activities could then be compared with the 
outcomes for the study's computer-based activities.  
 
If the students who did computer-based work achieved higher levels in their development 
of spatial thinking, then the computer-based curriculum could be said to have 'enhanced' 
what might otherwise have taken place without the computers. Alternatively the students 
using computers might have achieved development of spatial thinking which was only 
comparable to, or even inferior to the levels observed in students who did non-computer-
based spatial thinking activities. In this latter case the computer-based curriculum might 
be considered to have not 'enhanced' at all, but might even have resulted in a lesser level 
of development. It is easy to imagine that students who are using computers, many for the 
first time in school, may be so enthusiastic about the computers themselves that the 
technology actually distracts them from what the technology is supposed to be teaching 
them. By contrast, sheer familiarity with ordinary materials such as cardboard, glue and 
scissors, may allow students to focus more constructively on the ideas being represented 
through these everyday materials. 
 
As has been discussed briefly already, the broader question – 'Has learning occurred, 
enhanced or otherwise?' – can only be asked by making benchmark comparisons between 
some kind of entry-level evaluation of spatial thinking ability (or whatever the subject 
being researched) and that ability or achievement at the end of the period of study. The 
learning evaluation or measurement equation is simple: Post-'test' minus pre-'test' equals 
'learning'. Formal pre-tests and post-tests could be carried out using the ACER Space Test 
Unit 1 (MAPS Mathematics Profile Series 1978), or selected geometry and spatial 
thinking questions from Schleiger's Diagnostic Mathematical Tasks, or by taking 
appropriate examples from the Mathematics Curriculum Profile (Curriculum 
Corporation) or even the points of the C&SF Space Strand itself, or other curriculum 
resources such as items from the current LAPS (Learning Assessment Project) tests (some 
of which are known to indicate at least a low-level of spatial thinking), or even making an 
informal school-developed test.  
 
An alternative informal approach to entry- and exit-assessment can be attempted by 
combinations of questionnaire, student journal, or structured interview before the study 
and after it. For example, students (and teachers) can be asked to keep a journal in which 
they record their thoughts and experiences and questions about some topic, starting with 
simple instructions to 'Write about what you know about different kinds of shapes such as 
squares, and triangles and circles', and further instructions to write about subsequent 
lessons on related topics, finishing with "What have you found out now about two-
dimensional objects?'. 
 
Of course the scope of research needed to attempt to deal with these all of these questions 
considerably exceeds post-graduate course work requirements, for example. It might 
fruitfully form the basis of a complete PhD, and could conceivably even go far beyond 
the scope of a PhD as a long-term subject for investigation. Some researchers could build 
a substantial professional academic career out of the attempt to explore such a topic. Any 
research study that runs for a part only of a school year, with only a class or two being 
studied, even if the data collection was adjusted so that it could really come to grips with 
the stated research question(s), in the time allowed, would not be able to do full justice to 
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the topic. Instead such a naturally restricted project could provide a much simpler pilot 
study or 'dry-run' for possible later extended research. This kind of small-scale action 
research prototype is capable of yielding very good work. Similarly, as a piece of school-
level curriculum development, and accountable professional development, this kind of 
action research can meet its target goal – to provide documentable feedback about 
teaching practice, to inform future practice and to guide curriculum decisions and 
priorities. 
 
Spatial skills in using computer graphics software 
Focussing specifically on the hypothetical study of Spatial thinking skills, it is worth 
noting the fundamentally 2-dimensional nature of almost all computer-based screen-
display graphics. This could be a limiting factor in the attempt to develop solid or in-
depth 3-dimensional spatial thinking. Model-making seems to be an obvious and 
important adjunct to any work which otherwise relies on flat on-paper or on-screen 2-
dimensional images. Similarly it maybe useful to distinguish 2-dimensionally presented 
tasks which can be performed with 2-dimensional thinking, as opposed to those 2-
dimensionally-presented tasks which actually require the student to think 3-dimensionally. 
(An approach to describing different features of spatial thinking tasks is discussed in 
Gough 1991.) 
 
For example, students beginning to think about the movement of the 2-D Logo 
programming (e.g. LogoWriter, MicroWorlds, or Scratch) “turtle” on a 2-D screen can 
sometimes be seen getting out of their seat in order to look down or around in the way the 
turtle is looking in order to decide whether or not the turtle needs to be given a right or a 
left turn to make the next part of a drawing. This indicates a 3-dimensional response to a 
2-dimensional task.  
 
Similarly some of the Sunburst software packages which provide challenge and practice 
for problem solving in two and three dimensions often transcend the 2-dimensional 
restriction of the computer screen, and demand a 3-dimensional thinking response in 
order to answer questions about a tile being painted on one side and then turned over and 
rotated clockwise and painted or drilled in a different way (as in Factory and Super 
Factory) or a multi-story compound-structure building being seen from several different 
points of view, as in Building Perspective (these three software packages published by 
Sunburst for Apple IIe computers may now be somewhat outdated, but have not yet been 
replaced by comparable packages). 
 
Recognising the limits of the research 
Research hypotheses can be open-ended and as adventurous as the researchers choose. 
But some of the hypotheses or research questions may go beyond the limits of what is 
capable of being investigated, whether with full experimental precision or even with the 
more relaxed and less rigorous quasi-experimental design. When this occurs it is valuable 
to recognise it, and admit to the limits. For example, given natural classroom constraints, 
it may not have been possible to make direct comparisons between a class taught one way 
and a class taught another way, to say nothing about the difficulties of allocating students 
randomly to groups, or having a control group. But a research question about possible 
differences in the results of different teaching approaches remains a good question, and 
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the descriptive results obtained by looking at only one teaching approach may still remain 
as indicative of possible positive results.  
 
Simply being honest indicates the need for further, possibly more rigorous research, and 
shows an awareness of research questions known but so far not yet considered. As all 
researchers know, often the hardest task is to find good questions worth researching. But 
not all questions are immediately researchable. Recognising the differences between the 
achieved, the possible and the still unanswered is itself a small step forward, and a 
warning against being too confident about what is being done. Moreover, as a small-step 
cyclic approach to investigating ways of improving educational practice, action research 
relishes such successive, limited partial steps forward. Clearly stating the current limits of 
what has been able to be researched so far, and what has been found out, helps identify 
future research goals. 
 
Is this research really 'valid'? 
Within the setting of such an action research approach to investigating classroom practice, 
what is 'validity'? What is 'internal validity'? The experimental concept of 'validity' is 
concerned with whether or not the things that are claimed to be evaluated or studied 
actually are being so considered. At this point we need clear definitions. In the spatial 
thinking research investigation example, an attempt to consider validity might involve 
discussing whether or not the curriculum, as developed, is genuinely concerned with 
spatial thinking. Inevitably this relies on some definition of spatial thinking. A test is 
'valid' if it is believed to actually test the thing it purports to test: but what is it trying to 
test? how is it defined? However in this hypothetical case it seems that validity would not 
be such an important issue for the study, as long as what is described as involving 'spatial 
thinking' obviously does involve some kind of mental work with 1-, 2- and 3-dimensional 
objects and images.  
 
Such matters of definition and validity are important in another way. Whenever we are 
trying to solve some problem, we are embedded in some present situation. Only when we 
have a clear sense of the situation can we see clearly enough in what ways the problem, 
and its associated concepts and questions, may be different. Woolly language is no way to 
make progress. For example, many schools are now attempting to implement so called 
'profiles', which are meant to be a way of reporting on student learning in terms of so 
called 'learning outcomes' (exemplified by Curriculum and Standards Framework: 
Mathematics 1995). Outcomes-based curricula are all the rage. But what do such terms 
really mean? Are they different from the behavioural objectives (exemplified by Bloom's 
Taxonomy of Educational Objectives 1956) popular during the 50s and 60s? In what ways 
would a shift to outcomes-based reporting be different from the current practice? Too 
often teachers accept and attempt to implement, uncritically, whatever new package of 
concepts and language is handed to them by their institutional authorities, and out the 
window go various combinations of baby and bathwater. 
 
It is especially important in considering computers in education (or any other similarly 
new curriculum resource) to be wary of bandwagon effects coloring or even preventing 
thinking. There is an increasing tendency to hear the word 'new' and think that this 
naturally implies 'progress' and 'improvement', and therefore the new whateveritis must 
be implemented because it must be better. Vitamin-enriched, enzyme-added, protein-
boosted, … our mass advertising culture within our increasingly complex technological 
John Gough — Research Studies page  17 
and scientific world encourages such a view in the general public. Teachers also, in recent 
decades, have been encouraged to accept many changes in curriculum, materials, methods, 
workplace practices, administration and so on. Computers, with their extremely rapid and 
irreversible obsolescence simply force successive waves of newness on computer users 
and buyers, compounding these general expectations. We are reaching a stage where as 
soon as people, particularly teachers, hear the word 'computer' or 'Internet' they turn off 
the part of their brain which normally functions as a critic. Consider how unthinkingly the 
general public has embraced the march from 78 to mono LP to stereo LP, to audiocassette 
and finally, for now, to CD in recorded music. The same is often true in education. 
Moreover, those educational dinosaurs and luddites who see fit to protest against some 
latest great educational innovation can either be conveniently ignored, coerced to comply, 
ordered to shut up, or be sacked. (If one of us wants to continue listening to our 78s at 
home no one will stop us, though many heads will be shaken with disbelieving pity.) 
 
Sheer novelty, as we will see in another setting, tends to make us enthusiastic. What is 
really at stake is the critical issue of validity. Just what is being offered, and what is it 
replacing? What do we gain from the new technology? And what do we lose? As another 
example, some teachers are rushing to embrace the so called 'talking book' (a CD-ROM 
which allows hypermedia-type interactive access to words, information, pictures, 
animation, sound effects and music), seeing this as a great step forward in the laudable 
drive to help children learn to read. But what does it really provide? Without voice-
recognition a computer cannot listen as a child attempts to read aloud. Nor can an 
automated robot voice demonstrate good intonation and phrasing, nor pause to respond to 
a child's curiosity, nor recognise that a child is not listening to the story. A talking book 
can no more teach an illiterate child how to read than can any ordinary book. Not valid! 
What is a valid reading method, then? A human teacher, capturing the child's attention 
and enthusiasm, using good reading materials, sharing exciting stories, responding to the 
child's individual needs. It will be a long time before a machine can do better than that. 
 
The same kinds of questions of validity apply to other forms of computer software. The 
most amazing computer graphics package is only a supplement, substitute for, or 
alternative to students learning to use paper, pencils, crayons, paint, and other visual 
materials. Hand-eye coordination, judgements about line, color, shading, and pattern need 
to be made just as carefully. Computer-based clip art is simply visual plagiarism, artistic 
piracy or vandalism, and may not play any meaningful or valid role in the children's 
development of graphics skill at all, despite the fact that the results can look stunningly 
professional. It will only be a matter of time before newsagents and card shops will not 
sell pre-printed cards, but instead will allow the purchase of a computer-printed design-it-
yourself card that will require no designing skill whatsoever. When this occurs the 
personal and learning value of a child making his or her own card by hand will be 
incalculable. We say, of a child's clumsy efforts, 'It's the thought that counts'. We must 
always ask ourselves 'Where is the thought in whatever latest amazing gizzmo is offered 
as the latest great teaching technology?'. We need to keep our critical machine turned on 
all the time. 
 
Collecting research data from teachers and students 
As we attempt to establish changes and learning, apart from tests and test-like worksheet 
and related activities, where can useful action research data come from? Obviously 
teachers who participate in such a study should be formally and informally interviewed. 
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They are participants in the research, colleagues rather than 'experimental subjects'. 
However their involvement in the research will have considerable novelty for them, and 
hence involve them in much learning of their own. Hence their subjective reflections on 
their experience as participants will yield valuable qualitative data, extending information 
obtained from interviews with students and by accumulating students' writing about their 
experiences as well as collecting examples of students' own spatial and computer-based 
work. Also informal, unstructured observations of the behaviour of these teachers during 
the study can be included as data contributing to the material for any final report on the 
outcomes of the research. All of this teacher-related information is capable of showing 
where and how the teachers will have learned and have changed their attitudes, and 
developed new roles as teachers, classroom managers and facilitators of learning. Again, 
in examining change, in this case, 'teacher-change', it is important to have firm before- 
and after-statements to allow direct comparison, or attempt to specify or measure the 
apparent changes. 
 
Inevitably, as children are learning they will make mistakes. Indeed, if no errors are 
occurring neither is any learning taking place. This means that recording and discussing 
students' errors in computer programming, software use, group discussion, student-
teacher questions and answers, and pencil-and-paper-work and cardboard-and-scissors 
work becomes an essential aspect of this kind of action research. Analysis and discussion 
of 'errors' or (in reading terms, 'miscues') will shed any light on the student's spatial or 
other mathematical thinking. It is possible to make a 'diagnosis' of the faulty thinking that 
might then lead to a suggested or prescribed 'cure'. Think of the way we use students 
spelling 'errors' and reading 'miscues' to guide us in our attempts to help students learn 
how to write and read. Ann Newman has developed a 'diagnostic interview' for 
mathematics errors which corresponds to the familiar 'miscue analysis' of reading miscues 
(Newman 1977, 1983, Gough 1983). An analysis of student errors can form the basis for 
individual and group case study research, and can contribute significantly to any research 
evaluation of the implementation of new curriculum methods or materials.  
 
How clear is my learning theory? 
In our discussion of children learning, an important feature will be some account of how 
we believe children learn, and the evidence we see for this kind of learning taking place. 
Are we devotees of mastery learning? Do we subscribe to constructivist theories of 
learning? Are we unreconstructed Piagetians or behaviourists? Do we believe that the 
way children learn many school subjects resembles the psycholinguistic account of 
children's acquisition of oral language? Do we see mathematics learning as similar to 
scientific method or to language learning? How do we relate problem solving with the 
experimental processes of concept formation, skills development and attitude 
development? Have we been persuaded by Howard Gardner (1985) that children have 
multiple intelligences, and hence multiple kinds of learning? Where do we see left- and 
right-hand hemispherical dominance theories fitting in all of this, and so on? Such 
theories are like windows through which we observe and record what we think we are 
seeing. Our records will be more valuable if we declare our theories as part of our 
recording. 
 
Also, depending on our particular learning theories, we will have different ideas about 
appropriate ways of evaluating children's work and learning, and different ideas about the 
proper role or roles of the teacher. As a very broad rule of thumb it is usual to suggest that 
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the best way to try to evaluate a child's learning is to 'test the way you have taught'. 
Indeed it can be argued that, if some method of evaluation is too remote from the teaching 
methods that were used, the children may not see any connection between what they have 
been learning and the assessment tasks. As a result their performance on the assessment 
tasks may not be indicative of their learning. This is another facet of validity. 
 
Contrasting software for spatial learning 
Now let us consider specific examples of computer software with spatial thinking aspects. 
There is a fundamental difference between LogoWriter and ClarisWorks in their 
respective ability to develop students' spatial thinking. With LogoWriter, regarding the 
turtle as a 'graphic cursor' which must be verbally instructed what to do, the actual word-
based programming requires explicit verbal work to accompany thought. By contrast, the 
purely non-verbal visual performance skills required in ClarisWorks, using a graphics-
tool palette in combination with the point-and-click style of tools-palette, and menu-based, 
mouse-driven graphics, make it possible for a student to do a great deal of visual work 
without having to put it into words. Instead the user simply looks, plans visually, and then 
performs the necessary actions, rather like using a robot pencil, or even just drawing by 
hand. ClarisWorks emphasises learning to do things spatially, whereas LogoWriter 
emphasises learning to think spatially and to be able to speak about this through the 
command words of LogoWriter's programming language. (Detailed discussion and 
suggestions about using a graphics software package in school classrooms are given in 
Susan and Graham Ferres' book Mouse Art 1998). 
 
As a result of these two distinctly different ways of drawing, say, a rectangle, or a 
hexagon, LogoWriter stresses the verbal-mathematical and spatial link between angle and 
number of sides and total number of degrees in a full turn, along with physical ideas of 
moving (forward or fd) and turning (right or rt, or left or lt), and the step-by-step 
sequential nature of the drawing. In contrast ClarisWorks, at best, requires no more than 
the counting of the number of sides, and a little hand-eye coordination to place the 
drawing in the desired location and to make the drawing large enough. That is, 
LogoWriter is probably more likely to develop explicit verbal-based concepts, whereas 
ClarisWorks is more likely to develop largely non-verbal psycho-motor performance 
routines which may have very limited transference of learning to other situations away 
from the particular software package or from computer graphics. A child may know what 
to do with the mouse to make a rectangle, but may not know how to draw a rectangle, and 
may not have clarified the properties that distinguish a rectangle from a square, or a 
parallelogram. 
 
ClarisWorks develops a fluent performance routine, whereas LogoWriter develops a 
coherently structured collection of related concepts. These are very different kinds of 
learning, and warrant close research investigation. One is what-and-how-to-do, the other 
is what-and-why-to-do. It would be interesting to discover which results in a more easily 
built-upon sequence of learning, and which is better retained, and which is more readily 
adapted to novel situations. It might be expected that point-and-click techniques are only 
useable in other point-and-click environments, and would be unhelpful for a student 
attempting to learn non-point-and-click spatial or graphics software, or even learning to 
use a pencil and ruler. Moreover, a sizeable time-gap in practising such performance 
routines might easily result in them being forgotten. By contrast the logical procedures in 
LogoWriter would readily adapt to many different kinds of programming and to related 
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forms of mathematical reasoning, and even to physically moving through three-
dimensional space as a human version of a LogoWriter turtle, like a line dancer. 
Moreover, their logical structured nature might make such programming skill last longer 
in useable memory. 
 
Some of these differences might be explored through teacher and student interview, and 
might be observed in student behaviour, especially when one student tries to explain to 
another how to do something in either LogoWriter or ClarisWorks. Additional explicit 
verbal understanding of the spatial ideas implicit in the non-verbal use of ClarisWorks 
might be developed by asking students to write instructions for younger students to use in 
learning to draw particular shapes using ClarisWorks. We can attempt to gain insight to 
student understanding by requiring students to prepare draft instructions for using 
computer software, or other spatial materials. This can be improved by conferencing after 
trialling a draft set of instructions with younger students. Things which a more 
experienced student takes for granted will need to be explained to a beginner-student. For 
example: Where is the tool palette? What does it look like? How do you go to the Options 
menu? What would also be needed here is some explanation about pointing with the 
mouse, clicking and holding the button down, and then dragging with the button still 
down until the required option-command is selected and highlighted, then releasing the 
mouse to run the selected option. Confident acquired actions need to be turned, 
reflectively, into consciously chosen explicit words. 
 
The same comments about ClarisWorks as a non-verbal psycho-motor performance skill 
software package also apply to KidPix, and other mouse-driven software graphics-tool 
packages, and equally to pencil-and-paper and scissors-and-cardboard actvitiies which 
emphasise the development of particular performance skills, as a prerequisite for the 
development of spatial concepts and understanding of spatial relations between parts and 
wholes. In this case it is possible to ask to what extent a child is learning about the 
computer, or to what extent is the child learning mathematics which is implicit in this 
computer use? The perceived context and purpose for what is being learned can lead a 
child in quite different directions. This should become obvious through observation, 
discussion with the child, and related extension activities that explore the ways the child 
can transfer learning in one context or for one purpose to learning in another. 
 
When people know they are part of an experiment 
Any attempt to innovate, or carry out research, however relaxed in experimental rigour, 
however informal or gentle, should try to allow for the extra motivation that arises when 
using 'new' materials and activities. In education research the 'Hawthorne Effect' 
(McMillan and Schumacher 179–180; Ary et al. 226) means that, whenever you try 
something that is new, and the participants also know that it is 'new' and they are in some 
sense being 'guinea pigs', the innovation or experiment is likely to seem especially 
successful simply because it is at first a novelty. (The Hawthorne Effect is so named 
because it was first noticed in the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company in 
Chicago, where researchers were attempting to find significant factors that could improve 
workers' effectiveness. Because the workers were aware that they were part of an 
experiment, regardless of what experimental changes were introduced, everything seemed 
to have a positive effect.) Incidentally, the fact that the Hawthorne Effect can arise in any 
innovation is not a justification for trying to conceal from students that they are involved 
in a new project or investigation. Indeed, usually it is impossible to conceal from students 
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any involvement in new activities or with new materials. Moreover as an ethical rule of 
thumb, it is always preferable to be frankly open with students about what is going on in 
their classrooms. Instead, be honest, and let the novelty wear off. 
 
The apparent jump in enthusiasm and achievement that is observed when some 
curriculum innovation occurs usually seems to diminish if sufficient time elapses for 
students to become quite familiar with the seeming novelty. Unfortunately few education 
research experiments last long enough (say, at least half a year, to a year, or longer) for 
the Hawthorne Effect to wear off. Consequently the enthusiastic recommendation of a 
short-term artificially boosted curriculum innovation rarely stands any realistic test of 
time.  
 
The miracle cure for weakness in learning fractions, the amazing results of introducing 
cuisenaire rods, the stunning impact of calculators in classes (and so on), reported by 
researchers who have implemented and observed several weeks of activity in a school, 
may well turn out to have no serious long-term impact, once students become familiar, 
and eventually bored with the once-new ideas. The same effect also explains the 
persistent dissatisfaction teachers experience with any curriculum method, or class 
textbook, and the halo-effect they experience as soon as they introduce a new approach or 
a new textbook, regardless of whether the new thing is in any way an improvement, or 
even a serious change from the old. The result is that effective and valuable, but aging 
techniques and textbooks are allowed to be relegated to the back of a cupboard or a 
dustbin, simply because of its age. The moral is – beware of the superficially persuasive 
impact of halos and hawthorns. Beware of bandwagons bearing amazing new gifts. 
 
Assessment of student understanding 
How can we assess students' understanding, in this context of spatial thinking? One 
possibility could use a devious, or not obvious LogoWriter program to disguise what is 
really happening, and ask the students to translate the LogoWriter procedure into a pencil 
and paper diagram. This would be an excellent way of assessing students' spatial and 
logical reasoning skills. For example 
to draw.this 
lt 90 fd 30 
repeat 3 [rt 90 fd 30] 
end 
By this stage of trying to evaluate students' knowledge, many students would be familiar 
with the idea that a repeat 3 [other instructions ...] command is connected with 
drawing triangles – but here, where this is not  the case, the students' understanding is 
really tested.  
 
There may be other ways that similar skills could be evaluated after students have 
practised using ClarisWorks or other non-verbal performance-type graphic software. For 
example, older students could be asked to prepare instructions for using the drawing tools 
of a package such as ClarisWorks that younger students could use. Similarly students 
could be asked to report on what they learned about, for example, triangles, or parallel 
lines, as a result of their experiences using graphics software packages.  
 
It should be remembered also that in the attempt to establish whether or not students have 
changed, that is learned, as a result of their classroom experiences, they should have been 
given some initial benchmark 'measurement'. Simply repeating these benchmarking 
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activities (which might have included worksheets, interviews, reflective writing, observed 
practical tasks, or even pencil-and-paper tests) will give some indication of subsequent 
change. Again, using the same, or similar 'pre-tests' and 'post-tests' helps to ensure 
validity.  
 
Of course it is possible that students may vary considerably at different times in their 
ability to cope with any assessment task. This is the issue of 'reliability', where a 'test' 
with high reliability should give similar results under similar test conditions. Students 
tested once during a windy day may perform quite differently if they are tested later on a 
calm day. Similarly students tested at the start of a day may perform quite differently if 
they are retested at the end of a long hard day. Such day-to-day factors have the potential 
to complicate any attempt to evaluate student learning by comparing benchmark 
measurements, and teachers should be on the alert for such factors when they interpret 
'test' results. 
 
Writing conclusions 
The conclusions of such a study may need to be couched tentatively. Where it has not 
been practicable, or where decisions have been made not to collect 'pre-test' and 'post-test' 
information it will not be possible to make large statements about the research having 
'produced findings on positive effects', or the research having confirmed 'previous 
research work' unless the previous research is clearly cited and stands up to critical 
scrutiny, and actually bears comparison with the present study. As has been discussed, 
before-and-after benchmark data (either quantitative or qualitative) is necessary to argue 
the case that the research shows change, in students or classroom teachers. Similarly the 
research design must include different experimental treatments for different groups if we 
are going to argue that there is evidence that allows us to compare, say, computer-based 
approaches with non-computer-based work, or to say that this method produces enhanced 
results compared with the results produced by that method. 
 
However at a descriptive level, we can simply tell the story of what occurred, speaking 
tentatively, but realistically about the broader implications of our results. Even though we 
may not be in a position to compare before and after, or one group with another, simple 
informal unstructured observations may be quite enough to suggest, or even demonstrate 
quite strongly (with some possible inflation due to the Hawthorne effect) that spatial 
thinking, or some other change which was the focal target of the action research) did or 
did not occur and personal confidence in students and their teachers did or did not 
develop from working with this computer software (or other new materials or methods). 
Often such descriptive results are as much as can be hoped for from action research. It 
only requires a few small extra details to move towards more rigorous qualitative research. 
 
Finally, teachers should be recommended to write up versions of this kind of home-grown 
research. This should be distributed to all participants, and to a wider interested audience.  
Then, as Kemmis suggests (1994), the teacher-researchers should submit it to educational, 
subject-specialist and professional journals such as Vinculum and Prime Number 
(mathematics education journals in Victoria) for possible publication. Such publication 
serves as a guide for other practising teachers. It authenticates their normal professional 
activities, encourages them to take risks, to try new things, and at least keep up the proven 
motivation of novelty for its own sake.  
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Ethics in Action Research: A Conversation 
 
From: "A Student"  
To: <jugh@deakin.edu.au> 
Subject: ethics of action research 
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2002  
 
Hello, John. 
I'm doing a PhD under X's supervision. I've just read your "Turning School 
Investigations into Valuable Research".  
 
An issue you didn't touch on is the research ethics of Action Research.  
 
My proposed research study is largely auto-ethnographical, a self-reflective analysis 
of my efforts as a reform agent in a number of roles.  
 
During this final phase, 2002, I'm a deputy of a new high school which is using a 
curriculum organisation model I designed. 
 
I have ethics approval for use of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with 
teachers and students.  
 
Since this phase of my study is really Action Research, I'd like to include "...informal, 
unstructured observations of the behaviour of these teachers during the study".  
 
I find the issue of research ethics very problematical.  
 
Must I get formal consent for such informal observations (which many might baulk at 
giving). Or can I ethically make such observations in a general way without formal 
consent of all players? Regards, 
 
A Student 
 
****** 
 
Dear A, 
you're absolutely right. I didn't touch on the ethics of Action Research for three 
reasons.  
 
First, when I wrote the article I had not had as much experience in supervising 
students through ethics approval applications.  
 
Secondly, the article initially grew from the discussion of a Masters-level research 
paper where ethical issues were not so important (or didn’t seem so, to me, at the 
time).  
 
Thirdly, as the title of my article makes clear, I wanted to show readers/teachers how 
they could turn ordinary school activities into reportable research. This is easy enough, 
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within a school, where ethical issues are essentially identical to issues of team-work 
and professionalism.  
 
However, it should be noted that any formal research undertaken, AND REPORTED 
ON, FORMALLY (as in a Conference paper, or a published journal article) may need 
official approval from the “school authorities”. Here, exactly what constitutes “school 
authorities” may depend on your particular circumstances. 
 
For example, if you were working in a Victorian (or other State) government school, 
you would need formal approval to conduct research (that is, to gather and work on 
research data or information – oral, written, or recorded by audio or video or 
interactive web-site – from teachers, students, or other members of the school 
community) from the school Principal, and from the Victorian government school 
authorities (the official name changes, from time to time, but think, here of the 
“Ministry of Education”, and find the current version of the name, and the appropriate 
official in the bureaucracy). You may also need written consent from all those who 
are participating in your research. 
 
Similar comments apply, with appropriate adjustments in bureaucratic offices, if you 
are working in a Catholic school – in which case it would be the State or other 
headquarters for the Catholic school system – here think of the “Catholic Education 
Office”, or “CEO”, as the appropriate organization to approach, seeking ethics 
clearance to conduct research. 
 
If, however, you are working in a private school, then probably the only formal 
institutional ethics approval you would need would be that of the school Principal, 
and perhaps the School Council or governing board. 
 
But as soon as the would-be research is being conducted in a formal research setting, 
such as a university or as part of a university degree or a publicly accountable 
research project, ethical issues that can be taken for granted within the school’s do-it-
yourself context of ordinary professionalism need to be treated more explicitly, and 
carefully, as you realise. 
 
Hence your query is timely, and challenging.  
 
I assume you have raised the issue with your supervisor (and I expect that he hand-
balled the query to me). You might also raise it with the on-line discussion group of 
doctoral students that has recently begun. (Contact the Research Office of the Faculty 
of Education if you aren't aware of this on-line group.)  
 
How would I answer your questions? Let me see.  
 
You start by saying that your research is "auto-ethnographical, a self-reflective 
analysis of my efforts as a reform agent in a number of roles".  
 
I realise that research can take many forms. In particular, as a reflective critical 
autobiographical narrative, it is possible that the research can focus on events which 
have already occurred -- dealing with your efforts that have already occurred, but not 
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hitherto been formally recorded or critically analysed, and that have not been fitted in 
a context of similar research and methodological literature.  
 
That is, your research may deal with past events. If so, it is hardly possible to obtain 
retrospective ethical approval to allow you to conduct the research. It's happened. You 
are writing a history.  
 
One solution may be to present what you know to be AUTO-biographical as 
BIOGRAPHICAL.  
 
By concealing the fact that you are writing about yourself, you can totally conceal the 
explicit and implicit identities of people and institutions that feature in your 
discussion.  
 
The word "conceal" is misleading. This is not a matter of dishonesty, but of 
formalising the reporting into a pseudonymous third-person reporting. It would be 
better to speak of “representing” the people and institutions in a particular way -- so 
that they cannot be identified.  
 
Consider, as an extreme example, the way Julius Caesar referred to himself in the 
third person when he wrote his account of the wars in Gaul. Contrast this with the 
way John Holt writes about his own experience in the first-person, while ensuring that 
the names of children he works with are treated pseudonymously. Consider almost 
any other history or biography, where the personality of the historian or biographer is 
not seem to intrude, or be present at all. This can be achieved in such after-the-event 
research accounts of past events. 
 
The central feature of this biography/history solution is the guarantee of anonymity, 
both personal and institutional. No one should be able to read your thesis, or any spin-
off, and say, "Aha, the REAL author of this research is Andrew Seaton, therefore the 
Person X that Seaton refers to must really be Mr Whobody, and the school Seaton 
mentions as School Y must really be Uptown College". 
 
But reading your outline more carefully, I don’t think that’s the kind of research you 
have in mind. 
 
Your actual term for your proposed methodology is “auto-ethnographical”, and you 
extend this by suggesting it is “a self-reflective analysis of [your] efforts as a reform 
agent in a number of roles”. I’ve already offered a distinction between 
“autobiography” and “biography”, or even “history”.  
 
But the conjunction of the “auto-” and the “-ethnographical” is puzzling, and possibly 
deceptive. Ethnography is about studying a culture, a “people”. How can this be an 
“auto-”, or “self-” study of a “people”? 
 
What you seem to have in mind is a personal reflective account of a collective 
endeavour.  
 
This is possibly better described using the expression “participant-observer”.  
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The expression “participant-observer” highlights the fact that you are a 
“PARTICIPANT”, that is, you are one of the people being studied.  
 
As part of this you indicate there are a number of roles you play in, and corresponding 
critical perspectives you bring to bear on, the whole endeavour.  
 
The expression “participant-observer” also states that you are an “OBSERVER”. As 
well as participating, you are observing, with all the usual ideals of would-be 
objectivity, impartiality and neutrality, that go with researchers “observing”.  
 
Of course there is a tension, a potential conflict of interest, between participating and 
observing, between being involved and biased and subjective, versus being detached, 
unprejudiced and (scientifically) objective.  
 
But as we know, “objectivity” is no more than an ideal that is unavoidably tinged with 
subjectivity. The defence against this is to try to be as frank as possible about biases, 
personal beliefs, and so on. 
 
Is the expression “auto-ethnograhical” widely used in the literature? How do others 
handle its ambiguity, and conflicting tensions? 
 
However, rather than investigating past events, usually a (non-historical) research 
PhD takes a long time, during which the research events take place. You say that you 
are planning to report on events that have not yet all occurred, although you do say 
that some have already happened, such as the development of the new curriculum 
organisation. In this case a different solution is needed. There is time in hand to 
develop a case, beforehand, for obtaining ethical approval from those with whom you 
will be working.  
 
This seems to be your situation. You WILL be administering questionnaires, and so 
on. So how WILL you handle any possible "...informal, unstructured observations of 
the behaviour of these teachers during the study"?  
 
First, whatever kind of research data you plan to collect in the future, you MUST 
declare this clearly, ahead of time, to your intended subjects of research -- your 
colleagues, and students, and possibly even parents -- whoever may be a subject of 
"informal, unstructured observations".  
 
Where anyone is unable or unwilling to give you permission to collect research data, 
no matter what you may experience with that person, you are NOT allowed to include 
any information that derives from that person.  
 
You might be able to stretch this by speaking (with the usual anonymity in reporting) 
of informal or incidental evidence received in a pilot study, or from similar 
circumstances. But the research data so used should be incidental, rather than central 
to your main claims and arguments. If you DON'T have ethics approval for some 
research data, you can't pin your big research results on it.  
 
The process, as with seeking approval for administering "questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews", consists of developing a clear Plain Language Statement about 
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the kind of research information you might be gathering, its rationale, and the 
methods you propose using to ensure the information is used ethically.  
 
In your case the situation is that you are managing, coordinating or otherwise 
involved in activities connected with your role as deputy-principal of this new high 
school which is using a curriculum organisation model that you designed.  
 
If you WEREN'T doing a PhD you would still be working with teachers and students, 
and gathering data, and analysing it, and reporting on it -- but not as extensively as 
you will be for the PhD. Your ordinary work, with teachers, students and the new 
curriculum organisation model requires no formal ethical approval beforehand, and 
involves only ordinarily ethical professional behaviour.  
 
Obviously that does NOT require institutional and personal anonymity in reporting.  
 
But it DOES require that, for example, if you think the ICT coordinator in your school 
isn't toeing your line, or the Year 7 Language teacher is not a good teacher, you don't 
use your position as deputy-principal to take unfair advantages against these people. 
You follow due process, you behave professionally, you respect your colleagues.  
 
Likewise with the students. You may find in an interview, or have it reported by a 
class teacher, that Minnie Dreggs in the Year 9 History class thinks the curriculum 
organisation stinks. You can't take steps that ensure that Minnie Dreggs gets a 
detention, or misses out on the otherwise well-deserved prize for raffia-work. You 
behave professionally, and so on. 
 
I mention all of this because ethical behaviour in research is not that different from 
ethical behaviour in a profession.  
 
But we tend to be extremely explicit in our handling of ethics in research, while 
taking for granted virtually the same issues in ordinary professional activities.  
 
(Teams of teachers DON’T draft Plain Language Statements about what they propose 
doing, and how they are going to ensure that know one is mis-treated, and then invite 
potential participants to sign Participation Consent forms, before they start working 
together on some project. They are, however, professionally and legally answerable 
for their professional and public conduct in other ways.) 
 
HOWEVER, parallel with this ordinary deputy-principal curriculum-organiser work, 
you are also doing this doctoral research. That is, as I have started to argue, only a 
few notches tighter, or more scrupulous, ethically, than the ordinary work.  
 
The central issue in ethics (both professional and research) is minimizing or 
eliminating potential harm. Hence a first step is to try to identify potential causes of 
harm. Second, outline ways of avoiding or counteracting any such potential harm.  
 
You ask whether you must "get formal consent for such informal observations (which 
many might baulk at giving)"? The answer should be clear. Yes, you must.  
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But if you present the request for the consent in a clear sensible context (such as, your 
new school, your coordinating role as deputy-principal, your central responsibility for 
the new curriculum organisation model, and the resulting activities that will be going 
ahead, anyway, as an ordinary part of school operations, etc.), and if you offer 
guarantees of anonymity in reporting (in your thesis, and any spin-offs), and 
professional objectivity and accountability and neutrality (presenting yourself as a co-
worker in a joint-enterprise, rather than as a bureaucratic authority figure or "boss"), 
why would anyone baulk?  
 
Finally, as I am sure your realise, action research is a do-it-yourself approach to 
research.  
 
In your particular case you clearly highlight the autobiographical reflective nature of 
your research. But you also need to realise (as I'm sure you do) that your research is 
NOT just AUTO-biographical. You are telling other people's stories as well. Putting 
this slightly differently, the action research you have in mind is not so much do-it-
YOUR-self as do-it-OUR-selves.  
 
This means that your path through the remaining ethical issues involves reframing the 
research as a cooperative venture, so that you are a team-player who happens also to 
be the one telling the story of the team. It will be the team's story, warts and all, but 
told FOR the team.  
 
Putting all this together the potential harms should be counteracted by the statements 
of intended team-work, the anonymous reporting, the neutralising of authority within 
the collective decision-making of the team ...  
 
First, then, redraft your Plain Language Statement to include possible "...informal, 
unstructured observations of the behaviour of these teachers [and students! and 
parents?] during the study", along with the guarantees of anonymous reporting, 
fairness, impartiality, neutrality, ...  
 
That shouldn't be too difficult. Feel free to use any part of this wandering discussion if 
you feel it might be helpful.  
 
Many thanks for bringing your query to me,  
John 
 
***** 
 
From: "A"  
To: "John Gough" <jugh@deakin.edu.au> 
Subject: RE: ethics of action research 
Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2002  
 
John 
Thanks for your e-mail. I found your discussion interesting and helpful.  
I've been trying to resolve the ethics matter for a long time.  
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I accessed your article from Deakin's research web-site, and thought I'd try to get a 
comment straight from the horse's mouth, since you wrote about a research situation 
similar to the one I find myself in. 
 
Some of the literature on auto-ethnography I've read is: 
 
1. Ellis, C. and Bochner, A. 2000, 'Autoethnography, Personal Narrative, Reflexivity: 
Researcher as Subject', in N. Denzin, N. & Y. Lincoln, (eds.), Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks. 
 
2. Richardson, L. 2000, 'Writing: A Method of Inquiry', in N. Denzin, N. & Y. 
Lincoln, (eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks. 
 
Ellis and Bochner say:  
"Autoethnography is an autobiographical genre of writing and 
research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting 
the personal to the cultural. Back and forth autoethnographers gaze, 
first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing outward on 
social and cultural aspects of their personal experience; then, they 
look inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and may 
move through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations..." (p.739) 
 
Perhaps the thing I appreciated most about your "wandering discussion" was that it 
came back so quickly, and you were willing to spend some time to provide a 
considered response (and all for some bloke you don't know from Adam). Given the 
frustrations that have accompanied my distance learning, I can't tell you how much I 
appreciate that. Cheers, 
A 
 
******* 
 
Dear A, 
thanks for your kind words. You are the first person to contact me regarding my 
article (Graham Ferres is listed as co-author, but most of the ideas came from me, as I 
was assessing one of Graham's students), so I was not only flattered but also glad to 
have the feedback, myself, and hence willing to respond as well as I could.  
 
(I also used your message as a reason for not getting on with other pressing jobs. 
There's nothing like having an excuse for procrastinating.) 
 
(I was guessing about Richard Johnson -- but as he also received a copy of my reply 
to you, you might check with him for his specialist supervisor's advice.) 
 
OK, I'll confess I hadn't known if you had invented the term "autoethnography", 
because I'd never heard it before. My comments on it were comments made from 
considerable ignorance. But clearly you are familiar with it.  
 
Obviously such an approach is hard to combine with Deakin's formal ethics 
requirements, as well as the team-work aspect of your particular situation. 
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You may want to write AUTO-biographically.  
 
(And outside of formal ethics requirements, authors do this freely all the time, subject 
to libel laws, copyrights, and other public legal liabilities and responsibilities).  
 
But doing so from within a school-teacher team, when you are in some ways the 
"boss" of other team-members, and you reserve the right (as researcher, and as boss) 
to be frankly critical of other team-members ... that is potentially, ethically, and 
professionally, problematic.  
 
The result is that some other team-members may feel intimidated, and reluctant to 
continue playing, openly and honestly in the team. They may continue to go through 
the motions of being in the team. But they may actually be playing a deceptive game 
of please-the-boss, or worse, subvert or sabotage the boss's innovation. 
 
As far as Deakin's ethics requirements are concerned, as I suggested, the best way is 
to try to draft a clear Plain Language Statement, admitting the risks of harm, and 
outlining your side of a team-work research-motivated contract to avoid such risks.  
 
Having done that, you then hope to work as a team-member, trusting that the others in 
the team who have agreed to play, according to the rules of the team (and the PLS), 
will play fairly, so that the research data you obtain from them genuinely reflects their 
views, and their contributions to the team are as genuinely constructive as you would 
want them to me. Equally, where they may express criticism of genuine (unsuspected, 
or unanticipated) faults in the innovation (the subject being researched), you hope 
these willing team-members will be frankly and honestly critical, and not try to avoid 
trouble by saying things the boss might not like. 
 
I'm sure I'm now simply repeating things I have said (hastily, and roughly) already, so 
I'll stop. 
 
But if there are other matters you would like to discuss, please feel free to raise them. 
 
I have been on Off-Campus student myself, and appreciate rapid replies and help. 
Apart from that, I regard teachers in schools as colleagues, and it is part of my job, as 
a teacher-educator, to do what I can to help my colleagues when they ask for it. 
 
All the best with your research, and your ethics application, 
John 
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Teaching as a Research Methodology: An Outline of a Process 
and Case Studies From Teacher Education 
 
[Paper presented as Gough, J. (2004). Teaching as a Research Methodology: An Outline of a Process 
and Case Studies From Teacher Education at the Tenth Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to 
Research in Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental Education, held by the Centre For 
Studies in Mathematics, Science and Environmental Education, Deakin University, 6 and 7 December 
2004.] 
Central to the linked processes of learning, teaching, and researching, is the 
attempt to understand something: trying to make sense of experience — 
representing otherwise shapeless experience in terms of time, space, and 
words. The result is a “draft” communication, an emerging conversation 
between teacher-researcher, student-researcher, and emergent focus-subject-
matter. What do we (think) we mean? What (do we think we) are doing? How 
can we express this in ways that others might understand? How does the 
struggle to find (new) words for (new) experiences affect our understanding of 
(new) experiences, and alter what we later do? Teaching, as an exemplar 
research methodology is also compared to the spiral-cycles of problem 
solving, and to action research. 
Introduction 
At the centre of the intertwined processes of learning, teaching, and researching, 
is the process of attempting to understand something — in fact, a major 
preoccupation of homo sapiens— making sense of experience. This requires a 
“draft”, which represents otherwise shapeless experience in structured accounts of 
time, space and images, and words. The resulting “draft” is an attempt at would-be 
communication, a tentative, emerging conversation between teacher-researcher, 
student-researcher, and emergent focus-subject-matter. What do I think I mean? What 
do I think I am doing? What do we think we mean? What do we think we are doing? 
How can I or we express this in ways that we and others might understand? How does 
the struggle to find (new) words for (new) experiences affect my or our understanding 
of (new) experiences, and alter what I, or we, do later? 
I will not spend time, here, defining what I mean by “teaching”. Let me note, in 
passing, that for decades Bruce Joyce and Marsha Weil (recently joined by Emily 
Calhoun) have progressively developed a richer a richer examination of distinctly 
different kinds or “models” of teaching, which currently are seen as falling in several 
major groups, such as: 
• information processing models, including scientific inquiry, memorization, and 
lecturing; 
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• social models, including dyads and small groups, and role playing and values 
teaching; 
• personal models, including non-directive teaching (facilitation) and development 
of self-concepts; 
• behavioural models, including mastery learning, and direct instruction; and 
• individual difference models, including learning styles, and socio-cultural 
diversity (Joyce, Weil & Calhoun 2004 pp. v–xii). 
Yet despite the bewildering diversity of teaching models, Joyce, Weil & Calhoun 
almost provide a simple single definition of “teaching”, speaking, about “education” 
and “teaching” as processes that “build communities of learners” (2004 p 1) and 
saying that “Models of teaching are really models of learning”(p. 7), and that 
“education continuously builds ideas and emotions” (p. 6). They also say, with 
obvious circularity, that “real teaching is teaching kids how to learn” (p. 3). 
As well as seeing teaching as a form of communication, teaching, as an exemplar 
research methodology can also be compared to the spiral-cycles of problem solving. 
Similarly teaching resembles action research.  
The Brunerian concept of a “spiral curriculum” applies to both successive cycles 
of classroom cohorts, and to the longitudinal progression of individual cohorts across 
iterative versions of the same teaching/learning experience (Bruner 1960 pp 52–54). 
This “spiral curriculum” is also similar to the progressive cyclic nature of research. It 
moves incrementally from what we want to know now, through what we find out 
next, leading then to the identification of what further research may still be needed.  
Teaching as a research process passes through iterative, interactive, evolving 
stages of: 
• conceptual analysis; 
• reflection on personal and social experience; 
• critical review and analysis of existing literature on the focal topic; 
• planning and material and methodological/pedagogical development; 
• maintenance of running records; 
• critical reflective analysis; and 
• reflective changes based on feedback from research data; leading to 
• the dissemination of research outcomes. 
The Everyday Challenges for Teachers to Conduct Research  
Many teachers at Primary, Secondary and Tertiary levels, and in non-school (or 
tertiary) settings (such as adult education and vocational and work-place training), are 
involved in professional development, curriculum innovation and similar tasks related 
to teaching, reporting and accountability. These may seem remote from ideas of 
'educational research'. Traditionally there is a status-based divide between “those who 
teach” and “those who conduct research”.  
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However by exploring the nature of Action Research, for example, and other 
research models it is possible to suggest ways that teachers can reflect more critically 
and constructively on professional activities to which they are unavoidably 
committed. 
Increasingly teachers at all levels are asked to implement new ideas, new 
techniques of teaching, new curricula, and new methods of reporting. (Change, for its 
own sake, is often held to be a “good thing”. But beyond this, in an era of information 
explosion, and overload, faced also with a sometimes bewildering flood of new 
technology, changes are thrust on teachers. 
Teachers are also professionally responsible, accountable to their students, the 
parents of their students, to colleagues, and to their employers. They have little choice 
about introducing change (for its own sake, or otherwise) into their teaching. How, 
then, can teachers try to ensure that the educational changes they are implementing 
are as effective as possible? Such a questions needs careful investigation and 
reporting — it needs research! 
How? 
Telling it Like it is 
At the simplest level a teacher can provide a brief clear account of what he or she 
is doing as clearly as possible. The result is essentially a “descriptive case study”: 
• this is what I did 
• this is why I did it; 
• this is what I used; and 
• this is what I noticed happening.  
Such a report should include an account of what the teacher used to do, and why 
teacher thought it might be useful, or necessary to change from this.  
From Descriptive Case Study to Action Research  
With a little polishing this kind of simple, almost anecdotal description turns into 
a more developed form of “action research”. What kind of research is this? How does 
it relate to ordinary teaching events? What are the “actions”? [Note that parts of this 
discussion were first developed in a paper co-authored by Graham Ferres and John 
Gough, 1999, and published on the internet by the Deakin University Faculty of 
Education Research and Post-Graduate section.] 
Action research has been rather grandiosely defined as “research undertaken by 
practitioners in order that they may attempt to solve their local, practical problems by 
using the methods of science” (Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh, 1972, p 36). In this 
definition, we may question the relevance of the “methods of science” (which 
emphasises scientific objectivity and demands the standard formal stages of 
“scientific method”, namely, defining a problem, stating a hypothesis, deducing 
consequences of the hypothesis, expressing these consequences in the form of some 
testable proposition or situation, collecting and analysing data generated in the 
experiment-like attempt to test the hypothesis, and evaluating the plausibility of the 
initial hypothesis in the light of the results of the test: Ary et al. p 37: consider, also 
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Campbell & Stanley’s account of “experimental design” for educational research 
1963). Corey, a pioneer of action research less concerned with science, emphasized 
that research about schools (or comparable organizations) should be carried out in 
schools, by those who may have to carry out any changes that may result from the 
research (Corey 1954 p 8, cited in Ary at al. p 44). 
 
In fact action research was first proposed for general institutional use by the 
social psychologist Kurt Lewin (for example, 1946) as a process of: 
• cyclic study; 
• diagnosis and therapeutic intervention which resembles a doctor's attempt to 
help a patient through successive cyclic stages of: 
— first ideas; 
— fact finding; 
— planning; 
— therapeutic action steps; 
— monitoring; 
— evaluating; 
— replanning; 
— and so on (Lewin's cycle is described in Burns 1990 p 253).  
In Australia, action research has been recommended enthusiastically by Kemmis 
& McTaggart who define it as:  
a form of collective self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in 
social situations in order to improve the productivity, rationality and justice of 
their social or educational practices, as well as the understanding of these 
practices, and the situations in which these practices are carried out (Kemmis 
& McTaggart 1988 pp 5–6).  
Clearly teachers do this the kind of thing all the time, sitting in staffrooms, talking 
shop, trying to sort out what they are doing, and how to do it better. The only 
remaining steps, apart from talking about it, is to document the institutional setting, 
the issues, and the talk, as clearly as possible, and communicate it to others. (See also 
McTaggart 1991, and Kemmis 1994.)  
Teaching is not research unless it leads to wider dissemination of whatever has 
been learned or discovered (or simply investigated, analysed and described) to a 
larger community, including teachers and researchers. A “reflective teacher” may 
write long reports and fill pages of reflective analytic journals, and may make 
innovative modifications in his or her own teaching (which is certainly close to fully 
elaborated research). But without the move from “researching for oneself” to 
“researching and communicating to others”, it remains “teaching” — albeit good 
teaching, because it is critically considered, and moderated, but NOT (not YET) 
research. 
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An obvious problem arises as soon as a teacher begins trying to conduct research 
on what he or she is doing as a teacher. Unlike the intended objectivity of a scientist, 
psychologist or doctor who is (supposedly) dispassionately observing and evaluating 
events in the laboratory, or processes in the patient, teachers and educators who are 
doing (action) research ON themselves, are themselves subjective PARTICIPANTS 
in the events they are attempting to observe. They are identifying “strategies of 
planned action which are implemented, and then systematically submitted to 
observation, reflection and change ... [and they are] integrally involved in all of these 
activities” (Grundy & Kemmis 1981, cited in Burns 1990 p 252).  
Not only is objectivity difficult, in action research (as in so much educational 
research, and in research, generally), so is the attempt to control all possible variables 
to gain scientific experimental rigour, and the ability to identify significant factors 
with certainty. Teachers use “research methods to study classroom problems”, a 
teacher “conducts the study or has an important role in the research process”, and, 
“because the focus is on a solution to a local problem ... rigorous research control is 
not essential” (McMillan and Schumacher 1993 p 21). Indeed, for ethical, and 
professionally accountable reasons, having a control group of clients (such as school 
children) which receives no treatment at all is obviously out of the question in any 
institution where professionals are paid to deliver some kind of observable 
accountable service to ALL their clients. 
Given these definitions and descriptions, action research may be best thought of 
as normal professional work relating to a particular problem or research question, 
with a more focussed research-slant, actively probing definitions and assumptions, 
raising questions, examining different kinds of evidence, and implementing different 
kinds of practice in an attempt to find answers to the questions, and eventually 
achieve a solution to the initial problem. Equally action research can be used to 
investigate or critically describe the possibly unchanging (for the moment) status quo 
in a classroom or school, as Kemmis and McTaggart imply when they speak of action 
research investigating existing practices and situations. 
Kemmis & McTaggart's Action Research Planner (1988) identifies four cyclic 
interacting major stages or “moments” in action research: 
• planning; 
• acting; 
• observing and reflecting; and 
• formulating new plans, actions, observations, … (Kemmis & McTaggart 1988 
pp. 10–15); 
which they also give, slightly differently, as: 
• reconnaissance; 
• planning; 
• enacting and observing; 
• and reflecting (Kemmis & McTaggart 1988 pp. 54, 65, 77, 86).  
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Following Lewin, they point out that action research is participatory, and 
proceeds in systematic but flexible cycles, starting small, investigating small changes, 
using collaborative theorising and critical reflection. Kemmis and McTaggart also 
outline four things that actions research is NOT, namely, it is: 
• NOT what teachers usually do when they think about their teaching [although 
this is arguable]; 
• NOT simply problem solving [although their four stages exactly match the 
classic problem solving stages of Polya: 1945, pp. 5-6]; 
• NOT research done on other people, but research by participants on their own 
work [and/or also on their “clients”, surely!]; and 
• NOT the “scientific method” applied to teaching: they stress there are many so 
called “scientific methods”, and action research is not just about testing 
hypotheses [but naturally, if only informally, it involves natural equivalents of 
hypothesis forming and testing] (Kemmis & McTaggart 1988 pp. 21–22). 
They also suggest a plethora of common-sense guiding questions for analyzing 
and linking the four stages, such as: 
• what are the key words and ideas you use in discussing this topic? 
• what are some of the agreements and disagreements over these key words [this 
question is also referred to under the topic of “contestation”]; and 
• what should my next action steps be? (Kemmis & McTaggart 1988 pp. 56–89). 
They also distinguish three overlapping domains within which the research falls: 
• language and discourse; 
• activities and practice; 
• and social relationships and forms of organisation (Kemmis 1994: citing 
Kemmis & McTaggart 1988 pp. 15–16, 34, 40–42). 
Contrary to Kemmis and McTaggart’s blanket statement that action research is 
NOT what teachers usually do, reflective teachers naturally engage with many aspects 
of action research. Moreover with just a little planning (as Ferres and Gough argued: 
1999), teachers can straightforwardly turn investigations of teaching innovations at 
school, or about school, into a kind of “pilot-study research project”, possibly even 
with an experimental or quasi-experimental basis (as in Campbell & Stanley 1963), 
where a special “experimental treatment” class is compared, in more or less formal 
ways, with another class which receives a corresponding “traditional” or non-
experimental treatment or instructional regime. Importantly, the more effort teachers 
put into written preparations for their (innovative) teaching, and the formative 
reporting of outcomes from their teaching (which is NOT the same as writing school 
reports for individual students, but the kind of professional reporting provided to 
colleagues), the closer their reflective, innovative actions come to fully developed 
research. To earn the description “research” this should also include the crucial quasi-
final stage of “publishing” or more publicly reporting on research outcomes. 
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From Teaching to Research 
The process of teaching sometimes directly generates research information of 
different kinds. But in what way is this really “research”? 
We know that “research” can be understood as a process of investigating, or 
finding out, sometimes of “re-cognising” (that is, re-thinking, and/or re-
conceptualising) as well as recognising seemingly novel situations as familiar 
materials, and, generally, the generating of new knowledge, or the creating of new 
understanding. As such, “researching” is very similar to “learning”, if not actually 
identical.  
Naturally, then, teaching, which we know is closely related to learning, is, 
similarly, very closely related to research. 
As already noted, teaching is a “praxis” or DOING component of Action 
Research, which is a well established and familiar research methodology. 
Closely related to the instructional component of teaching is the assessment 
component. Formal assessment (such as marking essays, projects or assignments, or 
marking quizzes, tests and examinations), and informal assessment (such as talking 
with students, observing them as they work, and asking them to reflect on their own 
work-habits and engagement with the subjects being learned), readily generate 
research data about student understanding, misconceptions, learning styles, preferred 
intelligences, work-habits and attitudes to self, to others and to the subject at hand. 
Informally, in the cut-and-thrust of teacher-and-student classroom interactions, or 
the on-line equivalent of internet-based “virtual” exchanges (in a “virtual 
classroom”), instruction and assessment may occur simultaneously. One statement 
may immediately require interpretation (to understand it), clarification (by further 
questioning and conceptual probing), and diagnostically monitored feedback (in the 
form of a reaction-statement). This is cut-and-thrust, indeed. 
Teaching may also lead to conceptual refinement and clarification, and to better 
understanding of effective ways of producing new learning. It may also identify 
remaining difficulties that need to be resolved, or, alternatively, expose gaps in the 
curriculum that need new attention. Sometimes the very nature of teaching, with 
repetitive presentation of subject matter to successive cohorts of students, may result 
in a teacher deliberately seeking innovation in teaching method or in subject matter, if 
only to have some refreshingly new approach to what might otherwise be an 
unbroken career of “delivering” the one fixed subject (or tcxtbook) for an entire 
working career, as per the fictional, but delightful “Mr Chips”. (Not that this should 
be taken as an criticism of what real-life Mr Chips do, and achieve: good teaching is 
good teaching, even if it does not change much across decades.)  
 
But, importantly, where there is no change, and where teaching of a subject 
proceeds, year after year, with little modification in content matter, assessment, or 
instructional approaches, with the exception of minor adjustments in response to 
individual variation between students and class cohorts, there is much less scope, or 
use, for research, or teaching AS research. 
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Teaching (and Research) as Problem Solving 
Consider Georg Polya’s familiar four-stage process of problem solving (Polya 
1945 pp. 5-6: also Gough 2003). How might these apply to teaching, research, and 
communication? A table may help explore such comparisons. Note that where 
communication refers to “speaking” this should be taken as also indicating “writing”, 
as well as “picturing” (or other rendering of ideas only in forms other than prose). 
Table 1  
Comparing problem solving, teaching, research and communication 
Problem Solving Teaching Researching Communicating 
Look:  
— try to understand 
what the problem means 
Examine the context: 
— what do I expect is 
already known? 
— what “should” they 
know, next? 
— pre-“test” 
Where am I now? 
— what is the current 
uncertainty and/or 
problem? 
— what is the research 
question? 
What is the context? 
— the parties and/or 
speaker and audience 
— the subject for 
discussion 
— the purpose of the 
discussion 
Plan: 
— devise a method that 
might lead to a solution 
Prepare the next 
“lesson”: 
— content 
— method 
How can I gather 
information that can 
resolve the current 
problem or answer the 
research question? 
Draft (mentally) some 
of what might be said: 
— consider what might 
already be assumed 
— anticipate possible 
responses 
Do:  
— put the plan into 
action 
Teach the planned 
lesson: 
— be flexible 
Carry out the research: 
— gather data that 
could answer the 
research question 
Talk,  
and  
listen to other’s talk 
Check: 
— consider whether the 
attempted solution has 
worked 
Assess progress: 
— monitor responses 
to teaching  
— post-“test” 
Assess the use of 
research data as a 
defendable answer to 
the research question 
Monitor talking, and 
responses to talking: 
— do I make sense to 
myself? 
— does my “audience” 
understand me? 
— do I understand my 
“audience”? 
Cycle back, as needed, 
on the basis of critical 
examination, through 
any previous stage 
Cycle back, as 
needed, on the basis 
of critical 
examination, through 
any previous stage 
Cycle back, as needed, 
on the basis of critical 
examination, through 
any previous stage 
Cycle back, as needed, 
on the basis of critical 
examination, through 
any previous stage 
“Report” on success, or 
otherwise of solution 
attempts and possible 
solution(s) 
Report, to students, 
parents or guardians, 
and colleagues 
Report on (& “publish”) 
research outcomes, and 
plans for further 
research 
??? 
and/or 
“publication”  
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Simple as this is, it suggests commonsense commonalities. Of course, it does not 
provide fool-proof methods for conducting cutting-edge research, solving all possible 
problems, being the world’s best teacher, or being a brilliant communicator. These 
stages are not recipes, but low-level analytic descriptions of processes.  
Note also that a possible fifth column-category could similarly describe cyclic 
stages of LEARNING. Although Polya, in particular, saw problem solving as an 
aspect of DOING mathematics, Robert Davis, using information processing theories, 
elaborated Polya’s four simple stages into seven stages, as part of an analysis of how 
people learn (or generate either new concepts, or new skills: Davis 1984 p 306: on pp 
366-367 Davis expands the seven steps to ten steps, without significantly altering the 
general strategy: also Gough 1997, and Gough 2001). 
Similarly (as I have suggested earlier: Gough 2003) similar stages can be seen as 
applying to curriculum development, OR, expressing the same idea slightly 
differently, curriculum development can be located within a broad process of 
teaching, along with ASSESSMENT as another component or aspect of teaching.  
Through all of this, critical reflective examination or assessment or monitoring is 
a crucial component, Similarly another essential preparatory component is the 
researching of background, whether conducted formally, or informally (I have also 
argued earlier that critical examination and archival investigation are major aspects of 
research: Gough 2000, and Gough 2001.) 
Case Study 1: Conceptual Analysis and Identification of Process — Diagnosis 
of Spelling Errors 
In an earlier stage of my teaching career I once found myself in a room of 
teachers, attempting to teach, by demonstration, how to diagnostically analyse 
spelling errors, using the “Diagnostic and Remedial Reading Spelling Record Sheet” 
(Peters, 1975, Appendix A, pp 38–39). This involved taking spelling errors 
(appearing, for example, in a prose dictation task: Peters provided three age-graded 
examples: pp. 24–26), one at a time, out of context, and assigning it to one or more 
categories, such as: 
• substitution of letter strings: (a) phonically reasonable (b) not phonically 
reasonable; 
• faulty auditory perception; 
• perseveration [i.e. repeated occurrences of the same “error” despite teacher-
intervention: and/or mechanical repetitive writing of the same letter or letter 
cluster]; 
• omissions or contractions; 
• insertions; 
• transpositions; 
• doubling; and 
• unclassifiable. 
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My attempted lesson broke down as successive words were allocated to several, 
sometimes most or all of the available Peters categories. Moreover, when the teachers 
asked what remedial USE would be made of the resulting analysis, despite my 
preparedness to teach this lesson, and my close familiarity with Peter’s ideas about 
spelling, I realized, in the act of teaching, that there was no direct link between any 
process of spelling, or a process of teaching (and/or learning) spelling, even though 
Peter’s provided an interesting flowchart for “Remedial or First Spelling Programme” 
(Peters 1975, Appendix C, p. 44). 
I felt compelled to abandon the rest of the lesson, and slept little that night. 
The solution emerged, fortunately, in time for the following lesson. I expounded a 
new method for analyzing spelling errors, based on a linked combination of language 
theory, spelling process, and instructional approaches.  
Diagnostic questions guided the teacher’s analysis of the sample of spelling 
attempts: 
• has the student proof-read his or her writing? 
• does the spelling error sound right, or nearly right, or mainly wrong, as sound? 
• does the spelling error look right? 
• should this mis-spelled word be expected to be known as automatic spelling for 
this student? 
Each question led directly to suggestions for the teacher to pursue, either seeking 
further information, or intervening in some instructional or remedial way. I do not 
claim that my method is the best, nor do I believe that it was ever widely adopted 
(spelling quickly fell off the must-do curriculum agenda around this time, and in our 
troubled era of spell-checkers has not yet found its rightful, important place, in the so 
called Literacy curriculum — that is my view). But I do suggest that it is useful. 
Moreover, versions of this new method were published (e.g. Gough 1978, 1979, 
1981). 
My newly developed diagnostic approach was based on the theoretical and 
practical results of psycholinguistic researchers, who had been investigating methods 
of teaching students how to read, and practical methods of diagnostic analysis of 
reading errors, linked directly to theoretically sound and practicable approaches to 
reading remediation. The psycholinguistic research breakthrough occurred when 
language and oral language processes were better understood, and when researchers 
investigated and described the actual reading practices of competent adult readers. An 
invaluable experimental device was the use of bi-lingual texts, used to analyse the use 
of underlying meanings by bi-lingual speakers and readers. 
In my case the teacher-research result was that a new process of (child and adult) 
spelling was identified: 
• reliance on automated fluent handwriting; 
• use of visual memory to check the look of a target word; 
• etymological analysis of word-roots, and stems, to check the meaning of the 
target word; and 
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• letter-sound skills used as a last resort to obtain a phonetic approximation, thus 
enabling other proof-reading skills to be used, as well as dictionary 
referencing.  
This spelling process highlighted the importance of proof-reading, and the serious 
difficulties of proof-reading one’s own writing, when the usual fluent reading process 
was known to handle inferred and intended meaning, rather than literal letter-by-letter 
and word-by-word checking of a code. Let me add, by way of catching up, that this 
approach can be applied also to the currently notorious problem of over-reliance on 
spell-checkers that are unable to pique the rite word that is kneaded for the contest. 
Tri it yore selves. Its knot sew sample wenn ewe daunt no howe.   
Case Study 2: Teaching in an Era of Changing Computer Software 
Eight years ago I reported the start of fresh research, a self-study based directly 
on teaching, where the curriculum content was Logo programming, within the 
software environment of MicroWorlds. What had started as MicroWorlds version 1, 
has passed through several 1.something iterations, and several 2.decimal versions, 
and is currently available in several PC or Macintosh alternatives. Despite this, and 
behind the cosmetic changes to the user-interface, the major intellectual concepts, and 
purposes of Logo programming remain fundamentally unaltered. Oddly, as I write, 
the anticipated view that Logo would simply go away, because it is OLD (and we all 
know that “old” means BAD and/or DISCARDABLE), has not proved to be correct. 
The more schools equip themselves with computers (or adopt a lap-top policy for all 
students), the more they come to Logo (in the current form of MicroWorlds) anew, or 
return to Logo. 
Nonetheless there are some important matters that arise in MicroWorlds that had 
not previously featured in most earlier versions of Logo, such as LogoWriter. These 
include: 
• the use of the command dotimes, which is a version of a repeat command 
with a built in counting-variable; 
• command words such as launch, and, importantly, forever, which enable 
parallel processing; and 
• the challenge to older-style programming skills that had previously required 
careful use of local variable, the deliberate avoidance of global variables, and 
the use of recursion. 
Here the research exists in the teaching, the interaction between instructional 
material (provided on-line, and on paper) and students’ drafts of Logo programming, 
and in the progressive, constructive refining of Logo possibilities. Importantly, what 
would otherwise be no more than “teaching” becomes “research” when it is more 
widely published, as is the case (e.g. Gough 2004). While less of this research is 
publicly published (partly for lack of suitable refereed journals, and because of the 
temporary nature of printed books for rapidly changing software), as noted already, 
the feedback from research (based directly on teaching) to teaching itself, is an 
instance of action research, at its most fluid. 
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Conclusions, for the Time Being 
I am not claiming that teaching IS research. But I have tried to argue that, 
approached in special (natural, and not excessively arduous) ways, teaching can be a 
form of research. Importantly I have also tried to argue that, for teachers considering 
embarking on higher degree or other research, unsure what “research” might consist 
of, if they understood better how many aspects of their familiar teaching tasks are 
strongly research-like, and how readily they could extend some of these so they 
become fully developed research, the more confidently they could take those first 
tentative steps from being “teacher-only” to “teacher whop is also a researcher”. 
Hence I argue that many more people — teachers, particularly — COULD be 
active researchers IF they started to recognize the possibilities for drawing directly on 
everyday teacherly activities, and exploited these, for the sake of increasing 
professional knowledge about teaching, learning, and education generally, and for the 
special sake of becoming better teachers. 
Many of the points I have made are little more than common sense, made explicit. 
In the same way, action research itself, is essentially common sense, writ large: how 
to set about tackling long-term complex (team-handled) undertakings as openly, 
reflectively, and constructively as possible.  
But this should not be seen as trivializing the argument. Nor can common sense 
be alluded to, and then left, accepted as necessarily correct because it is held to be 
“common sense”. Instead it needs always to be critically examined. What is common 
sense for us, here, now, may not be sensible, in any way for other people, in other 
places, at other times.  
Our own everyday naturalistic understanding (“common sense”) should be 
problematised, and, maybe, even, queered. But this “contestation” is never for the 
sake of being difficult, or archly playful. It is, precisely, with the goal of recognizing 
that human knowledge, such as it may be, is inherently subjective, tentative, 
unreliable, and requiring continual critical scrutiny, however obvious, and taken for 
granted and “common sense” it may seem, initially to be. 
The goal is to know more, however tentatively, and to do better, however fallibly 
— or to do what we believe to be the best we can, given our finite, frail human 
circumstances. 
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Curriculum Development as Research 
 
A paper presented at the Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to Research in 
Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental Education, held by the Centre For Studies 
in Mathematics, Science and Environmental Education, Deakin University, December 2003 
The words “research” and “teach” are different. Higher status is often given 
to “researcher” over that of (mere) “teacher”. This paper argues that good 
teachers are researchers, yet curriculum development as a form of research is 
often undervalued, neglected, or ignored. Curriculum development includes 
these aspects of the research process: critique of the background of the 
research data (evolving curriculum and socio-cultural contexts); conceptual 
analysis, definition and demarcation; critical collection of literature; 
development of information-gathering tools (assessment instruments), and 
monitoring of subjects’ reaction to drafts of the focus topic. Examples are 
drawn from the author’s curriculum development for a Masters-level unit on 
assessment in education and training.  
Curriculum Development That is NOT Research 
Not all kinds of curriculum development constitute research. For example, when 
there is little real “development”, such as the hypothetical case that a teacher in a 
school is told that he or she will be teaching Year 8 Mathematics using a new 
textbook called Super Maths 8, and, importantly, the textbook and/or its curriculum 
content, is similar to what the teacher has previously taught or even to what the 
teacher experienced while a school student. This teacher will certainly need to 
“develop” a suitable sequencing of classroom instruction and activities, as well as 
assessment tasks. But the actual work could be summarized as “more of the same”. 
Certainly there is greater scope for “research” as the teacher attempts to establish 
an optimally effective match between his or her instructional activities and the work 
habits, attitudes, and learning engagement of the actual students. What are their 
needs? How well are they engaging with the challenges of the curriculum? If the 
intended progress is not satisfactory, or is greater than anticipated, what might the 
teacher do?  
But this might be better described in terms of “teaching” as a “research 
methodology”, which I hope to explore in a future Symposium presentation. 
When Curriculum Development CAN be Regarded as Research 
A crucial ingredient in curriculum development being a form of research is the 
“newness” of whatever curriculum is being developed. However this is not as simple 
as it might initially seem. Seemingly new ideas can be tricky. 
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The Ambiguity of Words — “Authentic Assessment”, Anyone? 
Plain words are easy to string together, with a resulting semblance of being 
meaningful, partly because they are at least grammatically well framed, and also 
because their plain meanings seem sensible. Despite this the words may not mean the 
obvious things we intend.  
Consider, for example, the technical term “authentic assessment” (e.g. Emmitt 
1999). This seems both appealing — we naturally want whatever we might do in the 
name of assessment to be “authentic”, rather than spurious — and immediately clear. 
Yet in my experience this term has been notorious for its misinterpretation by 
students who grasp only the plain language appearance and ignore, or misjudge the 
technicality. 
In fact the term “authentic assessment” has appropriated to itself (that is, it has 
terminologically highjacked!) the generic and honorific or meritorious everyday 
connotations of genuineness. 
This does NOT mean that any other form of assessment is unauthentic! Far from 
it. 
The technical definition of “authentic assessment” is that it is based on so called 
“authentic activities”, namely those that aim to achieve real-world, purposeful, 
practical goals. These are the kinds of goals that real people pursue in real life. 
For example, if we consider a school situation, an “authentic task” might be 
having students (with some teacher support, or other adult consultation and guidance) 
organise a school dance, or manage a school cafeteria, organise and edit and publish 
and sell a school newspaper, or investigate the costs of and lead a school excursion.  
Such activities might include considerable planning time, committee work, and 
the drafting and revising of working documents, preliminary plans, running reports, 
final reports, schedules of events, maps, trial runs, market research, costings, balance-
sheets, and so on. The assessment might focus on any aspect of the activity, including 
the running of committee meetings, the preparation of a project budget, the drafting 
of a proposal, and the final publication of an audited financial and descriptive report 
on the project. 
We can contrast this with a rather ordinary class lesson, or sequence of lessons, 
on, say, cafeterias, or newspapers, which might include students researching the topic 
and writing class reports. Such activities are clearly attempting to “simulate” or 
“model” what might otherwise have been “authentic” — really doing it! Alternatively 
consider other less obviously practical classroom activities, such as completing a 
worksheet of 4-digit multiplications, or solving quadratic equations. 
Consider, as an alternative, a non-school setting, such as an auto-repair training 
centre: an “authentic activity” might be actually working on a car. By contrast, 
simulating this, with textbook activities about fuel supply, ignition systems, piston 
design, and the physics of disk-brakes versus pad-brakes, would be far less 
“authentic” — and, according to the technical definition, NOT “authentic” at all! 
I will pass over without comment other potentially deceptive and misinterpretable 
technical terms as “enactivism” and “autopeosis” (e.g. Maturana and Varela 1980, 
and Begg 2002). Note that I am not suggesting that these authors are in any way 
unclear in their use of these terms. But again, in my experience, their readers are often 
less clear.  
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Certainly “enactivism” has little to do with “enacting” as it applies to the 
promulgation or implementation of a new law or statute. Equally “autopoesis” has 
little to do with “poesis”, the making of poetry, unless we stretch the words and their 
cargo of meaning to aesthetic eccentricities such as Gerard Manley Hopkin’s 
mystical-religious concoctions of “inscape” and “instress” as attempts to use words to 
capture the essence of existence, and the being of an object or an organism. 
How New is New? And How Could We Know? 
The idea of newness or novelty is itself inherently problematic. 
Any new thing is related to, and built on existing ideas and skills. To the extent 
that a potentially new idea is really new, it must nonetheless be understandable in 
terms of older existing knowledge. Otherwise we have no context within which to 
interpret it. Utter novelty, if we can imagine such a thing, is alien to what we know.  
We learn and understand, precisely, through what we know. 
Q: What did Tarzan say when he saw the elephants coming? 
A. “Here come the elephants!”. 
Q: What did Jane say when she say the elephants coming? 
A. “Here come the bluebirds!” (Jane was color-blind.) 
Q: What did Tarzan say when he saw the elephants with sunglasses on, charging down 
the path? 
A: Nothing. He didn’t recognize them. 
(Blake, 1964, pp. 8, 9, 14.) 
What I know, and can do, shapes what I think I see, how I interpret a situation, 
and how and what I am able to learn. I recall a toddler who was given his first toy gun 
by doting parents. He looked at the shiny metal, and pondered how to use it. Then 
placed it flat on the floor, and pushed it backwards and forwards, making his usual 
toy-car play-noises: “Brrm! Brrm!”. In this child’s mind, if in doubt, treat it like a 
familiar toy car. 
This broad theory of knowledge, and related learning, is fundamental in 
cognitivist, constructivist, information processing, and similar theories, as I have 
repeatedly argued (Gough 1997b, 2001). All human ideas are built on a personal, 
cultural, and biological foundation of “analogy” and “metaphors”. 
Though analogy is often misleading, it is the least misleading thing we have.” 
(Samuel Butler [1835-1902]: from Notebooks, in “Music, Pictures and Books: 
Thought and Word 2”; cited in Cohen & Cohen 1960). 
Looking beyond the theoretical — conceptualizing, analytic and descriptive — 
learning and knowing is fundamentally grounded in biologically inherited schemata, 
or “concepts”, or “metaphors” (e.g. Skemp 1971; and Gough 2001b). 
Even sophisticated ideas are built on a framework of very, very simple ideas 
— the kind of things we learn when we are two or three years old (Davis 1981 
180-188).   These underlying building-block concepts are the kind of gene-linked brain-skill hard-wired biological forms of knowledge we have, from birth, because our species evolved to attend to such “concepts” as “in”, “out”, “beside”, “above”, 
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“dark”, “light”. (Consider brain research — Carter 1998, Butterworth 1999, and Dehaene 1997 — by reviewed by Gough 2001a). 
The point, here, is that our biological bases for knowing, and for learning, and for 
creating “new” concepts, constrain us, and limit the achievable newness. We CAN be 
creative, but we do so within the limits of our species. 
“Numeracy” is New, and Means …? 
A current operational litmus-test of “newness” is whether or not our 
wordprocessor’s spell-checker accepts a word as one of its known words. The word 
“numeracy” is a case in point, still unaccepted as a REAL word by the software I am 
using to compose this discussion. Clearly the intention is that “numeracy” is the 
“number-related stuff, and maybe more, that corresponds to the well established 
language-based term “literacy”.  
There is a natural temptation to link these with the traditional Three Rs — 
Readin’, ’Ritin’ and ’Rithmetic. But nowadays the term “literacy” is stretched to the 
“reading” and “writing” of film, and multi-media, and computer-screens, and internet 
web-sites (for example, see Chandler & Gough 1999). Similarly, just as 
“mathematics” is now seen to include far more than number-only ’Rithmetic (which 
might be equally expressed as “numberacy”, to emphasise the number-focus limits of 
the usage), it is important to see “numeracy” as including such NON-NUMBER-
related aspects of mathematics as measurement, data-handling and statistical analysis, 
probability and random events, spatial thinking and geometry, logical reasoning, and 
problem solving. 
These issues arose when I joined a Deakin University team developing 
(curriculum development!) a new compulsory under-graduate Secondary-teacher-
training one-semester unit Numeracy Across the Curriculum with colleagues Susie 
Groves, Peter Grover, Ron Smith, and Helen Forgasz. In my mind, at least, a central 
difficulty was to distinguish, conceptually, and in practice, numeracy from literacy 
(both are a form of understanding and communication). Equally I needed to 
investigate and clarify the questions: 
What is “numeracy”; and in what ways is it different from, and in what ways is it 
related to the large body of knowledge we know as “mathematics”? 
a challenge for you to consider. 
Consider this: Imagine a a Venn diagram whose “universal set” shows all Human 
Knowledge — the totality of what humans know. Outside the universal set are things 
that humans don’t know, as well as things that are not knowledge of any sort — 
physical objects, for example, events such as a wind blowing, cloud in the sky or a 
wave on the surface of the ocean. There are also other forms of knowledge, such as 
how to detect the identify of each member of a dog pack, by smell, or how to navigate 
from Northern Siberia to the south coast of Australia — canine knowledge, 
migratory-bird knowledge, and other non-human kinds of knowledge. 
Within the universal set are smaller sets, each of which represents some specific 
branch of human knowledge. These include such traditional branches of knowledge 
as Music, Art, Ballroom Dancing, and How to Drive a Car, or How to Bake a Sponge 
Cake, as well as Knitting, Skateboarding, a Linnean taxonomy of plants and animals, 
Mendelev’s Periodic Table of Chemical Elements, and so on. Somewhere in this, 
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possibly overlapping some of the other branches of knowledge is MATHEMATICS. 
Somewhere inside “mathematics” is the smaller sub-set of “school mathematics”. 
Obviously some aspects of how-to-bake-a-sponge, for example, overlap with 
aspects of mathematics. But let us accept the broad distinctions between knowledge 
which is essentially mathematics, and other knowledge which may be investigated or 
enriched by mathematics, but which is not, in itself, essentially part of “mathematics”. 
Here is the challenge: where in this Venn diagram do you draw NUMERACY? 
Equally, what aspects of knowledge are OUTSIDE wherever you draw the 
boundaries of numeracy? Do any parts of numeracy fall outside mathematics as a 
body of knowledge? 
(If this is easy to answer, or irrelevant to your interests, consider a parallel 
challenge. This time the Universal Set is Human Communication. Some of this is 
oral, some is verbal-written, some is non-verbal/non-oral postural and gestural and 
facial. Somewhere inside this universal set is Reading and Writing — the first two of 
the traditional Three Rs. Where do you draw a boundary that would contain 
LITERACY, inside, but leave outside other aspects of human communication that are 
not considered part of Literacy?) 
The continuing process of seeking plausible and convincing answers to these 
questions was, and is, a piece of research (successively reported in, for example, 
Gough 2001c, 2002a, b, c, 2003a and b).  
One of the continuing complications here is the evolving impact of new 
information and communication technologies (or ICT — namely, computers, 
computer-based resources, and the internet, as medium for communication and as 
information resource) on curriculum and classroom instructional methodology that 
had previously relied exclusively on pencil-and-paper working, paper-based books 
(typically, textbooks), not-s-dynamic chalkboards and human teachers. 
Just as literacy necessarily expands to include skills needed to handle new media, 
such as CD-ROMs and web-sites and DVDs, equally numeracy, and “school 
mathematics” as a curriculum, needs to expand to include skills needed to handle 
spreadsheets, programming languages, dynamic geometry software (such as Cabri 
Geometry and Geometer’s Sketch Pad), and generic mathematics-processing software 
(also known as Computer Algebraic Systems, or CAS — such as Maple, Derive, and 
Mathematica — and increasingly incorporated in graphic calculators). 
My own conclusions are that: 
NUMERACY” IS (MOST OF) PRIMARY SCHOOL MATHEMATICS, USED 
OUTSIDE THE MATHEMATICS CLASSROOM.  
This tells me that numeracy is contained WITHIN (in set-theoretic and conceptual 
terms, “properly within”) the larger curriculum of school mathematics, which is itself 
properly contained within the whole large body of subject-matter knowledge which is 
“mathematics”, ranging across history and cultures and uses. 
It also alerts me to the fact that it is a collection of lower-level mathematics skills 
that are used widely in other non-mathematics school subject areas (so called KLAs, 
or Key Learning Areas), and also outside school altogether, in everyday life at home 
and in recreation, and in ordinary non-specialised non-technical aspects of adult 
work. 
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This is in fact a conceptual paradox that in my experience confuses some people. 
Numeracy, as I define it, and as many people think of it, is strictly SMALLER, as a 
body of knowledge, than mathematics. But is used almost UNIVERSALLY in 
everyday living. By contrast “mathematics” is used, in highly technical, but usually 
fragmentary or limited small-scale ways in the contexts of specialist trades — 
accounting, engineering, physics, and so on. That is, the smaller subject-matter is 
used more widely than the larger. 
Curriculum as a Concept or Topic for Research 
Sometimes the researching that needs to be undertaking is a kind of conceptual 
clarification, possibly linked with the devil’s advocacy or critiquing I have also 
outlined as a research methodology (Gough 2000), as well as possible academic 
“archaeology” (Gough 2001d). In this case, while discussing “curriculum 
development” as a form of research, in a self-referential way, one of my current 
challenges is to be a team-member developing a new Masters-level unit on 
“curriculum”. 
An obvious, simplistic question, then, is: What IS “curriculum? 
The equally obvious, traditional answer, is that it is some body of knowledge that 
is to be taught. 
However many of my colleagues dismiss this as simplistic and out-dated. Taking 
such a definition for granted, they move to see curriculum as a collection of problems 
and dilemmas, linked to underlying theories, cultural negotiations and conflicts, and 
political/historical movements. 
Curriculum, as a body of knowledge is not left in isolation, as a book on a shelf 
that a teacher might take down, open, and use to instruct a class. Instead curriculum 
(such as a textbook, and related background materials, as well as supporting 
instructional materials and classroom activities and learning experiences) is 
problematically embedded in fraught, uncertain human contexts: 
• who is the curriculum made for? 
• who made the curriculum? 
• for what purpose, or for whose purpose was the curriculum made? 
• how is this curriculum to be understood in terms of gendered views of human 
experience, ethnic diversity and tensions, religious beliefs and ethical values, 
political policies and principles; … 
and so on.  
Curriculum Development (Research) Is Needed Where Curriculum Changes 
Whenever there is a move to change curriculum, fresh research, including 
curriculum development, is necessary. Currently this applies, for me, with continuing 
changes in Logo programming software, notably, as MicroWorlds replaces 
LogoWriter, and, itself, moves to fresh versions of MicroWorlds (for example Gough 
1996). What can current versions of MicroWorlds do, and how can this potential be 
effectively matched with the interests and needs of the students I teach (many of 
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whom are themselves school teachers engaged in teaching school students Logo 
programming)? 
Similarly in the area of mathematics education, especially at Secondary and 
higher levels, this present era of scientific calculators, graphic calculators, dynamic 
geometry software, and mathematics processing software (also known as Computer 
Algebra Systems, or CAS), radically challenge traditional sections of the Secondary 
mathematics curriculum: trigonometry, graphing, statistics, and even algebra. If 
software can solve any (many) equations we can correctly type out, what need is there 
for students to develop pencil-and-paper algebraic computation skills? (Similar 
arguments were outlined, with further application to the impact of wordprocessing, 
web-sites and the internet on reading and writing: in Chandler & Gough 2000.) 
 
Curriculum Development: A Mini-Case Study — “Exemplary Assessment” 
Several years ago I embarked on the development of a new Masters-level course-
work unit on Assessment. Working with a team of Deakin colleagues I struggled with 
the fact that the previously used technical terms “assessment”(= educational 
measurement) and “evaluation” (= diagnostic interpretation of educational 
measurements) had been modified by the free-handed appropriation of the 
interpretative term “evaluation”, now used to apply to the structural and performance 
evaluation of educational programs and institutions. 
But that was only one of the early problems in this curriculum development.  
After much discussion and development the team also negotiated the assessment 
activities to be used in this unit on “Assessment”, one half of which was an 
investigative critical essay on the briefly expressed topic: 
The theoretical underpinnings of exemplary assessment and its application in 
context. 
We successfully taught this unit for the first semester, using on-line 
communication to support the off-campus correspondence “teaching-by-remote-
control”. 
But it was our own students, later, who raised a major question: 
— What is exemplary assessment? 
What did we have in mind when we used that pejorative, honorific term in the 
essay topic? Certainly we wanted our students to focus on the best assessment 
practices they could find, and, as far as possible, on current or recent practices, rather 
than to waste their time considering outmoded or weak and criticisable forms of 
assessment. We wanted our unit, and our students’ learning about assessment, to be 
concerned with “best practice” and to be seen to be at the “cutting edge”. Naturally. 
But we had not examined our own brief, bland exhortations to our students. 
Faced with their queries — what do you mean? give some examples — as 
convener of the unit, I had to think fast and hard — and try to keep the customers 
happy. I also had to attempt to live up, in the assessment practices being used by this 
unit, to the best advice the actual unit’s content material provided.  
The situation was all the more demanding because it was self-referential: how can 
a unit on assessment best assess its own students? What exemplary assessment role-
model does a unit on assessment offer these students who are learning how to assess 
John Gough — Research Studies page  54 
— and to criticize — assessment processes? Would we be hoist with our own petard? 
(Incidentally, this is an interesting, and challenging image, usually from Shakespeare: 
Homework: What is a petard, and how and who might it hoist?). 
In fact I had to develop some new (new for me) curriculum. The following 
discussion summarises my conclusions. 
What is exemplary assessment in or for a particular context?  
Obviously the “context” is someone’s own particular work-place situation (e.g. a 
school, a TAFE or polytechnic, a large industrial company where staff are involved as 
instructors in on-the-job training, a hospital, etc.).  
The word “exemplary” is harder to pin down. It means what it says — assessment 
that is an outstanding example of its kind, in its own particular setting. We can also 
think of terms such as “state-of-the-art”, “cutting-edge”, “best practice”, or “quality”. 
All of these capture the general idea of “exemplary”. 
However, what does “exemplary” mean in a particular workplace? This is hard to 
specify, because part of being “exemplary” is that it should fit its context as well as 
possible. In some cases this might mean that a normed multiple-choice test is 
“exemplary”. In other cases it might mean that a portfolio of student work, or a recital 
or exhibition or performance, combined with a face-to-face oral interview between 
the student, and a panel of instructor-assessors, might be the best way of assessing the 
student's learning, because it fits the student’s learning best. 
What is “Exemplary Assessment”, then? Simply “horses for courses” — fitting 
the best possible assessment in the best possible way with the specific circumstances 
that apply to the instructional-learning situation being considered. 
This is not THE explicit once-and-for-all comprehensively definitive answer. But 
it is an effective indicative answer, a collection of ideas that help us talk about 
possible ways of answering aspects of this question. 
Obviously, logically, anything “exemplary” is an example that is so good it is 
held up for admiration, as a model and moral example for others to follow. 
Hence, considering this question, we are really looking for ways of distinguishing 
goodness, or “quality” in assessment, and, simultaneously, identifying things that are 
not so good. Incidentally, the idea of “exemplary assessment” does not appear overtly 
in the research literature on assessment — not as far as I know. I would be delighted 
to hear otherwise, if anyone can provide examples of books, chapters or articles that 
state, explicitly, what makes assessment good, contrasted with what makes it bad — 
broadly. 
I am well aware of the large number of articles that say things like “high-stakes 
testing is wicked”, and “all standardised test are evil”. I have also come across 
suggestions that any kind of assessment is educationally abhorrent. I disagree with all 
of these extreme views. 
I think that some assessment is bad, for particular reasons, and other assessment is 
good, for other reasons; and amongst the good examples, some kinds of assessment 
are better than others. As in everything else, “quality” comes as varying spectrum, 
from Extremely Poor Quality to Extremely High Quality. The task, right now, is to 
try to identify features which, taken together, indicate high quality — good enough to 
be held up as an outstandingly positive example — “exemplary”. 
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Stating this very briefly, exemplary assessment is: 
• valid; 
• reliable; 
• fair; 
• transparent; 
• flexible; and 
• moderated, or calibrated, against other judgements. 
Here, by “valid”, I mean the usual idea of “validity” that is used in discussing 
formal assessment (such as tests), but I want to broaden this to less formal approaches 
also. If assessment tasks are valid they match the curriculum: subject-matter and the 
instructional-methodology; the what, how, when and why of instruction.  
The assessment matches the content (information, skills, concepts, processes) 
being taught. It also matches the method of instruction or teaching as well as the 
corresponding learning activities that occur in the classroom, laboratory, theatre, 
workshop, gymnasium, dancehall, playing-field, factory or studio, etc.). The 
assessment will also match the time allowed for the learning, and the sequencing of 
the instructional and learning activities. Finally, the assessment, importantly, matches 
the overall purpose of the learning situation. 
For example, if the curriculum is mathematics, based on a traditional textbook-
focused exercise-practising approach (which CAN be a very effective way of 
developing important mathematics skills), then it is “valid” to assess using practice-
exercise materials, within the time-frame of a class-lesson (or longer, if students are 
reasonably sturdy — but see “flexibility”, later). It would NOT be valid to assess this 
approach using an extended (e.g. 3-week, out-of-school) problem-solving project or 
investigation. 
Similarly, if the curriculum consists of real-life activities, then valid assessment 
of this would be some part of these real-life activities, or some close simulation of 
them. 
By “reliable” I have in mind a generalised version of the usual idea of 
“reliability” as applied to formal assessment. In particular, if a test is given today, for 
example, and the same test (or an equivalent version of the test) is given tomorrow (or 
a week later, without students having further opportunity to practice and without 
further instruction that might alter their initial performance) the two test results 
should be close to each other.  
Broadly speaking this means that reliable assessment is “trustable”. The results it 
gives for one student should be meaningfully relatable to results it gives for another 
student. The assessment is not capricious, or accidentally random. If a student can do 
a particular kind of project and show a particular level of achievement in the project, 
then a comparable level of achievement should be possible with a different project.  
Here, broadening our idea of “repeated” assessment, we need to realise that 
individual interests vary. Billie may be surprisingly interested in the Mogul Empire of 
India, but bored to tears by the Aztecs, or vice versa. This difference in personal 
interest will obviously color Billie's achievement on two otherwise similar projects. 
That is simply human nature. Good assessment has to allow for it. Of course, if the 
assessment contributes to important decision-making, Billie should be aware of this, 
and not be swayed unduly by his or her personal likes and dislikes. But this relates to 
“transparency”, discussed later.  
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In particular, reliable assessment will yield the same results regardless of who 
does the assessing. It is objective, not subjective. (Here, the assessor's likes and 
dislikes are not allowed to color the judgments being made — the flip-side of the 
students' likes and dislikes.) 
Good assessment is “fair”. The tasks, or questions, or test items, are not harder 
for some groups than for others, because part of the content being assessed is less 
familiar to one group, or because experiences or processes involved in the assessment 
are not part of the life and educational experiences of those being assessed.  
Questions about fairness typically raise issues of social diversity, such as gender, 
culture, age, and class. 
If, for example, the subject is “Popular Music”, it may make a difference if our 
class includes mature-age students whose ideas of "popular music" focus on Bing 
Crosby, Frank Sinatra, Guy Lombardo and Mantovani, while others in the class think 
“popular music” begins (and maybe ends) with Elvis Presley, while others think 
anything older than two years, by definition, isn't "popular", although it may be 
"classic" or "golden oldies".  
Similarly "opera" means different things, depending on whether it is Peking 
Opera, Balinese shadow puppets, The Who's Tommy, or Purcell's Dido and Aeneas.  
In literacy assessment, a person whose life-reading consists of Sports pages and 
big-rig truck manuals will suffer, perhaps unfairly, if the assessment material consists 
of an extract from Charles Dickens, or an e e cummings poem. 
But assessment will usually be fair if it is “valid”, because it will correspond 
meaningfully and practically to what has been experienced during classes. 
When good assessment is “transparent”, this means that those being assessed 
know what is going to happen to them, they are familiar with the kind of assessment 
activities, and content being used. They also understand how their work will be 
graded, because the criteria for judging the assessment have been explicitly stated and 
explained, with worked examples.  
Similarly those being assessed know what the purposes of the assessment are, and 
what the possible outcomes from the assessment, and the decisions that will follow 
the assessment could be. If the assessment is an ordinary part of the give and take in a 
school classroom, the students being assessed will feel at home with what happens 
when they are assessed. If major decisions hinge on how well the students perform, 
the students will know this, and will make sensible decisions about how much effort 
they are willing or able to put into their assessment performance. 
Flexibility of assessment is very important. Good assessment adjusts itself to suit 
the particular needs of the students being assessed — the right course for the right 
horse, and vice versa. Those who panic over tests are helped to find alternative ways 
of sitting the test that will reduce their panic-levels. If the time-limit on an assessment 
task is too harsh for some students, they may be allowed extra time. Students who 
struggle with reading will be allowed to have the assessment presented to them orally, 
and they will be allowed to respond orally, or be allowed other support (such as using 
a wordprocessor or voice-recognition software) that will help them cope with the 
assessment task at their own level of operating. 
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Importantly, as part of flexibility, those being assessed have clear, accountable 
processes of appeal if for any reason they feel aggrieved by the outcomes of their 
assessment. 
Good assessment will be “variable”or “diverse in nature. It will NOT be 
arbitrarily and absolutely pre-determined by one specific assessment task, such as one 
solitary end-of-year exam (unless suitable flexibility, rights of appeal, and training for 
the assessment task, or other necessary factors mean that this is not an unrelentingly 
brutal do-or-die situation). Instead it will consist of several separate pieces of 
assessment, usually compiled across several weeks of time, or longer, with different 
activities occurring in different pieces. 
Similarly, within a single test, project, or work-requirement, there will be variety 
in the question-type or tasks. A test that is only multiple-choice is clearly less “good” 
than a test that mixes multiple-choice with other forms of questions. Similarly a test 
of (so called) intelligence that relies on only complete-the-visual-matrix questions can 
hardly claim to be indicative of the known variability of intelligence, although such 
an item-specific test may give extremely valuable information about PART of a 
person's intelligence . 
This is one aspect of the assessment being “moderated”. Another aspect is that 
teachers and instructors have scope to comment on, amend, appeal, or otherwise 
“moderate” whatever comes from student assessment, particularly when the 
assessment is imposed on teachers from outside institutions such as university 
examination boards, or State education authorities.  
This allows personally (and professionally) informed “calibration” of otherwise 
impersonal assessment judgments. This can also occur, after state-wide testing, when 
students are being selected for university study, vocational training, or employment. 
Staff in universities, polytechnics, training institutions, and employers, naturally, may 
interview those students whose overall assessment ranking or test scores do not allow 
clear-cut decisions to be made, or those whose particular circumstances require 
careful individual judging. 
One formal way of moderating specific assessment is to match it against more 
general forms of assessment. While this is often regarded as part of the worst-case 
high-stakes situations, matching subject-test scores against general academic ability 
scores is a sensible way of screening for anomalies, or unfairnesses, as well as 
checking on class groups, school groups, and other groups in the whole assessment 
pool, by co-relating or calibrating different kinds of assessment. 
Put all of these attributes together in a particular piece of assessment, or as a 
collection of separate, different, mutually articulated assessment judgments, and the 
result should be — exemplary. 
This piece of curriculum development may not, itself, be exemplary, being no 
more than an outline of views and arguments. But it is, I hope, clear and indicative as 
an answer to the question: What is exemplary assessment? 
Incidentally, although this extended discussion of assessment may seem out of 
place in this Research Symposium, I will only suggest, briefly, that effective 
assessment practices are extremely valuable data-gathering tools, and hence have 
great potential in classroom-focused (and other) research. 
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Conclusion(s)? 
Finally, let me summarise my sense of curriculum development as a form of 
research by presenting it as a form of problem solving. Consider Georg Polya’s 
familiar four-stage process of problem solving: 
• Look; 
• Plan; 
• Do; and 
• Check (Polya 1945). 
How might these apply to curriculum development? 
First, we begin by looking at our present context. 
We consider our current situation, and our current underlying theories and 
guiding assumptions: where are we, what are we doing, how did we get here, and why 
are we doing these things? 
More importantly we do this initial self-regarding looking in a problem-posing, or 
problematising way, actively seeking to expose difficulties, uncertainties, 
contradictions, ambiguities, unconsidered hidden assumptions. 
What things are working well? What things are not working so well? How do we 
know that these things, whatever they are, are working well or not? 
We reach a tentative end of this opening stage with a clearer sense of our 
immediate position, and its problems, and the theories that describe and explain this 
position. 
Next we plan. Having explored our situation, and exposed likely problems, we 
cast around creatively, laterally, perhaps even randomly, and usually eclectically, 
seeking possible alternatives that might be trialed, any one of which might help move 
forwards to greater insight, fresh or renewed vision, improved practices. We are 
simultaneously devising new materials and new procedures. 
Obviously the next step is to implement one or more of our tentatively offered 
alternatives. As we do so we monitor what happens. 
The fourth Polya stage of Checking is simultaneously occurring all through all the 
other three stages, as well as featuring prominently as a tentatively final stage. How 
are things progressing? How far have we traveled? Have the potential solutions really 
solved anything, and, if so, what? 
Teachers, of course, do this kind of thing often. But they are less often fully 
aware of this, as the familiarity of what they are doing, their confident, comfortable 
use of day-by-day routines, conceals the potentially inherent problem-posing and 
problem-solving nature of their professional routines. 
By contrast, researchers do this kind of thing deliberately, actively trying to 
generate fresh questions to ask, and to investigate, hunting for answers. 
My main point is that curriculum development, as an aspect of teaching, IS often 
a form of research, and deserves to be recognised as such. Equally, teachers, in their 
own small-scale day-by-day-routine way, are often researchers, and deserve to be 
recognised as such. 
I have argued that curriculum development is a form of research. As such, it is 
one engaged in regularly by many teachers, without them realizing the research 
aspects of what they are doing. However teacher-researchers are potentially well 
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placed to contribute to the published body of research, and should do so. Several 
simple steps may assist them. 
Critically evaluate the current circumstances:  
• what curriculum is currently used? 
• what are its strengths, and weaknesses? 
• what are the current (and likely future) educational goals for this (or future) 
curriculum? 
• what possible alternative curriculum exists, or could be devised, and what 
alternative instructional methodology might be used or developed? 
Put the results of this problem-posing, critical analysis, and proposed problem 
solutions into academically supported written form. Circulate the draft for discussion 
among colleagues. Submit any revised form for possible publication in an appropriate 
professional education journal, for wider dissemination and discussion, and further 
critical evaluation and critically informed development. 
That IS research! We ought not neglect or slight it. 
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Exploring constructivism(s): the gaps between philosophy, 
psychology, praxis and common sense(s). 
[Paper presented at the 1997 Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to Research in 
Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental Education, Deakin University. An 
abridged version of this paper was published in B. Jane, S. Groves, I. Robottom, R. Tytler 
(Eds) Contemporary approaches to research in Mathematics, Science, Health and 
Environmental Education 1997, Deakin University, Geelong, 1998, pp 77-87.] 
 
ABSTRACT 
Constructivism (plural or singular) may be popular, but is not always well 
understood. Significant differences exist between the way the term is used 
by mathematics educators, science educators, and others. So called 
'radical' forms of constructivism are even less well understood. Yet do we, 
eventually, believe that we create what we know, or do we discover things 
which in some way already exist separately and objectively from us? How 
objective is knowledge? Does it help classroom practice to split these 
kinds of hairs? The research methodology, unavoidably, is conceptual, 
critical, cultural, discursive and philosophical. 
 
PAPER 
How I Do My Research 
Let me declare my methodology at the outset. Self-funded, or unfunded, this project, 
like all my other research activities, uses three basic methods. I read. I think. And I 
argue. A fundamental research tool is my writing. Out of the struggle to find words 
for the ideas and experiences I am trying to grapple with comes some developing 
sense of insight, and the possibility that I can communicate some of this insight to 
others.  
 
Sometimes I use a special kind of experiment, known also by the German name 
gedanken experimentieren, which translates (roughly) as 'thought experiment'. The 
English term is used extensively through Imre Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations: The 
Logic of Mathematical Discovery (1976 p 9, and elsewhere). Lakatos identifies such 
an approach as beginning with the Ancient Greeks who had a Greek word for it, 
deiknymi. Most of the early Greeks' speculative discussion of the nature of 'elements' 
and 'atoms' relied wholly on such thought experiments.  
 
As I read, and think, I test my thinking by examining the consequences, when I make 
certain assumptions. Depending on the consequences that seem to follow, I am able to 
confirm or disconfirm my thinking. (Notice my unreconstructed Popperianism.) 
 
We all use this methodology, in different ways, sometimes more formally, sometimes 
without being even aware that this is what we are doing. My methodology breaks no 
new ground. Probably the actual content or subject of my research breaks no new 
ground either. But I believe that I am making progress for myself. And I as I develop 
my thinking, testing it through my writing by seeking critical feedback from others, I 
believe that my work, unoriginal though it may be, may in turn help others develop 
also. So much, then, for methodology. I would, of course, with time or funds or 
interested colleagues (who were willing to contribute, for their part of collegiality, a 
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more explicitly experimental, descriptive measuring and evaluative approach), always 
be willing to have the content or focus of my 'research' examined within classrooms 
or laboratories. In the meantime, as I develop new teaching materials for my own use, 
I try the materials out on my own students, making further modifications in response 
to these trials. 
 
What I am Researching (Some of It …) — The (My) Background 
As my title indicates, I have recently been re-examining ideas about how children 
(students, people) 'learn', and what we might mean when we talk about 'learning', 
'knowing' and 'knowledge'. I say 're-examine' because I first started investigating (in 
my read-think-argue way) these ideas when I was initially training to be a high school 
mathematics teacher, nearly twenty-five years ago, and later when I was doing 
Masters course work and lecturing in teacher education at the Burwood campus. 
 
Back then it became clear to me that we 'learn' in a way that resembles the methods of 
discovery used by scientists (moments of insight embedded in a cyclic Popperian 
process of hypothesis formation, experimentation, and subsequent refinement and 
extension of hypotheses (e.g. Magee 1973): all of this is very similar to aspects of 
Polya-type mathematics problem solving). This 'learning' also resembles the 
unconscious (un-self-aware) learning of infants who are 'learning' to speak, walk, and 
become people. (Several articles discussed such a view of 'learning': Clements and 
Gough 1978, Gough 1982, Gough 1983, Gough 1984.)  
 
At the time I was pulling together things I had first come across in courses on 
Education Psychology, my first-year undergraduate course Psychology 1 ('rats and 
stats'—a typical Monash approach of the day, showing up Melbourne University's 
stick-in-the-mud Freudianism), along with ideas of psycholinguistics, history and 
philosophy of science, history and philosophy of mathematics, process approaches to 
reading, spelling and writing, and the language-across-the-curriculum movement. 
Syncretic, and eclectic.  
 
Constructivism had not been invented yet, as a term, at least not as far as I was aware. 
Piaget had just established (that is, his works, some from as early as the 1930s, 
recently translated into English were increasingly being popularised) a 'cognitive' and 
'developmental' approach as an alternative to the then rampant American 
behaviourism, and already I was becoming critical of Piaget and looking for a theory 
of learning that was more closely embedded within the nature of a particular process 
or a particular subject area. Hints of such a theory could be discerned in Margaret 
Donaldson's Children's Minds (1978) and Margaret Boden's critical survey Piaget 
(1979). Ideas of information processing and artificial intelligence seemed to be 
especially helpful because they suggested a way of describing 'processes' of thinking, 
talking and acting.  
 
The earlier work of Richard Skemp, subsequently revised, attempted to develop 
Piaget's ideas and apply them to an account of how mathematics was learned (The 
Psychology of Learning Mathematics 1971). This paralleled similar and even earlier 
attempts by Zoltan Dienes to develop some Piaget-like theory of concept development 
(e.g. Building Up Mathematics 1960). 
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My 1981 Master of Educational Studies project, titled 'Meaning Learning: Effective 
Teaching', attempted to discuss 'meaning-making' (as I termed it) as a central 
'learning' process in curriculum areas as diverse as reading, spelling, handwriting, art, 
music and mathematics. The British movement to find ways of connecting ideas about 
language processes (and language learning), led by researchers such as James Britton, 
Harold Rosen, and Douglas Barnes, allied in some ways with the British philosophers 
of education led by R.S. Peters, and paralleled by North American researchers and 
popularisers such as Paul Kohlers, Kenneth Goodman, Frank Smith and Donald 
Graves (whose process approach to writing was still very new), seemed to indicate a 
way ahead.  
 
Bringing Mathematics into the Picture 
But where did mathematics fit into such ideas? And what was mathematics, anyway? 
My earlier 1976 Master of Science thesis, 'The Mathematics of Some Logic Games', 
had discussed, amongst other things, the formalist-logicist approaches of Hilbert and 
the disturbing limitations to logicism demonstrated by Gödel, and the 'learning-like' 
scientific inductive hypothesis-testing methods involved in playing Queries 'N 
Theories, a mathematico-language-logic game (drawing on Noam Chomsky's idea of 
formal grammars and the Grammarama Project of George A. Miller, e.g. 1957, 1967, 
which itself drew on the formalist logic-language systems of Emil Post during the 
1920s — early versions of what later were known as Turing machines, and finally 
became actual computers!), developed by Layman E. Allen, the inventor of Wff 'N 
Proof (1962), working with Peter Kugel and Joan Ross. (Other papers attempted to 
discuss these issues and offer classroom applications and simulations: Gough 1978, 
anticipating the 1980s emphasis on the topic of problem solving, and Gough 1979.) 
 
Floating around in all of this was the central 'learning' topic of 'concept development'. 
What, for instance, was a 'concept'? How did it develop? What role might a teacher 
have in attempting to help students develop 'concepts'? Skemp introduced the term 
'schema' (its plural, if we accept the Greekness of the word, 'schemata'), rather than 
concept, and this opened at least three more connections which compound and extend 
the discussion. I had earlier come across 'schema' in Ernst Gombrich's brilliant 
discussion of pictorial schema (which in this setting were essentially visual patterns, 
cultural constructs, or 'conventions') in visual art: Art and Illusion: A Study in the 
Psychology of Pictorial Representation (1960) when I had been investigating the 
history of pictorial perspective in art, as one of my rather wide-ranging assignments 
carried out during my Dip. Ed. year when I was training to be a Secondary 
mathematics teacher. Amazingly (amazing for me), Gombrich used a Popperian kind 
of perceptual psychology, where concepts, that is what the brain believed and hence 
expected (or hypothesised) directed the experiments carried out by the eyes when 
looking around the world.  
 
Not only was this exactly the theory offered by the psycholinguists (such as Goodman 
and Smith) to describe the process of reading (and writing, and other language forms), 
it was also the theory of oral language acquisition offered by other psycholinguists 
(such as Roger Brown, outlined by de Villiers and de Villiers 1979). Moreover, 
Gombrich pushed the idea of 'schema' or 'concept' further back in history, before 
Piaget, identifying F.C. Bartlett's work on memory (1932) as his source for the term.  
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Moreover, Gombrich's discussion ranged across other non-European cultures, as any 
investigation of perspective and alternative methods of representation must do. This 
brought in cross-cultural comparisons, and anthropological approaches, and, 
inevitably raised the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis which I had first encountered in 
Postman and Weingartner's radical discussion Teaching as a Subversive Activity 
(1969). As with the theory about the reading process, and Gombrich's account of how 
we look at the world, we 'see' whatever we think we see through what we 'know'. That 
is, our sense of something we think of as the 'world' (which is in some sense outside 
us, yet also includes us as part of it) is only our personal (although usually socially-
shared) 'world-view' as it is partially clumsily expressed within the language we use 
to discuss the world. Whether any kind of objectively describable world actually 
exists other than our language-refracted rather hypothetical and tentative model of 
such a possible world is a subtle philosophical topic. 
 
Pretty radical. This comes close to the heart of Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea that 
language itself works like a kind of 'game', where rules, conventions and meanings 
are mutually negotiated as well as may be practically possible, by participating 
players, within particular contexts, always taking many things for granted, sometimes 
without being aware of what has been implicitly assumed or realising the logical 
consequences of such assumptions and conventions, knowing that any attempt to 
define everything turns into an infinite regress of definitions. The game-like nature of 
language, and hence of communication, and also of 'knowing', resembles the arbitrary 
game-like natural of a formalist-logicist view of mathematics. 
 
Clearly I have been looking widely, and across a considerable period of time. 
 
Focussing on Constructivism and its Origins 
Later the term 'constructivism' began to be used. By then I was familiar with the 
expression 'cognitivism' as it was used by Robert B. Davis (1984), who I already 
knew as the pioneer of the Madison Project which I had discussed in my 1978 paper 
on scientific method as I saw it, (Popperian), being applied to mathematics making 
and learning (Lakatosian). Davis's own Learning Mathematics: The Cognitive Science 
Approach to Mathematics Education (1984) had barely appeared when a popularising 
teacher-directed account of a constructivist treatment of mathematics (and other 
subject areas) appeared in the Frameworks series prepared as official curriculum 
documents by the Victorian Ministry of Education (e.g. Cribb, et al. The Mathematics 
Framework: P–10 1988, chapter 3 'How Do We Learn? And How Do We Learn 
Mathematics?'). The Frameworks authors saw learning as an active constructive 
process of concept development which occurred in all subject areas, and in 
mathematics in particular. They even offered a concept-map-like diagram (p 21) 
showing concepts as objects like speech-balloons, each equipped with several hooks 
which could be linked with other speech-balloon-concepts—exactly the same kind of 
diagram given by that grand pioneer of thinking about thinking and learning Edward 
de Bono in The Mechanism of Mind (1969 p 232) in his subject-specific discussion of 
'mathematical thinking', one of four different kinds of thinking discussed by de Bono 
in this book.  
 
After Frameworks we have all been 'constructivists' ever since. Long live 
constructivism! But what does it mean? And what difference does it make? 
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Almost as soon as we hear someone give a sketch account of 'constructivism' we 
realise that of course we have always been constructivists, whether we used the term 
or not (like Moliere's character who was delighted to discover he had been speaking 
in prose all his life, despite the fact that he had never heard the word before). Trivially, 
because we each do our own learning (I certainly can't do any learning for you — and 
vice versa — remember the story of the boy who taught his dog to whistle? he taught 
the dog, but the dog didn't learn!), we are each in some way constructing 'meanings', 
'facts', 'concepts' and 'skills' all the time that we learn. So what else is knew then, apart 
from using a new word? 
 
Amazingly (amazingly for me), these constructivist ideas have been around an 
extremely long time, hidden in overlooked religio-philosophical treatises (as with 
Giambattista Vico's surprising account of a constructivist philosophy of knowledge) 
or concealed within the airier speculations of philosophers as far back as Plato and 
Aristotle and the Ionians. I am indebted to Judy Mousley for showing me this (1997). 
The great constructivist theorist Ernst von Glasersfeld has given several historical 
accounts also (e.g. 1989). Once we go that far back we need to be on our guard. Plato, 
in particular, reigns seemingly invincible in this era of philosophy. Yet Plato may not 
be right, if such a judgement is possible or sensible. A strong case can be mounted 
against his theory (or 'myth') of a higher 'Reality' of which our material world is but 
an illusion, a flawed and pale imitation (deceptive shadows cast on the walls of a 
dimly lit cave by some reality outside the cave of human material experience). For 
example, the Sophists and Ionian philosophers still have a lot to teach us about 
ordinary 'reality' and the incompleteness and relativity of 'knowledge', offering a 
valuable corrective to Plato (for example Robert M. Pirsig's challenging philosophical 
novel, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values, 1974). 
 
But, but, but, … what difference does it make? What does constructivism offer that 
you can't get anywhere else, such as John Sweller's helpful 'cognitive load' theory, 
which connects with earlier ideas of information processing and cognitivism (e.g. 
1991)? Are we forced back to Piaget, sometimes identified as an early (comparatively 
early) constructivist? Perhaps even worse, as soon as we start looking for solid details 
about what constructivism either means, or does, we discover significant variation in 
how the term is used. 
 
Constructivism and Mathematics-Education — Helpful Technical Terms 
In mathematics education the researchers who identify themselves as 'constructivist' 
(of some kind, radical, social or other) present helpful terms (sometimes ugly 
neologisms, roughly coined new words and smashings together of existing word-
parts) that describe what we might actually see (or hear) students doing that indicates 
that they are in some sense 'constructing'. For example, von Glasersfeld offers the 
term 'subitising' (1982) which is the ability to ascribe a number (a concept or schema, 
or possibly a numeral, which is a representation of the number-concept expressed 
orally or as a written word or a written symbol, a digit or collection of digits or 
similar symbolic coding) instantaneously (or as quickly as mental-processing 
response-time experiments can establish) to a pattern of objects. In effect this is a kind 
of domino-reading or sight-word 'flash-card' ability to see a card with a collection of 
dots and instantly say how many dots have been seen. Glenn Doman (often associated 
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with the infamous unscientific brain-hemisphere psycho-motor developmental 
theories of Carl Delacatto) used this ability to subitise as the basis for his book 
designed to teach babies mathematics (I would appreciate any help I could get here, as 
I have no reference for this book, and its accompanying kit of flashcards: it is a 
companion volume to Doman's better known Teach Your Baby to Read 1963). 
 
Interestingly, some forms of subitising seem to have a biological or genetic basis. 
According to Edward MacNeal, the researcher Otto Koehler (1889-1974) was able to 
show that species of birds were able to distinguish quantitative differences (such as 
marks on a container, or a successive number of events before a known consequence 
occurred). Pigeons can 'count' to five. Ravens and parrots can 'count' to seven. 
Koehler described this as 'unnamed' or 'prelinguistic' counting (MacNeal 1994 p 91). 
It would be interesting to know how such counting operates in experimental situations 
where animals are involved in language training (e.g. Linden, 1974, 1993). Such a 
biological basis for mathematics has been recently argued by Stanislaus Dehaene 
(1997) who claims to have located the position in the brain that is active during 
calculation with numbers, and other researchers such as George Lakoff and Rafael 
Nunez. 
 
Steffe and Cobbe (1988), colleagues of von Glasersfeld, speak of 'unitising', which is 
the conceptual act of taking as a whole something which up until then has been 
handled as a collection of discrete unitary elements. A related constructivist tool for 
constructing is 'disembedding', or being able to dissociate sub-units from a composite 
unit while still recognising the unity of the larger whole. This clearly links with 
George Miller's pioneering discussion of 'chunking' as the cognitive process by 
which we are able to overcome the limited thinking-space of about seven 'spaces', 
plus or minus two (for an average adult), in short-term memory (1956, and Smith 
1975, ch. 2). The term 'chunking' is apparently due to Herbert Simon (1974).  
 
This also links with 'concept development', the collecting up of experiences and 
abstracting of a new concept sketched by Richard Skemp (and presumably many 
others before him). Skemp describes the way infants learn to abstract the concept of 
the color 'red' from many various instances of objects that exhibit 'redness', in 
association with information and feedback from adults and other color-experts 
interacting with the infants (1971 pp 25-26). Skemp remarks that a 'schema [or mental 
construct, or concept] has two main functions. It integrates existing knowledge, and it 
is a mental tool for the acquisition of new knowledge' (p 39). Obviously! The more 
we learn, the more we are able to learn. Does such analysis and introduction of 
supposedly explanatory terms really take us much further than common sense? And, 
beyond that, what are the limits of common sense, and can it sometimes mislead us? 
 
Some researchers have investigated the process of concept formation by defining a 
new term 'encapsulation', the forming of a conceptual entity from a developing 
dynamic process (e.g. Dubinsky, 1991). Put more simply, we form ideas about objects 
and different ways we can use them, according to the things we do with the objects. 
Concept formation is then seen to be the encapsulation (or putting together) of the 
cognitive representation of a mathematical operation in combination with some 
corresponding procedure, such as a routinised manipulation of objects. With such an 
approach, the process of counting (including pointing at objects and uttering the 
sequence of oral numeral words) is encapsulated as the concept of 'number'. That is, 
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'number' is formed as an idea from combining the way we represent counting orally 
with the active processes involved in doing counting with objects. Repeated counting 
is encapsulated as addition. That is, addition is constructed as an idea built out of the 
way we represent successive counting of several groups of objects, combined with 
different active processes, such as counting all the objects after combining them, or 
counting on the next group of objects from where we have reached after counting the 
first group of objects (Gray and Tall 1994 pp 139-140). This 'encapsulation' resembles 
the 'curtailment of thinking', or the intuitive grasping of a whole sequence or 
collection of steps and ideas, described by Vadim Krutetskii (1976 p 45). 
 
Gray and Tall also use the term 'proceptual thinking' to describe the combination of 
conceptual thinking and procedural thinking (which Skemp might describe as 
'relational' and 'instrumental', respectively: 1976) including the meaningful use of 
known facts and procedures to solve problems. Discussing children learning to count, 
they distinguish this from children who are 'procedural counters' and depend on being 
able to physically manipulate objects as they carry out a counting procedure. These 
ideas are described in Pearn (1996 p 127). Many other researchers make this natural 
distinction between conceptual work and procedural work, linked also with 
representational work. 
 
Gray and Tall (1994 pp 120, 137) include many mathematical concepts in their 
general discussion of their constructivist term 'procept'. 
… we consider the duality between process and concept in mathematics, in 
particular, using the same symbolism to represent both a process (such as 
the addition of two numbers 3 + 2) and the product of that process (the sum 
3 + 2). The ambiguity of notation allows the successful thinker the 
flexibility in thought to move between the process to carry out a 
mathematical task and the concept to be mentally manipulated as part of a 
wider mental schema. Symbolism that inherently represents the amalgam of 
process/concept we call a 'procept'. … the successful mathematical thinker 
uses a mental structure that is manifest in the ability to think proceptually … 
The less able are doing a more difficult form of mathematics, which 
eventually causes a divergence in performance between them and their more 
able peers. (Gray and Tall 1994 p 116.) 
Gray and Tall also use the term 'encapsulation' for the mental action of grasping or 
forming 'a (static) conceptual entity [or 'cognitive object', or schema or concept] from 
a (dynamic) process', noting that other writers use terms such as 'entification' or 
'reification' (1994 p 119). Does it matter that some researchers attempt hair-splitting 
distinctions in their technical definitions? Or can we attempt to make progress by 
recognising blurry overlap in concepts and methods, and settle on nice sounding 
sensible-seeming words that do a good enough job?  
 
It may be noted that Gray and Tall actually use the term 'process' in a loose way, 
allowing for the possibility that some processes can be carried out in several different 
ways, unlike mechanised 'algorithms' or 'procedures' which always follow the same 
fixed rules, or standardised steps of thinking or calculation. The ideas and processes 
that are being learned at one level of understanding become encapsulated into a new 
cognitive entity. This means that whole clusters of ideas and performance can be 
treated as a new coherent single unit, which can act as a building block for further 
concepts and processes at a higher level of thinking. This encapsulated cluster of parts 
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now functions as one step in a higher process, internalised and automated. Such 
internalising and automating is a key feature in constructivist theory, as it has always 
been in common sense approaches to mathematics teaching and learning. Students 
find it difficult to progress far in mathematics without 'memorising' or 'learning by 
heart' their multiplication tables and a wide collection of number facts and concepts 
(for example, not just knowing that 3 x 4 = 12, but that 3 x 40 = 120, 3 x 4 million = 
12 million, 3 x 40¢ = $1.40, and so on). 
 
Connections between particular ways of representing a concept (spoken words, 
written words, written symbols, diagrams, and manipulative objects), combined with 
the techniques or processes for working with this concept and its related 
representations, lead to the internalisation of the concept and automation of the 
process. Practice with showing, doing, and talking, leads to some kind of 
comprehension (up to a point) and the development of fluent skill. This, in turn, when 
internalised, becomes the basis for practice with new materials, new topics and 
concepts, and consequent new internalisation and automation. James Hiebert 
emphasises this when he notes that recent recommendations to decrease the emphasis 
on common drill-and practice activities may prompt us to reconsider the way that 
such routine procedures may valuably contribute to the development of meaningful 
and useful mathematical knowledge. In particular he identifies the potential, within 
drill-and-practice, to develop the cognitive processes of 'atomisation' and 'reflection'. 
The goal of the former is merely efficient execution of procedures, and of the latter is 
a broader understanding, and the recognition of patterns and meanings (1990 p 39).  
 
Clearly, for Hiebert, drill-and-practice, within a reflective context, increases 
efficiency and understanding. At this point it is worth mentioning another 
constructivist term 'metacognition' — becoming self-aware, developing the ability to 
reflect on what is being done or what is being learned, the ability to think about 
('meta'-) thinking (-'cognition'). Of course this is important: common sense tell us so. 
Is this new term (Greek smashed with Latin) merely jargon to frighten parents? 
 
How do constructivist researchers discover what goes on in children's minds, and 
hence find a need for these interesting new explanatory or descriptive terms? They 
use 'clinical interviews' and close observation, in the same way the Piaget pioneered, 
examining the way students respond to different tasks, and analysing what the 
students say as well as what the students do. Teachers use clinical interviews, in the 
same way that they use 'miscue analysis' as they listen to learners struggling to read 
aloud, whenever they respond in a diagnostic interventional way to their students' 
ordinary classroom activities. We could add to this some of the related techniques of 
so called 'discourse analysis' that attempts to identify important features of who is 
talking, who has authority, who is listening, what is stated, what is implied, and so on, 
in any oral or written exchange between a group of people. But this, too, largely, is a 
matter of common sense. 
 
Constructivism Across the Curriculum? Or Language? 
Perhaps oddly, despite the first enthusiasm for the Frameworks approach to an overall 
constructivist view of learning in all curriculum areas, there has not, as far as I am 
aware, been a move to develop 'constructivism across the curriculum'. Perhaps this is 
because the earlier, comparable project to develop ideas of 'language across the 
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curriculum' tended to fall by the wayside, except where it resulted in enthusiasm for 
'integrated' approaches to learning. Those who most persuasively argued for 'language 
across the curriculum' (such a Britton, Rosen and Barnes, or in Australia, Brian 
Cambourne), tended to be people who were clearly only from a 'language' background, 
and they were largely unheard by the subject specialists of other curriculum areas.  
 
Moreover, the so called 'process' approach, which simultaneously sprang from the 
results of language-oriented psycholinguistic research into children learning to speak, 
read and write, tended to shift the rhetoric from 'language' to 'process'. What that 
meant in practice was always difficult to pin down. It became popular to suggest that 
students, at all levels, should behave like the specialist adults, such as historians, 
biologists, geographers, mathematicians, artists, and physicists, and learn to use the 
adult-specialist processes (such as problem solving, carrying out laboratory 
experiments, writing for publication, and public performance). For a while 'process' 
was offered as the focus for all curriculum areas, particularly as the process was 
considered to be manageable and stable in an era of information explosion, when it 
was impossible even for trained adults to try to keep up with an explosion in content. 
Students, for example, no longer learned about history or geography, they learned 
how to do history or geography. 
 
If we are now starting to re-set a practical balance between 'process' and 'content' we 
may be recognising that you can't use a process without having some substantial 
content to make sense of the meanings in the process. Moreover, despite the 
information explosion, we can see that there are some basic foundation content ideas 
which need to be established. For example, you need to know some mathematics 
(content) in order to be able to do some mathematics problem solving (process). That 
is, we can't have a process (noun) without something (i.e. content) to process (verb): 
this was argued  by John Biggs as early as 1974. Of course the conceptual separation 
of process and content is only hypothetical, anyway. 
 
Finally, without the necessary development of fully re-worked curriculum documents 
for all other subject areas, all that the 'language across the curriculum' proponents 
could offer were anthology-like snippets (a bit of discussion and a few examples and 
some children's talk dealing with, say, mathematics, a similar bit for history, and so 
on). The rest depended on the experts in the other subject areas picking up the ideas 
and writing the necessary 'language across mathematics' or 'language across social 
science' (and so on) resource books and curriculum materials. However this did not 
happen, apart from a slight shift to ensure that, in all subject areas, students were 
encouraged to talk about what they were learning, student-learning journals or diaries 
were sometimes introduced experimentally, and some renewed emphasis was given to 
working with different genres of writing in other subject areas, as we see in Victoria 
with the 'project'-like Investigation CATs at year 12-level. 
 
Constructivism and Science Education — Another Country? 
It should be stressed, however, that as soon as we shift from mathematics education 
research into students' learning, with its own flavour of 'constructivism', and move 
across into a seemingly similar curriculum area, we find that the term 'constructivism' 
refers to quite different things. In the field of science education discussion of 
constructivism seems to be less concerned with trying to identify or describe 
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important learning processes (that can then be generalised to help teachers begin to 
understand difficulties involved in trying to teach other parts of the curriculum), and 
is more concerned with the idea of 'conceptual change'. Theories of conceptual 
change attempt to explain, for example, how a student can shift from a naive 
Aristotelian view of moving objects, where the presence of friction means that a 
constant force is needed to maintain a moving object's velocity, to a Newtonian view 
of objects remaining in a state of rest or uniform motion unless acted upon by an 
external force (and later, to an Einsteinian relativistic view of space-time and mass-
energy, in which the Newtonian view is simply a first-order approximation) (White 
and Gunstone 1989 pp 578-579). 
 
Moreover several critics have argued that, as a movement recently promoted in 
science education, constructivism has rapidly become hopelessly broad and vague, 
weakens any useful distinctions between ideas of existing scientific knowledge and 
'children's alternative frameworks' (such as naive Aristotelian friction-based 
particle dynamics), and undermines essential critical features of scientific method: for 
example, Solomon 1994, and Osborne 1996. One essential point here is that, despite 
being partly right in their alternatives, children's alternative frameworks can and 
should be criticised. From the criticism we develop less criticisable, more 'scientific', 
better frameworks. Discussing science education (for which we may read 
'mathematics education') Osborne cites Hodson (1990) who distinguishes three 
dimensions: learning science, learning to do science, and learning about science (p 
55). Constructivist theories tend to gloss over such distinctions, ignoring differences 
between the focuses of learning, doing and reflecting — indeed, the nature of 
knowing and knowledge. 
 
It should be noted, that, unlike in science, children working with mathematics tend to 
have no alternative frameworks at all, certainly nothing that corresponds, for example, 
to a naive view that the world is flat, the sun moves around the earth, offspring are 
likely to inherit the skills of their parents, and friction-effects show the right way to 
think about objects 'naturally' moving — that is, if an object is moving, something 
must be pushing it, a view that was perfectly obvious to Aristotle, and took the minds 
of Galileo and Newton to overturn conceptually. Perhaps the only comparable naive-
mathematics alternative view is the mug-gambler's theory that if we are tossing coins 
and we have seen 1000 Heads in a row, it stands to reason that we should get a Tail 
pretty darn soon, if not in fact the next time ( — what's wrong with that dad-blasted 
coin, anyway? I am reminded of the classic scene of coin-tossing in Tom Stoppard’s 
revisioning of Hamlet, Rosencrantz and Gildenstern).  
 
Generally students tend not to form alternative views about mathematics, except on a 
small scale. For example, one such alternative view can be summarised as the 'rule': if 
in doubt, add. Another 'alternative rule' is: when subtracting, take the smaller digit 
from the larger, regardless of where the digits occur. These have been more usefully 
described as 'default' options or resistant 'bugs' in students' concept formation or 
cognitive processing (Davis 1984 pp 46-47, 43-44). The information processing or 
artificial intelligence metaphor behind these terms should be noted — Davis is a 
constructivist, but also a cognitivist, and is well aware of still other theories. Such 
'default' expectations, and 'bugs' tend to arise when a student is not challenged enough, 
or is given practice tasks that are too simple, or that fail to include enough different 
operations and possible kinds of tasks. The constructivist solution is to demonstrate as 
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clearly as possible the actual consequences of the students' faulty thinking, to 'torpedo' 
the 'bug', to work through a step-by-step comparison of the faulty process and the 
correct process.  
 
Robert B. Davis uses the expression "torpedoing" — asking an alternative question 
which corresponds to the [wrong] answer the student has actually given. Usually this 
prompts self-correction of the first question, and then a correct answer to the second 
question, and thoughtful clarification of confusable but related concepts: (Davis 1966 
p 2; cited in Dawson 1969 pp. 174, 220, 221-222). 
 
It may be noted, also, that some students' alternative views in mathematics consist of 
no more than a different way of handling a task, such as adding up a column of 
figures starting with the left-most column, rather than the right-most, and later 
adjusting backwards if necessary. Such 'alternatives' are actually 'informal strategies' 
devised by the students as a constructive, intuitive and creative response to explicit 
instruction, student observation, non-teacher demonstration, and loosely supervised 
practice. These informal strategies are often the methods that students carry away 
from school and use for the rest of their lives. Or these strategies may develop outside 
of formal school instruction — 'street mathematics', sometimes also reflecting 
interesting cultural differences where the formal school culture, essentially that of 
Western Europe, is seriously different from the local culture. As an example many 
adults show diverse ways of mentally calculating with time, methods that were never 
taught in school , but which are effective and robust, in that they continue to be used 
successfully for years, without need for modification. Other informal strategies 
spontaneously arise in response to everyday experiences with money, a major non-
school focus for a great deal of mathematical thinking. 
 
Interestingly, as far as I can tell from my own limited reading of science education 
discussions of constructivism, none of the mathematics education technical terms 
have been picked up, in particular 'encapsulation', 'unitising' (which is essentially the 
same thing?), 'disembedding' (whatever happened to 'embedding'?), 'procept' and so 
on. Other, broader terms such as 'metacognition' have crept into the formal vocabulary 
of researchers in almost all curriculum areas. 
 
Another large difference between the mathematics flavour of constructivism and the 
science education flavour is that leading mathematics education theorists such as von 
Glasersfeld have argued for what he calls 'radical constructivism' which makes no 
necessary assumptions about the external objective reality of any of the mathematics 
that is being taught or learned. This 'radical' view stands in opposition to Platonist 
views of mathematics (and other kinds of knowledge) as exemplifying some 
transcendental 'reality', which exists 'out there', which creative mathematics 
investigate, like explorers attempting to chart unknown territory. The 'territory' exists, 
and the explorers are simply recording what they observe as they move around. For 
von Glasersfeld, and for the Vygotskian social constructivists, this is quite 
unacceptable. Mathematics, by their account, exists only as much as any other body 
of knowledge exists, in that it is made by humans and established by socially 
negotiated conventions or agreement.  
 
So called social constructivists have adopted a version of the learning theories of the 
Soviet researcher Lev Vygotsky, often touted as an alternative to Piaget, who always 
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emphasised the individuality of the organism doing the learning, and tended to 
emphasise the importance of personal experience rather than the development of 
shared language. Vygotsky naturally saw the social collective as the focus of what 
was done and known (or else Stalin would have had a few sharp words to say to him 
— in those days political correctness was deadly serious), and discussed the way 
language functioned through the process of group experience, negotiation and 
consequent individual (collectively guided) concept development. 
 
A philosopher such as Imré Lakatos straddles these ideas with his scrupulous account 
of the slow development of socially negotiated mathematical concepts, defining, 
testing definitions, proposing counter-examples, modifying definitions and theorems 
to take account of counter-example 'monsters'. For Lakatos mathematics exists as a 
human construction, known incompletely and fallibly (in a Popperian sense, namely, 
that tentatively held hypotheses can be disconfirmed by testing against examples and 
logical consequences). Moreover, mathematics is constantly in touch with some 
shared sense of an objective external world, where graphs are drawn, cardboard 
models of objects and 'monster'-counter-examples can be made, and the boundaries of 
understanding of humanly-created assumptions and definitions can be tested, 
experimentally, or at least as experimentally as mathematics can manage. 
 
This is often misunderstood. Up until the mid-Nineteenth century the common view 
was that mathematics was different from fallible, correctible science. Mathematics 
was concerned with truths which did not depend on experiment. There was an 
absoluteness to mathematics which separated it, philosophically, from all other forms 
of knowledge. After all, 2 + 3 = 5, for example, was held to be incontrovertible — 
even Martians and angels would accept this fact as 'true'. Euclidean geometry, to take 
another example, was simply a mathematical expression of the absolutely true 
properties of geometric space. Nice theory.  
 
Along came the theories of non-Euclidean geometry, including the Einsteinian 
account of a space-time continuum whose practical non-Euclidean nature is used even 
when we program computers to assist with global-position calculations that help 
jumbo jets navigate — we don't have to go far in the universe to find that Euclidean 
mathematics fails to do the job well enough, however good it may be as a first 
approximation for building houses and bridges. Along came the paradoxes of set 
theory, and the challenge of Gödel 's theorem (paradoxically, that there exist with the 
theory of ordinary arithmetic, statements which are true yet which can not be proved). 
The result was a retreat to an even more rarefied view of mathematics as a kind of 
formal and utterly arbitrary game that has no necessary relation to any kind of 
everyday life reality at all, except when we are doing business mathematics or 
'applied mathematics', in which case the connections between the absolute ideal world 
of mathematics and the gritty real world is no more than a puzzling coincidence.  
 
However mathematics has always been embedded in logical reasoning and has always 
tried to use definitions that fit with common sense experience. Repeatedly, when so 
called 'pure mathematicians' established some pretty result within their arbitrary 
deductive game, some other mathematician found a way of applying the otherwise 
idle speculation to a real world situation. This has always been the nature of 
mathematics and its connection with 'reality'. It is also the nature of the way students 
learn mathematics, fitting it against their everyday experience, and sometimes 
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extending their insight into such experience as a result of their new mathematical 
insight. Mathematics is a game, and often formal, yet probably never arbitrary. 
 
This relation between the theoretical 'unworldliness' or otherwise of mathematics, also, 
is a key difference with science education ideas of constructivism. For physicists, 
biologists, geologists and others, in order to have anything on which to build research 
there needs to be a shared assumption that some kind of objective external real world 
(of bricks and trees, and atoms, and quarks) does exist in some reliable, commonly 
understood way. Scientists are hardly Platonists, and are unlikely to be much 
interested in the more rarefied interpretation of von Glasersfeld that, superficially, 
looks as though it denies the existence of anything except the individual knower — a 
philosophical stance known as 'solipsism', and not very helpful if you want to do 
anything.  
 
However von Glasersfeld's seeming solipsism is more a caution against relying too 
much on the objective 'truth' of the posited 'real world'. The caution is sensible, even 
in hard-nosed science. What, for example, objective status can be ascribed to the 
concept of 'energy'? Or 'force'? Or 'space'? Or 'species'? Or (at a level of molecular 
self-replication) 'life'? These are arguably human constructs, constructed to make 
sense of some forms of socially negotiated observations of something which we might 
then suggest reflects some aspect of what, in an everyday common sense way, we 
take for granted to be the 'real' world. How 'real' is it, if the solid table against which 
we bruise our toe when we kick it (as Samuel Johnson attempted to dispose of the 
idealist theories of Bishop Berkeley), consists of Einsteinian warps in a space-time 
multi-dimensional field, or consists of 'space' between minute whirling quantum 
packets of mass-like energy or energy-manifesting mass, or superstrings of some 
mystical kind, or …? 
 
At this point we might realise that we have run head on into the slippery boundaries 
or limits of just what can be captured in language, and the difficulties of using 
language to communicate. The challenging ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein still 
tantalise some researchers (such as me) who try to grapple with the ideas of 
mathematics philosophy and the nature of knowing. It seems, however, that some 
science education researchers who discuss constructivism take the world of objects 
for granted, and equally take for granted the language they use to work and talk about 
their common sense world. This is understandable, but short-sighted, except that we 
don't need to know much about any of this to be able to function pretty well in the 
classroom — do we? 
 
What About 'Constructivist Teaching'? 
It should be clear by now that if constructivism, of different sorts, is about anything, it 
is a way of trying to describe what happens when people learn. The simple fact is that, 
regardless of how we may try to teach people, their attempt to learn will be 
describable in some way through a metaphor or theory of constructivism (and there 
are alternative metaphors which have not been entirely repudiated: for example, in an 
age of increasingly good experimental results in neuroscience, the seemingly 
discredited theory of behaviourism is far from dead!). Teachers who use discovery 
methods, Piagetian experiences, problem solving and contextually embedded 
immersion, chalk-and-talk, or even memorise-and-drill, and also those great teachers 
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of our television age (such as David Attenborough, Carl Sagan, Jonathan Miller and 
his namesake Julius Sumner Miller), all using vastly different methods, succeed (and, 
whether relying on rote, first-hand experience, or merely seeing and hearing, they all 
are capable of succeeding!) in getting their students to learn — this learning can be 
described as a 'construction'.  
 
Logically, constructivism, which is a descriptive theory of learning, has no necessary 
implications for teaching. Some teachers fail to grasp this logic, and attempt to devise 
constructivist teaching situations. The result is little more than an attempt to combine 
a weak form of guided discovery learning with a step-by-step task analysis, working 
on the assumption that if students are going to 'construct' and the things they are 
constructing come in identifiable bits ('concepts', facts', 'skills', 'experiences') then we 
will help them do their learning-construction if we structure their potential-learning 
experiences in small building-block steps. Nice idea. But, logically, it is no more 
likely to result in constructivist learning than any other form of teaching such as tell-
and-drill. 
 
As a result, living as we do in an age of continual curriculum upheaval, 
experimentation and attempted change, it should be stressed that the changes that 
have recently occurred, and are continuing to occur in mathematics and science 
education (and other curriculum areas) are not necessarily due to the rise and 
acceptance of constructivist theories. Rather, these changes have occurred 
concurrently with the development of constructivism. While there may have been 
some mutual exchange and benefit between the constructivist theorists and the 
curriculum innovators (serendipity is a wonderful thing), it could be argued that the 
curriculum innovations would have occurred anyway, even if constructivism had 
never been invented.  
 
In mathematics education, for example, such powerful factors as the rise of pocket 
calculators, graphic calculators, computers and mathematics software, along with the 
resolve to focus on problem solving (declared as the top priority for the 1980s by the 
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, and adopted globally), along with the 
international rebellion against over-use of teacher-centred formalised normed testing 
and examination-dominated curricula, have resulted in great changes. We should also 
never forget the crisis forced by the Cold War and the adoption of the so called 'New 
Maths'. Similar factors have been at work in science education. The theories of 
learning that have washed over and through these curriculum upheavals have 
themselves had only small impact on the actual content of curriculum or the methods 
of curriculum development (except, as an extreme example, when some teachers 
decided to use 'programmed learning' — nowadays this has developed into far more 
flexible Computer-Assisted Learning). 
 
As early as 1967, at a time when Cuisenaire was being quietly dropped in Victoria, 
the Association of Teachers of Mathematics, in Britain, discussing primary levels of 
mathematics curriculum, declared that (please excuse the naively sexist terms), 
Mathematics is the creation of human minds. ... Because mathematics is made 
by men and exists only in their minds, it must be made or re-made in the mind 
of each person who learns it. In this sense mathematics can only be learnt by 
being created ... We believe, then, that teaching which tries to simplify learning 
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by emphasising the mastery of small isolated steps does not help children, but 
puts barriers in their way. (A.T.M. 1967 pp 1-3). 
The discussion then moved on to a vision of teacher as facilitator in a child-centred 
process of learning, embedded in a social context — a nutshell anticipation of almost 
everything that would be claimed more than a decade later by constructivists, 
Vygotskians, and others. The more things change... 
 
Concluding...? 
Having said all of this, the idea of 'constructing' remains almost totally theoretical or 
notional. Where, after all, is this 'constructing' supposed to occur? In the student's 
brain. And what kind of constructions exist, as far as we know, in the brain? Synapse 
connections, that is, a kind of increased electrical nerve-cabling between certain 
collections of brain cells, apparently due to some brain-response and activity based on 
experience, mediated through the senses, in the 'real world'. And where are the 
constructivists who have anything to say about synapses, neurons, or the functions of 
the brain? And what about the problem of consciousness or human self-awareness? 
Where are the synapses that handle that?  
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Notes and Activities for the Presentation of the Symposium 
Paper: Exploring constructivism(s): the gaps between 
philosophy, psychology, praxis and common sense(s). 
 
Summary:  
 Socio-genetic constructivism rules! — Is That OK? — Radical! 
Or: 
 Wittgenstein 1, Plato nil. 
 
First, write down the colors of the rainbow. 
 
Next, listen to the following short verse: 
The Moving Finger writes; and having writ, 
Moves on: nor all they Piety nor wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line, 
Nor all thy tears wash out a word of it. 
from The Ruba'iyat of Omar Khayam (translated by Edward Fitgerald 1809-1883). 
 
Now, what mental image, if any, did you form as you heard these words? Does it alter 
or challenge your image if I remind you that the original author (whose words you 
heard in translation) was writing in Arabic, where the pen moves from right to left?  
 
(Does it matter if the first line reminded you only of Spike Milligan's parody: 
The Moving Finger writes, and having writ, 
Moves on — to write another little bit.) 
 
Will it matter, in one hundred year's time if the common understanding of the word 
'write' or the role of the moving finger, has nothing to do with pens — even now, for 
many of us, 'writing' really means keyboard drafting! 
 
Here is the first point: All knowledge is constructed convention.  
 
(Let me slightly amend that: almost all knowledge. Some knowledge can be regarded 
as genetically pre-determined or structured, rather than conventionally constructed. I 
may say something about this later.) 
 
An example, taken from Edward MacNeal Mathsemantics: Making Numbers Talk 
Sense (Penguin, New York, 1994, p 52), quoting Richard Feynman in "What Do You 
Care What Other People Think?": Further Adventures of a Curious Character, 
(Norton, New York, 1988): 
You can know the name of [a] bird in all the languages of the 
world, but when you're finished, you'll know absolutely nothing 
whatever about the bird... I learned very early the difference 
between knowing the name of something and knowing something. 
All you'll know about is the patterns of meanings and language-use which these bird 
names show—you know about the namer, not the named! 
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Here is a second point. All knowledge is convention, or even common sense. But we 
need to be aware of the question 'Whose convention? Whose common sense?' 
 
Let me give an example. If we talk about fish, will we be satisfied to use the example 
of the Polynesian fishermen (reported by Malinowski, in James Britton Language and 
Learning, Penguin, 1970 p 24) who have three words for fish: these are equivalent to 
fish-I-eat, fish-that-eat-me, and other-fish, or the-swimming-thing. 
 
Try these simple tasks:  
Round 2.51 to the nearest whole number. 
Next, round 45 cents to the nearest whole dollar. 
What am I getting at here? 
While rounding is a straight-forward process, it may expose some of our personal and 
cultural views about the concept of 'zero'. 
 
Consider the following exchange, developed from MacNeal (p 128): 
Q: Does the equation have a number of solutions? 
A1: No, only one solution. 
A2: No, no solution. 
The first answer implies that 'one' is not a number: when we have a number of 
solutions we necessarily have more than one solution. The second answer similarly 
implies that 'zero' is not a number. 
 
At this point we are the mercy of the Greek view that 'nothing' does not really signify 
anything, and that 'one' is not a number, but is a unit by which we can measure other 
numbers larger than one. By contrast, the Hindu view accepts nothingness as a state 
of being which can legitimately be used in sensible discussion. 
 
Incidentally, the word 'three', in many Indo-European languages, relates to a Sanskrit 
root which can be seen in the Latin stem 'trans' which means through or beyond, or 
many. Hence the old story of people who counted 'one, two, many'. 
 
Here is another short task: write down a definition of the term 'spectrum'. 
 
We see the world through our accepted conventions, often without being aware of 
actually using conventions. Rather, we think we see what actually is. We think that 
what we see actually exists. Consider the word 'image' or 'IMAGE' —  
 
 
Do we see letters, or only the shadow-outline of letters? (Adapted from a similar 
example by R.L Gregory, cited by Gombrich, in Gregory and Gombrich, 1973). 
 
Only when we try to use a different world-view can we realise the conventional 
nature of much of our thinking. 
 
MacNeal (pp 137-139 and 202-203) describes Hopi ideas of time. We speak of a 
period of three days. Time can be sliced. Hopi speak of time that is unsliceable and 
can only be experienced. We discuss a trip that takes three days. The Hopi talk about 
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a trip that finishes at the end of the third day. We say that twenty days is longer than 
ten days. The Hopi say that the twentieth day comes after the tenth day. 
 
Now, coming back to the rainbow and spectrum questions, write down why you have 
a finite list of colors as the answer for the first question when a spectrum is essentially 
a continuum? 
 
Knowledge is something that exists inside people's heads, stored as neural circuits, 
electro-chemically strengthened networks or connected collections of brain cells 
known as neurons.  
 
Knowledge can be derived from experience, but can also, in certain forms, be 
permanently 'wired' into an organism's brain at birth. It appears that part of our ability 
to respond to the appearance of eyes in something which appears to be a face may 
actually be biologically built-in at birth, rather than anything we learn, that is, 
personally construct from experience. Other sensory responses to our ordinary 
environment, such as the ability to detect apparent depth (that is, plunging vertical 
distance ahead of us, or at our feet), may also be genetically predetermined, or 'hard-
wired' into our brain's circuitry at birth. Awareness (albeit unreflective, not within 
active consciousness) that an object is rapidly approaching our head, in response to 
which we rapidly blink our eyes shut, flinch or wince or attempt to duck for cover—
this too seems to be present from birth, rather than being learned by trial and error 
after being hit a few times by rapidly approaching pillows, and other air-born missiles 
directed towards our heads by malign circumstances beyond our control. 
 
Intuition is what we think before we know. 
 
Knowledge is represented outside of people's heads by means of writing, diagrams, 
symbols and other forms of archival representation (CD-ROM, video tape, computer 
memory, and so on). 
 
Knowledge is a 'convention', negotiated by knowers, communicated approximately by 
language, symbols, signs, physical performance. 
 
Learning is a process of negotiation between initial-knower and would-be knower. 
 
A great deal depends on what one person means and knows, on what the other person 
knows and thinks is meant, on the present context and purposes (possibly differently 
understood). 
 
We make and control our own meanings. Nonetheless it is possible for us to make 
mistakes. We may fail to recognise what are logical consequences of things we think 
we are saying. We may say the exact opposite of what we really mean, and our 
listeners may actually hear us say exactly what we mean to say, even though we say 
the opposite. 
 
Consider this more technically demanding example: 
— Explain what basic mistake has been made in the following textbook passage: 
 'As the temperature of the filament [of thin tungsten] increases, its resistance 
increases due to an increase in tungsten's resistivity' (Lofts, G., O'Keefe, D., 
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Robertson, P., Pentland, P., Hill, B., Pearce, J. Jacaranda Physics 1, Jacaranda 
Wiley, Milton, Queensland, 1997, p 360). 
 
The practical point is that how we think of the subject matter we are trying to teach, 
the bridges we are trying to build, and the territories that are connected by the bridge, 
effects how we teach it, how we react the students we interact with, and the way we 
try to negotiate a mutually acceptable map of what we are doing. 
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A Collection of Questions and Activities for the Symposium Paper: 
Exploring constructivism(s): the gaps between philosophy, psychology, 
praxis and common sense(s). 
 
1. Explain the reason for the English language dislike of using split infinitives, to 
simply show the role of 'convention' in language development and use. 
 
2. Match each of the following food combinations with one of the following sources 
or contexts. 
 A  Empty a can of sardines into a bowl of tomato soup. 
 B  Use cod liver oil as a condiment on roast beef and vegetables 
 C  Vanilla icecream sprinkled with potato crisps 
 D  Chicken casserole with dark (bitter) chocolate sauce 
 E  Applying a sauce whose main ingredient is fish guts to almost all foods eaten 
 F  Serve well-fried bacon with pancakes and liberal amounts of maple syrup 
 
 (i)   One of Bob Hawke's favourite dishes 
 (ii)  Fred Hoyle The Black Cloud (science fiction novel) 
 (iii) a favourite Aztec dish 
 (iv) Margaret Craven I Heard the Owl Call My Name (novel) 
 (v)  hearty lumberjack food 
 (vi) typical cuisine of Ancient Rome 
 
3. Explain why black is not a color. Explain why white is not a color. In terms of 
color concepts, what would you call silver? Why is Homer's sea 'wine-dark'?  
 
4. For each of these two photos (one shows a man holding a lottery ball towards the 
camera nearly in line with his face, the ball seems much larger than the man’s mouth 
and nose: and one shows a street scene with skyscraper where the buildings seem to 
tip away from the viewer), identify the particular camera lens used to achieve this 
effect. 
 A  Fish-eye lens 
 B  Wide-angle lens 
 C  Normal lens 
 D  Deep-focus lens 
John Gough — Research Studies page  83 
 E  Multi-facet lens 
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5. Explain what basic mistake has been made in the following textbook passage: 
'As the temperature of the filament [of thin tungsten] increases, its resistance 
increases due to an increase in tungsten's resistivity' (Lofts, G., O'Keefe, D., 
Robertson, P.,  Pentland, P., Hill, B., Pearce, J. Jacaranda Physics 1, Jacaranda 
Wiley, Milton, Queensland, 1997, p 360). 
 
6. A spherical steel ball of mass 500 gram is released from the top of a long inclined 
plane, sloping at an angle of 30 degrees to the horizontal. Rolling down the plane, 
having started from rest, how fast is the ball rolling after 10 seconds?  
  Remember that Newton's Second Law (the Law of Inertia) states that F = ma 
(the effective Force that acts on an object is equal to the product of the mass of the 
object and the acceleration of the object).  
 Also, in metric units, the vertical force due to gravity on an object at the Earth's 
surface is approximately 9.8 Newton (kilogram metre per second per second).  
 And of course cos 30o = .87, cos 60o = .5, sin 60o = .87, and sin 30o = .5 
 
7. You are standing at the top of a tall cliff, 100 metres above sea level. Looking 
straight out to sea, you lower your line of vision 30 degrees from the horizontal 
and see a ship. How far away is the ship? 
 
8. Explain how we can mix the colors blue and yellow and get the result of green, and 
how we can mix the colors blue and yellow and get a resulting grey color, and 
how can we mix red and green and get yellow? 
 
9. Homework Task: Use a mirror and a water-based fibre-tip pen (a washable 
whiteboard pen is ideal). Stand close to the mirror and look at your face. Consider 
how large it appears in the mirror—rather like looking at a person standing 
opposite you. Now take the pen, reach out, close one eye, and trace around the 
mirror image of your face. Now look at the oval shape you have traced. Does it 
seems as large as your face had at first appeared? 
 
10. Consider the classic statement 3 + 4 = 7. Match each of the following alternative 
answers with one of the following conditions. 
 A  5 
 B  10 
 C  3.04 
 D  2 
 E  1 
  
 (i)   Adding so many dollars and some other many cents. 
 (ii)  Adding in modulo 5. 
 (iii) Addition in base 7. 
 (iv) Adding multiples of Aleph-nought, the smallest transfinite number. 
 (v)  Vector addition of perpendicular vectors. 
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Devil's Advocacy as Critical Research Methodology: Spatial 
Thinking as a Case Study 
[Paper presented at the 1998 Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to Research in Mathematics, 
Science, Health and Environmental Education, Deakin University.] 
 
ABSTRACT  
Playing a role of 'devil's advocate', although familiar generally within 
our culture, tends to be taken for granted, undervalued, neglected, or 
even held in ill-repute. Who wants to be on the devil's side when we 
could be on the side of the angels? But a devil's advocate wields 
essential critical and analytical tools which ought to be better 
understood and more deliberately used. What do you mean? How do 
you know? What does this imply? How would this alter current 
practice? What is the current practice that seems to be required to 
change? Why change? How could you test this idea? What difference 
does it make? Related issues such as the unthinking cultural 
acceptance of 'change is good' and 'change is progress', and 'critical 
fatigue', threaten to undermine reasonable principles of conservation. 
In my own work I find myself constantly playing a devil's advocate 
role, probing, challenging, and testing materials I read, the work of 
students I am supervising, and my own thinking and practice. I 
propose to discuss spatial thinking, and the related theories of Piaget, 
Van Hiele, and Krutetskii, in particular, as a brief indicative case study 
of devil's advocacy in practice. 
 
Introduction: What is Devil's Advocacy? 
'It's funny how many of the best ideas are just an old idea back-to-
front' (Adams 1987, p 55.) 
 
What is devil's advocacy? Like many important critical ideas, it is hard to pin down. 
But it is a way towards knowing. The hard-nosed economic rationalist, to take one 
approach to knowing something, says, in the lilting expression from the popular 
Hollywood film Jerry Maguire, 'Show me the money!', or 'What is the bottom line?', 
which really means, 'How big a profit do I make?' or 'What will I have to pay for 
this?'. The empiricist says, 'Show me the evidence', or 'Why should I believe this?'. 
The devil's advocate is a kind of inverted empiricist. Instead of looking for reasons to 
believe, the devil's advocate tests proposed knowledge by looking for reasons to 
disbelieve whatever is being proposed. 'Why should I believe that?' or 'But how can I 
believe that when … ?'. 
 
Traditionally a devil's advocate was the person appointed by the Pope or a college of 
cardinals, charged with the task of examining the life and works of anyone who was 
being considered for possible canonisation, a potential 'saint'. The devil's advocate's 
task was to test as rigorously as possible the saint-candidate's candidacy, searching 
for hidden sins, flaws in the character, doubt about the veracity of miracles brought 
about by praying for the saint-candidate's help, and so on. While purportedly putting 
the devil's case against the candidate being accepted into sainthood, the devil's 
advocate was actually a highly regarded member of the church hierarchy, and not, of 
John Gough — Research Studies page  86 
course, in any sense of the term, on the devil's side. But using the term more broadly, 
there is more to being a devil's advocate. 
 
Working as a devil's advocate includes examining the terms and arguments used, 
considering alternative interpretations and potential uncertainties, proposing counter-
arguments and looking for counter-examples and contradicting evidence, asking how 
the idea being proposed works in practice and what difference it makes, and 
investigating what would be the consequences if the proposed idea were actually not 
true. For me, a confirmed devil's advocate, it is my own knee-jerk reaction against 
unconsidered knee-jerk reactions to the latest breath-taking new idea that happens to 
come along, to the unthinking acceptance of band-wagon orthodoxies. Being a devil's 
advocate is also good fun because it gives plenty of scope to play, intellectually and 
critically, with ideas, probing, sometimes pricking, plausible propositions. A devil's 
advocate is as rigorous in searching for counter-examples and counter-arguments as 
the opposition's (what might be called an angel's advocate) seeking of confirming 
evidence and supporting arguments, and in testing these is no less rigorous than his or 
her opponent's testing of the contrary case. 
 
I should stress that being a devil's advocate does not mean believing in nothing 
(known in philosophical circles as nihilism, which might be linked with the Buddhist 
doctrine that the material world is an illusion). Nor is it simply nay-saying deny-
everything cynicism. The line between constructive scepticism (looking for reasons 
that something might be accepted as 'true' as well as alternative reasons why it might 
not be 'true') and cynicism is blurry. But I like to think that I am a sceptic, a 
questioner, a person who does believe many things, but only when there is 
convincing evidence for doing so, and this evidence has been rigorously tested, 
counter-examples searched for and analysed, and so on. Aren't we all? 
 
Perhaps this marks me, as I said in my symposium paper last year (1997), as an 
unreconstructed Popperian, following Karl Popper's view of scientific method, not as 
one of sifting evidence to confirm theories, but attempting to refute or disconfirm a 
theory. Recently one of the students I have been working with startled me with a 
passing mention of 'empiricists and post-empiricists, positivists and post-positivists'. 
Oh, no! I thought, not another post-blahblah to worry about. And, 'positivists'? 
Weren't they big back in the so called Vienna School, between the World Wars, 
Bertrand Russell and logical positivists, loosely linked with wild-eyed behaviourists 
such as B.F. Skinner—all foundering in the formal mathematical paradoxes of Kurt 
Gödel, and Wittgenstein's arguments about the unresolvable game-like ambiguity of 
informal language. It turned out that my student was reading the Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994 pp 5, 13, 109-110, ) whose 
encyclopedic all-inclusiveness and rampant labelling results in two words for what I 
think of as empiricism, or scientific method. Certainly Popper made a major 
contribution to the philosophy of science. But despite his changed emphases and 
ways of describing scientific method, practising scientists went on in much the same 
way. There were not, despite the grandiose labels of the Handbook, two paradigms 
(another ugly word, which evoked all the ambiguity of Thomas Kuhn's famous 
discussion, and its rather confused aftermath), but one. 
 
I mention this in some detail because it illustrates one of the features of devil's 
advocacy: namely, always wanting to know what a term means. (I am well aware that 
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as far as Humpty Dumpty is concerned words are simply there to do whatever we 
want them to do—'the question is … which is to be master', you or the words: Carroll 
1871 chap VI.)  
 
There is more to this than often meets the eye. A devil's advocate also wants to know 
what a term doesn't mean, and what a term is different from, and what a term is good 
for. A term which looks as though it specifies something, but actually includes many 
other things as well, maybe too many other things, is useless. Well chosen, clearly 
defined terms capture precise, or at least reasonably clear meanings, and just as 
clearly exclude others. Why? Trying to come to grips with knowledge, at least for me, 
is purposive. I don't just collect knowledge, I want to be able to do something with it, 
such as answer questions, and understand things which have puzzled me, and 
sometimes to actually do something, such as use computer graphics to make 
isometric drawings, or learn to program using Logo, or design and build a coffee 
table, or write a book, or a paper about research methodology—such as this. 
 
A Devil's Advocate is a Jargon-Buster 
Postman and Weingartner (1969 p 16), typically, attempting to express their radical 
sense of the real point of schools (knowledge-communication factories), quote 
Hemingway's interview remark that necessary equipment for a great writer includes 'a 
built-in, shockproof crap detector'. This is one of the functions of devil's advocacy — 
detecting crap. Showing that some proposed idea simply cannot be believed, because 
of reasons X, Y and Z. Sadly, it's easy to be taken in by crap. Sometimes we are 
willingly gullible, and refuse to test the evidence for or against. Humans are not 
always consistent or logical—they can't be. It is part of human nature to live, as well 
as possible with paradox and contradiction. It is, stating a truism, certain that I will 
die, and that whatever I do in my life will make no discernible difference to the 
universe in one hundred, or one thousand years—but I go on doing it just the same, as 
though I could make a difference. And maybe I can, for a very short while, make a 
difference. But I know any difference, any ripple I cause, will quickly enough 
disappear. This is the paradoxical wisdom of Albert Camus's existentialist novel The 
Plague (1947)—brutal, but enough to build a life on. 
 
'Why sometimes [said the White Queen] I've believed as many as six impossible 
things before breakfast'. (Carroll 1871 chap V.) When Lewis Carroll invented the 
White Queen she was a figure of absurd humour. In our age of quantum theory, 
political correctness, and post-modernist post-deconstructuralism the White Queen is 
seen as heroic—if only we could attain her intellectual strength. Douglas Adams 
realised this when he invented the Electronic Monk, a labour-saving device, like a 
washing machine, which saves you from having to believe 'all the things the world 
expected you to believe' (1987, p 3). 
 
Why do we need crap-detectors, or to test definitions, or search for counter-examples 
(as Imré Lakatos argued, in his Popperian discussion of the 'proofs and refutation' 
method of making mathematics, which last year I argued had its natural counterpart 
in constructivist theories of learning mathematics, or anything else: Lakatos 1974)? 
Partly we need it as an act of critical self-defence, because we live in an age which 
has sanctified 'change'. New is good, newer is better, change is good, change for 
change's sake, and hooray for progress! 
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Critical Fatigue and the Chimerical Drive for Novelty—Post-… What? 
One driving force behind this intellectual pro-change culture is a kind of 'critical 
fatigue' or 'intellectual habituation'. Ernst Gombrich describes this in his major study 
of the psychology of decorative art, The Sense of Order (1979). He notes 'the 
undeniable psychological fact that the familiar tends to register less than the 
unfamiliar, and that the public therefore demands ever stronger stimuli' (p 212). He 
further comments that this links with 'the tradition of the new', the ceaseless search 
for 'originality', '… ranging from a mild interest in innovation to the impatient 
rejection of last year's model' (p 213). Against this, a practical minded devil's 
advocate retorts, if it ain't broke, don't fix it! Hold fast that which is good. Are there 
any healthy babies being thrown out with this ageing bathwater? The same idea arises 
in John Brophy's neglected Second World War novel Immortal Sergeant (1942 
chapter 6): 'the programme for a concert had to be compiled carefully. The public 
loved its familiar classics … but the critics had heard them too often. You had to lure 
the critics with something new, which was hard to get, or by a bit of showmanship'.  
 
Incidentally, why am I pillaging novels and books on decorative art to make a point 
about educational research methodology? It is because I am a rag-bag eclectic (not, I 
hope, a rat-bag eclectic). As the trendy French would put it, je suis un bricoleur, 
using Claude Levi-Strauss's bizarre and alienating terminology (e.g. Levi-Strauss 
1966 p 17, or Papert 1980 p 173, or Denzin and Lincoln 1994 p 2). Sadly, it is typical 
of much that a devil's advocate would find wrong with trendy research jargon that we 
do not insist on clear English for a simple idea. But of course this use of obscure 
foreign terminology adds a sophisticated highly intellectual sense of … je ne sais 
quois (which, though it may sound very smart and impressive, means, literally, 'I 
don't know what', which does rather sum up the unhelpful point of obtuse abstruse 
terms). Unashamedly I am a dog's-body theorist: I practise bricollage; that is I am a 
Jack-of-All-Trades, a do-it-yourself-er, who finds that similar ideas arise in diverse 
settings. Naturally they 'arise', because my mind sees them there. It is typical of 
human thinking that we see life through our own thinking and experience, through 
personal lenses, whatever we are looking at. Inevitably, then, much that I read or hear 
becomes grist for my own mill. Isn't this true for us all? 
 
Critical fatigue or overload, of course, explains a lot of the bizarre stuff that occurs in 
'modern' and 'post-modern' art, to say nothing of the well-intentioned hyper-
imaginations that have arisen in educational thinking, and practice. Again, the 
possibility of creating a label may actually serve as a conceptual trap, creating a 
semblance of something that may mislead us into thinking we are seeing something 
which is actually not there, clothes on the naked Emperor. What, for example, is 
'post-modernism'? If we take literature as the arena for asking such a question, what 
might be exemplars of 'post-modern' novels? John Fowle's The French Lieutenant's 
Woman? Gary Crew's Strange Objects? Joyce's Ulysses? Sterne's Tristram Shandy? 
Petronius's Satyricon? Almost any characteristic of so called 'post-modernism' can be 
found in books which are so old that they make nonsense of the 'post-' or the '-
modern'.  
 
What about education? Do we actually live in a 'post-modernist' age, and if so, where 
was the 'modernism'? Profiles? New math? Programmed learning? Behavioural 
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objectives? Sloyd? Project work? A.S. Neil and 'Summerhill'? Bertrand Russell? John 
Dewey? The invention of compulsory education?  
 
So much, perhaps, for deceptively attractive, attractively deceptive terms. Similar 
difficulties of terminological inexactitude arise with terms such as 'information 
technologies, learning technologies, technology, convergent technologies, numeracy, 
and the Internet. Would we, for example, speak of a computer as an example of 
technology? A typewriter? A pen? Is the alphabet a form of technology? Where do 
we draw the line so that on one side the examples represent the concept of technology, 
and on the other side the examples are not-technology? 
 
Active Learning — Sounds Good, But Could That be Right? 
As another example, I frequently encounter the idea that students were in some 
earlier era not-active learners, with the suggestion that now the Internet, or computers 
(or Cuisenaire, or New Maths) will miraculously make students active learners. But 
this is largely spurious. When we are carry out large quantities of education, 
especially of people younger than 20 years of age, pre-employment people, there is a 
great deal of compulsoriness about this learning and, because students have little 
choice, compulsory education often has an appearance of students not being active. 
Being interested and being active are not necessarily the same. But students, whether 
studying voluntarily, or compulsorily, within a formal educational setting, usually do 
what they are told by their teachers. This 'doing' is 'active'. Equally, students learn by 
actively connecting with information and experience (mentally active, even if not 
always physically active and wandering around classrooms or jumping around in 
gymnasiums, or performing in some way, such as practising a musical instrument, or 
using a spoken or written language). Even in the strict methods of teacher-dictation, 
student-memorisation, and rote performance, students were 'active' in their attempts 
to memorise, and, even with rote-intended instruction, to make some kind of personal 
sense of what is expected to be learned. 
 
It may also be noted in passing, in our age of student-centred approaches to learning, 
and teacher-as-facilitator, that not only are students actually active, so must teachers 
be. The whole point of being a teacher is to make a difference, to change the students, 
to bring about learning. Putting this provocatively (and being a devil's advocate is 
often a matter of acting as an agent provocateur, a possum-stirrer or pot-stirrer, a 
provoker, a thorn-in-the-side, a nagging conscience, a voice in the wilderness, a 
prophet not honoured in his or her own country), a teacher is paid to interfere with 
students' minds, and any teacher who is not doing this is simply child-minding! This 
does not mean that a teacher must run classes with a rod of iron, or totally dominate. 
But it does at least mean that the teacher is accountable for the learning of students, is 
in control of the class, and directs the activities that occur in the class. Certainly 
students can be consulted, and may even make significant contributions to any 
decisions about what is to be studied and learned, to what will be the focal activities 
of the class. But the teacher remains dominant, in the way that the compere of a TV 
show dominates the discussion of the guests, and ensures that things run smoothly, 
and that the discussion is worthwhile and substantial and pleasant.  
 
Of course a teacher must listen to what students say, and be able and willing to 
respond to this. The teacher must also leave space, and time, in which students can 
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think and work without continual prodding and input from the teacher. But most of 
what the students will be engaged in will be material, questions and challenges 
provided by the teacher, essential stimuli and motivation. Without this direct 
intervention and contribution ('interference', indeed) by the teacher, left to their own 
devices, most students would be quite pleased, for example, never to do any 
mathematics at all, and instead spend all their time chatting about TV, playtime, 
looking forward to lunch, gossiping about classmates, playing games, and so on. 
While it is true that students do learn informally and spontaneously in non-school 
settings, and it is the goal of schools and teachers for their students to become 
increasingly independent of direct teacher-input, most of the learning which occurs in 
schools which are established for the purpose of compulsory education occurs 
precisely because of the action and initiative of teachers. The older the students, the 
less reliant on teachers they should be, but now I am speaking ideally—even devil's 
advocates can be idealists. 
 
Oh Brave New Computer-Crazy World — 'New'? Different? 
One of my students picked up a point from other researchers: 'The type of student in 
our classroom today, is as Green and Bigum mention (1993 p 119), quite different to 
previous eras'. But the devil's advocate in me disagrees. Certainly the student has new 
tools. But the student's approach to learning is the same as it always was—teachers 
often having to drag them to the actual learning, kicking and screaming—'Why do I 
need to know this? When will I ever use it?' Unfortunately, although Green and 
Bigum are exciting to read, and often provocative, they frequently exaggerate for 
rhetorical purposes or just simply get things wrong. Think about the students you 
teach. Making some allowance for comparatively recent generational changes in 
popular culture (rock video and computer games, for example), are these students 
really different from the way you and your friends were when you were in school? Or 
when your parents were in school? 
 
To push this argument a little further, consider the glowingly recommended attributes 
of computers in schools recently offered to me by another of my students: The 
computer is a: 
• think pad; 
• key to access data from Encarta to Reuters; 
• tool to store, organise and manipulate information; 
• doorway to the most powerful multimedia formats; 
• construction site for learning; 
• gallery to exhibit knowledge and understanding; 
• multi-dimensional tool in a multimedia age; and 
• communication tool to express feelings, share ideas and to develop powerful 
relationships. 
 
But as a devil's advocate, let me also point out that: 
• an exercise book is a think pad; 
• a library gives access to data; 
• algebra, calculators, encyclopedias, measuring instruments, and so on, are tools for 
working with information; 
• paper-based education, which I am talking about here, is a doorway to many 
publication-formats; 
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• discussing ideas with people, and working intellectually with recorded forms of 
knowledge is a way of constructing learning, and anywhere that you do this is a 
construction site, even a blackboard can be a construction site; 
• a gallery is a gallery, and so is a concert hall, a sports arena, a dance floor, a book, 
or billboard, or broadcast, or lecture, or other form of public or shared 
communication; 
• pens, paints, printers, stamps, scissors, paste, audio-recorders, video-recorders, 
editing machines, and so on are each of them dimension-tools in a multi-
dimensional information age; and 
• talking, singing, dancing, gymnating, playing, miming, writing, acting and 
interacting are communication tools to express feelings, share ideas, and 
develop powerful relationships — more powerful, we would hope, than 
anything mere machines can develop, because people interacting with people 
face-to-face is more immediate and mutually supportive than anything that can 
be seen and reacted to on a computer screen. Of course, when robots pass the 
Turing test of detectable intelligence, my remark about face-to-face will come 
unstuck. 
 
What I am trying to get at here is a counter to the underlying naive enthusiasm of the 
student, who seems to be offering these views of computers as though this is all new, 
an amazing breakthrough in learning tools.  
 
We have, in fact, had other versions of these tools, in the past, which were often as 
effective as anything a computer can do. 
'Well, what we called a computer in 1977 was really a kind of electric 
abacus, but …' 
'Oh, now don't underestimate the abacus,' said Reg [the Regius 
Professor of Chronology at St Cedd's College, Cambridge], 'In skilled 
hands it's a very sophisticated calculating device. Furthermore it 
requires no power, can be made with any materials you have to hand, 
and never goes bing in the middle of an important piece of work'. 
'So an electric one would be particularly pointless', said Richard [a 
former college student, and computer programmer] … 'There really 
wasn't a lot this machine could do that you couldn't do yourself in half 
the time with a lot less trouble… .' (Adams 1987 p 19.) 
 
We get a similar unthinking knee-jerk rejection of the so called 'empty-vessel' 
theory of knowledge. But think of your own experience as a student in school. Did 
you ever feel you were an 'empty vessel? Do you think your teachers ever treated you 
as an 'empty vessel'? And, if so, how could it have been different? Think now of your 
own work as a teacher. Isn't it true that, when you set out to 'teach' something, you 
start by assuming that, whatever it is you are about to teach, your students do not 
already know it, at least not in the way you want them to know it—or else there 
would be no point in teaching it! Hence, as far as this particular topic is concerned, 
these students are 'empty' of that topic, or at least 'naive' about the topic. They may 
know the topic exists, but not really know anything about it, or know wrong things 
about it. That is, the 'empty vessel' metaphor, like many metaphors, is partly right, 
and partly wrong, and should not be unreasonably pilloried, nor should something 
alleged to be a non-empty-vessel theory be held up as a panacea. 
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The same student, sketching the impact of 'learning technologies' on schools, 
argued that: 
in a student-centred learning environment, especially one supported by the 
use of technology, the role of the teacher, far from being diminished is 
expanding and becoming more demanding and challenging. Far from 
abdicating their responsibilities or being replaced by machines, teachers 
are playing a far more active role in student learning, one to which the 
term 'facilitator' does not do justice. They need to: 
• support students in taking responsibility for their own learning by 
giving students ownership of the learning process; 
• structure activities to incorporate computer-mediated technology when 
and where appropriate;  
• ensure the development of 'information literacy';  
• encourage students to seek advice and information from 'experts' 
beyond the classroom, whether through the Internet or through 
mentoring arrangements; 
• encourage collaborative, project-based work to help students to be 
good local and global citizens; 
• assist students in reflecting on their learning and in developing more 
effective learning strategies and in developing all aspects of their 
'intelligences';  
• ensure the development of appropriate ethical standards of behaviour 
towards the sensitivities of others, intellectual property, data privacy 
and the integrity of systems and networks; and 
• be co-learners with their students in using the technology effectively. 
But, wearing my devil's advocate hat, I'm not sure there is much here that hasn't 
always been true about the role of teachers. Changes in technology do not alter this, 
not that much. 
 
Similarly, consider this idea proposed by a student:  
'If the teacher can design an activity which uses the computer and also has 
some relevance to the students' life-worlds, the students are more likely to 
construct meaningful mathematical knowledge'.  
Certainly this idea would be good, but hard, to research. However simply using 
computers may not make the learning any more meaningful.  
 
Consider, for example, whether or not Secondary mathematics students are currently 
learning, say, standard deviations, any more meaningfully now that they routinely 
use scientific calculators compared with the old days when all calculations were done 
using formulas and pencil-and-paper, or even using non-scientific calculators. It 
might be the case that the computers actually distract students from the real focus of 
the learning, or conceal the educational goals. We might think Secondary algebra 
students are learning, say, how to solve and manipulate quadratic equations, but they 
are actually only learning how to run a part of Mathshelper or some other 
mathematics processing software, and not really grasping the idea, say, of completing 
the square. In fact, using computers, would they ever actually see the 'square' that is 
being completed, and what does the 'completing' idea really mean unless it is actually 
seen?  
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Students Really Learn By Really Doing Projects — Really? 
We need to be constantly on critical guard against claiming things to be true which 
we want to be true but which might not necessarily be the case. We need strong 
devil's advocates to protect us from being too hopeful. Nowadays, in the era of CATs 
(Common Assessment Tasks—namely, projects and examinations) and problem-
solving projects, students are asked to complete a large investigative project, 
requiring students to apply and extend their existing 'tool-kit' of skills and concepts to 
new situations. Such a project, or the stages in exploring and solving a large problem, 
may involve considerable quantities of important mathematics, and the educational 
rationale for such projects is held to be that it reflects the real way that 
mathematicians use mathematics, and it provides a context in which mathematics 
curriculum is learned more effectively by the students.  
 
Really? Sometimes all the students are aware of having achieved at the end of such 
an investigation are some answers to the overall project problems. The mathematics 
the students have used does not really sink in, certainly not in a general sense, 
because the students only ever see this mathematics as a means to an end, not 
something that might be used in many very different situations, or that might 
meaningfully connect with other important mathematical ideas. Imagine, for example, 
setting the students a task of finding the speed of a falling object at a given instant. 
While this might involve a lot of calculus-related mathematics and thinking, the 
students may learn virtually no calculus at all from the activity, even though the 
students do obtain a reasonably correct answer using mathematically rigorous 
arguments.  
 
If students are to develop their understanding they need to be able to look up from 
their narrow focus on getting answers, and examine and generalise the task-specific 
method they are using. In effect they must say to themselves, 'I have found an answer 
to this particular question, but what other kinds of questions can I use this method to 
solve, and what is this method really doing?' Moreover, far from appreciating that 
this is the way real mathematicians use mathematics, students come away from the 
project with a sense of having done what the teacher asked them to do: haven't 
students always focused on their own private game of 'Please the teacher, and avoid 
trouble?' 
 
Here is another example of glowing student-oriented rhetoric which ought to be 
challenged.  
'When students construct their knowledge, teachers must let them link their 
learning of concepts in their own way. If we let children (or in fact 
anybody) follow their own noses, learning anything that they are curious 
about, they will go faster and cover more ground than we would ever think 
of trying to set out for them, or make them cover.'  
Arguing as a devil's advocate, if students are left to make their own connections, or 
left too free in their connecting, they easily get things wrong.  
 
Notice the way students use their own terms, such as 'timesing' instead of multiplying, 
or develop idiosyncratic informal methods for doing arithmetic (adding the tens first 
and the units later). Consider the scope for mis-learning when students interpret too 
freely or in ignorance. Remember the child who called her teddy bear 'Gladly' 
because her teddy was cross-eyed and she knew the old hymn tune 'Gladly My Cross-
John Gough — Research Studies page  94 
eyed Bear'. Think of the scope for students to get things wrong, or rely on formulas, 
when they think of 'limit' in terms of plain English everyday meanings, or just plug 
values into nPr and nCr instead of arguing step-by-step from first principles. 
 
When glowing rhetoric and newness is pursued relentlessly, with little attention paid 
to earlier practices, inevitably the history that is not remembered is repeated. Guided 
reading, for example, the latest fashion in classroom reading methodology, is simply 
a re-invention of a whole class all reading the same book aloud. In this case, the 
devil's advocate notes wryly, the more things change the more they stay (or 
eventually become) the same, again. 
  
Moreover the Hawthorne Effect is not as widely known as it ought to be, the 
experimentally demonstrated result that, while participant-subjects believed they 
were involved in some new experimental treatment, their general performance was 
boosted, until they became used to the newness. Hence novelty has a genuine 
teaching value, but not because the new ideas are necessarily good, in themselves, but 
simply because they are regarded as new. Once the newness fades with time, the 
artificial boost in motivation and consequent achievement disappears, unless there 
really is some previously-masked benefit in the now-aged innovation (McMillan and 
Schumacher 179–180; Ary et al. 226). A devil's advocate knows all about the 
Hawthorne Effect, and cautions against being misled by it. 
 
The Great Piagetian Breakthrough — Are Children Really Like That? 
I may have always been a devil's advocate — haven't we all. But perhaps Piaget first 
triggered my conscious critical reactions. Fascinating though the experiments were, 
the interactions between child, experimental task, and clinical interviewer, I 
repeatedly found myself not believing what were claimed to be the results. 
Adult: Are there more flowers or more daisies? 
Child: More daisies. 
(From a transcript of a Piagetian interview in a Nuffield film 'Children 
and Mathematics, quoted by John Holt 1970 p 63.) 
Holt, puzzled by the child's reply, quotes unpublished remarks of Tony Kallett, a 
British school adviser: 'the child's job is to figure out what the adult expects him to 
say, and the adult's job is to make this as easy as possible for the child' (p 64). Holt 
himself is blunter.  
'Alternative answers have been on the following lines:  
(1) Huh? You can't ask that;  
(2) More [flowers] naturally;  
(3) Huh? What do you mean?' (p 66). 
 
That is, too often, Piaget's interview script or use of language or experimental task is 
so unusual that children are tricked into giving answers which do not reflect what 
they really think. The more I read about Piaget, including critics such as Charles 
Brainerd, Graeme Dettrick, Peter Bryant, and Martin Hughes, the more I was 
impressed by Piaget's hard work and innovative thinking, and the less I was 
impressed by his research conclusions. In fact Piaget, with his famous 'concrete 
operations' and 'Stage' theory, was not himself all that original. In the fantasy novel 
The Crock of Gold, the Irish novelist James Stephens noted that 'With children, 
thought cannot be separated from action for very long. They think as much with their 
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hands as their heads. They have to do the thing they speak of in order to visualise the 
idea' (1912, Book VI, chapter XVII, pp 149-150).  
 
Seymour Papert, the inventor of Logo, gives a fascinating account of his childhood 
experience with cogs and gears — 'I became adept at turning wheels in my head and 
at making chains of cause and effect'. Later Papert used gears as mental models when 
he first encountered the ideas of multiplication tables, and equations with two 
variables in algebra (1980 p vi).  
 
This is not an argument for introducing gears into kindergarten. However it was 
precisely in order to provide a similarly powerful semi-concrete context that could 
help students experience and think about mathematics that led Papert to develop 
Logo.  
 
Peter Sullivan describes a related example, where a concrete object, surprisingly 
enough, enabled a student to think very quickly. One day he asked his son, then in 
Grade 1, 'what's fifteen plus sixteen?', and was surprised by the speed with which his 
son answered 'thirty-one'. The answer came too quickly for a digit-by-digit mental 
counterpart to a pencil-and-paper algorithm. Had he used the well known strategies 
of near-doubles or double-and-adjust? Had he for some reason memorised a number 
fact and recalled the result? His son explained that he knew 'fifteen minutes is a 
quarter of an hour, and thirty minutes is half an hour, so thirty-one' (Sullivan 1994 p 
12).  
 
From this we can conclude that it is extremely difficult to effectively prescribe 
concrete materials as essential components of the mathematics curriculum. Some 
children benefit from some materials some of the time. But, like Abraham Lincoln 
fooling the people, not all children benefit all the time from any particular material. 
My oldest son, who started Primary school already able to calculate mentally, using 
informally developed counting strategies and 'just knowing', which is, of course, the 
central goal of the mathematics curriculum, soon stopped being able to do this, 
precisely because a misguided Prep teacher believed that all children needed to rely 
exclusively on concrete materials when they started doing number work in schools. 
Grrr! 
 
In this case, who could have predicted that a Grade 1 student would have mentally 
internalised such information about analog clocks, or be able to connect the clock 
image with a number fact? Yet this is, obviously, the way students think, albeit, 
idiosyncratically. This is not an argument for making analog clocks a compulsory 
concrete aid for all junior Primary arithmetic learning. But teachers need to 
encourage their students to use such personally significant concrete models as a 
natural informal aid to related thinking activities. 
 
These examples show the power of first working with objects, and then thinking 
about them, automating and internalising, a key process in constructivist theory, as I 
noted last year (Gray and Tall 1994). In fact it could be argued that one of the 
important factors in Piaget's interview work is that so much of it is oral, naturally, 
with children who have not yet learned to read or write. Yet the internalising and 
automating of written language skills brings with it a lift in vocabulary and a change 
in thinking which may have a significant effect on thinking generally. How many of 
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us find out what we think by the exploratory process of trying to write down our 
ideas? 'The little girl had the makings of a poet in her who, being told to be sure of 
her meaning before she spoke, said: "How can I know what I think till I see what I 
say?" ' (The Art of Thought, Graham Wallas (1858-1932) — I have been unable to 
find a full reference for this quote found in the Penguin Book of Quotations). 
 
Pictures Also Need a Devil's Advocate 
Words, of course, are not the only arena for devil's advocacy. Consider the following 
simple example which was offered by a visiting North American academic as a 
model for explaining the dynamic connection and interaction between three kinds of 
information or experience, such as: Language, Actions, and Attitudes; or 
Mathematics, Science, and Technology. Criticise the diagram. 
 
I leave as an exercise the following diagram, which is meant to serve as the 
'conceptual model' for teacher education in a nearby country. I am assured by one of 
my students, a lecturer from a teachers' college in this country, that the diagram is 
very well understood by teachers and educational professionals. I am not so sure that 
there is ANYTHING that is understandable, but it is most unlikely that my critique 
would have any effect: as the Americans say, 'You can't beat City Hall'. 
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Consider, for example, the Venn diagram (is that what it is?) in the centre of the 
diagram, and the perpendicular bi-polar axes (Spiritual–Physical, and Intellect–
Emotion) which are (apparently) overlaid on the over-lapped circles, and ask how 
these seven words are meant to be connected, or how the inner parts of the diagram 
are meant to connect with the outer vertices of the triangle. 
 
Theories of Spatial Thinking: A Case Study 
Are there 'stages' of development in learning about Geometry and thinking spatially? 
The famous Swiss experimental psychologist and education theorist Jean Piaget 
devised many ingenious experiments and used these to develop extensive theories 
about the way people learn about 'space' in the world around them. His major study 
with Bärbel Inhelder The Child's Conception of Space (1948) argued that infants and 
children progress in geometric knowledge from topological concepts, through 
projective geometry and eventually reach Euclidean concepts only with the advent of 
formal school instruction —a surprising reversal of the actual historical development 
of theories of geometry in mathematics. 
  
But this says more about Piaget's personal philosophical tendency to look for 
surprising evidence of abstract modern mathematics in children's thinking than it 
does about either the history of geometry or what children really can or cannot do. 
Despite this, Piaget has been very influential. (Generally I subsume Inhelder into the 
use of the name 'Piaget' in this discussion, not to belittle her work, but in recognition 
of Piaget's pioneering significance.)  
Without going into too much detail consider briefly one of Piaget's more intriguing 
and appealing spatial experiments: the classic 'Three Mountains' task, which Piaget 
describes as 'co-ordination of perspectives' (1948, pp. .210–246). The apparatus 
consists of a physical table-top model of three mountains, shown in the sketch in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Jean Piaget's 'Three-Mountains' Task 
This should be easy for picture-literate adults to understand visually. Obviously for 
the young Swiss children Piaget interviewed and studied, Alpish mountains were 
certainly part of their everyday experience. (But consider how Dorothy on the prairie 
plains of Kansas might respond to Piaget's questions!) Each mountain has identifiable 
features such as height and color, a snow cap on the highest, a hill-top cross on the 
second highest, a red house on the top of the lowest of the mountains, not shown in 
this sketch. The child must identify a particular pictorial representation of the three 
mountains as seen from a specified position. To do this the child chooses from a 
collection of realistic pictures of this model as drawn from several different points of 
view. (Experimenters nowadays would use close-up scale-model photographs instead 
of Piaget's drawings.) The child is helped to do this by the experimenter using a toy 
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doll who is supposed to be moving like a real person around the model of the 
mountains as though the mountains and the doll were real. 
  
What will the doll see when it stands here —at A, B, C, or D, and so on? Piaget had 
several different ways of asking these kinds of questions. 
  
He interviewed 100 children, ranging in age from 4 years to 12 years old. As a result 
he described several major Stages in development, each with important sub-Stages—
all part of a much larger general theory of cognitive development through 
childhood—the classic Pre-Operational, Concrete Operations, Formal Operations 
theory of Piaget. 
 
In short, the youngest, or least developed children who could understand or seem to 
respond sensibly to Piaget's questions did not identify the point-of-view of another 
observer: 'the child distinguishes hardly or not at all between his own viewpoint and 
that of other observers (represented by the doll in different positions)' (Piaget & 
Inhelder 1948, p. 212). For such a child, when attempting to imagine another person's 
point of view, the child believes that anyone else will see only what the child sees. 
The child cannot see beyond his or her own point of view. The child is locked into 
'egocentrism'. 
 
Very interesting. Such children would be baffled by instructions from pre-school and 
school teachers to perform spatial tasks needing an imaginative response to another's 
viewpoint. Cooperative play with building materials would be extremely difficult. 
 
Martin Hughes Versus Piaget 
It takes a devil's advocate, a brave researcher with an equally intriguing experimental 
set-up to challenge such impressive research. Martin Hughes, the author of Children 
and Number (1986), developed a simple counterpart to Piaget and Inhelder's 'Three 
Mountains' (in Margaret Donaldson's classic Children's Minds : 1978, pp. 19–31): a 
cut-away house, with a policeman-doll and a boy-doll shown in the bird's-eye view of 
Figure 2.  
 
  
Figure 2: Martin Hughes' 'Policeman and Boy' Task. 
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The boy doll can be placed at positions A, B, C or D. The child is helped to 
understand the equipment. Questions are asked such as, 'If the policeman stands here 
[as shown] and the boy is here [e.g. A], can the policeman see the boy?'; 'If the 
policeman is here [actually placed at B, for example], place the boy so the policeman 
can't see him'. Very few errors occurred, and children were helped to overcome any 
errors. This led to the real test: two policemen were placed in different locations, and 
the child had to try to hide the boy-doll. 
 
Where Piaget found that children up to the ages of 8 and 9 were unable to answer 
'Three Mountains' questions correctly, unable to 'de-centre' (nasty jargon) or 
overcome 'the egocentric illusion' (Piaget's words, translated, quoted by Donaldson, p. 
20), Hughes found that children aged between three-and-a-half and five years could 
answer his 'Policemen and Boy' questions with an overall accuracy of 90 per cent. 
And four-year-olds could handle even harder questions with the same success rate. 
Who is right? 
 
Piaget's work has been replicated by others. Hughes' work stands up to experimental 
scrutiny. What is at stake is the interpretation offered by both researchers, and critical 
comparison of the two experiments. According to Donaldson the key difference is 
that some of Piaget's younger children actually did not understand the task, although 
this seems not to have been obvious to Piaget. Hughes was able to use a simplified 
version of the 'Three Mountains' task with pre-school children and, given careful help 
to make sure they understood what they had to do, most of them succeeded. 
 
But more importantly, Donaldson points out that even three-year-old children know 
what is involved in 'hiding' from some one. Though of course few children are used 
to really hiding from policemen, 'hiding' is a widely played young child's activity. 
That is, the Policeman task 'makes human sense' (emphasis in Donaldson's original, p. 
24) where Piaget's task is clearly harder and also less humanly sensible because the 
motives and intentions of the imagined players in the task is not obvious. 
 
This discussion of two key research experiments indicates the caution we need to 
exercise when faced with apparently compelling experimental evidence that children 
can or can't do certain things—or that they pass through certain stages at particular 
ages. There is a difference between being influential and a pioneer, as Piaget 
unquestionably has been, and being reliably right and helpful in the classroom. A 
devil's advocate tests these differences. 
 
Piagetian Disciples — van Hiele's Developmental Theory of Geometric 
Learning 
Consider another increasingly popular theorist-researcher of spatial thinking. Just as 
Hughes came to his research in critical response to Piaget's influence, in the 1950s 
the Dutch Pierre van Hiele and his wife Dina van Hiele-Geldof attempted to build on 
and 'correct' Piaget. They constructed a developmental theory about geometry, 
building on the responses of school children to instruction in traditional (Euclidean) 
geometry. This research began with two parallel doctoral studies. Following the early 
death of his wife, van Hiele continued their joint work, and his research articles and 
major study Structure and Insight (1986) has had considerable continuing influence. 
The following discussion draws on the Australian-based research of John Pegg. 
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According to van Hiele, students move through five identifiable Levels of thought or 
geometric understanding, as follows (adapted from Pegg 1990, pp. 427–428): 
Level 1: Students identify figures by their shape as a whole. An object (say 
a trapezium) is what it is because it looks like it, a square and a 
rectangle are seen to be different. A typical comment from a student at 
this level is that 'a rectangle is a longer square'. 
Level 2: Students identify figures by their properties. However, the 
properties are independent of one another. A typical response might be 
'a square has four equal sides and four equal angles'. Squares and 
rectangles [which share some of the stated properties] are still seen to be 
different. 
Level 3: Students still identify figures by their properties, however 
relationships between properties are observed. A typical response might 
be 'an isosceles triangle has two equal sides', but if probed about the 
angles the student will say 'if the sides are equal then the angles opposite 
them must also be equal'. A square is now seen to belong to the class of 
shapes called rectangles. Concepts such as parallelism and congruence 
emerge as principle aspects to be explored and used even though they 
had been known and talked about at lower levels. 
Level 4: Students can reason in a formal (deductive) way. They can solve 
theories [or 'theorems'] without relying on rote learnt steps that need to 
be followed. 
Level 5: Students can work within systems based on different axioms and 
study other [non-Euclidean] geometries which are not based directly on 
[Euclidean] experience. An example would be projective geometry. 
 
We notice in the examples offered by John Pegg the typical sequence by which 
students at first distinguish in everyday terms between 'square' and 'rectangle' (and 
the term 'oblong', which is an everyday synonym for the mathematical term 
'rectangle'), and only later accept the mathematician's view that a 'square' is a special 
case of a 'rectangle', and also that a 'square' is a right-angled example of a 'rhombus'. 
In fact 'rectangle' and 'rhombus' are also included in the larger category of 
'parallelogram' and this is in turn included in the still larger category of 'quadrilateral', 
itself a category within the general family of 'polygons'.  
The successive development of finer and finer distinctions between definitions or 
categories is often conceptually problematic for students. The example of 'square' and 
'rectangle', initially discrete concepts, later being seen with 'squares' as a subset of the 
set of 'rectangles', is a classic example. Exactly the same difficulty arises in the 
successive refinement of zoological concepts. Typically, many students at first find it 
shocking or at least puzzling to include 'birds' as a subset of the larger category of 
'animals', and commonly rebel at the teacher's suggestion that 'humans' are also 
'animals'. 
 
Van Hiele and Pegg are right in their analysis and description of a theoretical 
intellectual sequence of levels of understanding—from everyday concepts to formal 
definitions and abstract deductive skills. But whether this has any relation to 
psychological developments within an individual or learning stages is another 
matter—grist for a devil's advocate.  
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For example, notice that Pegg's account of van Hiele's theory Level 5 assumes that 
direct experience of geometry is 'Euclidean'. But whatever the limitations of Piaget's 
research, it seems clear that infants' and very young children's perceptual world and 
thinking is based on the non-Euclidean concepts of 'near, far, in, out, touching, not-
touching' and so on. That is, so called 'direct experience' may not be inherently 
Euclidean at all. After all, Euclid proposed his geometry after millennia of human 
activity with informal geometric experiences, and non-Western cultures did not 
develop Euclid's formalisations.  
 
Straight lines, angles and so on are human conceptual constructions which provide an 
abstract basis for certain kinds of human activities. We only need to step into a world 
of plaited wattles and round-walled round-roofed mud-thatched huts, or the well-
known hemispherical Inuit igloos, to realise that 'straight' and 'angle' are also culture-
relative, and not necessarily part of direct experience unless you happen to live in a 
world built of bricks and planks and right angles, dominated by tools and machines 
and school-based approaches to language and concepts. 
 
The van Hiele Levels are certainly interesting. Pegg and others have used the Levels 
as structural guides for approaches to developing geometric curricula. For example 
Pegg suggests that teachers encourage students:  
to concentrate initially on the properties of a rhombus. Not until 
students are familiar and comfortable with these properties is it 
suggested that work involving [compass-and-ruler] constructions 
(such as bisecting a line and drawing perpendiculars) should be 
commenced. Such an approach allows teachers the chance to let 
students, who are at Level 2, work at their level of understanding in 
carrying out and explaining constructions (a topic teachers often cite 
as difficult to 'teach'). The end result of such an approach is that 
students can talk about the reasons why the constructions 'work' in 
terms of the properties of a rhombus. They do not need to rely on 
remembering a number of 'tricks' that they do not understand and need 
to memorise (Pegg 1990 p 428). 
 
This sounds convincing. But so did Piaget's 'Three Mountains' research. Let us now 
consider what possible flaws a devil's advocate might be in such a view? 
 
To begin with, van Hiele and those who use his ideas, seem to be confusing the idea 
of 'development' with the experience of schooling. Piaget's theory, with its Stages of 
Pre-Operational, Concrete Operations and Formal Operations, argued that children 
cannot be 'taught' how to move from one Stage to another. Rather, if a teacher has 
any role in helping students move onwards through their cognitive developmental 
stages, it is only to provide as much rich and suitably structured experience as 
possible, from which students will be able to make their own discoveries and 'grow' 
through this experience to a new way of thinking. Pegg, discussing the reported 
difficulties with compass-and-ruler constructions, is similarly hesitant about the 
possibilities of 'teaching' being effective.  
 
But Piaget's ideas, about providing rich experience and challenging materials and 
activities, distinguish between traditional approaches to school curricula (lesson A, 
followed by lesson B, and so on, developing concepts and skills in order x, y, z, and 
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so forth) and a kind of uncontrollable mental growth that corresponds with 
physiological growth (such as the onset of puberty, given a sufficiently nutritious 
diet). You can't teach people to become taller. You can't teach children to physically 
mature into adults. You can't teach people to move from Concrete to Formal 
Operations. But with a good enough 'diet' or experience, they will get there 
themselves — according to Piaget and Piagetians. 
 
Whatever we may think of such claims, this is obviously very different from any 
comparable claim by van Hiele or his followers that you can't teach people to move 
from, say level A to level B. Different, precisely because van Hiele's identified 
Levels are so clearly tied to different stages in a traditional geometry curriculum. It 
seems impossible to imagine any way that a student could move from, say, Level 3 
(structured geometric vocabulary) to Level 4 (standard Euclidean proofs), or from 
Level 4 to Level 5 (non-Euclidean geometries) except by the direct intervention and 
instruction of a teacher wielding a well structured geometry curriculum. Whereas it is 
possible to imagine a student moving from Piaget's Pre-Operational to Concrete 
Operational Stages simply through rich experience and natural 'growth'. Isn't that how 
most of us did this, and our children after us? Surely we did not rely on a teacher and 
formal instruction, or informal parental hints.  
 
As for moving from Concrete to Formal Operations, especially in mathematics where 
the move is one from number work to algebraic work, and beyond, it is extremely 
difficult to imagine how this can be done without teachers. But that is yet another 
criticism of Piaget's theories which need not detain us too long here. The more you 
take a devil's advocate look at hard details of school curricula, the more Piaget seems 
to have less and less immediate relevance or constructive implications for the 
business of teaching and working with children and their school-based mathematical 
thinking especially in the transitional stages from arithmetic to algebra. (Further 
details can be found in the specialist research discussion by Clements and Gough 
1978.) 
 
Separate from these remarks, notice also the way Pegg, for example, emphasises that 
students should focus on restricted geometric topics, such as the rhombus, until these 
are 'mastered' or sufficiently understood to be able to become the basis of extension 
to further and other topics. But Pegg himself identifies a key limitation:  
… if this idea was pursued in detail then the process would need to be 
repeated many times (i.e. with many figures) before a satisfactory 
basis, across a large section of Geometry, was established ... apart 
from the tedious repetitive nature of the activities, it is not clear that 
the sum of the repeated procedures would ever give a satisfactory 
holistic answer for the student (Pegg 1990 p 430). 
Pegg's discussion goes on to consider van Hiele's suggestions for overcoming this 
limitation. However the overall implication seems to amount to little more than the 
obvious point that teachers should proceed to teach geometry as well as possible, 
bearing in mind that students may not always understand at first, and may take time 
to come to grips with the real implications of the curriculum. 
 
In the extreme case, we might accept van Hiele's theory, and claimed that this should 
form the basis for teaching geometry in school, because it has been shown 
experimentally to be the way that geometry is actually learned. But against this we 
John Gough — Research Studies page  103 
simply need to ask ourselves whether this was, in fact, the way we learned geometry? 
Obviously, because we would not accept any suggestion that we have not ourselves 
learned anything about geometry, there are other ways of learning geometry. Are they 
as effective as van Hiele? That could be researched. But van Hiele's analysis itself is 
not evidence for this. 
 
Krutetskii and Two Forms of Mathematical Thinking: Analytic-verbal and 
Spatial 
The mathematics education researcher Vadim Krutetskii (1976), working in the 
former Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s, used diagnostic interviews to 
investigate the way students worked with mathematics tasks. He found there were 
three kinds of mathematical reasoning. He called 'analytic' that kind which relied on 
words and chains of logical reasoning, which analysed a task into separate terms or 
symbols and concepts and subtasks and separate steps. He used the term 'synthetic' 
for the kind of thinking that involved images and spatial thinking (mentally working 
with mental images). A third kind of thinking, called 'harmonic' was a flexible 
combination of the other two kinds (Krutetskii 1976 p xiv). Many mathematics tasks 
can be handled in one or other of the three ways. Consider this: A boy says to his 
sister, 'If you give me 8 nuts then we will have an equal number'. But she replies, 'If 
you give me 8 nuts, I will have twice as many'. How many nuts did each have? 
(Krutetskii 1976 p 204). Do you use algebra (analytic) or a diagram (spatial) or some 
combination of these two methods?  
 
John Munro suggests teachers should try to match the method of instruction to a 
student's preferred cognitive style (Munro 1995). It is also helpful to try to extend 
students, encouraging them to develop skills outside of their preferred cognitive style. 
 
The idea that different people can have verbal abilities as well as non-verbal, in 
particular, spatial abilities, is very old. You may be good at music, and I may be good 
at mathematics, and our friend may be able to write sonnets without raising a sweat, 
while yet another friend is a wonderful sight on the ballroom floor. When the first 
intelligence tests were being developed, psychologists found it helpful to develop 
word-related and logical reasoning tests, and also to develop spatial pictorial tests, 
because they found that different people had different kinds of abilities. Psychologists 
needed different kinds of tests to be able to evaluate these different abilities. One test 
could not capture the whole variety of individual skill, talent, achievement, 
intelligence or, broadly, 'ability'. 
 
It often happens that a student who seems to have average intelligence, or even lower 
than average intelligence, as shown by verbal intelligence scores or word-related 
achievement at academic school work, may actually have above average non-verbal 
intelligence, possibly of different kinds, including body actions—consider the body-
intelligence of a skilled gymnast or dancer—or picture-making skill—how well can 
you draw a recognisable 'likeness' of another person, or even copy another picture? 
The recent discussion of multiple-intelligences (for example Gardner 1983) simply 
carries these psychological theories across into classroom applications, connected 
with ideas of personal cognitive styles.  
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Krutetskii's achievement, in part, is to identify very clearly the role of spatial and 
verbal thinking within the mathematics curriculum, and outline a theory of 
mathematics learning and thinking which parallels the familiar ideas of 
constructivism. According to Krutetskii many kinds of mathematics which may not 
seem at all spatial can actually be handled by spatial thinking, the inner or mental use 
of images as an alternative to overtly manipulating objects. But geometry, in 
particular, is a branch of mathematics that appears to rely on spatial thinking, even 
while it develops sophisticated analytic reasoning as part of its general intellectual 
tool kit. 
 
Geometry is the formal study of spatial concepts such as 'point, line, plane, angle, 
turn, region, parallel, perpendicular, similarity' and 'congruence'. Spatial thinking is 
the broader ability to use mental images in spatial ways. Of course, ever since 
Descartes (and the other inventors of coordinate, that is algebraic Cartesian 
geometry) we have been able to express formal geometric concepts, such as 
Pythagoras's theorem about right-angled triangles, in formal algebraic ways, such as 
a2 + b2 = c2, which readily generalises beyond geometric of everyday spatial 
interpretations to such hyper-dimensional equivalents as a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 = e2.  Some 
algebraic treatments of geometric situations, while elegant and direct, are far harder 
for students to deal with than the equivalent simple ideas related to obvious diagrams 
and spatial properties.  
 
That is, we can dispense with a diagrammatic geometric treatment if we want to. But 
this makes the mathematics harder to learn. Similar remarks can be made about the 
differences between formalised or axiomatic treatments of geometry, and less formal 
approaches using rough sketches, approximate definitions, and spatial thinking. 
 
Consider some examples that might help to show the connections, and differences 
between these different kinds of thinking. Consider any triangle ABC. Construct 
perpendicular bisectors of the sides AB, BC and AC. Using ordinary arguments of 
Euclidean geometry (in particular, arguments based on establishing the 'congruence' 
or geometric equivalence of pairs of triangles), prove that the three perpendicular 
bisectors intersect each other at a single point. Show also that this point is the centre 
of a circle which passes through points A, B and C, a circle that 'circumscribes' the 
triangle. Incidentally, do you know how to use a ruler, pencil and compass to 
construct a perpendicular bisector for any line AB? Can you provide Euclidean 
arguments (or vector arguments or transformational geometry arguments) to prove 
that the construction succeeds in making a line which both bisects and which is 
perpendicular to the line being bisected? 
 
Having done this, can you now translate this situation into coordinate geometry? Let 
A be the point (0, 0) and B be the point (x, 0) and C be the point (m, n), where x, and 
n are both non-zero, and m is not equal to x. Use coordinate geometry arguments to 
show that the equations of the straight lines which pass through the mid-points of AB, 
BC and AC, which are also perpendicular to lines AB, BC and AC, intersect at one 
single point which is equi-distant from A, B and C (Gough 1994 p 1). 
 
Similar investigations, Euclidean and Cartesian, can show that the angle-bisectors of 
the angles in any triangle meet at a point which is the centre of a circle which just 
touches the sides of the triangle (the inscribed-circle); the medians of any triangle 
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intersect at a single point; and, the altitudes of the sides of a triangle also meet at a 
single point. Do you know how to use a ruler, pencil and compass to bisect any angle, 
or to construct a perpendicular to a line at any given point on the line? Do you know 
how to find the equation of a straight line which halves the angle between any other 
two distinct straight lines? 
 
Sketch what the following diagram would look like when viewed from point A, point 
B, point C and, finally, Point D. 
 
This, of course, is an adult equivalent of Piaget's three-mountain task. As you attempt 
any of these spatial thinking activities, you might like to consider where they might 
arise in a van Hiele developmental level, or in a Victorian Curriculum & Standards 
Frameworks (CSF 1995) Strand and Level. Also consider whether or not you are 
using school-learned skills to tackle these tasks. 
 
Conclusions(?) 
Finally, it is worth remembering, as a good devil's advocate will remind us, a key 
practical fact: learning, like thinking, is something that happens inside people's heads. 
Last year I made a similar point in discussing theories of constructivism. When a 
person learns, what is being 'constructed' is, literally, connections between brain cells. 
Something similar can be said about spatial thinking. Whatever the theories—Piaget's, 
Hughes, van Hiele's, Gardner's, or others—what really happens, in terms of working 
with physical objects, diagrams and mental images occurs inside brains. Perhaps 
Krutetskii's discussion of 'synthetic' thinking, or Gardner's 'spatial intelligence', what 
I have sketched here as spatial thinking, comes closest to anything which might 
actually correspond to changes in connections between brain cells. We may yet live 
to see a time when the brain's active functioning is mapped, and we will see that 
when a person solves a mathematics problem spatially this occurs in brain-location X, 
and when a person solves the problem with verbal-analytic methods this occurs in 
location Y. But I doubt any brain-locations will be identified with a Piagetian 
Developmental Stage or a van Hiele Level.  
 
Of course being able to see where spatial thinking is located in the brain will tell us 
nothing, directly, about how to construct a spatial thinking curriculum, and is 
unlikely, short of inventing brain-hats that students will wear in class, to enable a 
teacher to know whether or not a curriculum is succeeding, and a student not only is 
thinking spatially, but is also learning, developing new spatial thinking skills and 
concepts. But careful, critical, constructive, sceptical analysis will help us understand 
our curriculum and our students better, and we will be able to teach more effectively. 
For me this is the purpose of research. 
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Spiritual Knowledge and Intelligence 
Beverly Jane — Faculty of Education: Monash University: Peninsula campus 
John Gough — Deakin University: Education Faculty (SDS)  
 
[The following discussion is based on a paper presented at the Symposium on Contemporary 
Approaches to Research in Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental Education, held by the 
Centre For Studies in Mathematics, Science and Environmental Education, Deakin University, 9 and 
10 December 2002] 
 
Abstract 
Following critical analysis of recent developments in Howard Gardner's 
theory of Multiple Intelligences, the authors became interested in the area 
of "spiritual knowledge" (an aspect of Gardner's "existential intelligence"). 
Critical reading of academic research literature, and of biography, 
autobiography and "literature" (including fiction, and poetry), provides a 
description and critique of "spiritual knowledge", while preparing for 
further research. 
 
An Introductory Outline of a Research Methodology and Example 
This discussion of Literature Reviewing as a research methodology, taking Spiritual 
Knowledge as a case-study of how the methodology is used, will: 
• present a case for regarding "spirituality" or "spiritual experience, knowledge and 
intelligence" as an aspect of human existence, which is readily seen to vary 
amongst individuals; 
• link the variations in different facets of human existence with Howard Gardner's 
theory of multiple intelligences; 
• note possible overlap with EQ or "emotional intelligence" as considered by 
researchers such as Daniel Goleman, whereas Gardner’s theory subsumes EQ 
into several of his "multiple intelligences"; 
• explore the uncertainty regarding a Gardner-type approach to a possible "spiritual 
intelligence"; 
• use Gardner's original eight-point criteria for identifying and defining an 
"intelligence" as a basis for critique of the concept of "spiritual intelligence"; 
and 
• finish with some samples from a "literature review", including a review of 
"Literature". 
 
Recent interest in Spiritual knowledge or intelligence in science and 
technology education  
It is becoming recognised more and more that the old mechanistic paradigm, with its 
Cartesian-Newtonian science, no longer serves us. As a result, many scholars are 
calling for a paradigm shift, including Capra and Australian scientist Charles Birch. 
Science educators favouring an ecological worldview include Smith (2001) and Jane 
(2001). Jane argues for a new paradigm, “deep ecology”, because it is holistic, and 
includes spiritual and subjective viewpoints, which offer the potential to contribute to 
a sustainable future for our planet.   
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Keirl (2002) critiques Howard Gardner’s Theory of Multiple Intelligences to see if MI 
theory relates to the domain of Design and Technology. MI theory better addresses 
the complex nature of the human mind and attempts to offer an holistic view of 
human intelligence. However we argue that MI theory falls short of providing a 
universal account of intelligences. In developing our argument we have been 
searching the literature: the first step of any purposeful journey is often the most 
important. 
 
What is “Spiritual Knowledge”? 
Mathematical knowledge includes examples such as 2 + 3 = 5, or this two-
dimensional geometric object, ∆, is a “triangle”. Linguistic knowledge includes 
information about “parts of speech” such as “nouns”, and written letters of the 
alphabet, and their phonetic or spoken counterparts “phonemes”. Similar statements 
can indicate what “knowledge” means in the areas of music, art, history, and, moving 
away from “cognitive” or “intellectual knowledge” into other kinds or “performance 
knowledge” such as dance, sport, and vocational and recreational activities.  
 
We can also extend any discussion of knowledge or experience to “emotional 
knowledge” such as understanding (usually through personal experience mixed with 
social discussion) emotions such as rage, envy, sympathy, dislike, hatred, and love, 
and related physiological states such as nausea, ecstasy and lust. 
 
But if we want to discuss “spiritual knowledge” or “spiritual experience”, and want to 
argue that this is a form of knowledge or experience that is different from any of those 
already mentioned, what do we mean? 
 
I believe that if someone really wants a happy life then it is very important to pursue 
both internal and external means; in other words, mental development and material 
development. One could also say “spiritual development”, but when I say “spiritual” I 
do not necessarily mean any kind of religious faith. When I use the word “spiritual” I 
mean basic human good qualities. These are: human affection, a sense of involvement, 
honesty, discipline and human intelligence properly guided by good motivation. We 
have all these qualities from birth; they do not come to us later in our lives. (The 
Dalai Lama’s Book of Wisdom, 1999, p 5.) 
 
It needs to be stated, at the outset that spiritual knowledge has NOTHING to do with 
so called knowledge of god (or gods, or goddesses, minor deities, animist water-
spirits and tree-spirits, or their demonic equivalents, such as Satan, Beelzebub, devils, 
or imps), angels, astral bodies, spirits, ghosts, bogles, afreets, djinns, vampires, 
werewolves, and other creatures of the occult. Nor has it anything to do with a so 
called “immortal soul” or with a non-physiological, non-emotional, non-intellectual 
“spirit”-component of a human. I am content to let others deal with matters of the 
paranormal. 
 
We use the term “spiritual knowledge” to focus specifically on particular kinds of 
natural human experience and awareness which can be attested to by atheists, 
agnostics, and religious-believers alike, while omitting any consideration of the non-
human, supra-human or supernatural. 
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Saints and sinners have always been with us. So have holy men, and holy women, 
priests, shamans, witch-doctors, medicine-men, witches and warlocks, monks and 
nuns, visionaries and prophets, and ordinary lay-people. Churches, temples, shrines, 
synagogues, cathedrals, sacred-sites and cemeteries. Icons, cult-objects, fetishes, juju, 
divining rods and bones, I–ching sticks and dice, Viking runes and casting sticks or 
bones, zodiacs and horoscopes, numerological computations. Leave aside reports of, 
and belief in the supernatural, in para-pschology, in the paranormal — tales of 
levitation, reincarnation, prophetic dreams that come true, numerology, telekinesis, 
poltergeists, astral travel, angels, demons, and the “soul” — and accept that things we 
can refer to as “spiritual” have always been part of human activity, whether we 
believe in any of it or not. 
 
Wherever human activity exists there is human variation. Some people are physically 
stronger, some are weaker. Some are intellectually cleverer, some are slower or more 
limited in their ability to use their brains to solve problems. In the case of spiritual 
activities, it is easy to demonstrate that some people are more worldly, and others are 
less worldly, and, correspondingly, more concerned with matters we can describe as 
“spiritual”.  
 
In some ways these spiritual matters overlap with philosophical issues of ethical 
behaviour. How should a person live? What is a good life? Why does evil exist? What, 
if anything apart from biological (physical or biochemical) finality of an organism, is 
the nature and meaning of death? What is life? What is consciousness?  
 
Clearly, asking such questions also moves us away from “spiritual”, towards 
“scientific”, and “socio-political”. 
 
Already in this preliminary discussion of the term spiritual knowledge we can 
envisage a conceptual or experiential spectrum that starts, at one scientifically 
demonstrable end, with certain kinds of brain functions that may be identified using 
highly sophisticated brain-imaging, and ranges to a mystical and almost 
incommunicable end, with human reports of religious belief, accounts of personal 
conversion to belief, and, in the extreme, even visions of supernatural beings or the 
experience of religious presence.  
 
Non-Religious Aspects of Spiritual Knowledge 
Our discussion will deal with the more demonstrable, communicable and less mystical 
aspects. These include, as examples, a sense of: 
• awe: recognition of the largeness and complexity and power of the universe, at a 
cosmological scale, and at geological, biological, molecular, and even sub-
atomic scales; 
• humility: realistic awareness of an individual person’s human limits, finiteness, 
weakness, and comparative long-term and large-scale insignificance: this may 
be further extended, within the biological arena, by a non-species-ist acceptance 
of the equal value of non-human species; 
• belonging: feeling at one with the universe: this may be experienced also as a 
profound sense of respect for the environment and its complexities, and subtly 
balanced forces; 
John Gough — Research Studies page  111 
• mystery: awareness of the limits of personal and collective intellectual knowledge, 
and the unresolvably conflicting alternatives; 
• mortality: recognition and acceptance of one’s own death, and the death and 
eventual ending of everything currently known and experienced; 
• responsibility: awareness of personal involvement in the universe, linked with a 
sense of conscience, and awareness of a larger balance and justice; 
• uncertainty: awareness and acceptance of the inevitability of change, and 
randomness, and the accidental or arbitrary nature of events and existence; 
• obedience: awareness of the need to conform to inexorable and unavoidable 
physical and social forces (or risk loss of one’s own liberty, or life, or risk doing 
damage to others or to the environment); 
• aesthetic harmony: recognition that human existence includes more than food, 
shelter, time-passing, and biological drives. 
 
We only need to consider human memories of such everyday experiences as looking 
at the stars in a clear sky, watching ocean waves crashing against rocky cliffs, seeing 
teeming microscopic planktonic life in a drop of sea-water shown in a TV 
documentary, glimpsing a rainbow at the tail-end of violent thunder-storm; or the 
twilight-darkness of a total solar eclipse — such evocative moments are more than 
intellectual, and emotional, more than mere electro-chemical perceptual data from the 
natural world.  
 
Spiritual knowledge, glimpsed in childhood, can be life-changing. Albert Einstein is 
said to have begun his life-work as a scientist when he was given a simple magnetic 
compass, and the unchanging North-pointing of the compass-needle challenged his 
naïve child’s sense of the direct physical relationship between natural objects. 
 
Spiritual Knowledge &/or Intelligence(s): Howard Gardner’s Journey 
Analysing varieties of human activity, Howard Gardner proposed the idea of 
“multiple intelligences” (1983), highlighting that there is more to “intelligence” than 
a standard IQ test might be able to deal with. As we shall see, having begun with 
some of the more obvious kinds of intelligence (or human experience), Gardner’s 
theory has grown towards the general territory of spiritual knowledge. 
 
Initially Gardner suggested seven different kinds of intelligence, categorized, briefly, 
as follows: 
1. Visual-spatial or art smart: creative, imaginative, and perhaps more a visual 
learner; 
2. Bodily-kinesthetic or body smart: agile, energetic, touching and talking 
healthily; 
3. Logical-mathematical or math smart: logical, inventive, and a problem-solver; 
4. Linguistic-verbal or word smart: reader, writer, and perhaps more an auditory 
learner; 
5. Musical-rhythmic or music smart: sings, plays, and is rhythmic 
6. Interpersonal or people smart: a socializer, a listener, and a keen communicator; 
and 
7. Intrapersonal or 'me' smart: strong-willed, intuitive, and an introspective learner. 
 
Later Gardner proposed an eighth intelligence: 
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8. Naturalistic or category smart: holistic thinker, classifier and appreciates the 
environment (e.g. Gardner 1999). 
 
But what does it mean to be Naturalistically intelligent? Would we want to believe 
that a maritime culture that divides all sea creatures into two fish-related categories, 
namely “fish that I eat” and “fish that eat me”, is less Naturalistically intelligent than 
others whose sea-food recipes include bouillabaise? 
 
Naturalist intelligence designates the human ability to discriminate among living 
things (plants, animals) as well as sensitivity to other features of the natural world 
(clouds, rock configurations). This ability was clearly of value in our evolutionary 
past as hunters, gatherers, and farmers; it continues to be central in such roles as 
botanist or chef. I also speculate that much of our consumer society exploits the 
naturalist intelligences, which can be mobilized in the discrimination among cars, 
sneakers, kinds of make-up, and the like. The kind of pattern recognition valued in 
certain of the sciences may also draw upon naturalist intelligence. (Cited in (Checkley 
1997.) 
 
This is particularly interesting because it is clear that Gardner is attempting to capture 
quite diverse forms of human experience in his search for other “intelligences”. More 
recently still, Gardner has been considering the possibility of a ninth intelligence, 
namely an “Existential” intelligence.  
 
For example, in one interview Gardner explained: 
In my efforts to update MI theory in the light of new research, I 
am considering the possibility of existential intelligence. This 
term denotes the human proclivity to ask fundamental questions 
about life:  
Who are we?  
Where do we come from?  
Why do we die?  
Certainly kids resonate to these questions, and such queries also 
form the basis of much of our religion, art, science, and 
philosophy. One of the entry points that I mentioned above is 
actually called the existential, or foundational, one. 
It takes as its point of departure the posing of such big questions. 
I see my three topics as my own answer to three existential 
questions: 
• Where do we come from? (Evolution is the only scientific 
answer to this question; there are, of course, faith-based 
answers.) 
• What are some of the wonderful things of which humans 
are capable? (To my mind, the music of Mozart is as good 
an answer as any.) 
• What are some of the terrible things of which humans are 
capable? (Alas, the Holocaust gave new meaning to the 
word evil.) (cited from Scherer 1999). 
 
Already Gardner’s discussion of Existential Intelligence seems to overlap with broad 
aspects of spiritual knowledge.  
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In another interview Gardner adds: 
We might say that existential intelligence allows us to know the 
invisible, outside world. The only reason I haven't given a seal of 
approval to the existential intelligence is that I don't think we have 
good brain evidence yet on its existence in the nervous system — 
one of the criteria for an intelligence. (Checkley 1997) 
 
Gardner’s book Intelligence Reframed (1999) elaborates on this. 
 
In chapters 4 and 5, Gardner considers several new candidate intelligences — spiritual, 
moral, existential, and naturalist — ultimately settling on only the latter two. While 
there is a good case to be made for spiritual intelligence, he observes, our capacity to 
grasp cosmic and transcendent truths ultimately depends on affective characteristics 
and we have as yet no scientifically reliable way of investigating such traits.  
 
Moral intelligence is also rejected on the grounds that morality involves value 
judgments and intelligence is by nature value-neutral. (Robert Coles would disagree.) 
 
Existential intelligence — the capacity to ask profound questions about the meaning 
of life and death — is one of the cornerstones of art, religion, and philosophy and 
qualifies as an intelligence in its own right, says Gardner.  
 
However, since he has not been able to find the part of the brain dedicated to dealing 
with such questions, he is hesitant to add it to the list.  
 
As for naturalist intelligence — the ability to recognize and classify natural species 
and understand ecological relationships — Gardner says that it deserves to be 
recognized as a bona fide intelligence, similar to the seven described in the original 
theory. [From a book review at http://www.scottlondon.com/reviews/gardner2.html 
last accessed 28 August 2002-08-28] 
 
Another review of Gardner’s discussion in Intelligence Reframed adds this: 
According to Howard Gardner (1999 p 59) there are problems, for 
example, around the 'content' of spiritual intelligence, its privileged 
but unsubstantiated claims with regard to truth value, 'and the need 
for it to be partially identified through its effect on other people'. As 
a result: 
It seems more responsible to carve out that area of spirituality 
closest 'in spirit' to the other intelligences and then, in the 
sympathetic manner applied to naturalist intelligence, ascertain how 
this candidate intelligence fares. In doing so, I think it best to put 
aside the term spiritual, with its manifest and problematic 
connotations, and to speak instead of an intelligence that explores 
the nature of existence in its multifarious guises. Thus, an explicit 
concern with spiritual or religious matters would be one variety — 
often the most important variety — of an existential intelligence. 
Existential intelligence, a concern with “ultimate issues”, is, thus, 
the next possibility that Howard Gardner considers — and he argues 
that it “scores reasonably well on the criteria” (Gardner p 64).  
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However, empirical evidence is sparse — and although a ninth 
intelligence might be attractive, Howard Gardner is not disposed to 
add it to the list. “I find the phenomenon perplexing enough and the 
distance from the other intelligences vast enough to dictate prudence 
— at least for now” (Gardner p 66). 
The final, and obvious, candidate for inclusion in Howard Gardner's 
list is “moral intelligence”. In his exploration, he begins by asking 
whether it is possible to delineate the “moral domain”. He suggests 
that it is difficult to come to any consensual definition, but argues 
that it is possible to come to an understanding that takes exploration 
forward. Central to a moral domain, Howard Gardner suggests, “is a 
concern with those rules, behaviours and attitudes that govern the 
sanctity of life — in particular, the sanctity of human life and, in 
many cases, the sanctity of any other living creatures and the world 
they inhabit” (Gardner p 70).  
If we accept the existence of a moral realm is it them possible to 
speak of moral intelligence? If it “connotes the adoption of any 
specific moral code” then Howard Gardner does not find the term 
moral intelligence acceptable (Gardner p 75).  
Furthermore, he argues, researchers and writers have not as yet 
“captured the essence of the moral domain as an instance of human 
intelligence” (Gardner p 76). 
“As I construe it, the central component in the moral realm or 
domain is a sense of personal agency and personal stake, a 
realization that one has an irreducible role with respect to other 
people and that one's behaviour towards others must reflect the 
results of contextualized analysis and the exercise of one's will.... 
The fulfillment of key roles certainly requires a range of human 
intelligences - including personal, linguistic, logical and perhaps 
existential — but it is fundamentally a statement about the kind of 
person that has developed to be. It is not, in itself, an intelligence. 
'Morality' is then properly a statement about personality, 
individuality, will, character — and, in the happiest cases, about the 
highest realization of human nature.” (Gardner p 77) 
So it is, that Howard Gardner has added an eighth intelligence — 
naturalist intelligence — to his list. He has also opened the door to 
another possibility — especially that of existential intelligence — 
but the court is out on that one. [Mark Smith 2002, at 
http://www.infed.org/thinkers/gardner.htm] 
 
What are these “criteria” that Mark Smith refers to, used to determine whether a 
proposed new intelligence deserves to be included in the collection of Gardner’s 
Multiple Intelligences? 
 
In setting up his original theory with seven distinct intelligences, Gardner viewed 
intelligence as 'the capacity to solve problems or to fashion products that are valued in 
one or more cultural setting' (Gardner & Hatch, 1989).  
 
He reviewed the literature using eight criteria or 'signs' of an intelligence: 
• Potential isolation by brain damage. 
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• The existence of idiots savants, prodigies and other exceptional individuals. 
• An identifiable core operation or set of operations. 
• A distinctive development history, along with a definable set of 'end-state' 
performances. 
• An evolutionary history and evolutionary plausibility. 
• Support from experimental psychological tasks. 
• Support from psychometric findings. 
• Susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system. (Gardner 1983, pp. 62-69: also 
cited in Smith 2002: also Gardner & Hatch 1989.) 
 
In developing a clearer account of spiritual knowledge, it will be helpful to consider 
any evidence we already have that might indicate that some, at least, of Gardner’s 
eight criteria apply in the case of spiritual intelligence. 
 
Consider, initially, an example of research on brain-function related to spiritual 
knowledge. 
 
Religious belief and experience are usually regarded as beyond 
scientific exploration, yet neurologists at the University of 
California San Diego have located an area in the temporal lobe of 
the brain that appears to produce intense feelings of spiritual 
transcendence, combined with a sense of some mystical presence. 
Canadian neuroscientist Michael Persinger, of Laurentian 
University, has even managed to reproduce such feelings in 
otherwise unreligious people by stimulating this area.  
According to Persinger: 
‘Typically people report a presence. One time we had a strobe 
light going and this individual actually saw Christ in the strobe … 
[another] individual experienced God visiting her. Afterwards we 
looked at her EEG [electroencephalogram] and there was this 
classic spike and slow-wave seizure over the temporal lobe at the 
precise time of the experience — the other parts of the brain were 
normal,’ 
The fact that we seem to have a religious hot-spot wired into our 
brains does not necessarily prove that the spiritual dimension is 
merely the product of a particular flurry of electrical activity [in 
the brain]. After all, if God exists, it figures He [or She, or It] 
must have created us with some biological mechanism with 
which to apprehend Him [etc.]. (Rita Carter Mapping the Mind, 
1998, pp. 13, 19: citing Ian Cotton “Dr Persinger’s God Machine” 
1995.) 
 
Other researchers report similar findings: Michael Shermer 2001; Andrew Newberg, 
Eugene D’Aquili and Vince Rause 2001; Cook and Persinger 1997; Saver and Rabin 
1997; and Bob Holmes 2001. 
 
Consider the following further examples: 
• recent research on psychopathic criminals links an absence of functioning social 
and personal morality, that is, a “conscience”, with specific brain damage (e.g. 
Antonio Dimasio’s research on the behavioural effects of lesions in the orbital 
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frontal cortex — the so called “moral compass”, resulting in psychopathic 
consciencelessness: O’Neill 1999); 
• biographical knowledge of saints, whose spiritual abilities are prodigious; 
• an identifiable core of behaviours, including conscience, empathy, meditation, 
spiritual ecstasy or trance-like experiences; 
• accounts of monastic, meditation, Zen, and other forms of spiritual training; 
• by contrast, evolutionary (bio-genetic survival value) may be far harder to argue; 
• supporting neuroscientific research on religious brain-states is known, for 
example Cook & Persinger (1997); and 
• whether a spiritual symbol system exists may be harder to argue, but many 
spiritual practices include icons, and symbols of religious experience and belief, 
such as the figure of Jesus being crucified (and an abstract cross), and Tibetan 
mandalas, and Australian Aboriginal cave and sand-paintings and alcheringa 
designs. 
 
Michael Shermer, citing the neurological research of Newberg et al., says: 
When Buddhist monks meditate and Franciscan nuns pray, for 
example, single positron emission computed tomography scans [PET 
scanning] of their brains indicate strikingly low activity in the 
posterior superior parietal lobe. The authors dub this bundle of 
neurons the orientation association area (OAA). The area’s primary 
function is to orient the body in physical space … when the OAA is 
up and running smoothly, there is a sharp distinction between self and 
non-self. When the OAA is in sleep mode — as in deep meditation 
and prayer — that divide breaks down and, consequently, the lines 
between reality and fantasy are blurred. Is this what happens to monks 
who feel a oneness with the universe or with nuns who feel the 
presence of God? (Shermer 2001, p 54). 
 
The expression “losing oneself”, in relation to mystical experience, ecstatic trance, 
and similar moments of awe and insight, springs to mind. But it is important to realise 
that such experiences do not come easily. They usually require careful instruction, and 
practice. That is, they are a form of learned behaviour, partly conscious, and 
deliberated, and partly subconscious and intuitive. 
 
However, as a means of gathering further evidence of spiritual intelligence, Literature 
Review may be a valuable first step, easier and cheaper than attempting either breain 
research or genetic and archaeological research. That is, surveying “literature”, or 
searching through published research journals (across several overlapping and related 
disciplines, such as anthropology, religion, and psychology), as well as searching 
Literature, the literary world of novels, plays, poems, and the related worlds of 
biography and autobiography. 
 
A Literature Review of Literature Incorporating Spiritual Knowkledge 
Here is a first example: a transcendent feeling of “belonging”, of being part of the 
universe.  
 
Arthur Koestler’s novel Darkness at Noon (one of the great documents of the 
Twentieth century) describes the last weeks in the life of a Communist terrorist and 
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radical during a 1930s Stalinist purge of party leaders and functionaries. Rubashov, a 
former Commissar, is imprisoned (not for the first time), and interrogated, before 
being subjected to a show-trial, and executed. (Koestler had himself been imprisoned 
by Franco’s fascists during the Spanish Civil War, so his account of prison life is 
chillingly convincing.) Shortly before his death, Rubashov’s interrogations have 
ceased, and he is left alone, untroubled by warders or interrogators. It should be noted, 
in passing, that as a devout Communist, Rubashov has abandoned any religious 
background he may have had during his pre-Revolutionary childhood, and is a 
confirmed atheist, believing only in Marxism’s dialectical materialism. 
 
Sometimes [Rubashov] would respond unexpectedly to a tune, or 
even the memory of a tune, or of the folded hands of the Pieta, or 
of certain scenes of his childhood. As if a tuning fork had been 
struck, there would be answering vibrations, and once this had 
started a state would be produced which the mystics called 
‘ecstasy’ and saints ‘contemplation’; the greatest and soberest of 
modern psychologists had recognised this state as a fact and 
called it the ‘oceanic sense’. And, indeed, one’s personality 
dissolved as a grain of salt in the sea; but at the same time the 
infinite sea seemed to be contained in the grain of salt. The grain 
could no longer be localised in time and space. It was a state in 
which though lost its direction and started to circle, like the 
compass needle at the magnetic pole; until it finally cut loose 
from its axis and travelled freely in space, like a bunch of light in 
the night; and until it seemed that all thoughts and sensations, 
even pain and joy itself, were only the spectrum lines of the same 
ray of light, disintegrating in the prism of consciousness.  … 
Apparently even a patch of blue sky [glimpsed from his cell, or 
remembered from childhood] was enough to cause the ‘oceanic 
state’. (Koestler 1940, p 203). 
 
Tragically, Rubashov is still trying to serve his Party, and its higher goals, even as the 
Party decides to destroy him. He realises, as he reflects on his new insights that “The 
‘oceanic state’ was counter-revolutionary … [was] ‘escape from the task’, ‘desertion 
of the class struggle’” (p 204). He comes to believe that “for forty years he had been 
running amuck — the running-amuck of pure reason” (p 205). 
 
Much of this could now be explained scientifically as Rubashov’s physiological and 
emotional response to physical torture, mental suffering, sleep-deprivation, starvation, 
isolation, and other destructive aspects of his imprisonment. But the insight he 
achieves is itself a form of learning, and exactly parallels that willingly sought by 
devotees of kinder belief systems. 
 
Other possible books include: 
• Ursula Le Guin A Wizard of Earthsea where the breaking of laws of creation 
which emphasise the importance of “balance” results in disruption and the 
release of evil; 
• Ursula Le Guin The Farthest Shore where death is seen to be an essential aspect 
of human life and values. 
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Looking beyond books, occasionally films touch on aspects of human experience that 
can be described as spiritual. (This is discussed at length, with a special theological 
emphasis, by Robert K. Johnston’s Reel Spirituality 2000.)  
 
Consider, for example, the popular films of the Australian director Peter Weir, such as 
Picnic at Hanging Rock, and Dead Poet’s Society. Images and attitudes that may 
initially strike the viewer as odd or disturbing, become more sensible if they are 
reconsidered as examples of spiritual knowledge.  
 
In Picnic at Hanging Rock, otherwise unexplained, almost randomly inserted close-up 
shots of animals (a blue-tongue lizard, for example), and the frequent images of the 
monolithic rocks themselves, seeming to hang surrealistically against a vast slowly 
sweeping cloudscape, might at first be seen as little more than scene-setting. In fact 
the literal visual impact of the brooding rocks, shown in disturbing visual perspectives, 
is emotionally heightened by evocative pan-pipes on the soundtrack. But the larger 
significance of these images is their mystery, a luminous feeling of awe, the tension 
between trivial human endeavours and the power, teeming richness, and 
unpredictability of the natural world. 
 
The moral core of Dead Poet’s Society is simultaneously one of embracing 
celebration of rich culture, enhanced by the existential injunction to SIEZE THE 
DAY! Although Weir is not usually considered a maker of religious films, consider 
his apocalyptic, mystical working of Australian Aboriginal beliefs in The Last Wave, 
the impact on a tough-minded New York cop of Amish values and life in Witness, and 
the man/god, illusion/reality, stage/world dualisms in The Truman Show, where the 
off-stage director can “cue the sun”! (Incidentally, Johnstone gives a detailed chapter 
to Weir, as a maker of religious films. But oddly, does not mention, as a possible 
precursor, Graham Greene, as novelist,  film-script writer and writer of major filmed-
novels such as The Third Man, The Heart of the Matter, and The End of the Affair.) 
 
A very different, but equally profound non-religious spiritual experience reported in 
fiction occurs at the moment of “nausea” in Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophical novel of 
the same name (Nausea 1938). The central character, sitting alone in a park, realises, 
with a powerful physical sense of nausea, that the natural world around him, like the 
world of human activity that includes him, could be utterly different, and could 
change, irrationally, and arbitrarily, at any moment. Nothing that is necessary drives 
the world, its objects and events. Humans live in a terrifying world of change and 
freedom, where wildly different choices are possible. Yet despite being visited 
occasionally by this disturbing insight of “absurdity”, the Sartrean central character 
manages to find a way of choosing to BE, as a person, which convinces him that what 
he is doing is reasonable — as “reasonable” as anything can be in a world of chaos 
and choice.  
 
Sartre’s colleague in existentialism, Albert Camus, in his philosophical novel The 
Plague (1947) provides an even stronger, less mystical, WAY for humans to live, in 
an absurd world, where everyone will, eventually, die, and human suffering (as 
Buddha recognised) is unavoidable. For Camus, living in an absurd, godless, material, 
finite world, the preferred way for a human being to live with dignity is to act to 
alleviate suffering, despite the fact that all such actions — like those of a doctor 
ministering to a patient — are doomed to end in failure. The patient may be helped to 
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live, for now, but will sooner or later die. Nonetheless the doctor persists in his forlorn, 
existentially absurd minstrations. 
 
In an uncertain world, living in changing times, we can learn much about spiritual 
actions by reading novels. Consider, as a sprinkling of possible authors, Graham 
Greene, Elizabeth Goudge, Rumer Godden, Ursula Le Guin, and others. 
 
Conclusion, or Tentative Beginnings? 
There are no easy answers to questions about spiritual knowledge, intelligence, and 
learning, nor even clear directions. But like other aspects of human experience, the 
challenge for researchers is to investigate in any way possible.  
 
We are reasonably familiar with modern technological Western culture, its 
materialism, and its emphasis on laboratory- objectified science as THE way of 
researching and establishing new knowledge. Its extreme aspects of would-be 
objectivity, the distinction between mind and matter, the distinction between living 
organisms and dead inanimate matter, its separation of human life from non-human 
life-forms are known, and have been criticised and questioned. Nonetheless Western 
science clearly has already begun to explore spiritual knowledge. Other ways of 
knowing, and other cultures also contribute to this project, including native American 
and Australian Aboriginal traditional cultures, with their blending of human and non-
human life, their totem identification of people with animals, their grounding of 
humanity and culture in a whole environment. 
 
The first step, beyond this discussion, will be to continue extending this initial sketch 
of a literature survey. Then we will know more, and be better informed about possible 
ways to progress. 
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What is Spiritual Knowledge or Experience? 
 
I believe that if someone really wants a happy life then it is very important to 
pursue both internal and external means; in other words, mental development and 
material development. One could also say “spiritual development”, but when I say 
“spiritual” I do not necessarily mean any kind of religious faith. When I use the 
word “spiritual” I mean basic human good qualities. These are: human affection, a 
sense of involvement, honesty, discipline and human intelligence properly guided 
by good motivation. We have all these qualities from birth; they do not come to us 
later in our lives. 
The Dalai Lama’s Book of Wisdom, 1999, p 5 
 
Mathematical knowledge includes examples such as 2 + 3 = 5, or this ∆ is a “triangle”. 
Linguistic knowledge includes information about “parts of speech” such as “nouns”, 
and written letters of the alphabet, and their phonetic or spoken counterparts 
“phonemes”. Similar statements can indicate what “knowledge” means in the areas of 
music, art, history, and, moving away from “cognitive” or “intellectual knowledge” 
into other kinds or “performance knowledge” such as dance, sport, and vocational and 
recreational activities. We can also extend any discussion of knowledge or experience 
to “emotional knowledge” such as understanding (usually through personal 
experience mixed with social discussion) emotions such as rage, envy, sympathy, 
dislike, hatred, and love, and related physiological states such as nausea, ecstasy and 
lust. 
 
But if we want to discuss “spiritual knowledge” or “spiritual experience”, and want to 
argue that this is a form of knowledge or experience that is different from any of those 
already mentioned, what do we mean? 
 
Let me state, at the outset, that, as far as I am concerned, this has NOTHING to do 
with so called knowledge of god (or gods, or godesses, minor deities, animist water-
spirits and tree-spirits, or their demonic equivalents, such as Satan, Beelzebub, devils, 
or imps), angels, astral bodies, spirits, ghosts, bogles, afreets, djinns, vampires, 
werewolves, and other creatures of the occult. Nor has it anything to do with a so 
called “immortal soul” or with a non-physiological, non-emotional, non-intellectual 
“spirit”-component of a human. I am content to let others deal with matters of the 
paranormal. 
 
Although I may be guilty of abusing the word-stem “spirit”, or the usual church-cum-
religious connotations in the word “spiritual”, I want to focus specifically on 
particular kinds of natural human experience and awareness which can be attested to 
by atheists, agnostics, and religious-believers alike, while omitting any consideration 
of the non-human, supra-human or supernatural. 
 
Here is a first example: a transcendent feeling of “belonging”, of being part of the 
universe.  
 
Arthur Koestler’s novel Darkness at Noon (one of the great documents of the 
Twentieth century) describes the last weeks in the life of a Communist terrorist and 
radical during a 1930s Stalinist purge of party leaders and functionaries. Rubashov, a 
former Commissar, is imprisoned (not for the first time), and interrogated, before 
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being subjected to a show-trial, and executed. (Koestler had himself been imprisoned 
by Franco’s fascists during the Spanish Civil War, so his account of prison life is 
chillingly convincing.) Shortly before his death, Rubashov’s interrogations have 
ceased, and he is left alone, untroubled by warders or interrogators. It should be noted, 
in passing, that as a devout Communist, Rubashov has abandoned any religious 
background he may have had during his pre-Revolutionary childhood, and is a 
confirmed atheist, believing only in Marxism’s dialectical materialism. 
 
Sometimes [Rubashov] would respond unexpectedly to a tune, or 
even the memory of a tune, or of the folded hands of the Pieta, or of 
certain scenes of his childhood. As if a tuning fork had been struck, 
there would be answering vibrations, and once this had started a state 
would be produced which the mystics called ‘ecstasy’ and saints 
‘contemplation’; the greatest and soberest of modern psychologists 
had recognised this state as a fact and called it the ‘oceanic sense’. 
And, indeed, one’s personality dissolved as a grain of salt in the sea; 
but at the same time the infinite sea seemed to be contained in the 
grain of salt. The grain could no longer be localised in time and space. 
It was a state in which though lost its direction and started to circle, 
like the compass needle at the magnetic pole; until it finally cut loose 
from its axis and travelled freely in space, like a bunch of light in the 
night; and until it seemed that all thoughts and sensations, even pain 
and joy itself, were only the spectrum lines of the same ray of light, 
disintegrating in the prism of consciousness.  … Apparently even a 
patch of blue sky [glimpsed from his cell, or remembered from 
childhood] was enough to cause the ‘oceanic state’. (Koestler 1940, p 
203). 
 
Tragically, Rubashov is still trying to serve his Party, and its higher goals, even as the 
Party decides to destroy him. He realises, as he reflects on his new insights that “The 
‘oceanic state’ was counter-revolutionary … [was] ‘escape from the task’, ‘desertion 
of the class struggle’” (p 204). He comes to believe that “for forty years he had been 
running amuck — the running-amuck of pure reason” (p 205). 
 
Much of this could now be explained scientifically as Rubashov’s physiological and 
emotional response to physical torture, mental suffering, sleep-deprivation, starvation, 
isolation, and other destructive aspects of his imprisonment. But the insight he 
achieves is itself a form of learning, and exactly parallels that willingly sought by 
devotees of kinder belief systems. 
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Facing Our Own Death: A Secular Approach to a Spiritual 
Angst 
 
I am going to die. You are going to die, too. You could bet on it. This is a safe bet. In 
the not so cynical words of … (??): “Only two things in life are certain: death and 
taxes.” Some people avoid paying taxes. Nobody avoids death. (But, in the words of 
the Monty Python sketch, “Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition”.) 
 
The young child wakes in the night, sobbing, “I don’t want to die”. 
The concerned parent goes to the child and says: 
A. Don’t worry, dear. You aren’t going to die. 
B. Don’t worry, dear. You aren’t going to die yet. 
C. Don’t worry, dear. You aren’t going to die now. 
D. Don’t worry, dear. You aren’t going to die now, as long as terrorists, accidental 
house-fire or psychopathic arson; God-blasted lightning or meteorological incident 
such as hurricane, tornado, deluge, or flash-flood, plate-tectonic events such as an 
earthquake or volcanic eruption; the sudden impact of a meteor or asteroid or other 
cosmic debris or errant man-made satellite, faulty passing aeroplane or speeding road 
vehicle; … (etc.), doesn’t get you, suddenly. 
E. Don’t worry, dear. We’re all going to die, sooner or later. 
F. Don’t worry, dear. You’re right. You’re going to die. Get used to it. 
 
And so on. 
 
Aidan Chambers in his experimental Young Adult novel Now I Know (1987) presents 
this experience strikingly: 
One evening, Nicholas Christopher Frome was lying idly in his bath 
when the thought struck him that eventually he would die. He had if 
course thought this before. His is no fool. But that evening it 
penetrated his consciousness with a terrible clarity. A clarity so pure, 
so undeniable that, despite the pleasant heat of the water, he turned 
cold inside. What made the thought so terrible was not the knowledge 
of his eventual death, but the realization of the separateness of his 
being. He was not, he understood completely for the first time, merely 
his parents’ son, nor just any seventeen-and-one-month year old 
youth, nor simply another member of the multitudinous human race. 
He was him self. A separate, individual, unique and self-knowing 
person who would one day snuff it. I am not, he thought, anyone else. 
Only me. … and one day this Me will come to an end. I shall not be. 
His stomach curdled. He sat up and spewed into his bathwater. 
(Chambers 1987 p 9: emphasis in the original; ellipsis JG). 
 
The Church of England’s Book of Common Prayer (1549) expresses a similar sense of 
shocked dread in its rites “At the Burial of the Dead”, particularly the prayer at the 
interment of the body:  
Man that is born of woman hath but a short time to live, and is full of 
misery. He cometh up, and is cut down, like a flower; he fleeth as it 
were a shadow, and never continueth in one stay. In the midst of life 
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we are in death: of whom may we seek for succour, but of thee, O 
Lord, who for our sins are justly displeased. Yet, O Lord … O Holy 
and most merciful Saviour, deliver us not into the bitter pains of 
eternal death. Thou knowest, Lord, the secrets of our hearts; shut not 
thy merciful ears to our prayer; but spare us, Lord … suffer us not, at 
our last hour, for any pains of death, to fall from thee. 
Here, apart from the moral issue of sins, and possible eternal damnation, the fact of 
mortality, and the eternity of death, and the agony of the individuality and solitariness 
of each death, weigh on the minds of the mourners attending the last journey of the 
person being buried. 
 
The existential question, confronted with awareness of “personal mortality” is, to 
begin with, what are we going to do about it? 
A. Deny it? 
B. Ignore it? 
C. Try to avoid it? 
D. Enjoy what limited life we have as well as we can? 
E. Use our available life in ways we choose, and are able, to live a “good” life? 
 
A further existential question, closely related, arises from the death-related concept of 
“personal oblivion”. Not only is it a biological fact, an inevitability, that we are all 
going to die, we will all, in time, be utterly forgotten.  
 
You might be as famous, for example, as your great-great-grandfather, who has 
(probably) ended up being utterly unknown even by his great-great-great-
grandchildren. (If this example happens to fail in your case, and in fact your own 
great-great-grandfather actually was amazingly famous just add a few greats, and 
oblivion rears its blank head.)  
 
You might be as famous as the President of the United States of America, or one of 
the Twentieth century’s film star icons. But just wait. There was a time when the 
United States of America did not exist. Like people, national organisations, and any 
aspect of human culture, has a finite life-span. In time, there will be no United States 
of America. All it takes is a nuclear holocaust, or an asteroid strike, or simply the 
passing of sufficient time for continents to move across the surface of the Earth, 
colliding, upheaving and subducting, and even “North America” changes into 
something else. 
 
If geological changes to not bring about oblivion, be assured that the Sun will, in a 
few million years, use up its helium resources and turn into a Red Giant, and expand 
so far that it engulfs the Earth, or whatever remains of the Earth. You might take 
comfort in the idea of humans travelling to other, safer, so far surviving Solar 
Systems in our own Milky Way galaxy, or even to other galaxies. But if our historical 
descendants go far enough away from us, sooner or later personal fame will dwindle, 
and eventually reach the dwindled stage of oblivion. Just wait. You too will be utterly 
forgotten. 
 
So, if you believe that the point of being alive, or a redeeming, or sustaining aspect of 
our awareness of our own mortality is that at least we will have made our mark, 
somehow, and not lived in vain, and we will, at least be remembered, think again. 
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This can only be true, it can only sustain you, in the near future. Further away in time 
you will be anonymous dust. 
 
Interestingly, our human awareness of death seems to be paralleled in some other 
species. 
 
For example, elephants seem to grieve when one of their social group dies. Consider 
Derek Joubert’s National Geographic video Reflections on Elephants (1994). 
Similarly Joyce Poole discusses elephants’ mourning (Poole 1996: also George Page 
1999.)  
 
Consider also chimpanzees, as discussed in a PBS web-site on animal intelligence, 
emotions and consciousness: 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/animalmind/consciousness.html 
Chimps and elephants appear to exhibit another consciousness 
trademark: an awareness of death. Both animals grieve when family 
members die: elephants even linger over the bones of long-dead 
relatives, seeming to ponder the past and their own future. (PBS 
Nature's Inside Animal Mind: "Animal Consciousness", October 23, 
2001.) 
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Research as Archival Archaeology and Conservation: The Case 
of the Book on Learning Without ‘Learning’ in its Index! 
 
Research typically looks forward, and privileges the new, while kicking aside 
older material. However, again and again the wheel is reinvented by 
researchers with forwards-only blinkers (or gear-boxes?). In 1984 Robert B. 
Davis published Learning Mathematics: The Cognitive Science Approach, a 
rich and powerful discussion drawing on years of curriculum development, 
classroom research, and mathematics education and information processing 
research. In 1999 Elizabeth Fennema and Thomas A. Romberg dedicated 
Mathematics Classrooms That Promote Understanding to the memory of 
Robert Davis. But he and his work do not appear in this book, or in other 
leading accounts of research in mathematics education and in school and 
university classrooms. What a loss! What an oversight! Hold fast that which is 
good. We need intellectual conservation to protect the endangered world of 
information as much as we need ecological conservation in defence of our 
biosphere. 
 
[A paper presented at the Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to Research in 
Mathematics, Science, Health and Environmental Education, held by the Centre For Studies 
in Mathematics, Science and Environmental Education, Deakin University, 26 November and 
27 November 2001] 
New is Better, Righter — Old is Out-Dated, Wronger — Really? 
Our culture is dominated by the relentless rush forwards, the pursuit of 
“progress”, and the uncritically accepted idea of scientific development, that new 
knowledge replaces old knowledge. We see this in the ever-changing fields of visual 
arts, where a new artist must NOT be like Picasso or Warhol or anyone earlier, but 
must be wholly new. The vicious word “pastiche” is sometimes used to target those 
whose art-style is judged to be derivative of another identifiable artist or art 
movement. (Despite this, art, and also music, and fashion in clothes and home 
decoration, may hanker after the old. In this case we can call the deliberately not-so-
new “RETRO”, or “NEO-whateverperiod”, or give it critical approval by calling it a 
“Classic”. Nostalgia can have cachet, or can be chic. But, such aberrations aside, if it 
ain’t new it’s obsolete.) 
We routinely expect that ideas, and practices have use-by dates, or sunset-clauses 
indelibly stamped on them. A change is as good as a holiday. The new broom sweeps 
clean. The old grey mare she ain’t what she used to be. And so on. 
Other cultures are not like this. Confusian culture has a respect for the established 
traditions. A sound Confusian education is NOT up-with-the-latest, but case-hardened 
rigorously tempered drilling in standard dicta, routine arguments, and well rehearsed 
practices.  
Similarly, the study of, literally, the Classics, is constrained by the fact that 
(barring the hoped for, but unexpected discovery of a lost or hitherto unknown work) 
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there are no new works of literature in Ancient Greek or Latin, no new Parthenons or 
Venus de Miloses — nor new Egyptian hieroglyphics, or Babylonian mud tablets. 
Archaeologists may discover new examples (previously LOST examples, or hitherto 
UNKNOWN) from past eras. But no live Caesar is writing his or her memoirs. No 
Sargon is dictating legal instructions to satraps in Bactria.  
Certainly those who research the Classics may borrow from modern, new 
theories, to extend and modify their analyses of the past. Feminism, for example, or 
neo-Marxist workingclass perspectives, or Levi-Straussian structuralism, or 
Saussurian semiotics may be added to the Classicists’ tool-kit. But if new theories and 
research tools are brought into this field of research, the new research results must be 
fitted meaningfully alongside what is already established. 
In these unusual cases, few babies are tossed out with bathwater. 
In most other aspects of modern culture, and especially in educational research, 
we lose a lot of aging, well-washed babies! 
Those of us engaged in teaching at tertiary levels are pressured to be at the 
cutting-edge. We may be sued if we claim to be providing effective instruction for 
contemporary needs, and are not in simply demonstrable ways “up-to-date”. We look 
at out textbook reading lists (“textbooks”! — shock! and horror! shock? horror? 
maybe! maybe not?) and agonise if they are (as I write) older than, say, 1995. Tut, 
tut! Dear me. This can hardly be a good resource book for preparing student-teachers 
to teach Primary school mathematics in the Twenty-first century (!), if the publication 
date is 1994, or, more shockingly, 1984! Tempus fugit, and the times they are always 
a-changin’! 
I want to argue against this. I want to urge caution. I present this as a rearward-
looking research methodology. 
WHAT is this subject (whatever we are researching) about? 
WHERE did it come from? 
WHAT is its history, and WHAT can we NOW usefully learn from its PAST? 
Old Theories Never Die, the Young Ones Just Act as Though They Had 
It is unrealistic to ignore changes in theories. But that does not mean we should 
accept any new jumped-up Johnny-come-lately idea just because it is new.  
Constructivism may be flavour of the month, or may have been, but that doesn’t 
mean that Behaviourism, or Gestalt theories go away, or that they ought to. We can 
critique Behaviourism until the cows come home, but humans still stubbornly go on 
‘behaving’. Similarly the would-be scientific objectivity of Behaviorism continues to 
be relevant to educational research. 
As hard science advances (yes, it does), we find that Biology becomes an 
essential aspect of educational theory. The continuing developments in scientific 
understanding of brain functions provide new ways of understanding what children 
are doing in schools, and the way adults think. (E.g. Butterworth 1999, Carter 1998, 
Dehaene 1997, and Greenfield 1997, and 2000). Where previously psychologists such 
as Richard Skemp talked, hypothetically about “ideas”, “concepts”, and “schemata” 
(e.g. Skemp 1971), neurologists can now identify small sections of the brain that 
become observably active when a person thinks of a word, or speaks the word, or 
hears the word, or writes the word. 
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This year genetic scientists identified a gene for language. People who do not 
have this gene, or whose version of this gene is defective, find it extremely difficult to 
acquire spoken (or other) language! In time we may have gene therapy that might 
reverse this. Until then, language deficits due to a faulty gene will be incurable, 
although diagnosable. Moreover, just as language deficits NOT due to brain damage 
are now diagnosable, so will gene defects be able to be eliminated as suspected 
culprits. (E.g. Gough 2001a, Smith 2001.) 
At a much lower level of would-be science, the once popular theory of Benjamin 
Bloom’s Taxonomy of Cognitive and Affective Domains (e.g. Bloom et al. 1956), 
later discarded and discredited, returns, disguised in the shape of “learning outcomes” 
as in the now standard, and largely unquestioned (but NOT unquestionable) 
Curriculum and Standards Frameworks (1994, 1999, 2000) of Victoria. The wheel 
turns, bumps, wobbles, falls over, and returns. 
We might look at a theory, such as “constructivism”, and slap our heads in 
wonderment, exclaiming that “This says nothing about the social context”, or “This 
ignores human interactions”, or “What about the different effect of tools on 
thinking?”, and then latch onto “social constructivism”, or “constructionism”. How 
could we have been so short-sighted?! Thank goodness we can throw MERE 
“constructivism” in the bin, and replace it, with many sighs of relief, with a suitable, 
vitamin-enriched “post-modernist-constructi-whatsit”. What about dispensing with 
“constructi-anything” altogether, and grab hold of “enactivism”, or “activity theory”, 
or “psychosociosemiotics”, or “situated cognition”, for example? 
The last, as a viable concept, is rather silly. After all, “situated cognition” is what 
we have been talking about all along. In what possible sense were we ever talking 
about NON-SITUTATED cognition? Nonsense! Any talk of cognition always 
situated the cognising in some way, surely. Any change of name, or change of theory 
is only a change of emphasis. 
Instead of situating our discussion of learning exclusively in the formal 
institutions of learning (schools, universities, and so on), we also consider learning 
and school-like behaviours in the work-place, and in such everyday situations as 
shopping, cooking, and holidaying. But are these so different? Didn’t school lessons 
also consider, for example, the mathematics of shopping, travelling, working, and 
other non-school and post-school situations? Do we really achieve anything 
importantly new by changing the terminology? 
The same comment applies more generally to other theories, and the historical 
evolution and adoption of theories. If we regard language as a “tool”, then any 
discussion of learning that includes language-use (and this can include gestural 
languages such as American Sign Language, and so called non-verbal “languages” 
such as facial expressions and postural body language) necessarily entails some form 
of tool-use, and hence is actually some form of “constructionism”. Similarly, 
regarding the alphabet (or Chinese characters, and other forms of writing) as 
“technology”, any theory of written-verbal learning is necessarily a theory that 
includes the impact of technology on the thinking and behaviour of the human 
subject. 
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The Times May Be A-Changin’ But the Kids are Much the Same, etc. 
Leaving aside the argument that old theories retain valuable ideas, and may, 
indeed reappear in modified and unsuspected forms, it is also true that, however 
theories may change, or appear to change, when the research focus is education or 
instruction or learning, much of the subject being considered by the theories remains 
largely unchanged. A child in a school is a child in a school. A student learning 
Primary school mathematics is still learning Primary school mathematics. What 
Rambella learns today is usually similar to what Rambella’s parents learned, and 
Rambella’s grandparents, and so on — back to everyday informal learning in 
medieval European villages, or wherever Rambella’s ancestors came from. 
Even the wilder versions of the so called New Mathematics of the 1950s and 
1960s, with its various emphases on axiomatic approaches, set theory, logical rigour, 
and abstract mathematical structure, possibly tricked out with colorful Cuisenaire 
rods, or Zoltan Dienes’ plastic attribute blocks, led, eventually, to students learning 
how to count, add, subtract, multiply and divide, learning how to solve quadratic 
equations, and, in short, learning a re-expressed version of the same kind of 
mathematics that Isaac Newton, or Mrs Samuel Pepys learned centuries earlier. 
New post-modernist definitions of terms such as “literacy” may come into vogue, 
expanding on the old-fashioned Readin’ and ’Ritin’, to allow for the “reading” of 
such new kinds of un-book-like “texts” as film, interactive web-pages, multimedia 
CD-ROMs, hypertext electronic “books” and Internet web-sites, spreadsheet tables, 
interrogatable databases, computer-animated graphs, and zoomable maps. But before 
students approach these dizzy heights, or perhaps simultaneously with some of the 
less alphabetically-demanding aspects of these new-fangled “texts”, students still 
need to learn their old-fashioned ABC. 
Reading and Writing are still fundamental parts of “literacy”, deconstruct and 
reconstruct or post-modernise the term however you will. Hence the research methods 
and results of the 1960s and 1970s psycholinguists remain just as important as they 
ever were. (For example, Frank Smith 1971, 1973, 1975.) We throw this bathwater, 
and these babies, away at our peril. The technologies of the alphabet, and writing by 
hand, as well as by computer keyboard, remain as important as ever, technologise it 
however we like, even to the extent of developing computer-based voice-recognition, 
and the possibility of saying aloud whatever we want to communicate, instead of 
laboriously writing, letter by letter, or typing, letter by letter. (For example, Chandler 
and Gough 1999, and Gough 2000.) 
Every Theory Has a History 
As new theories come along we learn the new technical terms, the new jargon. As 
we learn to speak and use this new language, we are simultaneously learning a new 
way of understanding the world and the doing of research. (Language is a way of 
structuring, and making sense of otherwise raw perceptual experience of our physical 
world. But the links between language, language use, and the understood nature of the 
“world” or so called “reality” are philosophically subtle in the extreme: Gough 1997.) 
For example, when Richard Skemp wrote his epochal book The Psychology of 
Learning Mathematics (1971), suddenly ordinary school mathematics teachers were 
expected to tune into Skemp’s new language of “concepts” and “schemas” (e.g. 1971 
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chapter 2 “The Formation of Mathematical Concepts” and Chapter 3 “The Idea of a 
Schema”). Having considered “the formation of single concepts”, we are told that, 
“each of these [single concepts] by their very nature is embedded in a structure of 
other concepts” (Chapter 3, p 37). 
Then we strike Greek: “The general psychological term for a mental structure is a 
schema. The term includes not only the complex conceptual structures of 
mathematics, but relatively simple structures which coordinate sensori-motor 
activity” (Chapter 3 p 39). 
Apparently Skemp regards learning to walk, or to dance a polka, as “relatively 
simple”, but I will pass over that with little further comment. Parents watching their 
baby progress from crawling to toddling know some of the complexities of what is 
achieved by upright bipedal locomotion, even though they have no first-hand recall of 
the difficulties they, too, overcame when they were infants. Dance students, similarly, 
know better than to underestimate sensori-motor learning. 
Gosh! we might say. I thought I understood how we “know” or “learn” 
mathematics. But now I realise that there are “concepts” (single bits, like atoms or 
grains of mental sand) and “schemas” (which are collections or structures of 
“concepts” — mental molecules, or sandcastles, maybe). How new. How different. 
How difficult. 
But, in fact, how not so new, at all. Herbert Read (1943 p 120) notes that James 
Sully (1896, pp. 352-353) is the first, as far as Read is aware, to use the term 
“schema” in this way. Decades earlier than Skemp, and before Piaget, from whom 
Skemp has silently borrowed the term. 
Also, how potentially misleading. How lightly Skemp speaks of “mental”. 
However he is not actually referring to the interactions between brain cells when he 
speaks of “mental”. These days, thanks to neuroscience, we can actually use brain-
imaging to show where in the head the “ideas” are, and also show how one brain-
centre is linked with another, as the brain combines this bit (such as numerosity, the 
recognition of the quantity of objects we are considering) with that bit (such as the 
verbal term, or number word, for this particular numerosity), while also recognising 
this kind of object (such as a collection of playing cards), along with other features 
(such as size, color, position, and so on). 
As a very different example, consider that Willatts, in 1977, and Morley in 1975, 
outline developmental stages by which children learn to draw objects on a kitchen 
table (Willats’ drawing task) and a person (Morley’s drawing task). With sighs of 
relief we can now take up the results of this research, and Willat’s and Morley’s 
associated developmental theories, and totally reconsider how we will teach children 
to draw — or perhaps even whether or not we will try to teach them at all.  
Maybe we will just show them lots of ways of drawing tables and people, and let 
the students make whatever sense of this experience they can. Would that constitute 
up-to-date constructivist teaching? 
But in fact as early as 1922 Cyril Burt (he of the famous faking of twins-research 
data, but nevertheless a major serious educational research pioneer who made 
enormous contributions to education) published a seven-stage developmental outline 
of how children draw (Burt 1922 pp. 319-322: cited in Read 1943 p 117). All 
subsequent research has largely either rediscovered what Burt already knew, or totally 
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ignores Burt’s research, and anyone else’s research as well (e.g. Goodnow’s account 
of children’s drawing, how they learn it, and how difficult it is to change the way they 
do it by direct instruction, contains no mention of any of the classic developmental 
stages of children’s drawing: 1977). 
We may think we are looking at something new. But the actual history may be 
concealed, or ignored, or the creator of the new theory may simply not know the 
earlier work — alas! 
Rationale for a Theory-Scanning Rear-View Mirror, or for an Archaeological 
Approach to Archives 
The preceding remarks are offered as a case for being aware of the history of 
theories, and their evolution. It is also further evidence for my arguments that we 
need continual vigilance, such as a devil’s advocate approach to any theory (Gough 
1998), and constructive sceptical critique of any theory (Gough 2000). 
All of this then leads to a small case study: the surprising neglect of Robert Davis. 
Case Study: Robert Davis and the “Cognitive Science Approach” 
Robert B. Davis’s Learning Mathematics: The Cognitive Science Approach to 
Mathematics Education (Croom Helm, London, 1984) summarises decades of 
mathematics curriculum development, research, and instructional innovation. Davis 
pioneered the Madison Project in1957, one of many New Math experiments — 
arguably, one of the best. Davis is one of the great teachers, such as W.W. Sawyer, 
with research linked directly with our standard curriculum, at all levels! But his work 
is not widely known. Why? 
Around 1984 the buzz-word “constructivism” swept in. Davis’s term “cognitive 
science” means the same thing, if “constructivism” means anything. Davis was aware 
of the new term (e.g. pp 338, 92), but it is neither prominent nor Indexed! Despite the 
prominent word “learning” in the title, most of his discussion is about “problem 
solving”, which IS his theory of learning! Hmm! 
Through much of his discussion Davis draws carefully on several areas of 
research from the 1970s and earlier, particularly: 
• information processing (the handling of information, including theories of 
human perception and thought); 
• computer programming (especially Seymour Papert’s Logo programming 
language); 
• artificial intelligence (the attempt to program a computer to simulate human 
intelligence); 
• Piagetian theories such as “assimilation” and “accommodation”; 
• mathematical problem solving; 
• remedial mathematics and error analysis; 
• mathematics learning, and mathematics performance (observed classroom 
behaviours); 
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• Piaget’s clinical interview method, and protocol analysis (working out the 
meaning of the recorded interactions between teacher, student, instructional 
materials, and task attempts; 
• brain damage research; and  
• latency studies (examining how long a person takes to handle individual steps 
in a multi-step task). 
It is a heady, but remarkably powerful mixture, not always clearly flowing in its 
arguments, but always stimulating. 
But Davis was in other ways ahead of his time.  
His discussion also includes an early version of Jean Lave’s pioneering theory of 
“situated cognition” (Davis pp. 159-160: Lave 1982, and Lave, Murtaugh and de la 
Rocha 1984). Davis may have been one of the first to recognise the importance of 
Lave’s work. Yet it is typical of Davis’s eclectic and syncretist work that he was 
willing to draw on any useful research, and useful theory, any examples of real 
learning, not just in mathematics but also physics, music, reading and language use. 
Robert Davis’s work is frankly eclectic. He borrows where and when he see fit. 
Sometimes this means that what he understands, and knows how to use, may outstrip 
the ability of his possible readers to follow his arguments. He is, simply, a polymath, 
able to see connections in sometimes surprising places.  
To be able to understand Davis you need to be familiar with Piaget’s theory, 
information processing theory, artificial intelligence, computer programming, oral 
language acquisition theory, Chomsky’s theory of grammatical structures, 
undergraduate level mathematics, undergraduate level physics, education research, 
psychological research, … and so on. 
What are some of his outstanding contributions? 
Firstly, he reshaped Piaget’s well known clinical interview technique.  
Interestingly, Piaget’s method may owe something to the very early research 
methodology of William A. Brownell, who simply asked students to “work their 
problems out loud” (Brownell 1928: cited in Leder and Forgasz 1992 p 4). Brownell 
was working, broadly speaking, within Thorndyke’s behaviorally oriented 
“associationist” approach. But he also emphasised the mathematical patterns and 
meanings that were shared by the drill-and-practice instructional materials used by 
associationists, and all drill-and-practice teachers. 
One teacher-cum-researcher, and one student: the teacher-researcher observing, 
and encouraging, while the student negotiates a possible path towards a solution to a 
problem.’ 
But Piaget’s tasks were usually abstract, unusual, and different from ordinary 
school curriculum — albeit ingenious and often intellectually challenging.  
By contrast, Davis’s discussion, again and again, focuses on the students’ 
grappling with otherwise ordinary school curriculum tasks: additions, solving 
equations, manipulating geometric objects. 
The research methodology of audio or video recording student problem solving 
activity, and then analysing the student’s actions is Davis’s “protocol analysis”. This 
was pioneered in his long case study of students, from the start of schooling through 
to university levels, part of the Madison Project of the 1950s and later. Certainly 
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Davis was not alone in developing Piaget’s interview techniques in this way. But he 
was amongst the earliest to do so. 
Secondly, Davis focussed on the actual learning, both when it was succeeding, 
and also, and extremely importantly, when it wasn’t succeeding. This meant that he 
was one of the first researchers to focus on student errors, and in particular, on those 
special kinds of errors that most students make, and those kinds that are peculiarly 
resistant to remedial intervention. Knowing that learning was a process of creating 
and modifying problem solving methods, he was especially interested when the usual 
problem solving strategies, the attempts to create a new solution, led to wrong 
answers — not just slips, but profoundly misconceived outcomes, that were 
stubbornly believed in by the students who created them. 
Similarly, in directing attention to “errors” or “miscues”, Davis was introducing 
the then recently established methods of “miscue analysis” that had been devised in 
the psycholinguistic theories about the process of reading (e.g. Smith 1971, 1973, 
1975, 1978). Such errors, or miscues provide not merely diagnostic information about 
what is going WRONG, but crucially important information about what a student is 
actually DOING! This provides invaluable insight into what the student is 
THINKING, and MIS-THINKING! 
Much more recently, in upper Secondary mathematics, some of Davis’s “classic 
learning errors” in algebra have been studied by researchers such as Swedosh (1996) 
and Barrington (1997). The remedial breakthroughs reported at that time, and later, 
by Swedosh (1997), follow directly from Davis’s much earlier work, 
Nowadays, especially in science education, we are familiar with the constructivist 
notion of “alternative conceptions”. But Davis highlighted these before they were 
called “constructivist”, or graced with the term “alternative conception”. He, and 
others, referred to them as “disaster studies”. Davis was particularly concerned to 
investigate what goes wrong with learning when students, and even highly trained 
supposedly “expert” mathematics and science professionals, are given comparatively 
simple mathematics or physics questions, and come up with shockingly wrong 
answers. Aristotelian, friction-based pre-Newtonian conceptions of dynamics die 
hard, and so called everyday common sense prevents the correct application of highly 
trained principles! 
Again, in important ways, this attention to “expert” behaviour provided 
invaluable insight into “student” behaviour, and hence the way teachers could more 
effectively interact with student, strengthening their learning. This paralleled the 
research of psycholinguists who were trying to understand how to help students learn 
to read (for example, Frank Smith, again: 1971, 1975, 1978; also Paul Kolers, and 
others, assembled in Smith 1973). When psycholinguists observed what competent 
(“expert”) readers actually do, they discovered “errors” that were better regarded as 
“meaningful miscues”, where letters and words were sometimes mis-read, but, 
typically, resulted in alternative and acceptable meanings. When a miscue resulted in 
a non-acceptable interpretation of the text being read, the expert saw cued to re-read 
and attempt to self-correct. (You may have done this yourself in the preceding 
sentence when you encountered the misleading typographical reversed-letter-order 
rendering of “saw” instead of ‘was” — or didn’t you notice it? Typically, “expert” 
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readers predict so much of what they are reading that a strong prediction obviates the 
need to attend to each word, or each letter.) 
Thirdly Davis expanded Polya’s simple four-stage view of problem solving 
(namely Look, Plan, Do, and Check: Polya 1945, Part 1, point 6, pages 5-6), not 
exclusively in mathematics, into seven or more steps. In doing this Davis was 
drawing on both neurological research, and the parallel investigation of computer 
programming and “artificial intelligence”, linked with the psychological theory of 
“information processing”. 
(1)  Examine the problem (or input data); 
(2)  Retrieve from memory some knowledge representation structure (schema) that 
seems likely to be helpful; 
(3)  Gradually build a representation for the problem; 
(4)  Build a representation for a matching piece of “knowledge” 
(5)  Make two “mappings”, the first linking some of the input data with its 
representation (linking 1 and 3); the second linking the representation of the 
problem with the “knowledge” representation (linking 3 and 4); 
(6)  Evaluate the adequacy of the constructions (3 and 4), retrievals (2), and 
mappings (5), accepting, or rejecting, or modifying portions of these steps; 
and 
(7)  cycle back through steps 1 to 6 as often as necessary to achieve a solution, or 
the understanding that a solution is not possible (Davis 1984 p 306: on pp 
366-367 Davis expands this to ten steps, without significantly altering the 
general strategy). 
What Davis adds to Polya’s four stages is the way mathematics is represented 
(both as mental structures, and as formal academic knowledge), and the way a learner 
attempts to match a hypothesised method of solution against the details of the 
problem and its working out. This is not uniquely Davis’s idea. Others, in particular 
those focussing on mathematics as a method of “modelling” the real world, see such a 
process in a similar way.  
For example, Edward de Bono outlines several forms of problem solving, 
including one he refers to as “mathematical thinking”, but which applies whenever 
we encounter a problem in the real-world, and attempt to find a solution to the 
problem by re-interpreting the problem in terms of formal knowledge (1977).  
According to de Bono:  
mathematics is a game played with symbols and rules. The rules constitute a 
special universe in which things happen according to these rules. Anything 
enters this universe by being translated into a [mathematical] symbol. The 
symbol is processed according to the rules of the [mathematical] universe, and 
then [is] translated back (de Bono 1977 p 230).  
That is, for de Bono, mathematical thinking is a kind of “mathematical 
modelling”, similar to Popperian or experimental scientific method: 
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•  start with a real-world problem situation; 
•  translate this into the formal world of rules and symbols; 
•  use the rules for manipulating the symbols, until some solution within the 
formal world is obtained; and 
•  translate the formal solution back into the real-world, and check that the 
interpreted solution fits the problem. 
Fourthly, not only does Davis outline a theory of learning (= problem solving, 
regarded as a mixture of hypothesising, information processing, concept creation, 
language analysis, non-verbal processing, information or cognitive representation 
retrieval, and so on), he also outlines a method of teaching which fits this theory, 
namely, his “paradigm teaching strategy” (Chapter 21). This emphasises meanings, 
non-verbal thinking, diagrams, and personal experiences, including experience of 
abstract ideas represented both conceptually and concretely. This paradigm teaching 
strategy is partly based on Piaget’s process of “assimilation”, fitting new 
understanding alongside existing knowledge, as well as “accommodation”, creatively 
drawing on existing knowledge and novel stimuli, to build largely new ideas. Because 
of the attempt to link the new knowledge to existing knowledge, it is essentially 
constructivist, in the broadest sense, even though Davis was writing before the theory 
and the term “constructivism” came into widespread use. Equally, while some 
theorists regard Piaget as a pioneer “constructivist”, Davis’s discussion is essentially 
post-Piagetian. 
Importantly, through his book Davis repeatedly argues that problem solving IS 
how we learn, for ALL kinds of learning. How does this fit with your own preferred 
theory of how people learn, or your own understanding of problem solving? 
We learn in an attempt to make sense of, or deal with, a novel situation that we 
have not previously faced before. This requires us to use our existing knowledge, and 
skills, responding to the stimulus of the problem, in creative ways. We are just as 
creative in mathematics, science, sport, and other aspects of human activity as we are 
in art, drama, literature or dance.  
Oddly, and perhaps this partly explains why Davis work has fallen into neglect, 
the word “learning” which is so prominent in the title of the book, does not appear in 
the Index of the book. To discover Davis’s definition of “learning” it is necessary not 
only to read the whole book, challenging for many readers, but to also grasp it as a 
whole, as Davis clearly did. Far fewer readers, and very few classroom teachers of 
mathematics, have his breadth of knowledge, or his penetrating insights.  
Perhaps what he needed most were a good editor, to insist that the large ideas 
were made more prominent, and argued more cohesively, and a good publisher, able 
to produce a widely available and widely read, cheap but highly significant 
paperback. Richard Skemp had one rather simple idea to offer, but was fortunate that 
Penguin Books gave him the global English-speaking world in which to say it. Davis 
suffers, by comparison. Yet it is Davis, and W.W. Sawyer, one of Davis’s listed 
master teachers (Davis p viii), who can really help teachers teach better. Skemp can 
only help them distinguish between meaningful learning, and instrumental skill and 
drilled rote. 
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It will be illuminating to offer some of Davis’s examples, and leave them as 
challenges. The important point, one that Davis emphasised repeatedly, is that any 
self-respecting theory of learning ought to be able to explain what goes wrong when 
students learn. Yet many theories find themselves unable to correctly answer counter-
intuitive questions such as these. Similarly a good theory of learning should also 
explain what a teacher can do that will effectively eliminate such misconceptions, 
counter-intuitions, and alternative approaches.  
What are YOUR personal theories about the nature of mathematics, how to teach 
mathematics, and the way that students learn and use mathematics? How would your 
theories explain the “student” and “expert” “mis-conceptions” that arise when these 
examples are tackled? 
Two Rolling Circles 
A smaller circle rolls around a larger circle. The radius of the larger circle is three 
times the radius of the smaller circle. When the smaller circle rolls all the way around 
the larger circle, how many turns does it make? The so called “expert” answer is three 
times. This is wrong! (Davis pp. 217-218.) 
 
Two Pyramids Joining 
This problem first appeared in the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test for 1980. 
The fact that it was wrongly handled by experts, and hence was wrongly graded by 
the test-markers, was sufficiently scandalous that it was reported in Time magazine. 
 
The problem is this. Take two equilateral solids, where each edge has length L 
units. One is a pyramid with a square base, and the other has is a tetrahedron (a 
“pyramid” with a triangular base). Join the two by gluing together two geometrically 
congruent faces. How many faces does the resulting geometric solid have? (Also how 
many edges does the resulting geometric solid have? What if we joined two square-
based pyramids by gluing together triangular faces?) (Davis pp 219ff.) 
Vocabulary Retrieval 
Which common four-letter English word ends with the sequence of letters 
‘ENY’? (Davis p 237). 
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Alphanumeric Arithemetic Code Computation 
In the following addition, each letter of the alphabet represents uniquely, without 
repetition one single digits. What digit does each letter represent? (Davis pp 238ff.) 
  SEND 
+ MORE 
 MONEY 
Conclusion? 
Having very briefly argued the strength and importance of Davis’s work, let me 
end by stressing that my concern is not one of mere nostalgia for old ideas. Nor is it 
simply a matter of historical interest, to keep a kind of genealogical record of who or 
what begat whichever later theory.  
Rather it is a matter of recognising that Davis’s work is still extremely relevant. It 
should NOT be forgotten. It still needs to be used.  
The fact that so little practical and theoretical attention is currently being paid to 
Davis, apart from the esteem of colleagues, is lamentable.  
If we understand what Davis really achieved in this 1984 monograph, we will 
recognise anew its potential to be re-expressed, and freshly applied to today’s needs 
— to help students learn mathematics, and, indeed, to LEARN! 
Also, in the light of this small case study, we can identify a neglected research 
methodology, and consider the power of an ‘archaeology of archives’, which involves 
an almost literal digging into historical layers of research literature. This helps us 
reconsider, and hence critically analyse, attractive new terminology and approaches in 
the light of earlier terms, theories, and research processes. New is not always, and not 
necessarily better or different. But if we ignore our origins we remain blind to 
fundamental questions about whether or not we are making any kind of progress. 
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Taking Assessment in (Mathematics) Education into the Next 
Century: Objectives, Portfolios, Tests and Accountability  
 
ABSTRACT: During the 1970s and 1980s a climate-shift in the teaching 
profession moved away from formal testing of groups towards alternative 
forms of assessment, informal cumulative descriptions of individual 
performances, measured not against other students but against process 
criteria. Batteries of normed tests gathered dust on storeroom shelves. 
Teachers went on strike at the mention of the word 'test'. Checklists, 
anecdotal records, interviews, conferencing and portfolios became the new 
style of evaluation. Yet in the mid-1990s, internationally, a reworked 
version of the once-outlawed 'behavioural objective' was hailed as a new 
key to detailed assessment and curriculum construction — the 'learning 
outcome'. With shrinking funds for educational services, teacher 
professionalism and accountability are now more important than ever. Can 
anything be learned from the once-shunned old approaches to evaluation? 
How can portfolios and learning outcomes be used effectively? How can 
isolated Rich Assessment Tasks [RATs] within a problem-solving 
approach to mathematics form a coherent curriculum? What is 
'benchmarking' and how is it related to 'learning', defined as a change in 
behaviour? Can alternative assessment methods be used to contextualise 
and moderate formal methods of evaluation? Increasingly, the time 
available for assessment is diminishing, the content of school curriculum is 
ballooning, the information explosion becomes global as schools shift to 
embrace the Internet, new developments in silicon technology challenge 
traditional approaches to calculation, graphing and algebra, and possible 
brave new worlds threaten as much as beckon. What is the future for 
educational evaluation in the first century of the next millenia?  
 
Notes: Sketches of Ideas That Could Be Developed 
• Importance of cumulative assessment, rather than just isolated topic-tests. It is 
essential to treat mathematics as a cumulative subject, in which one topic is expected 
to be meaningfully connected with another topic. In the past, for fear of hurting 
students by having them undergo difficult end-of-year and term tests that include 
questions that range across a variety of topics, many teachers have attempted to make 
tests painless by reassuring students that, for example, the test tomorrow will only be 
on 'Area', and the test in a month's time will only be on 'Money'. This is thought to be 
beneficial to students, because they can study for such a topic-test, if they want to do 
as well as possible, by studying the announced topic. Once the test is over they can 
also forget that topic. The real challenge arises when, for example, a teacher asks a 
question about the cost of carpeting a room, combining aspects of both topics—area, 
and money. Yet, in reality, students should be able to mix and match topics, letting 
otherwise separate and forgettable topic concepts and skills interact and strengthen 
and make sense of each other.  
 
• John Sweller (on myths of mathematics learning) notes that the single defining 
characteristic of competent problem solvers is not that they have well developed 
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problem solving skills but that they have been exposed to a wide range of problems, 
and can call on a large repertoire of mathematical tools to deal with any novel task. It 
can be argued that the old cumulative end-of-year test, when it is not carried out 
brutally, actually embodies an essential problem solving skill, namely, the ability to 
identify a particular task-type and apply the appropriate method or collection of 
methods to handle the particular task. Moreover there are some topics, such as length, 
perimeter, area, volume, mass and density which benefit from being taught as 
simultaneously as possible.  
 
• If they are taught separately students will develop inappropriate theories about the 
way the topics relate, such as believing that if two shapes have the same area they 
must have the same perimeter, or that if we change the perimeter of a shape in some 
way we necessarily change the area. (Here, we can exchange words such as perimeter 
and area for words such as surface area and volume and make the same general 
cautionary statements). 
 
• If we tell students that they are about to have a test on '-ea-' words, to take a 
language education example, the students immediately know that they don't have to 
worry about '-ee-' or '-e...e- words, or the subtleties of 'readjust, reality, reed, head' and 
'heart', for example. If the test is going to be about using the 7-times tables in 
multiplying, the students immediately know they don't have to worry about addition, 
subtraction, or division, all of which have direct links with the 7-times table, not to 
mention place-value, decimal and fraction concepts: (3 x 7) + 33, 65 ÷ 7, 42 – 14, 30 
x 700, 12 x 0.07, 3/7 + 5/14, and so on. 
 
• Link evaluation with change-in-behaviour; 
  definition of 'learning' = post-test - pre-test 
 
• Emphasise relation between teacher-evaluation and self-correction by students: both 
are more effective when the nature of the task or topic being taught and learned is 
made as clear as possible. 
 
• Review the constructive role of evaluation as a process of monitoring student 
learning, measuring effectiveness of curriculum delivery, provide directive and 
diagnostic feedback for subsequent small-group and individual teaching, and give 
directions for curriculum modification: plus giving information for child-parent 
feedback and reporting - recall the old triangle model of teaching, learning and 
evaluation, 
 
• Emphasise the general principle of evaluating in the same way that you teach. 
 
* Note that student behaviour can be capricious - right one day, wrong the next; 
evaluation needs to establish whether student behaviour that has been observed is 
actually persistent, and whether the student is aware of what has been learned. 
 
• Student self-correction is a natural counterpart to teacher-managed assessment and 
fedback — it is a constructive step towards a stuent becoming independent of teachers 
and school. 
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• distinguish between learning situations (new topic or skill) and practice (review, 
consolidation, challenge and extension, remediation, linking other hitherto separate 
but otherwise known things). Possibly mention Piaget's idea of assimilation (re-
working an existing room in a house) as opposed to accommodation (building a new 
room, or using some parts of existing rooms to make a newish room). 
 
• Stress the importance of having a clear purpose for evaluation: what will the results 
of the evaluation be used for? 
— checking success or otherwise of teaching and delivery of curriculum (feedback 
for teachers) 
— reporting back to parents about overall progress at the end of a year (summative) 
— identifying students with special needs, or for instructional grouping (program 
screening and class organisation) 
— reporting to students about their learning progress (summative) 
— measuring learning change (post-test - pre-test), using the results for any of these 
purposes 
— identifying levels of mastery, with possible need for extension or diagnostic 
intervention (formative) 
 
• Discuss process analysis methods, such as Reading Miscue Analysis or Newman 
Mathematics Diagnostic Error Interviews: the goal is to analyse students' performance 
of skills and automatic knowledge of 'facts', and identify weak spots in processes 
which need direct instruction, correction, or redirection and guidance to improve 
checking, proof-reading and spontaneous independent self-correction. Link this with 
the recent work (e.g. Cath Pearn's conference piece and related articles) in MAV 
Conference 1997 on Mathematics Intervention, identifying high correlations between 
young students' need for Reading Recovery and Mathematics Intervention, and 
similarly for Bob Wright's work in Mathematics Recovery. 
 
• Mention serious high priority long-term goals: 
— independence 
— positive self-concept 
— curiosity and self-motivation 
— knowing how to learn and enjoying learning 
— constructive recreational life-interests 
 
• Tell the story about growing a tree: you can measure the height of the tree every 
three months, and be absolutely certain about where the tree is really at, or what level 
the tree has reached: but the tree grows just the same, regardless of being measured, 
or not. Many trees in forests do quite well without ever being measured in their entire 
lives! The point, with classroom measurement, is that when you know where the child 
is at, this should then have certain clear instructional consequences. If it doesn't then 
you are measuring (summative) for the sake of it, not in order to do something about 
the results of the measuring. 
 
• As an alternative, consider school photographs. As long as a school takes regular 
photographs of whole classes and individuals, the school can genuinely claim to have 
a true and up-to-date picture of the students and their growth. But what, if anything, is 
done with these pictures? Feed the scrawnier students peanut butter? Make the 
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plumper weaker students develop physical fitness? It is what you do with the picture, 
or as a consequence of measuring, that matters. 
 
• Portfolios: Talk about collecting samples of students' work. This results initially, at 
least, in unorganised, unwieldy heaps of raw data. 
— How can they be analysed?  
— How can you compare the heap of Billie's work-samples from Term 1 with those 
in Term 3? How can you compare the Dinosaur project with the work on the History 
of Clocks? (Chalk and cheese?)  
— Is an isolated piece of work representative? Of course it is possible that a piece of 
work from one particular day may be unrepresentative, because Billie was having an 
'off day' that day. But will the work from good days naturally counterbalance this bad-
day sample? Is it valuable to know that Billie may be a student who has three bad-
days for every one good-day? Is it helpful to know that, when it's a good day Billie 
can do amazing work, if the reality is that most of the time the level of achievement is 
comparatively dismal? 
— How can we make constructive connections between a collection of pieces of work 
and specific learning outcomes? 
— How can we connect pieces of work with a particular curriculum? How many 
different pieces of work, or different kinds of work samples do we need to collect to 
be assured that we have adequate representative information to throw some light on 
the particular subject or curriculum? 
 
• Is it helpful to have a clearly stated Learning Outcome, with a corresponding 
question or task that a student can do, and then record how the student handled the 
task? This can allow you to build up a collection of tasks (with their corresponding 
Outcomes) which indicate the student's overall performance. Such tasks can be 
presented to students in the form of worksheets, homework projects, short tests or 
quizzes, or even as exams. With homework tasks you need to be alert to the 
possibility that students may have obtained considerable help from others, so that the 
achievement indicated by the project may not accurately reflect what the student has 
learned or is able to do unaided. With tests and exams you may need to be cautious in 
the severity with which time-limits are used, and you should be alert to student test-
anxiety imparing the student's ability to perform as well as possible. 
 
• Can we devise a 'map of the curriculum', and chart on it (recording dates of arrival) 
the individual progress of each student, as the student is helped to explore the territory 
on the map? Is the CSF something like such a map? What use is made of previous 
years' records, to provide a clear overview of the progress across years of time of 
individual students? To what extent is the First Steps program a 'map'? Or the earlier 
'Profiles' approaches used in several Australian States and also nationally? 
E.g. First Steps: Spelling: Developmental Continuum, Department of Education of 
Western Australia, Perth, (1997) 
First Steps: Writing: Developmental Continuum, Longman, Melbourne, 1994. 
First Steps: Writing: Resource Book, Longman, Melbourne, 1994. 
 
• Consider H.L Schoen (1996) 'Assessment Issues From a Mathematics Education 
Perspective': web-site URL  
http://www.ericse.org.eric/publications/public-01.html 
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• 'Formative' testing or evaluation is used by teachers to form the subsequent teaching 
that will follow the evaluation. 
 
• 'Summative' evaluation is used to summarise the progress that a student has made 
through some period of time. 
 
• Clarify the difference between 'criterion-referenced' and 'norm-referenced' 
evaluation. Compare this with a curriculum structure such as the CSF-Mathematics, 
or the National Profiles, which was constructed by a team of draft-writers, who 
prepared drafts of Learning Outcomes or Indicative Behaviours or Nutshell 
Descriptors; these were subsequently considered by other teams of teachers who made 
further suggestions, based on their pooled years of teaching experience, about the 
appropriateness or otherwise of the suggested 'Levels' of 'Bands' for each of these 
'outcomes' (and commented on the clarity, and sense of the outcomes). Hence such 
'Outcomes' were certainly not 'normed' by being given as formal test items to a 
representative sample of several thousand students, and then being statistically 
analysed to link test-performance levels with age or grade levels, or to rak test-
question levels of difficulty. Yet the process of establishing a particular Level for a 
particular Outcome, based on teachers' perceived judgments and professional 
experience results in a quasi-norm or pseudo-norm. It has no statistical basis but has 
the same eventual effective, in that it suggests that a particular Outcome can 
'normally' be reasonably expected to be mastered by a certain broad age of school 
student or stage in the school process. 
 
• Criterion-referenced tasks are not in themselves a bad thing. Nor is there any real 
alternative to stating some kind of criteria as guides for teaching. It is one thing to 
criticise 'teaching to a test' (an easy slogan to bandy around, and often taken as some 
kind of irrefutable criticism of testing; yet teaching to a test is not necessarily a bad 
thing either, especially when we recognise that evaluation should match instruction, 
or else run the risk of being irrelevant or misleading). It is quite another matter to 
criticise 'teaching to an outcome'. This is simply teaching. Without a goal for the task, 
without a clearly stated outcome, any so called teaching lacks direction, or focus. If 
the teacher tries to work with no clear possible outcomes in mind, then the teacher 
cannot be made accountable for what is being done, and any learning that the students 
actually achieve will have occurred more by accident than planning. 
 
• It is easy enough to state a criterion-referenced outcome. But how can we be sure a 
student shows that the outcome has been successfully achieved? Evaluation is harder 
than it looks. We might, for example, specify that a child can do … (pick an example 
from CSF. But what if the child handles it this way? Or that way (say, using a 
calculator)? Remember the story of the Physics student who was asked to say how he 
would use a barometer to find the height of a multi-storey building. The student 
mentioned how bored he was with the obvious answer that involved measuring 
differences in air pressure at ground level and at the top of the building. He proposed 
as a solution, using a long piece of string, and measuring the length of string used to 
lower the barometer from the top of the building to the ground. The student's 
favourite answer, however, was to go to the caretaker and say, 'If you can tell me the 
height of this building or show me an architect's plan, I will give you this fine 
barometer'! 
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• Even when we develop flexible methods for evaluating criterion-referenced learning 
outcomes, another difficulty remains. How exhaustive do the outcomes need to be to 
encompass the particular curriculum. We might, for example, be able to specify 
Outcome A, and Outcome B, and to have some worksheet tasks, or observation 
criteria, or test questions which we believe enable us to establish that these outcomes 
have been learned. But do we also want to specify the connecting outcome that 
enables a student to recognise, for example, the way Outcome A and Outcome B are 
related (for example, linking plane area with surface area of solid objects, or 
connecting area concepts with volume concepts)? Then, if we do have this extra 
Outcome A + B, do we also want to connect it with other connecting outcomes, such 
as Outcome C + D, and so on? How many outcomes are enough? 
Maybe use reference: Mousley, Clements, Ellerton in Leder Assessment and Learning 
in Mathematics, ACER, 1992 pp 107-144: Page 135 says that using criterion-
referenced tests developed from predetermined behavioural objectives is simplistic 
and inadequate and fails to provide a clear cut indicator of children's understanding... 
 
• It is commonly said that testing a student and giving the student a number or a letter 
grade achieves nothing. While this is superficially true, it should be stressed that it 
may take only a tiny amount of interpretation of such a number or grade to obtain 
important information. For example, suppose a student in Grade 3 completes the 
Schleiger Diagnostic Mathematical Tasks (1993) for Grade 3 (the DMT3) in February, 
or near the start of a school year, and obtains an overall percentage score of, say, 95% 
(or even something as low as 75%—remember that we can only test with limited 
measuring accuracy). This result is far more than just a number. It means that the 
student has in effect completed all the learning that would usually be expected to be 
covered during Grade 3. Clearly such a student needs new challenges, and might 
usefully be asked to work through the DMT4 (and if that's OK, try the DMT5, and so 
on) before deciding just what level of mathematics curriculum would be most 
appropriate. 
 
• Some schools declare that they have no need for more formalised approaches to 
educational evaluation because they are using a 'whole language approach', or an 
'integrated curriculum', or some other innovative model for teaching. However this 
may not actually be a reasonable attitude. Unless the 'whole language approach' (or 
similar scheme) provides an adequate outline of curriculum content and methodology, 
including detailed guidelines for teaching, monitoring learning, and providing 
feedback to students and effective diagnostic intervention, the scheme is likely to be 
wishy-washy, or worse. What, after all, do you teach in, Say, Grade 4? What do you 
do with a child who, for example, can read many words at sight but has no real 
comprehension of what is being read? Educational evaluation, where it is effectively 
linked with practical curriculum planning, is essential to ensure that students are 
helped to learn as efficiently and constructively (and emotionally positively) as 
possible. Anything less is a dereliction of professional responsibility on the part of the 
students' teacher! 
Even the most organic and whole-process-oriented 'whole language' approach relies 
implicitly on learning outcomes of quite specific kinds. These can include such as 
outcomes as 'can read chapter books with ability to retell or show comprehension', 
'can write haiku which are soundly formed meaningful statements using the correct 
syllable pattern', or 'can spell all of the 100 Most Frequently Used Written Words'. 
Ditto for CSF outcomes … find some. 
John Gough — Research Studies page  147 
 
• Emphasize the general idea of testing the way you teach, or making assessment 
methods correspond to the methods of instruction and learning. For example, if a 
subject includes a lot of laboratory work then make sure that any evaluation also 
includes laboratory work, perhaps even a laboratory exam. Similarly, if students are 
expected to work together in cooperative groups, or to perform collaborative tasks as 
they are learning, then the same teams of students should be called on to work 
together collaboratively to prepare some form of collaborative assessment of their 
team-work. 
 
• 'brainstorming' as a collective pooling of background knowledge on a topic, used 
formatively to identify remaining gaps in knowledge (the teacher is likely to be the 
one able to identify a 'gap' — students who do not know something are unlikely to 
known that they don't know), to prompt questions about relationships between terms 
and concepts identified during the brainstorm, and to be used to attempt to develop 
concept maps and flow charts and other methods of organising the initially randomly 
generated brainstormed information into more rationally organised forms, for further 
investigation. A non-judgmental think-tank approach (in which wild ideas and 
combinations can be floated with a group, without immediately declaring the idea 
invalid or irrelevant—how might it be relevant? do Bono's many thinking strategies 
are extremely useful for this kind of work) can be used, in conjunction with 
brainstorming, as a way of generating possible solutions to problems, relying on the 
random combinations and sparks of inspiration that can occur when individuals share 
their thinking. Obviously brainstorming cannot be used effectively in any summative 
sense, although some teachers have been known to present the result of a 
brainstorming session as a resource chart for subsequent tasks such as creative writing. 
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Spatial thinking, 'space' and 'geometry' 
 
Abstract 
Spatial thinking is a special aspect of mathematics which is often neglected or not well 
understood. The recent move to consider theories of 'multiple intelligence' requires a fresh look 
at traditional ideas of geometry and not so traditional aspects of mathematics content and 
thinking. Although Paiget and Inhelder attempted a major study of this topic, and their research 
has been influential, there is need for cautious and constructive criticism, especially when 
mathematics curricula and teaching approaches are being widely reviewed. 
 
Introduction 
Mathematics is about number and measurement, right? Wrongish. It's about these, and more, about things 
behind number and measurement. It's about a way of looking at the world and reasoning. Yes, mathematics is 
about 1, 2, 3, ..., and +, -, %, and x2 + x - 2 = 0, but it's also about 'triangles', 'parallel', 'similar', 'congruent', ..., 
and about 'if X is true then Y cannot be true because ...'. Large, intricate, and complicated. Simple, complex, 
exciting. Pretty. Challenging. 
 
Pretty challenging? How many mathematically different ways can you take four squares, all the same size, and 
fit them together so that any two squares side by side share a common whole edge, and no square is left 
unconnected to some other square, and where two squares are not said to be joined if they meet only at a 
common corner? 
Here is the answer, using only three squares at a time. 
Figure 1.1: Fitting three squares together at a time joined by whole edges. 
 and  
And here are several ways that three squares at a time are not allowed to be 'joined'. Can you see why each 
breaks one of the 'joining' rules? 
Figure1.2: Incorrect ways of fitting three squares together. 
 
Making as many possible different shapes with four squares at a time is a simple enough question perhaps. But 
consider the detail that is taken for granted: 'shape, square, size, touch, join, share, edge, corner, combinations', 
and so on. The question 'How many?' refers to mathematics as number. The materials involved are squares, the 
'spatial' or geometric aspect of mathematics. The task requires manipulation of elements to create different 
shapes, a different kind of mathematical work altogether.  
Try this: fold a piece of paper three times, then use a hole-punch (or a sharp object) to make a hole through the 
folded sections: draw a diagram of what the paper, now holed, will look like when it is unfolded. Now unfold it 
and consider your predictions beside the reality. Think about what mathematical ideas are built into this task. 
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If it wasn't obvious before, it should be starting to come clear that mathematics is a web or tapestry of concepts 
and skills, woven from many different threads, knotted and connected in many different ways. 
What is 'spatial thinking'? 
The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play 
any role in my mechanism of thought. The physical entities which seem to 
serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images 
which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced and combined ... The above-mentioned 
elements are, in any case, of visual and some muscular type. Conventional 
words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary 
stage ... when words intervene at all, they are, in my case, purely auditive, ...  
(Albert Einstein, in a letter to the mathematician Jacques Hadamard, in 1945,  
responding to a questionnaire on the psychology of mathematical creativity and thinking:  
quoted by Arthur Koestler in The Act of Creation 1964, pp. 171–172) 
When spatial thinking occurs, a person considers a mathematical task or question posed in a 1- or 2- or 3-
dimensional setting, and forms a mental image of the object or works directly with the object, in order to move 
towards some solution of the task. Such thinking seems to be virtually wordless, a way of thinking with shapes 
and images, rather than a linking of word-like ideas. We can say that the solution to the task is achieved by 
'insight', a potent word —'in-sight'—seeing inwardly. 
Notice that the noun 'space' is turned into the adjective 'spatial', the letter 'c' changing into a 't'. What do we 
mean by 'space' when we speak of 'spatial thinking'? Despite immediate thoughts of 'Outer Space', black holes, 
aliens, rockets, stars, galaxies, planets and the solar system, what we are really talking about are those aspects 
of mathematics which deal with points, lines, regions, angles, rotations, reflections, symmetry, … all those 
mathematical ideas which can most effectively be represented by diagrams and models.  
Mathematical tasks which involve only one dimension are dealing with questions about single lines, about 
finding a path from one point to another, about locating a position in a loop or circumference of a circle. The 
one-dimensional nature of such tasks may not always be obvious. Moving a counter along a Snakes and 
Ladders board, for example, is essentially a one-dimensional activity. Why? The two-dimensional layout of the 
board is equivalent to a number-line of squares which are numbered (perhaps from 1 to 100). Similarly, 
counting the hours around an analog clock from one hour to another, or counting minutes in lots of 5, is 
essentially one-dimensional as the numbers around a clock face are equivalent to a special number-line that 
loops around at its end to join up with its starting position, like running laps around a race track —twelve on a 
clock is also a zero! 
Two-dimensional tasks involve questions about areas, regions, insides and outsides of a surface, fences around 
a paddock, flat objects such as kites and chess boards, lines intersecting each other, lines touching curves, and 
so on. Usually we ignore the fact that a chess board, made of wood or cardboard or even a thin sheet of paper, 
actually has 'depth' or 'height' as well as 'length' and 'width', just as we ignore the 'volume' of wrapping paper or 
carpet when we consider questions about the area involved in covering a floor or wrapping a parcel. Notice, 
though, that we buy house paint by the litre, but do so on a basis of estimated coverage of square metres for the 
volume-contents of the tin. 
Three-dimensional activities deal with the standard ideas of 'length', 'width' and 'height' that we associate with 
the concept of 'volume' or so called 'solid' objects such as cubes, boxes, cylinders, spheres and cones, which 
have direct two-dimensional counterparts such as squares, rectangles, circles and triangles. 
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Working in the former Soviet Union in the 1950s and 60s, the Soviet researcher Vadim Krutetskii (1976) 
argued that there are three different kinds of mathematical thinking: 'analytic' (which relies on words and chains 
of logical reasoning), 'geometric' or 'spatial' (which uses images), and 'harmonic' which is a mixture of the other 
two kinds (p. xiv). It is easy to experience these ways of thinking.  
Consider this task, and imagine how you might find a solution:  
Three friends visit a library on different days. Alex visits every 3 days, Benny 
visits every 4 days, and Con visits every 5 days. The last time they were all at 
the library together was a Tuesday. How long will it be until they all meet 
there next? What day of the week will it be? (Krutetskii p. 14).  
A spatial thinker might use a calendar or number line to work this out, counting successive whole numbers as 
days in 'bundles' of 3, 4 and 5. An analytic thinker might use the verbal-symbolic abstract concept of 'lowest 
common multiple'. A mixed or harmonic thinker might combine aspects of both the other approaches, mentally 
'skip counting' successive multiples of 3, possibly visualising an imagined number line, and checking which are 
also multiples of 4 and 5. 
While spatial thinking is clearly a natural way of handling a wide variety of mathematical questions, it is not 
the only way of dealing with concepts about 'space'. The standard school mathematics topic 'Geometry' is often 
treated in a largely 'analytic' way, using word definitions, sequences of instructions for drawing and 
construction activities, and rules for logical reasoning. 
Albert Einstein described himself very definitely as a spatial thinker. Interestingly, because he was more a 
physicist than a mathematician, once he had finished his thinking with visual images and signs he sometimes 
had to struggle to find the right algebraic formulae or mathematical forms to express his spatial insight, partly 
because he was not widely read in the modern mathematics of his time. 
Consider also the international reporting of gender differences in spatial thinking, where males tend to be better 
than females. How do you rate? Here is a typical spatial thinking task. Imagine you are driving to some place 
you have never visited before. You consult your handy street directory or road map to check how to get there. 
Then as you are driving, turning right and left around totally unfamiliar streets, with the street directory on the 
passenger seat beside you, do you stop, sometimes, to decide which direction to turn next, and find that it helps 
your thinking if you actually turn the street directory so that the road-lines on the page are going in the 
direction you are actually facing? Talk with your friends about this task. Although both male and female 
drivers are equally capable of making a wrong turn, or getting lost during such a task, typically many male 
drivers will 'move' the street directory in their head, not on the passenger seat, while many female drivers move 
the map on the car seat in order to see literally which direction to turn. 
Isn't 'Space' the same as 'Geometry'? 
When we were at school the mathematics curriculum included a topic called 'Geometry' where we learned 
about special objects, such as squares, rectangles, parallelograms, rhombuses, triangles, circles, cubes, prisms, 
and so on. We also learned that, for example, there are 360 degrees in a full turn, and 90 degrees in a right 
angle, and angles can be acute, obtuse and reflex, and triangles can be equilateral, isosceles and scalene, and so 
on. We might have learned about Pythagoras' Theorem, and learned how to prove geometric properties, such as 
that the external angle of a triangle is equal in size to the sum of the two opposite internal angles, or properties 
of parallel lines and an intersecting transversal. We might have gone as far as studying similarity of triangles, 
and memorised the special triangle ratios of sides which we refer to as cosine, sine and tangent, the central 
functions of Trigonometry. 
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All of these things are part of a 'Geometry' curriculum, but they are also part of a larger topic which can be 
conveniently referred to as 'Space'. Moreover, most of this Geometry curriculum was taught in an analytic 
thinking style, emphasising definitions, rules, proofs and formulae. Little attention was given to developing 
skill with spatial thinking, or even encouraging students to use diagrams except as a first step to establish the 
facts of a textbook question. In fact often teachers discouraged students from relying too much on a diagram.  
This means that many of the ideas discussed here will be familiar, but they now need to be placed in a larger 
framework. Since you were at school there may have been changes in the more traditional kinds of geometry 
curriculum. New topics have been introduced, partly for their own sake, partly as intriguing ways of interesting 
students and trying to motivate aspects of the traditional curriculum. Tessellation (or 'tiling' activities, such as 
fitting octagonal and square tiles together to cover a bathroom floor —with some tile-cutting to fit against the 
floor edges) and Escher-type diagrams have become a popular way to motivate standard concepts of 'area'. 
(You may like to investigate the art and mathematical applications of Maurits Escher, the Dutch artist. Books 
and jig-saws of his work are readily available.) Questions about reflection symmetry and rotational symmetry 
have also been used to motivate ideas of angle and pattern. 
Getting started 
Let's begin with a simple task. Which of the following shapes in figure 1.3 are triangles? 
Figure 1.3: Which of these shapes are 'triangles'? 
 
Well, shape A has curved 'corners', and B is made of broken lines, and C is completely filled in, and D is partly 
filled in, and E is a strange diagram representing a three-dimensional piece of bent metal which was originally 
an elongated cylinder, and F is a combination of filled in regions including two trapezoidal shapes. 
In fact this is a trick question, or at least a tricky question, because mathematically speaking, none of them are 
triangles! If you look closely you will see that E is actually meant to be a picture of a 'triangle', meaning, the 
musical instrument called a 'triangle'. But you would be right to say that all of them are 'triangular', because 
they all have some features which belong to the concept of 'triangle' or otherwise resemble what 
mathematicians call 'triangle'. 
Why aren't they triangles? As you have probably guessed, it all depends what you mean by 'triangle', and this 
issue goes to the heart of what is being learned when we study Space or Geometry —we explore definitions and 
the consequences of and connections between definitions. 
How do you define 'triangle'? There are several different ways, but mathematically each definition specifies the 
same group of two-dimensional objects. Here is one definition:  
'A triangle is a two-dimensional closed figure or polygon, formed by three straight line segments, where each 
pair of line segments intersect at one point'.  
Here is another: 'A triangle is the set of points in a plane which is obtained by starting at one point, moving a 
finite distance in a straight line, turning through any angle which is not a multiple of 180 degrees, moving 
another finite distance in a straight line, and then returning along a straight line to the first point'.  
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Here is another: 'A triangle is the set of points formed by joining any three distinct points in a plane by straight 
line segments'.  
Here is another: 'A triangle is obtained when we take any straight line segment and create two more line 
segments by joining the two end-points of the first line segment with any other point in the plane as long as that 
point does not lie on the straight line formed by extending the first line segment.'  
Can you think of other ways of defining 'triangle'? 
Notice that the lines or line segments (we might choose to use precise terms, or settle for everyday equivalents 
and approximations) which form a triangle must be straight (no curves) and complete (no gaps). And the 
triangle is the 'fence', not the 'paddock' inside the fence, just as a circle is the 'circumference' not the 'disk' 
enclosed by the outer circular edge. So, technically, a filled-in triangular region is not itself a triangle although 
it has a triangle as its outer edge or boundary. 
Yes, we are splitting hairs. But this is part of the way we need to think if we are to make progress in 
mathematics. We need to be precise and exact and concise. But we also need to see the general idea behind the 
technical detail, we need to understand the generic spatial idea of 'triangular' as well as the ruthlessly specific 
analytic definition of 'triangle'. Moreover, we should realise that many mathematical terms also have related 
non-mathematical meanings, as in the musical instrument called a 'triangle'.  
We can even find that a specialised mathematical term can have different mathematical meanings. The number 
4 is, for example, a 'square' – that is, it is a 'square number'. Indeed it can be helpful to demonstrate the nature 
of 'squaring' numbers, of identical-twin multiplication factors, by using a square-shaped diagram of dots for 
unit whole numbers. Similarly Pascal's Triangle is not itself a triangle, nor did Pascal actually invent it, 
although Pascal significantly contributed to its theory and applications, and its construction and numerical 
relationships can best be displayed in a triangular-shaped chart. 
Also, whenever we attempt to teach a new concept we must simultaneously discuss examples of that concept 
along with examples which do not belong with that concept. Only by investigating those defining features 
which enable us to distinguish a 'triangle' for example, from triangle-like and non-triangular objects can we 
really find what the concept of 'triangle' means. Figure 1.4 contains some more almost-triangles and not-
triangles. 
Figure 1.4: Some shapes which are 'near-miss' triangles. 
 
We make it harder for learners when we set up artificial separations between concepts, ostensibly because we 
want to avoid confusing the students. For example, whenever we attempt work on 'area', we should also include 
some work on 'perimeter' (and vice versa), and possibly some work on 'volume' and 'length'. This makes it 
necessary for students to identify similarities and differences between these concepts. 'The conjecture that equal 
perimeters enclose equal areas is a strong one. If we are to generate a realistic mathematical attitude, we must 
allow the children to develop critical powers' (Association of Teachers of Mathematics 1967, p. 315).  
Biologists encounter this conceptual task as soon as they attempt to move beyond the common terms for 
different kinds of animals, for example, and attempt to specify the essential differences, and similarities 
between such animals as frogs and toads, butterflies and moths, crocodiles and alligators, dolphins and 
porpoises and whales, and so on.  
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In mathematics we encounter the need to define clearly, or as clearly as the level of children's understanding 
will allow, as soon as we move beyond everyday language involved in counting, talking about location of 
objects, and describing different features of objects. In what ways is an 'oblong' different from a 'rectangle'? Is a 
'square' a 'rectangle'? When is a 'diamond' a 'square', and when is it a 'rhombus' and when is it a 'lozenge'? 
Sometimes the answers to these questions seem hair-splittingly trivial. But eventually, as happens in all matters 
of definition and attempts to share commonly understood meanings, it all depends on just what you mean, and 
you can't progress without being as precise as you need to be for the present task. 
The problem with diagrams, concepts and examples 
Every time we draw a diagram, we run a risk that students who look at the diagram may focus on features 
which we do not intend to be significant. Let's stick a bit longer with the example of 'triangle'. The standard 
school treatment of triangles tends to emphasise certain kinds of 'off-the-peg' or 'ready-made' or 'standard' 
triangles: equilateral, and right-angled, and usually shown in standardised ways, sitting on their flat bottom 
edges, as in figure 1.6. 
Figure 1.6: 'Standard' triangles. 
 
Understandably school children who have only ever seen these clichéd kinds of triangles may be unsure if the 
following examples in figure 1.7 are triangles, also. 
Figure 1.7: Some non–'standard' triangles. 
 
We need to make sure that school students see many different kinds of triangles, in many different orientations, 
and not just the standard 'posting box' or 'attribute block' kinds of triangles. Figure 1.8 has some slightly 'wilder' 
examples. 
Figure 1.8: Extreme cases of triangles. 
 
These are also triangles, although you may need to make some allowance for the limitations of computer-based 
graphics. In other words, the intention to show a straight line may have to be accepted, even though the 
limitations of computer graphics may result in a stair-case collection of dots and dashes. The specific diagrams 
or objects represent an idea. Students need to form an abstract concept based on specific examples, and 
counter-examples of not-the-concept. 
Richard Skemp (1971) discusses this in The Psychology of Learning Mathematics (chapter 2). By looking at 
many examples of a concept we are able to form an idea of, for example, 'chair', and we can recognise 
'chairness' in different objects, including the one-legged, five-footed, wheel-toed, stoolish thing I am currently 
sitting in, although we may draw the line at the human-sized open-fronted basket that hangs from a chain on the 
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veranda of the next-door house —'chairness' can only be stretched so far, and that is a basket-trapeze, not a 
genuine 'chair'. Similarly by seeing many examples which our parents assure us are 'red', and many other 
counter-examples of things which we are told are not red, we develop the abstract notion of 'red', and later, 
having learned to identify many different words of a similar kind we form the yet more highly abstracted 
concept of 'color', and perhaps later still develop the color-related concept of 'saturation', and the shade-related 
concept of 'tone'. 
This is a crucial aspect of all learning. We investigate specific examples, and counter-examples, and generalise 
and abstract from the specific to the idea represented in different ways by different examples. We recognise that 
a poodle, doberman, spaniel, terrier, collie, whippet, chihuahua, pug, pekinese, dalmatian or an alsatian is a 
'dog'. And a 'dog' is not a 'cat'. But dogs and cats are —take your pick —quadrupeds, carnivores, pets, 
mammals, vertebrates, animals, organisms, and so on.  
To identify one kind of dog from another, or to identify one kind of animal from another, we learn to recognise 
distinctive features (tail, coat, size, spots, ears, etc.). The infant who sees a cow for the first time and 
spontaneously declares 'Puppy!' is on the right track, but still needs to clarify some of the distinctive features. 
The three year-old who is given his first toy 'stove', looks at it, places it on the floor, and makes a 'Brrrmm! 
brrrmm!' noise as he moves the stove back and forth on the floor is making a serious conceptual error. Apart 
from anything else, the stove has no wheels! (And is a 'dingo', a 'wolf' or a 'jackal' a 'dog'? How 'doggish' is a 
fox? Is a 'lion' or 'lynx' a 'cat'? a 'genet'?) 
Frank Smith describes the role of 'distinctive features' in perception and learning, and the way children develop 
the ability to attend to different features for different tasks (see Smith 1975, pp. 15–16, and many other books 
by Frank Smith, a great teacher of psycholinguistic theories of reading and general learning theory).  
Sometime orientation is not a distinctive feature, sometimes it is. Which of the following shapes in figure 1.9 is 
a 'cat' and which is a 'b'? 
Figure 1.9: When does orientation matter for  'cat' or 'b'? 
 
We need to do the same with geometric objects and concepts about space. Identify distinctive features, become 
familiar with different tasks, form abstracted concepts, and concepts about concepts, and concepts about 
concepts about concepts, and so on, and learn the relations between examples and concepts. 
Sometimes the distinguishing features are very subtle, or non-existent and we must interpret from the context. 
When, for example, is a 'b'-like character a '6' or '9' or 'e'? And does an electronic calculator make such a 
distinction? What about 's', 'S', '5', '2', 'z' and 'Z', or '3' and 'E', and what about differences between printed text, 
computer and calculator fonts, handwritten characters, upper-case and lower-case, and so on? 
Chuan-Seng Lee and Georgina Herbert (1993), in 'Geometric Diagrams and Geometer's Sketchpad in Primary 
School Mathematics' raise issues about 'attributes' of diagrams. In particular,geometric objetcs inGeometer's 
Sketchpad  always have a specific attributes such as the distance from one point to another, or a specific length 
for any line segment, or a specific angle between any two line segments? But consider the way mathematics 
teachers draw a diagram of, say, a rectangle, and say it is meant to represent any rectangle? Sometimes this idea 
of generality is an important feature of geometric diagrams: they are not meant to represent specific lengths or 
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specific angles —instead they are meant to represent a general case. Clearly this is one major limitation of 
Geometer's Sketchpad and other software packages All cases drawn using Geometer's Sketchpad are specific! 
Sometimes a rough sketch is more than enough to identify the crucial features we are referring to. Consider the 
way many adults rely on a watch which has hands but has no numbers on the dial. Clearly, a visual idea carries 
a lot of information, not all of which is necessarily part of the message intended to be conveyed at any 
particular time. 
Investigating 'Space' in three dimensions 
The activities you have been attempting with cardboard triangles can also lead to simple three-dimensional 
work. Notice that now, if a diagram is difficult to interpret, you need to create a 'solid' object, not just a 
cardboard cut-out, and manipulate that. Indeed, learning to cope with two-dimensional diagrams of three-
dimensional objects can be a major hurdle, comparable to the challenge of learning to read a map as a 
representation of a real piece of landscape.  
Figure 1.10 is a diagram of an object made from geometrically 'congruent' or identical cube-blocks fitted 
together.  
Figure 1.10: A three dimensional object made from identical cubes. 
 
How well can you interpret such a diagram? Assume there are no hidden holes, no extra blocks at the back of 
the object. How many cubes make this shape? Can you follow this diagram as a plan for building, and use 
cubes to create the object represented by this diagram? Could you draw a diagram to represent what we obtain 
if we remove the cube whose front face is labelled B? Or the result of removing the cube whose upper face is 
labelled C? Or the result of placing another cube behind the B-cube and below and in front of the C-cube? 
The diagram is based on the principle that a vertical cube-edge is shown 'vertically' on the page. But horizontal 
edges in the two major directions being used are shown on the page as line-segments drawn at an angle of 30 
degrees (approximately, in this drawing) to the horizontal. The special feature of this way of drawing is that 
cube-edges appear equally long in the three major directions that they are shown.  As long as we only measure 
lines in the diagram in the three major directions, which are at right angles to each other, or 'mutually 
perpendicular', we can use the same units of measurement. Such diagrams are called 'isometric', meaning 
'measuring equally' (like the term 'isobars' in Weather charts, showing lines of points where air pressure is 
barometrically equal).  
Working with isometric diagrams may take a little practice. In fact this is often the case for almost all kinds of 
two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional objects. Even photographs of everyday objects, 
something we take for granted, are not necessarily immediately 'readable'. Infants may need help in learning to 
interpret photos and recognize a photographic image or realistic drawing of a familiar object as actually 
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representing that object. Children from some non-Western cultures, possibly less used to photos and drawings, 
may need careful instruction in school before photos and diagrams become easily 'readable'.  
There are other ways of representing three-dimensional objects using two-dimensional diagrams. The best 
known is the standard 'house plan' or 'building plan' that uses a so called 'birds-eye view', which is like looking 
down on the building from a height, with roof and ceilings transparent or invisible, and 'side-views' through 
transparent outside walls.  
Notice that a 'map' of a piece of country is essentially a bird's-eye view, with considerable symbolic 
simplification. The simplification that results from using visual symbols is obvious as soon as we compare an 
aerial photo or satellite photo of the same piece of countryside with a map or street directory —an interesting 
activity! But such a simple representation runs into difficulty if the piece of country is sufficiently large for the 
earth's curvature to complicate our attempt to represent what is actually part of the curved spheroidal surface of 
the earth on a flat two-dimensional piece of paper —another very interesting activity!  
'Spatial' thinking clearly takes us beyond ordinary tasks of the traditional 'Geometry' curriculum? Several of 
these three-dimensional tasks using objects made from cubes have been loosely adapted from the excellent 
DIME materials developed by Geoff Giles of Stirling University. 
Are there 'stages' of development in learning about Geometry and thinking spatially? 
The famous Swiss experimental psychologist and education theorist Jean Piaget devised many ingenious 
experiments and used these to develop extensive theories about the way people learn about 'space' in the world 
around them. His major study with Bärbel Inhelder The Child's Conception of Space (1948) argued that infants 
and children progress in geometric knowledge from topological concepts, through projective geometry and 
eventually reach Euclidean concepts only with the advent of formal school instruction —a surprising reversal 
of the actual historical development of theories of geometry in mathematics.  
But this says more about Piaget's personal philosophical tendency to look for surprising evidence of abstract 
modern mathematics in children's thinking than it does about either the history of geometry or what children 
really can or cannot do. Despite this, Piaget has been very influential. (Generally I subsume Inhelder into the 
use of the name 'Piaget' in this discussion, not to belittle her work, but in recognition of Piaget's pioneering 
significance.)  
Without going into too much detail we will consider briefly one of Piaget's more intriguing and appealing 
spatial experiments: the classic 'Three Mountains' task, which Piaget describes as 'co-ordination of perspectives' 
(1948, pp. .210–246). The apparatus consists of a physical table-top model of three mountains which look a bit 
like the sketch in figure 1.11. 
Figure 1.11: Jean  Piaget's 'Three Mountains' Task. 
 
This should be easy for adults to understand visually. And obviously for the young Swiss children Piaget 
interviewed and studied, such Alpish mountains were certainly part of their everyday experience. (But consider 
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how Dorothy on the prairie plains of Kansas might respond to Piaget's questions!) Each mountain has particular 
identifiable features such as height and color, and a snow cap on the highest, a hill-top cross on the second 
highest, and a red house on the top of the lowest of the mountains, not shown in this sketch. 
The task involves the child identifying a particular pictorial representation of the three mountains as seen from 
a specified position. To do this the child chooses from a collection of realistic pictures of this model as drawn 
from several different points of view. (Experimenters nowadays would use close-up scale-model photographs 
instead of Piaget's drawings.) The child is helped to do this by the experimenter using a toy doll who is 
supposed to be moving like a real person around the model of the mountains as though the mountains and the 
doll were real.  
What will the doll see when it stands here —at A, B, C, or D, and so on? Piaget had several different ways of 
asking these kinds of questions.  
He interviewed 100 children, ranging in age from 4 years to 12 years old. As a result he described several 
major Stages in development, each with important sub-Stages—all part of a much larger general theory of 
cognitive development through childhood—the classic Pre-Operational, Concrete Operations, Formal 
Operations theory of Piaget. 
In short, the youngest, or least developed children who could understand or seem to respond sensibly to Piaget's 
questions were unable to identify the point-of-view that another observer would have: 'the child distinguishes 
hardly or not at all between his own viewpoint and that of other observers (represented by the doll in different 
positions)' (Piaget & Inhelder 1948, p. 212). As far as such a child is concerned, when attempting to imagine 
another person's point of view, the child believes that anyone else will see only what the child sees. The child 
cannot see beyond his or her own point of view. The child is locked into 'egocentrism'.  
Very interesting. Such children would be baffled by instructions from pre-school teachers and school teachers 
about performing certain spatial tasks that require an imaginative response to another's viewpoint. Cooperative 
work in playing with building materials would be extremely difficult.  
It takes a brave researcher with an equally intriguing experimental set-up to challenge such impressive research. 
Martin Hughes, the author of Children and Number (1986), developed a simple counterpart to Piaget and 
Inhelder's 'Three Mountains', described in Margaret Donaldson's classic Children's Minds (1978, pp. 19–31). 
Hughes' model resembled a cut-away house, with a policeman doll and a boy doll which looks like this in the 
bird's-eye view of figure 1.12.  
Figure 1.12: Martin Hughes' 'Policeman and Boy' Task. 
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The boy doll can be placed at positions A, B, C or D. The child is helped to understand the equipment, and 
questions are asked such as, 'If the policeman stands here [as shown] and the boy is here [e.g. A], can the 
policeman see the boy?', and 'If the policeman is here [actually placed at B, for example], place the boy so the 
policeman can't see him'. Very few mistakes occurred, and children were helped to overcome any mistakes. 
This led to the real test, where two policemen were used, placed in different locations, and the child had to try 
to hide the boy doll. 
Where Piaget found that children up to the ages of 8 and 9 were unable to answer 'Three Mountains' questions 
correctly, unable to 'de-centre' or overcome 'the egocentric illusion' (Piaget's words, translated, quoted by 
Donaldson, p. 20), Hughes found that children aged between three-and-a-half and five years could answer his 
'Policemen and Boy' questions with an overall accuracy of 90 per cent. And four-year-olds could handle even 
harder questions with the same success rate. Who is right?  
Piaget's work has been replicated by others. Hughes' work stands up to experimental scrutiny. What is at stake 
is the interpretation offered by both researchers, and critical comparison of the two experiments. According to 
Donaldson the key difference is that some of Piaget's younger children actually did not understand the task, 
although this seems not to have been obvious to Piaget. Hughes was able to use a simplified version of the 
'Three Mountains' task with pre-school children and, given careful help to make sure they understood what they 
had to do, most of them succeeded.  
But more importantly, Donaldson points out that even three-year-old children know what is involved in 'hiding' 
from some one. Though of course few children are used to really hiding from policemen, 'hiding' is a widely 
played young child's activity. That is, the Policeman task 'makes human sense' (emphasis in Donaldson's 
original, p. 24) where Piaget's task is clearly harder and also less humanly sensible because the motives and 
intentions of the imagined players in the task is not obvious. 
This discussion of two key research experiments may be enough to whet appetites for further reading or 
research and theories, or to indicate the caution we need to exercise when faced with apparently compelling 
experimental evidence that children can or can't do certain things—or that they pass through certain stages at 
particular ages. There is a difference between being influential and a pioneer, as Piaget unquestionably has 
been, and being reliably right and helpful in the classroom. 
One more theorist-researcher 
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Just as Hughes came to his research in critical response to Piaget's influence, another contributor to 
developmental theories about geometry attempted to build on and correct Piaget. Dutchman Pierre van Hiele 
and his wife Dina van Hiele-Geldof worked in the 1950s on the response of school children to instruction in 
traditional (Euclidean) geometry. This research began with two parallel doctoral studies. Following the early 
death of his wife, van Hiele continued their joint work, and his research articles and major study Structure and 
Insight (1986) has had considerable influence. The following discussion draws on the Australian-based 
research of John Pegg. 
According to van Hiele, students move through five identifiable Levels of thought or geometric understanding 
which may be descried briefly as follows (adapted from Pegg 1990, pp. 427–428): 
Level 1: Students identify figures by their shape as a whole. An object (say a 
trapezium) is what it is because it looks like it, a square and a rectangle are 
seen to be different. A typical comment from a student at this level is that 'a 
rectangle is a longer square'. 
Level 2: Students identify figures by their properties. However, the properties 
are independent of one another. A typical response might be 'a square has four 
equal sides and four equal angles'. Squares and rectangles [which share some 
of the stated properties] are still seen to be different. 
Level 3: Students still identify figures by their properties, however 
relationships between properties are observed. A typical response might be 'an 
isosceles triangle has two equal sides', but if probed about the angles the 
student will say 'if the sides are equal then the angles opposite them must also 
be equal'. A square is now seen to belong to the class of shapes called 
rectangles. Concepts such as parallelism and congruence emerge as principle 
aspects to be explored and used even though they had been known and talked 
about at lower levels. 
Level 4: Students can reason in a formal (deductive) way. They can solve 
theories [or 'theorems'] without relying on rote learnt steps that need to be 
followed. 
Level 5: Students can work within systems based on different axioms and 
study other [non-Euclidean] geometries which are not based directly on 
[Euclidean] experience. An example would be projective geometry. 
We notice in the examples offered by John Pegg the typical sequence by which students at first distinguish in 
everyday terms between 'square' and 'rectangle' (and the term 'oblong', which is an everyday synonym for the 
mathematical term 'rectangle'), and only later accept the mathematician's view that a 'square' is a special case of 
a 'rectangle', and also that a 'square' is a right-angled example of a 'rhombus'. In fact 'rectangle' and 'rhombus' 
are also included in the larger category of 'parallelogram' and this is in turn included in the still larger category 
of 'quadrilateral', itself a category within the general family of 'polygons'.  
The successive development of finer and finer distinctions between definitions or categories is often 
problematic, and 'square' and 'rectangle', initially discrete concepts, later being seen with 'squares' as a subset of 
the set of 'rectangles', is a classic example. Exactly the same difficulty arises in the successive refinement of 
zoological concepts. Typically, many students at first find it shocking or at least puzzling to include 'birds' as a 
subset of the larger category of 'animals', and commonly rebel at the teacher's suggestion that 'humans' are also 
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'animals'.  Van Hiele and Pegg are right in their analysis and description of a theoretical intellectual sequence of 
levels of understanding – from everyday concepts to formal definitions and abstract deductive skills. But 
whether this has any relation to psychological developments within an individual or learning stages is another 
matter.  
For example, notice that in Pegg's account of van Hiele's theory Level 5, in particular, assumes that direct 
experience of geometry is 'Euclidean'. However, whatever the limitations of Piaget's research, it seems clear 
that infants' and very young children's perceptual world and thinking is based on the non-Euclidean concepts of 
'near, far, in, out, touching, not-touching' and so on. That is, so called 'direct experience' may not be inherently 
Euclidean at all.  
Straight lines, angles and so on are human conceptual constructions which provide an abstract basis for certain 
kinds of human activities. We only need to step into a world of plaited wattles and round-walled round-roofed 
mud-thatched huts, or the well-known hemispherical Inuit igloos, to realise that 'straight' and 'angle' are also 
culture-relative, and not necessarily part of direct experience unless you happen to live in a world built of 
bricks and planks and right angles, dominated by tools and machines and school-based approaches to language 
and concepts. 
The van Hiele Levels are certainly interesting. Pegg and others have used the Levels as structural guides for 
approaches to developing geometric curricula. For example Pegg suggests that teachers encourage students:  
to concentrate initially on the properties of a rhombus. Not until students are familiar and 
comfortable with these properties is it suggested that work involving [compass-and-ruler] 
constructions (such as bisecting a line and drawing perpendiculars) should be commenced. 
Such an approach allows teachers the chance to let students, who are at Level 2, work at their 
level of understanding in carrying out and explaining constructions (a topic teachers often cite 
as difficult to 'teach'). The end result of such an approach is that students can talk about the 
reasons why the constructions 'work' in terms of the properties of a rhombus. They do not 
need to rely on remembering a number of 'tricks' that they do not understand and need to 
memorise.  
Pegg 1990 p. 428 
This sounds convincing. But so did Piaget's 'Three Mountains' research. Let us now consider what possible 
flaws there might be in such a view? 
To begin with, van Hiele and those who use his ideas, seem to be confusing the idea of 'development' with the 
experience of schooling. Piaget's theory, with its Stages of Pre-Operational, Concrete Operations and Formal 
Operations, argued that children cannot be 'taught' how to move from one Stage to another. Rather, if a teacher 
has any role in helping students move onwards through their cognitive developmental stages, it is only to 
provide as much rich and suitably structured experience as possible, from which students will be able to make 
their own discoveries and 'grow' through this experience to a new way of thinking. Pegg, in discussing the 
reported difficulties with compass-and-ruler constructions, seems to be similarly hesitant about the possibilities 
of 'teaching' being effective.  
But Piaget's ideas, about providing rich experience and challenging materials and activities, distinguish 
between traditional approaches to school curricula (lesson A, followed by lesson B, and so on, developing 
concepts and skills in order x, y, z, and so forth) and a kind of uncontrollable mental growth that corresponds 
with physiological growth (such as the onset of puberty, given a sufficiently nutritious diet). You can't teach 
people to become taller. You can't teach children to physically mature into adults. You can't teach people to 
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move from Concrete to Formal Operations. But with a good enough 'diet' or experience, they will get there 
themselves—according to Piaget and Piagetians. 
Whatever we may think of such claims, this is obviously very different from any comparable claim by van 
Hiele or his followers that you can't teach people to move from, say level A to level B. Different precisely 
because van Hiele's identified Levels are so clearly tied to different stages in a traditional geometry curriculum. 
It seems impossible to imagine any way that a student could move from, say, Level 3 (structured geometric 
vocabulary) to Level 4 (standard Euclidean proofs), or from Level 4 to Level 5 (non-Euclidean geometries) 
except by the direct intervention and instruction of a teacher wielding a well structured geometry curriculum. 
Whereas it is possible to imagine a student moving from Piaget's Pre-Operational to Concrete Operational 
Stages simply through rich experience and natural 'growth'.  
As for moving from Concrete to Formal Operations, especially in mathematics where the move is one from 
number work to algebraic work, and beyond, it is extremely difficult to imagine how this can be done without 
teachers. But that is yet another criticism of Piaget's theories which need not detain us too long here. The more 
you look at hard details of school curricula, the more Piaget seems to have less and less immediate relevance or 
constructive implications for the business of teaching and working with children and their school-based 
mathematical thinking especially in the transitional stages from arithmetic to algebra. (Further details can be 
found in the specialist research discussion by Clements and Gough 1978.) 
Separate from these remarks, notice also the way Pegg, for example, emphasises that students should focus on 
restricted geometric topics, such as the rhombus, until these are 'mastered' or sufficiently understood to be able 
to become the basis of extension to further and other topics. But Pegg himself identifies a key limitation:  
… if this idea was pursued in detail then the process would need to be 
repeated many times (i.e. with many figures) before a satisfactory basis, 
across a large section of Geometry, was established ... apart from the tedious 
repetitive nature of the activities, it is not clear that the sum of the repeated 
procedures would ever give a satisfactory holistic answer for the student.  
Pegg 1990 p .430. 
Pegg's discussion goes on to consider van Hiele's suggestions for overcoming this limitation. However the 
overall implication seems to amount to little more than the obvious point that teachers should proceed to teach 
geometry as well as possible, bearing in mind that students may not always understand at first, and may take 
time to come to grips with the real implications of the curriculum. 
Is it dangerous to over-simplify mathematics instruction? 
What if we believed Piaget's argument that some children may not be ready to deal with tasks such as the 
'Three Mountains', or other 'conservation'-related activities? Or if we believed that a vauable implication of van 
Hiele's theoretically proposed Levels of geometric thinking was that we should ensure that students all 
understood a topic before moving on? It seems we would spend a lot of time not even trying to move forwards, 
for fear of confusing students, or of presenting cognitive tasks they were incapable of handling, or of 
attempting to build on concepts and skills that were not yet understood or mastered but had only been 
encountered and grappled with in rote ways.  
Moreover, in the effort to ensure that students always understand and master any particular topic before 
attempting to move on, we would try to strip each teaching topic down to its simplest possible pieces, each of 
which would be taught as simply as possible, separately from other ideas which might be too readily confusable 
with the learning objectives currently being attempted. We would also try as hard as possible to show how 
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these simplest-possible building bricks related to important activities in the real world—we would emphasise 
practicality and relevance wherever possible.  
But 'understanding' and 'mastery' are slippery educational goals. Often understanding only arises in hindsight. 
And 'mastery' is limited, relative to the particular task at hand. What I have mastered about 'squares', for 
example, is seen to be incomplete as soon as I realise that a 'square' is also a 'rectangle', or that a 'square' is part 
of Pythagoras' Theorem, or that a 'square' is the result of translating a line segment within a plane 
perpendicularly to the orientation of the line segment, or that a 'square' has four axes of reflectional or line 
symmetry, and also has rotational symmetry. That is, what is 'mastery' at a particular stage of learning, is only 
'partial mastery' within some larger piece of learning. We have never completely 'mastered' or 'understood' 
some concept, although it may be comforting to think that we have. Mathematics is 'like a jigsaw that never 
ends. Just as we build up a "real" puzzle by completing a small bit of the border here, a little of the house in the 
picture there ... as small entities fit into place, yielding a satisfying picture, so, it seems, does our awareness of 
mathematics develop' (Association of Mathematics Teachers 1967, p. 310). 
Moreover the instructional crutch of 'relevance' and real-world usefulness, valuable though it may be 
sometimes, may actually conceal from students the fundamental underlying ideas. Typically, Economics 
students who study the Mathematics of Economics learn calculus that is so utterly dedicated to Economics 
applications that they have no idea at all that they are learning one of the great achievements of mathematics, 
and are completely incapable of applying the ideas they 'master' within an Economics setting to any other 
relevant subject. At Primary levels, it may be difficult to argue for relevance of 'symmetry', for example, or 
real-world applications for learning to read Roman numerals or for distinguishing isosceles from equilateral 
triangles. However, the sheer intellectual challenge involved in grappling with such issues, and their underlying 
general non-real-world significance, should be sufficient justification for suggesting that Primary students 
might enjoy learning about these things, and benefit from that learning. 
Using mathematics games to develop spatial thinking and geometry 
One way of focussing fairly painlessly on geometry and spatial thinking is through certain kinds of board 
games. Here are some suggestions (adapted from Gough 1994). Keep in mind, though, that some people do not 
like board games. What is fun for you may not be fun for me, and vice versa. Alternative activities include 
construction materials and kits such as Lego and Meccano. Similarly there is considerable spatial thinking in 
following the instructions for building a plastic scale model, or a boat-in-a-bottle, or other construction kits.  
 
Conclusion 
Spatial thinking is a way of doing mathematics, thinking mathematically, as much as it is a piece of curriculum 
content which includes aspects of what we traditionally call 'Geometry'. Always remember that part of this 
mathematical thinking involves problem solving, while another, possibly more important part, involves the 
forward-looking aspect of problem solving known as problem posing. I have deliberately written this 
discussion so that it does not work as a teaching guide, step by step, lesson by lesson, topic by topic, to a piece 
of curriculum. Instead I have tried to present questions which seem immediately intriguing,attempting to show 
a role model of problem posing, inventing new questions rather than harking back to familiar materials.  
This is not meant to be a criticism of familiar questions or standard approaches to this topic. A well constructed 
textbook treatment of, say, properties of a transversal intersecting a pair of parallel lines, or area and perimeter 
of irregular polygons, or an investigation of Platonic polygons and their three-dimensional polygonal 
counterparts, is still a valuable teaching resource. But it is important to try to make sure that such a treatment is 
used from a problem solving point of view, and, as much as possible, is used as a springboard for asking new 
questions. Now we have learned this: how can we use it, and what else can we do? 
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While Spatial thinking is largely non-verbal, it helps to keep in mind theories of language learning (including 
the psycholinguistic theories about oral language acquisition, learning to read, and learning to write), to give 
language-based insight to the processes involved in learning non-verbal concepts and skills. The fundamental 
processes of learning and making meaningful sense of experience seem to be the same whether they are being 
applied to verbal or non-verbal learning , or to psycho-motor learning, or socio-cultural learning, and so on —
including music and art. 
In a Primary class of mixed ability children, investigating the theme of 'Furniture', questions arose about the 
way trees were sawn lengthways and turned into planks of wood. One further question was, what shape is the 
cross-section of a tree trunk if it is cut across the trunk? And then, what is the cross-section when the cut goes 
at a slant? (Association of Teachers of Mathematics 1967, p 125). In fact questions about predicting cross-
sections occur in Piaget and Inhelder's experimental studies (1948 1956, chapter 9 'Geometrical Sections') and 
Piaget also investigated children's ability to draw a picture representing the drawing of a water-level in a half-
full bottle that is standing upright, lying down, or tilting half-way between horizontal and vertical (chapter 13 
'Systems of Reference'). 
Try these tasks yourself. Then consider the comments that follow, speaking to us from thirty years ago! 
Having seen an object cut across is not enough. It is no good asking the child to 'look' and 
draw what he 'sees'. Until he has met some conventional representations or symbolizations of 
the kind of thing he is to look at, he has no idea how to select what he should attend to, and 
no idea how this could be described or represented. 
Children have to learn how to look, how to select what to look at, and how to look at it. In 
this learning process symbols play an essential part; they may be gestures, words, or signs or 
drawings. The child acquires them by seeing and hearing them used in appropriate contexts, 
and at any stage the 'vocabulary' of symbols that he knows is growing and developing, 
increasing his ability to comprehend. It is not just that the extent of his 'vocabulary' 
determines how much he understands of what is 'said', although that is part of it; nor that his 
'vocabulary' determines how much he can communicate of what he understands, although that 
is another part of it. But the words and signs at his disposal have a more dynamic life; they 
are the tools he needs for his explorations. 
Every teacher knows that this is true in the case of [verbal] language. Words are not solely for 
talking with. They are part of the process of structuring experience and giving it meaning. 
The same is true for any other system of symbols, and in particular for the system of 
conventions that we use to describe shapes: the models we make and the diagrams we draw. 
Certainly the figures we draw are not merely copies of nature. Squares and rectangles and 
circles are as much abstractions as numbers are, and we would never arrive at them by simple 
observation of things around us. 
(Association of Teachers of Mathematics 1967, p. 126: emphasis in the original) 
This is the challenge of Spatial thinking and Geometry —to provide necessary tools for (mathematical) 
exploration of the physical world, linked with our culturally-constructed intellectual world. 
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Spatial Thinking and the D.I.P.T. Analysis 
 
[Developed from an earlier version with the same title in Prime Number vol. 6 no. 2 June 1991 
pp 3 - 5.] 
      
Spatial thinking occurs when we make a mental picture or model in our head and then use that 
picture or model to work out an answer to a problem. We may use spatial thinking whenever we 
drive a car, or park a car (to say nothing about reversing a car!), set a table, choose which 
saucepan to use, decide the next move in a game of chess, slice the remaining two-thirds of a pie 
to serve five people, and so on. Of course spatial thinking is not the only kind of thinking. But it 
is very important, and often neglected in schools. 
 
Here is an example of an everyday task and some different ways of dealing with it. When we are 
moving furniture, we might bring a large table up to a narrow door. The problem is: how can we 
get the table through?  
 
There are several ways of answering this. One way would be to physically manipulate the table 
until we find a way of getting through. This direct trial and error, turning and pushing a real 
physical object, is a weak kind of spatial thinking. Alternatively we might imagine that, if 
we tip the table over on its side, and if we then poke two of the legs through first at one side of 
the door, then we can slip the rest of the table through, giving the table a careful turn so that the 
rear legs fit through at the end. This time the problem is solved, or a possible solution is offered 
mentally, without actually carrying out the physical task at all. Such use of our three dimensional 
imagination is real  spatial thinking. 
 
Another alternative would be to measure the three dimensions of the table, to measure the door 
and adjacent walls,  and maybe to do some trigonometry or Pythagoras calculations. Then, from 
all of this analysis of the situation, construct a possible solution. This is not spatial thinking at all, 
unless we make scale diagrams to assist our calculations. It is another way of thinking 
mathematically - essentially it is verbal, "analytic", formula-based, formal mathematical 
thinking. By contrast, spatial thinking is non-verbal, wholistic, imagistic. In a very literal sense, 
spatial thinking is essentially a matter of "in-sight". 
 
As this example suggests, there are two different ways of thinking mathematically - 
"analytically", and "spatially". A third possible way is to combine these two in some way, 
perhaps doing some of the work analytically, and some spatially. Most people who have learned 
to think mathematically (which is, in fact, most people), think either analytically, or spatially or 
both. This description of "analytic", "geometric" (i.e. spatial), and "harmonic" (i.e. mixed 
analytic and spatial) types of mathematical thinking was developed by the Soviet researcher V. A. 
Kruteskii (1968, 1976, p 315). 
 
But if we look carefully at most mathematics curricula, we will see that spatial thinking is given 
very little emphasis. The instructions are given in detailed verbal, analytic prose. The diagrams 
are explained analytically using labels, and causally linked sentences. Even those areas of 
curriculum that might be expected to be handled by spatial means are actually dealt with 
analytically as much as possible. In topics such as area or volume, for example, most curricula 
will move on to algebraic formulae to handle length by width, and so on. Routines will be 
introduced to enable a complex area or shape to be broken down or analysed into manageable 
bits, rather than trying to find a way of dealing with the whole task. 
John Gough — Research Studies page  166 
 
Compare the average page of a mathematics textbook with, for example, a Lego manual which 
instructs children how to build some particular Lego model. The step-by-step Lego instructions 
analyse the task down into little manageable bits, from start to finish, brick by brick. But it is all 
done without words. Each step is a picture of what the model should look like now. Certainly 
some children will respond to this analytically, carefully identifying which Lego block fits where 
against which other Lego block, sometimes even counting the little dots or bumps on top of the 
blocks. But others take all of this in at a glance, and build directly from the diagrams, thinking 
spatially. 
 
This means that there is a discrepancy between the almost wholly analytic approach adopted by 
mathematics curricula and textbooks, compared to the way that many people rely on spatial 
thinking.  
 
A further complicating factor is that a wide range of international research tends to show that on 
almost any spatial task, males are more able to think spatially than are females. To a large extent 
this may reflect current cultural differences in upbringing and expectation. It is the boys who 
tend to be encouraged to climb trees, build cubby houses, play with Lego and Meccano, throw 
stones, steer billy carts, read maps, saw wood, dig holes, put up tents ... and so on.  
 
We may want to challenge such cultural stereotypes. There are always exceptional cases that do 
not fit cultural categories. Tom-boys rebel, and some become Olympic target shooters, or engine 
drivers. Some boys become chefs, and fashion designers and hairdressers. Also there seems to be 
a trend to counteract stereotyping within schooling and within the community generally. Kind 
aunts give footballs to their little neices, and doting uncles give dolls' houses to their nephews. 
Nonetheless, examine any toyshop, and the current stereotyping that still exists is immediately 
obvious: dolls, fairy costumes, toy cookware, toy jewellery and pink and pastel things to the left, 
guns, cars, trucks, fighting heicles and heroes, and red and black things to the right (or vice 
versa), all gender-categorised, and color-coded on the basis of gender-biased market research. 
 
Do boys play with Barbie's friend Ken? Do girls play with Skeletor or Swamp Thing? We will be 
waiting a long time before we see serious change in market-driven gender-coding, before we will 
be able to buy user-cuddly 'Conflict-Resolution Man, With Problem-Solving Suggestions!', as 
envisaged by Jane Sullivan in her article 'Children and Violence: When Does It Start?' (1996). 
 
It should be clear, then, that the current mathematics curriculum's emphasis on analytic thinking 
tends to ignore spatial thinking. This is likely to disadvantage the half of the population that is 
female, as well as the rest of the population that may prefer to handle mathematical thinking 
spatially. 
 
Here are some more spatial tasks to consider. 
 
1. Imagine an analog clock (i.e. one with hands) showing 12:30. 
2. Draw an analog clock showing 12:30.  
3. What time will this clock show one and three quarter hours after 12:30? 
4. What direction do you need to point so that you are pointing at the sun at noon in June (or in 
December)? (The answer, in Australia, is not simply "up" - think about it.) 
 
Consider the different kinds of spatial thinking involved in such everyday tasks, and the different 
ways that people can handle the tasks. Starting with the first question: What does your  mental 
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image of the clock look like? Are there numbers on your mental image of a clock face? What 
kind of numbers, ordinary Hindu-Arabic, or Roman, or computer-style? What kind of hands, 
plain, ornate scroll-work, Mickey-Mouse-gloved hands? Then consider the second question: 
How are the numbers placed on the drawn clock face? If you have used Roman numerals, look at 
the numeral for "four o'clock" and if possible find a real clock with Roman numerals to compare 
with your drawing. Is the hour hand correctly placed on the drawn face? How have you answered 
the third question: Have you drawn a picture of the clockface one and three quarter hours after 
12:30? Did you do any arithmetic to find what the subsequent time would be? With the last 
question: What kind of mental image of the sun, or Australia or the Earth did you make? 
 
If we want to give extra attention to spatial thinking, it is helpful to be able to analyse different 
aspects of this complex, natural process. In 1977, Ken Clements and Nongnuch Wattanawaha 
published "The Classification of Spatial Tasks Suitable for the Classroom". This provided four 
separate variables for analysing spatial thinking: Dimension, Internalization, Presentation and 
Thought — D.I.P.T. 
 
Their original intention was that the DIPT analysis would allow teachers to identify differences 
between tasks. However further research showed that different individuals were likely to handle 
tasks in different ways. And how a person handled a task one time might be quite different from 
the way it is handled another time. This meant that it was impossible to anticipate completely or 
exactly the spatial nature of a task before seeing how a particular person would perform the task.  
 
The real value of the DIPT analysis lies in its identification of the particular way that the task is 
being performed. When diagnostic interviews are carried out, where the individuals perform 
certain mathematical tasks, showing and explaining as well as they can what it is that they are 
doing, it becomes possible to identify how the individuals are thinking, analytically and spatially.  
 
Also, by focussing on D, for Dimension, the DIPT analysis stresses the possibility of spatial tasks 
that use one dimension, or three dimensions, in contrast to the usual predominance of two-
dimensional tasks. Similarly, by identifying different ways of making and using images 
(Internalization), and different ways of presenting the result of the task (Presentation), it is 
possible to design a range of tasks that will include this variety of spatial performance.  
 
If mathematics curricula are to deal with spatial thinking more effectively, they need to offer the 
widest possible challenge. Of course, individuals will respond differently to tasks, regardless of 
the intention of curriculum designers. But this is true for analytic tasks as well as spatial thinking 
tasks, as research on children's invented informal strategies in arithmetic is currently showing. 
 
To carry out a DIPT analysis, start by deciding just what the task is that will be analysed. Then 
consider how many spatial dimensions are involved in the task. Does a person need to form a 
mental image of something in the task? Does anything need to be done with the mental image? 
How will the result of the task, or the "answer" be presented? What kind of thinking is involved 
in carrying out the task? 
 
Depending on the answers to these questions, the DIPT analysis rates or scores the answers with 
a numerical code. Different tasks, and different ways of doing the task will have a different score 
which indicates  these differences. 
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D = Dimension: this is scored: 
1 for a one-dimensional or linear task 
2 for a two-dimensional task that involves a surface or area 
3 for a three-dimensional task that involves a solid object or three-dimensional 
space. 
Some spatial tasks may involve three-dimensional objects but actually involve only 
two-dimensional thinking: for example, in working out which chess piece to move, 
the chess piece is a 3-dimensional object, but the move takes place in only two 
dimensions.  
Even the jumping move of a knight is essentially a 2-dimensional move from one 
square to another: usually the thrid dimension of depth or height is irrelevant in 
board games. 
Some tasks may involve 2-dimensional objects, but because they must be 
manipulated in a third dimension the complete task is really 3-dimensional. For 
example, using a contour map to plan a route, or playing a pentomino game where 
pieces may be flipped over, are tasks that involve thinking in a third dimension about 
t-dimensional objects. 
 
I = Internalization: this is scored: 
0 when no mental image is needed to obtain a solution or carry out the task. 
There maybe a picture or object provided with the task that means no image is 
needed 
1 when a mental image is required 
2 when a mental image is required and this image must be mentally, spatially 
manipulated in some way 
 
P = Presentation: this is scored:    
0 when no picture or object is required in presenting the result of doing the task.  
The result may be a word or number 
1 when a picture or object must be selected from several given alternatives. 
This is typical of multiple-choice tasks 
2 when a picture must be drawn or an object must be constructed. This picture or 
object corresponds to the final mental image 
 
T = Thinking: this is scored:  
0 when none of the following are needed, or when the task specifies which of the 
following skills are to be used 
1 when any arithmetic calculation,  measurement, logical arguing or other kind of 
formal reasoning is required but not specified by the task 
 
Generally, once a DIPT analysis has been carried out, the higher the score for any of 
the four variables, the harder the task is to perform.  
This kind of information contributes to the assessment of ability and skill. 
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How does this work in practice? Consider the four spatial tasks mentioned earlier. Certainly 
different people may respond differently to these tasks. But discussing a general DIPT analysis 
for these tasks will help to clarify  the DIPT classifications. 
 
1. Imagine an analog clock (i.e. one with hands) showing 12:30. 
Here the image to be formed is essentially 2-dimensional.  
Someone might have imagined a large Swiss cuckoo clock which is built like a solid house.  
Any clock is actually a 3-dimensional physical object.  
But the essential nature of an analog clock involves only two dimensions: up and down (one 
dimension) and across (the second dimension).  
So here D = 2. 
The task requires a mental image to be formed. But nothing has to be done, mentally, with the 
image.  
So I = 1. 
 
There is nothing to be presented or selected or drawn or constructed. 
So P = 0. 
Very few people would have to stop and think about imagining a clock.  
No one needs to do any arithmetic or work out any steps of logical reasoning. 
So T = 0. 
 
2. Draw an analog clock showing 12:30. Again, D = 2.  
Most people will immediately know what 12:30 looks like.  
Certainly they will form a mental image.  
But this will not need to be manipulated mentally.  
So again I = 1. 
 
However, most people will get the hour hand in the wrong position.  
Those who get it right may have had to mentally correct their initial image by mentally turning 
the hour hand clockwise (how much?).  
For these people, I would be 3.  
Presentation is different with this task.  
There is no selection to be done, but a drawing has to be made.  
So P = 2.  
If the question had asked: Which of the following clock-faces correctly shows 12:30? the task 
would have involved selection and P would have been 1.  
Most people do not need to calculate or reason to be able to draw 12:30.  
So T  = 0.  
But anyone who consciously worked out where the hour hand points would have scored T = 1. 
 
3. What time does the clock show one and three quarter hours after 12:30?  
Some people may respond to the ambiguity of this question by simply calculating and then 
stating the time.  
For them, the question is numerical, not spatial, and there would be no Dimension or any other 
DIPT category to be considered. 
 
Other people may   
(a) handle the question spatially but give the answer as a number.  
(b) handle it spatially and give the answer by drawing the clock face.  
(c) calculate the answer, but show the answer by drawing the clock. 
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For all of these different possibilities there are different DIPT scores for the way the task is 
performed: 
(a) D = 2, I = 2, P = 0, T = 0 
(b) D = 2, I = 2, P = 2, T = 0 
(c) D = 2, I = 1, P = 0, T = 1. 
 
4. What direction do you need to point so that you are pointing at the sun at noon in June 
(or in December)? (The answer, in Australia, is not "up"). 
Try a DIPT analysis of this task. 
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Critique: The Impact of ICT (Information and Communication 
Technologies) on School Education — A Case Study 
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Information and Communication Technologies have been a long time coming. 
Behind the anticipation, and hype, what is the developing reality? What 
appears to be best practice? What, by contrast, is typical practice? Where are 
the gaps between inflated rhetoric and sober reality? Critical analysis is a 
crucial research tool, faced with confusing, sometimes meaningless 
terminology, and a seriously limited research base. This critique of research 
and policy becomes even more important as State and national authorities 
rush to embrace the new waves of user-friendly computer-based learning 
tools and the communication and resource extravaganzas offered by e-mail, 
the Internet and web-based information and interactivity. 
Introduction: What’s “Critique”? 
I chose this topic, a research methodology called “critique”, with a case study, as 
I was searching for something to present to this Symposium, while mindful of my 
earlier work in related areas. At the same time I was making extensive critical notes 
on a new book by Lankshear, Snyder and Green (2000), preparing to review it. (Let 
me stress that in discussing this book, and other case study materials, I am not being 
willfully or only critical. Lankshear and his colleagues say much that I commend, as I 
will show. My work as a critic is constructive, and appreciative, as much as it is 
analytical, questioning, and only occasionally includes complaint.) I realised, as the 
pages of notes accumulated, that I was carrying out a form of research — I was 
“critiquing”. Could I draw on this fresh experience, and present this approach to 
research to the Symposium? Let’s see. 
Critiquing is closely related to earlier methods I have discussed, such as playing 
the part of devil’s advocate (Gough 1998b), and conceptual testing (Chandler and 
Gough 1999). Concepts are analysed, arguments are assessed, conclusions and 
examples are tested for their logical consequences and tried against possible counter-
examples. The method of critique is flexible and informal. It is not rule-bound or 
procedurally prescriptive. It adapts to fit the particular case being considered. 
The conclusions that follow an effective critique are corrected errors, clearer 
understanding, an extended and carefully balanced and examined context, with a 
cautious, critically constructive re-interpretation of existing research. Beyond that 
there are suggestions for possible future research, new directions, and re-focussed 
goals.  
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As with other, more familiar forms of research, the outcome of critique is “new” 
knowledge, or existing knowledge seen anew. While critique itself does not usually 
generate its own fresh research data, it can include the analysis and meta-analysis of 
existing research data. In its own modest way it advances what we know — in limited 
ways, assuredly. But nonetheless this is a worthy goal to aspire to, and I believe that 
the method is worth considering at this Symposium. 
Research Question: What is the impact of ICT (Information and 
Communication Technologies) on schooling?  
The information technology revolution has been looming for decades. Once it 
consisted of classes in which a keen teacher, probably studying at university, or 
recently graduated with brand new computer science training, would hand out data-
input cards, and a paper clip, for students to punch out tiny holes, to be read by light 
meters in a photo-sensitive program-compiler. FORTRAN, probably. Hands-on. For 
the dedicated hard-core minority. Circa early-1970s. 
Then the breakthrough, or not having to breakthrough, when a pencil could be 
used to mark the data-input cards. These cards, of course, would be delivered to a 
friendly university-run mainframe computer, and students would get back the results 
of the programming several weeks later. Hard work! Circa mid-1970s. 
A fresh breakthrough occurred with the invention of the micro-computer — we 
know them as “desk-tops” or “workstations”. Circa late-1970s, early 1980s. 
Any school that purchased an Apple IIe, or an IBM 286 (or Microbee, BBC, 
Commodore 64, or Tandy RadioShack WhatEver, etc.) could enter the “personal” 
computer age. Five-and-a-quarter-inch floppy disks, and a monochrome screen, and 
dot-matrix printer … and students struggling to learn how to wordprocess, and create 
and interrogate a database, and use educational skill-and-drill and game-type practice 
software, and maybe do a little BASIC programming, or LOGO, typed in capitals, 
with numbered lines of commands. This was supported by pencil-and-paper 
preparation, which was then laboriously retyped at the computer keyboard, and by 
chalk-and-talk lessons on Computer Awareness, or Computer Literacy, as a new 
school “subject”. Each student would be lucky to get an average of 1 hour per month 
actually working on a computer. 
The next wave of the revolution consisted of schools beginning to develop 
laboratories of micro-computers, scheduling students into special laboratory class-
times; or to get one computer into each classroom, with students working in pairs or 
small groups, and working-time at the computer scrupulously rationed. Circa mid-
1980s to early 1990s. 
Meanwhile in the business world computers were marching in inexorably — 
handling accounts, inventories, and customer service. But few homes owned 
computers. Apart from converts, and experts, and professionals in the IT trade, who 
would ever need one? 
Then, in Australia, Coles Supermarkets and Apple computers dreamed up their 
supermarket-docket promotion deal, and a lot more schools got a lot more computers, 
for very little cost. Circa early 1990s, and Macintosh computers began to show a few 
people, those willing to pay extra for real user-friendliness, just how good a computer 
could be, and how easy to use. 
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Hot on the heels of this thin end of the Apple-wedge, IBM realised that DOS-
commands were a barrier to widespread popular amateur or non-specialist, non-
business home use. The result was the dam-burst of “windows”-style software, with a 
mouse, and pull-down menus — 1995 — with the new Windows95 user-interface— 
and people started to think that “PC” meant “computer”.  
Incidentally, related to this breakthrough is the cautious interface-sensitive 
advice: 
never trust anything said by anyone about the impact of computers earlier 
than, say, 1995 … when Bill Gates bit the interface-bullet and shifted the IBM 
platform to a ‘windows-style’, mouse-enabled, point-and-click working 
environment (Chandler and Gough 1999). 
User-friendliness is a fundamental key to several things about computers and their 
educational impact, most particularly their curriculum-penetration (their ability to 
reach into all areas and levels of schooling), and their market-penetration (their 
widespread adoption by non-computer specialists). Whatever might have been found 
by researchers when computers were rare, student experience of computers was 
extremely limited, and computers were hard to use will be irrelevant in a later era, 
when most students have a lot of experience using computers easily. 
Almost as soon as the PC-based “windows-style” work-environment became a 
universal standard, the next breakthrough was the rapid widespread acceptance of the 
need to reach beyond the desktop and into the Internet. The short-lived fax-machine 
revolution of the 1980s was essentially stopped. Fax communication was rendered 
more than redundant by the ability to send not just a mere paper-image of a 
document, but the electronic, editable version of the text, or of other kinds of 
“information”, not just prose. Modem connections which had been a specialist’s 
option for nearly two decades suddenly became a common or garden feature of 
computers and computer-use. Although not many people knew what “http” meant, the 
world-wide web — “www” — and e-mail’s “at-sign” — @ — and the web-site tag 
“dot-com” slipped painlessly into radio, newspaper, and TV reporting, and even into 
everyday language. Having your own web-site became a new status symbol. Circa 
late 1990s. 
Given this sketch-outline history, what has been its developing impact on 
schools? Or on the wider community? Here is one enthusiastic view: 
Another student 'reading' Melissa's multimedia presentation on Egypt can 
select a video 'grab' of the sphinx, with textual information included, or an 
animation that traces through the archaeological dig of Tutankhamen's tomb 
with accompanying audio information. More than that, the package can be 
copied, shared over a network or transported over phone lines from Melissa's 
classroom to a 'sister class' in Cairo! (Warren 1994 p 14.) 
The sceptic in me wonders where Melissa found her video grab, or her animation, 
or her audio information. It may look and sound great. But it smells just like a project. 
Select, copy and paste is just the same, whether it is a picture from an encyclopedia, a 
slab of text from a pamphlet, a video-grab from a video (which Melissa did not make 
herself), or a copied sound-clip. What remains unclear is whether Melissa learned 
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more from making this multimedia project than if she had been given a list of 
questions to answer, or if she had used real photocopying, scissors and paste, and a 
set of trusty Derwent pencils, assembling a traditional paper-based “project”. The 
same sceptical caution applies to the idea of asking students to create a web-site 
(Gough 1998, p 114).  
Interestingly, Lankshear, Snyder and Green remark that: 
In many cases, we find that the skills used in research for HyperCard and 
PowerPoint presentations [these are both different forms of multi-media-
authoring software] essentially ‘the same, and set up in the same ways’ as 
those formerly employed in pen-and-paper contexts … To a large extent, the 
substance of the learning and teaching remains more or less the same as we 
knew it to be prior to the emergence of these new technologies (2000, p. 95). 
Let me say, here, as plainly as possible, that almost anything that can be done or 
learned using a computer can be done or learned just about as well (perhaps not as 
easily or quickly) not using a computer. Moreover, computers are not a guaranteed 
panacea, not a cure for all the problems we face with schooling, and education in the 
wider community. Worse still, the ill-considered rush to embrace computers, with 
little second thought, endangers non-computer skills, hand-crafts, folk-arts, everyday 
human activities and interpersonal exchanges that may all to easily be swept aside as 
“old-fashioned”, or “low-tech”.  
Where’s the Critique? 
Having got this far, we are almost ready to disassemble aspects of the guiding 
research question. Part of the point of the research methodology of “critique” is that 
unless we attempt to disassemble the ideas we are trying to work with, our research 
will fail to engage with the situation, and will yield unhelpful results. Alternatively it 
may pursue misleading research goals, or produce research data which is distorted by 
the unsuspected biases or unexamined assumptions. 
It has also been important to make as clear as possible the idea that any attempt to 
answer the research question is continually challenged by the rapid changes that are 
occurring in computers, their uses, and educational provision or access to them. 
Notoriously it is hard to hit a moving target, and this particular research target is 
moving all the time! 
So: wanting to investigate the impact of Information and Communication 
Technology on schooling, it may be helpful to pause, and ask: 
• what kinds of information? written? oral? pictorial (static or movie)? aural? 
procedural? 
• what kinds of communication? face-to-face? paper-mediated? electronic? voice-
activated? 
• what kinds of technology, especially “hardware”? 
• a static stand-alone desk-top computer? 
• a portable stand-alone personally owned lap-top computer? 
• a work-station, or home-computer, or lap-top with Internet connection? 
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• a computer with other “extras”, such as a MIDI keyboard for music, or a 
CD-ROM disk-drive? 
• what kinds of technology, especially “software”? 
• wordprocessing? 
• databases and spreadsheets? 
• computer graphics (either pixel-based or object-oriented)? 
• computer programming languages (e.g. Logo, BASIC, Pascal, C++)? 
• mathematics processing packages (aka Computer Algebra Systems, or CAS; 
including Maple, Derive, Mathematica) or graphics calculator software? 
• music processing or composing software? 
• Internet web-page authoring, or multi-media packages (handling layout of 
graphics, video, audio, user-interaction, and text for on-line and electronic 
CD–ROM–type environments)? 
• desk-top publishing software (handling layout of graphics and text for paper-
based environments) 
• what kinds of venues for learning? ordinary classrooms? computer or other 
laboratories? libraries? homes? work-place settings? 
• what kinds of educational paradigm shifts? changing from: 
• an oral pre-literate, or non-literate culture to a book-based culture? 
• a centralised curriculum organisation to a school-based curriculum? 
• an expository teacher-centred classroom environment to an exploratory 
child-centred learning environment? 
• a traditional whole-class organisation focussed on a prescribed textbook or 
curriculum base, to an individualised or small group approach that uses 
personally negotiatiated learning goals supported by flexible open-ended 
resources? 
So far these questions deal only with ICT. We could develop a similar set of 
questions about “schooling”, and other non-school learning situations. I am 
attempting to raise questions, generally, along the following lines, acting as a 
constructive sceptical critic, a “devil’s advocate” (Gough 1998b): 
• what does this term mean? 
• what does this term do? or what is it for? 
• who does this term apply to? 
• what did we have, or do, before this term developed or came into widespread 
use? 
• how different, or similar, is this “new” idea from older antecedent counterparts? 
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The rise of ICT is not the first major technological change to hit schools. In our 
life-times we have moved from an era of pencils and ink-pens to ballpoint pens 
(“biros”, and fibre-tip pens), with a consequent change in the nature of the 
handwriting curriculum. This is now, in turn, being challenged by the impact on 
handwriting, and initial literacy, of the increasingly ubiquitous computer-handled 
alternative to older-style writing processes, namely wordprocessing, with 
“keyboarding” as its counterpart to letter-by-letter hand-writing, and seamlessly 
smooth editing of successive drafts of ideas within the one evolving document, 
contrasted with re-writing and re-typing of a succession of separate hand-drafted 
versions of a particular “text”. (This is discussed further in Chandler and Gough 
1999.) 
Vignettes of Successes and Failures in ICT-related Research 
Armed with our devil’s advocate questions, what do we find when we start 
looking at recent accounts of research, and discussions of the impact of ICT on 
schooling? 
Consider, first, the sudden terminological shift from IT to LT, that is, from 
“Information Technology” to “Learning Technologies”. I have argued elsewhere that 
“Learning Technologies”, as they are commonly understood, based almost 
exclusively on wordprocesssing and Internet use, leave out many valuable software 
tools and related skills. 
As a result the move to incorporate learning technologies in school curricula and 
modern work practices does not really change what is currently done. Far from being 
genuinely new, learning technologies succeed only in slightly extending on existing 
practice (Gough 2000b). Unfortunately the new emphasis on electronic resources 
tends to lead students to neglect books, or videos, as important sources. In my own 
work with student-teachers and teachers I am increasingly encountering students who 
complain that they can’t find anything on a particular topic they want to investigate. 
Yet what they mean is that so far their Internet searches have revealed nothing (and it 
is possible that any web-sites they may have found may lack a sound scholarly basis), 
and, to me, shockingly, they have not bothered to look at the shelves of books and 
journals in their university library. 
Secondly, consider a recent attempt to research the impact of laptop computers in 
schools (Ainley, et al. 2000). At this point my comments should not be misconstrued 
as a wholesale condemnation of this research. As my review shows, at length (Gough 
2000a), this is a major investigation, with much to teach us. However it also over-
emphasises wordprocessing, Internet browsing and e-mail, and spreadsheets, while 
neglecting such important kinds of software as computer graphics, mathematics 
processing software, and music composition software. It also seems to misunderstand 
and grossly undervalue Logo programming (as in the multi-media package 
MicroWorlds) as a learning environment which can be used effectively across most 
areas of the curriculum. 
Moreover this important study of Year 7 and 8 classes using personal laptops 
neglects to gather, or report on any information about previous or existing desk-top 
computer-access and computer-use at home. This is further compounded by the 
limited, short-term attempt to gather “control group” information about non-laptop 
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computer use, and non-computer learning from students who were not included in the 
experimental laptop classes.  
The reality is that, where schools have not yet bitten the laptop-bullet, regardless 
of the limited school-provision of desktop computers in many schools, many students 
have access to computers, and, increasingly, to the Internet, at home. School concerns 
about computer-provision, computer-access, and the development of computer-based 
skills, compounded by related issues of social equity, culture, and gender, are 
frequently short-circuited or obviated by the de facto improvised home-provision of 
computers. Schools generally, and Ainley and her colleagues, ignore this home-
provision at their peril if they hope to describe and develop adequate computer skills, 
at school and beyond. 
Thirdly, consider the massive conceptual territory claimed by Lankshear, Snyder 
and Green, in the title of the study: Teachers and Techno-Literacy: Managing 
Literacy, Technology and Learning in Schools (2000). The terms “teacher” and 
“school” may be reasonably clear, at least initially, or traditionally. However as ICT 
continues to develop, and modify the community, the physical walls of a “school”, 
and its “library” begin to dissolve. The roles played by a flesh-and-blood teacher in a 
classroom are extended by the not-so-flesh-and-blood activities of “virtual teachers” 
— the designers of educational software, information web-sites and interactive CD-
ROMs and web-sites, and the on-line programmed “robot teachers” who carry out the 
designer’s intended instructional interactions.  
Against this, of course, schools have never been the sole repository of knowledge, 
or the sole instigator of learning. The walls between “school” and “community” have 
always been permeable. Similarly school students have always learned from people 
who are not trained teachers, just as they have also learned from books, films, and life 
experiences outside the formal classroom.  
But what are we to make of the term “techno-literacy”? 
The term “literacy” is problematic, anyway, unless we adopt the traditional view 
that it refers essentially to being able to read and write. This is often stretched, 
conceptually, to include “visual literacy” (the ability to understand and make non-
verbal diagrams or pictures). Traditional literacy is clearly only part of the essential 
life-skills that modern citizens need to be able to understand and work with early 
Twentieth century media, such as film and TV, or with the mixed-media of 
newspapers and magazines. 
But how is the “techno”- part of the neologism invoked, and to what purpose? 
This is discussed extensively through the book. Suffice it, perhaps, to focus on one 
example, which I hope may be taken as representative of the limited or even faulty 
views offered by the authors. Lankshear, Snyder and Green allege that: 
In the print era, all instances of encoded information and communication were 
bounded … [print-era] texts have edges, borders, margins … But with the 
shift from print technology to computing, and the emergence of database 
technology, hypertext and hypermedia, we can now ask: Where is the text? 
Indeed, more radically and unusually, we can ask: when is the text? Also, 
what is the text? Which is the text and which is the context? (2000, p 38). 
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At the trivial level of books, covers, pages, borders and margins, this may be true. 
But in important ways, print-era texts were not really bounded. 
When one text referred to another (by quote, extract, paraphrase, footnote, 
reference, parody or allusion) the boundary between one text and another was broken 
down. You only need to stand in a paper-based library, looking at the shelf of 
different books on one topic, to recognise the breakdown of text boundaries. No 
single volume contains the world’s accumulated wisdom on any particular topic: it 
never has. I felt this myself as a young student when I began to write my own cross-
referencing footnotes in the margins of my books: “See also X”, or “This is 
contradicted / explained / supported by Y”. Similarly an anthology of excerpts that 
inspires a reader to go to the source-text is a counter-example to such bounding. 
Consider, for example, the old Victorian Readers (1940), the literacy primers of my 
own 1950s Primary school days. I was surely not the only student who happily found 
the novels and other sources of the extracts of story, poetry, and non-fiction included 
in these classic Readers. 
Also, when a book-text is also a theatre performance, a radio dramatisation, a film 
or a TV adaptation, or simply a well performed oral reading of the ink-on-paper text, 
the text is where? Or when? During the film? In the speaking aloud? With the actors 
on the stage or screen? In our memory of spoken words, moving faces, scenes, events, 
and feelings? Consider a Shakespeare play, on paper and on stage, or the interactions 
in a reader/viewer’s experience between Dickens’ novel Great Expectations and the 
David Lean film version. 
The hot-link in an Internet web-page that takes an Internet-browsing person from 
here (at a computer screen, viewing one down-loaded web-page) to there (at the same 
computer screen, viewing another downloaded web-page from a different web-site) is 
little different from a citation on a paper-page (“This is discussed at length in chapter 
W”; or “See Bloggs’ alternative argument in U”) that links across the boundaries of 
margin, page, chapter or book, or the book-cover illustration of a filmed version of a 
novel. 
Taking this only slightly further, Lankshear and colleagues argue that we live in 
an age that values “information” over “knowledge”, or other aspects of 
communication: 
deep [in] the realm of values, norms, priorities, goals and purposes, and 
identities … [in] many ways, the text paradigm was the literary text, and 
essayist writing dominated school literacy. However … we now see … the 
separation of text and information … [and need] to view literacy as involving, 
and even requiring, the integration of text and information … [challenging] 
traditional ways of thinking about literacy that … [see] information … as 
subordinate … [or] secondary to ‘understanding’ or usage (2000 p 39). 
Fortunately they later redress this apparent view by including amongst their 
“principles of technorealism” the aphorism: “Information is not knowledge” (2000 p 
147). 
Certainly if their experience of school and “literacy” was like mine, and perhaps 
yours, the English teacher did spend time on “writing compositions”, and we read a 
lot of fiction. The “literary text” was a major focus for study and practice. But surely 
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it was not the only focus. We also learned how to handle “non-fiction”, to write 
technical reports, and formal letters, and how to make notes from the blackboard or 
our textbooks. That is, “non-literary texts” were also a major focus for study and 
practice. Information was just as important then, as it is now. 
Lankshear and his colleagues’ discussion is not helped by their Figure 3 (2000 p 
40), which consists of two perpendicular lines (axes, perhaps? but there are no arrow-
heads to indicate this). One line is labelled Text at one end, and Information at the 
other; the other line is labelled Technology and Language at opposing ends. I find this 
diagram quite confusing: as a visual literacy sign or symbol it is hard to “read”. It 
suggests that we have two poles, or axes, and that “Text”, for example, is in some 
way an opposite of “Information”, while “Text” is also separable in some way from 
“Language”. 
For me this figure (and the related discussion) is baffling. I cannot imagine how I 
could have a text (whatever that might be, and Lankshear and his colleagues have an 
extremely flexible, if not outright vague definition of “text” which includes more than 
printed material: p 62) which does not contain some kind of information. (Of course 
we could resort to the Dadaist nonsense-poetry using random letters and invented 
meaningless syllables, and say that this is “text” which is free of “information”. 
However the Dadaists had an information-related point to such a radical and 
ultimately pointless literary/artistic innovation. I doubt that is what Lankshear and his 
colleagues might have had in mind, if, indeed, they really have some coherent way of 
explaining this figure.) Equally, I find it impossible to imagine that I could have a 
piece of information which could not be construed as some kind of text, even if it is 
(as they suggest it might be) a spreadsheet, or part of a database filled with categories 
and numbers.  
Meanwhile I find that “language” runs inseparably through text and information. 
Equally I find “language” inherent in “technology”; and, vice versa, there is 
“technology” .inherent in certain forms of language, or language representations. To 
their credit, Lankshear and colleagues emphasise that 
Written language is always already technologised, in the sense that it comes 
into being only in and through available technologies of information and 
communication — such as marks on natural surfaces, the alphabet and other 
symbol systems, stylus and pencil, the printing press and, today, the ‘digital 
electronic apparatus’ (2000 p 25). 
But if Lankshear and colleagues are misguided in their description of the 
differences between old-style book-based learning, and old-style literacy (and 
elsewhere in their arguments they seem to misunderstand how people read, and how 
they express themselves through writing), can we accept their radical views of the 
ways new technologies change our uses of books, information, and “literacies”? Only 
if we very carefully critique their arguments, their examples of supposed good-
practice, and their suggestions for modifying current school practices. Very carefully! 
Some of what they say, after much critical sifting, can be shown to be sound, and 
valuable. Elsewhere they are wrong, unhelpful, or misleading. 
Fourthly, even where we can clearly identify a change in the school, such as 
having a computer in a classroom, or even a row of them, or a laptop for each student, 
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does this make a difference, compared with the pre-computer situation? As a possible 
example, most classrooms now have a computer, which may be connected to the 
Internet. But, it is important to ask whether that really changes the essence of what 
the classroom would consist of if the computer and Internet connection were not 
there? (This, and related issues were discussed in Chandler and Gough, 1999).  
Much as I enjoy a good web-site, I am not sure that I have yet found one that is 
better, for learning, or as a source of information, than a good book on the same 
subject. Similarly, no matter how constructively and sensitively interactive a web-
site, or learning software package, or interactive instructional CD-ROM may be (and 
some are quite good), they lack human warmth and sympathy, and they are only as 
good as their underlying programming, or their underlying human programmer(s). 
They cannot respond to a student’s important side-tracking interest, or frustration, or 
a sudden, unpredictable, creative inspiration.  
Similarly, consider the writing process, shifting ideas from inside your head (in so 
far as we can reasonably say that the ideas are there, before they are manifested 
elsewhere) out onto paper or a computer screen. Research on “text-drafting” or the 
“psychology of composition” — the process and thinking when one use 
wordprocessing on a computer — suggests that the computer is a mind-tool that 
enables a writing-drafter to work quite differently than if the person was using pencil 
and paper. Maybe. What do you think? 
Whether a text is wordprocessed or hand-written, regardless of the surface-
level cosmetic features of spelling, grammar, and text-legibility, the real test 
of the compositional process is the expression of clear ideas. That depends on 
the human brain behind the composing. Being able to wordprocess will, in 
itself, do nothing to improve on what the brain can do. That is, wordprocessed 
documents are likely to be technically more correct and cleaner, but they are 
unlikely to be better as pieces of written/composed expression by an author. 
Wordprocessing does not, in itself, guarantee clearer thinking. It does not 
work as a thinking tool, except that it may make initial drafting and on-the-
run editing easier (Chandler and Gough, 1999). 
Finally, consider the much hyped Internet, that is, the agglomeration of web-sites 
that can be electronically “visited” by computer-users with a modem-connection, 
suitable web-browsing software, and an Internet service-provider, is little more than a 
vast Earth-spanning electronic library. However, unlike most libraries which consist 
of commercially produced paper-based (and other) materials, these web-sites, these 
electronic books, can be “published” or offered on the Internet, by any bozo who can 
afford the cost of making such a web-site and the cost of “mounting” it, using his or 
her computer-plus-modem-connection, or hiring the services of an Internet provider.   
A commercially published paper-based book (or video) is editorially checked for 
quality, accuracy, and morality. This is never a guarantee that, just because something 
is seen in print, it can be wholly believed. One of the most important goals of 
education is to develop students’ ability to critically evaluate whatever sources of 
information they encounter. Faced with a massively ballooning heap of web-sites, 
few of which have any editorial checking for quality, truth, or accuracy, this is 
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increasingly important. That is, book-sifting information-analysing skills are exactly 
what students need when they start looking at web-sites, because students need to 
learn to think critically, in all situations (paper-based, electronic, and live-action 
human), and because web-sites are largely equivalent to “electronic books”. (This is 
discussed at greater length in Gough 2000b). 
Conclusions? 
A revolution is occurring in the working lives of most researchers and educators. 
The revolution is having an increasing impact on the “customers” of these researchers 
and educators, that is, on the larger school community as a whole, students and 
parents alike. This revolution is also occurring on the desks of researchers, educators, 
students and parents. For us, as participant-observers, a reflective, critical self-study, 
bolstered by constructive scepticism, seems apt.  
You, my reader, might then pause a moment, and ask yourself how much your 
own present job, as researcher and academic, would be changed, tomorrow, if you no 
longer had free use of computer, printer, software, and Internet access to e-mail and 
web-sites. Certainly academics and researchers managed, years ago, without these 
aids. As I have noted, anything (that is, almost anything) that can be done with a 
computer can be done just about as effectively without one. Nonetheless having 
computers, and, more recently, the Internet as a medium for communication and a 
source of information, helps us do our job. What has been the impact of computers 
and the Internet on us? 
Sometimes as I struggle to make sense of the discussions I find myself involved 
in, or the books, articles and web-sites that challenge me, I feel like an outsider, an 
observer, not one of those differently active ones who conduct the active data-
generating of more familiar kinds of research. The parade goes on, regardless. I 
watch, and wonder. I try to be active in my own ways. 
Now that I try to sum up what I am hoping to do with these remarks, I am 
reflecting, critically, on my own processes of critical reflection — a process of meta-
analysis, or meta-critique.  
Looking back at some of my past efforts I feel that I have been doing little more 
than endlessly chipping away at the same old block. I can re-express this, speaking of 
chipping, in the immortal words of Don Chipp (the Australian politician who became 
disenchanted with the two dominant political parties, and decided to inaugurate a 
third alternative party) — I have been trying “to keep the bastards honest”. 
Expressing this more allusively, I am continually asking: what is the emperor 
wearing? 
Intellectual gad-flies are needed now like never before! 
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ABSTRACT 
Effective research depends on clear definitions, and arguments, which have obvious 
plausibility and fit reality. But this is not always easy to establish. Sometimes earlier 
researchers have worked with unclear definitions. The technical terms being investigated in 
research may in practice be widely and diversely used in non-research settings. It can also 
happen that, quite independently of what the research community is attempting to investigate, 
the real world marches on regardless, surrounded with a certain amount of confusion, media 
hype, and political bravado. Education generally, as a field for research, is a topic that 
everyone knows something about. Research ideas bloom and wither. Cultural and 
technological changes in society and education result in uncertainty and confusion. In this 
setting, research methodology needs to be firmly grounded in sceptical, hard-headed common-
sense. Any definition proposed for research needs to be 'tested': What does it mean? How do 
we know this? If this is what is meant, then what are the obvious consequences? If this is what 
is claimed, does it correspond to what is commonly reported? The outcome of careful scrutiny 
of research topics, tested by critical analysis, and checked against actual circumstances, can 
often be a clearer framework or picture of what the research might realistically be able to 
investigate A short case study is discussed, in which these methodological approaches are 
brought to bear on the research topic 'Computer Impacts on Curricula'. 
 
Introduction 
In principle it has almost invariably to be accepted that brand-new 
weapons, particularly those of revolutionary design, need a small 
battlefield trial; that to place reliance on sheer novelty to win battles is to 
despise the enemy since only if a novel weapon is really adequate in 
concept will it survive repetitive use in battle. A weapon’s ultimate test of 
durability is its capacity for improvement by the intellectual evolution of 
its basic characteristics and the integration of each improved model into 
the changing strategical and tactical concepts of practical soldiers. 
(Macksey 1976 p 36). 
With the comparatively recent advent of mouse-driven ‘windows’-style user-friendly 
interfaces, pioneered by Macintosh, and imitated on the IBM platform, we have 
moved from the ‘small battlefield trials’ of the early clumsier days of the single stand-
alone computer in an otherwise ordinary classroom. Now we routinely accept the idea 
that a student’s work-station is an individually ‘owned’ computer, and many schools 
may soon pursue the laptop options that so far only a few schools have experimented 
with—very successfully! The ‘intellectual evolution’ of the computer has now 
resulted in it being an indispensable tool for almost all school work, except the un-
replaceable human performance classes of Dance, Physical Education, Instrumental 
Music, Drama and crafts such as Cooking and Woodwork. It is time for all teachers to 
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consider the ways that computers may be ‘integrated’ into the ‘strategical and tactical 
concepts’ of classrooms that have hitherto relied on the battle-hardened technology of 
textbook, blackboard and pen (plus or minus a bit of video, and audio). 
 
But almost as soon as we state our concern, as a research question—such as ‘What is 
the impact of computers …?’—we face conceptual difficulties that need careful 
analysis. What do we mean? Even the seemingly clear use of a word such as 
‘computer’ needs careful analysis of real situations and uses. Can we draw on early 
research and hope to find anything of enduring value from the experimental 
pioneering days of mouse-less stand-alones? What ‘curriculum’ do we have in mind? 
How effectively can we isolate school-experience with computers from home-
experience, especially at a time when schools are still not able to provide as much 
personal computer access as many students enjoy at home? 
  
Cautious, critical, sceptical devil’s advocacy can make an important contribution to 
the early stages of this research endeavour (Gough 1998). In the end, what can be 
established by the analysis may be little more than common sense, perhaps. But what 
is revealed by the careful analysis is not immediately obvious, and the sense is, 
perhaps, not all that common, awash, as we are, with media hype, inflated and mis-
directed expectations, and unsubstantiatable claims of what computers are, 
supposedly, or allegedly, good for. 
 
What is the impact of computers on the school curriculum? 
In classroom-based research, there may be a tendency, as Doyle and Ponder (1975) 
pointed out nearly 30 years ago, to be disproportionately concerned with teacher 
behaviour compared with other elements of the classroom ecology (that is, the 
network of connected processes and events which impinge upon classroom 
behaviour). Currently we also need to start attending to recent silicon-based 
classroom innovations which act as substitutes for teacher behaviour, which typically 
involve computers, software and electronic computer-mediated communication 
(including electronic document exchange, e-mail, Internet searching and downloading, 
and student-software/web-site interactivity). 
 
The very existence in classrooms of computers, with or without Internet connections, 
the arrangement of the classroom, the impact on student behaviour (e.g. discipline 
issues) and the impact on curricula and possibly on cognitive processes (e.g. the 
challenge posed by wordprocessing to the traditional handwriting curriculum, or by 
mathematics processing software to the algebra curriculum) impinge on teachers’ pre-
planning and classroom action. 
 
As Postman and Weingartner (1969) argued, 30 years ago, 
a change in an environment is rarely additive or linear. You 
seldom, if ever, have an old environment plus a new element. You 
have a totally new environment requiring a whole new repertoire 
of survival strategies. In no case is this more certain than when the 
new elements are technological (p. 20). 
 
Of course, thirty years later it is worth asking whether the environment of schooling is 
actually all that different from the mid-60s Postman and Weingartner were discussing. 
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That is, now that Postman and Weingartner’s technological and institutional future 
has arrived, is it really different in substance from the 1960s-present about which they 
wrote? Cable TV and video, for example, may not be all that different from the TV 
they had seen as a challenge to book-based culture and traditional teacher-centred 
book-based schooling. Even where teachers have embraced the use of TV in 
classrooms, if it is the teachers who choose what is watched, and when it is watched, 
and who ‘host’ or ‘compere’ the resulting classroom discussions of what has been 
watched, perhaps the book-centred methods are actually only slightly altered by some 
partial substitute by broadcast, cable and video. 
 
Postman and Weingartner also remarked that, ‘As Father John Culkin of Fordham 
University likes to say, a lot of things have happened in this [Twentieth] century and 
most of them plug into walls’ (1969, p. 19). While the image of new things all 
plugging into walls is catchy, it actually misses some important points. Almost all of 
the labour-saving devices that plug into walls, that is the electrically-powered ones, 
actually have their hand-powered, steam-powered, water-powered, or animal-powered 
counterparts that preceded them in the Nineteenth century. Certainly we live in an age 
when, thanks to devices that plug into walls, we don’t have to spend Mondays doing 
the family laundry, and Tuesday doing the family baking. But the most important 
devices may be those that allow us to communicate and receive information. The 
quantum jump in culture that marks the Twentieth century is less the fact that modern 
devices run on electricity, than that they transmit and receive information—albeit, 
slightly anticipated by global telegraph cabling in the Nineteenth century. 
 
The real point is not one of splitting a few historical hairs about links between 
industry, technology and culture, but to emphasise that the important ‘plugging in’ is 
the telephone line with modem, aided by global satellite networks. Moreover it serves 
to highlight a further quantum leap in computer-use—from stand-alone to networked! 
 
Computer/Technology Curriculum Impact: Example 1 
As a possible example, most classrooms now have a computer, which may be 
connected to the Internet. But, it is important to ask whether that really changes the 
essence of what the classroom would consist of if the computer and Internet 
connection were not there?  
 
A teacher who knows and controls and leads, supported by information resources and 
teaching materials, delivering education to a group of students who do not know so 
much and are in the classroom precisely for the purpose of doing what the teacher 
wants them to do … the current classroom may not be that different from a 1960s 
classroom. 
 
Computer/Technology Curriculum Impact: Example 2 
One intriguing example may highlight this further. Those of us who grew up with the 
idea that ‘literature’ equals ‘books’ (augmented by live theatre, and its celluloid and 
TV counterparts), have now accepted that Literature at school can expand to include 
the study of, say, Eisenstein, Kubrick, Frankenheimer, and Spielberg, alongside 
Dickens, Shakespeare and Keats. However with the rise of computer games, 
Catherine Beavis has urged school Literature teachers to consider setting a computer 
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game for study, alongside books and film (Sinclair, 1999 p 12). Beavis offers ‘Abe’, 
the computer game hero from the game Abe’s Exoddus, set in the computer game 
fantasy scenario-world known as Oddworld, arguing that Abe is a leader-saviour 
character who can be compared with Oscar Schindler, a real person in history, and 
central figure in a Spielberg film and a book by Thomas Kenneally. Beavis suggests 
‘you might spend one period a week playing the game and another two or three 
writing about it’ (p 12).She argues further that ‘definitions of literacy are changing 
and kids need to be visually literate as well as verbally literate’ p 12). 
  
But despite the apparent shift, from book or film, as focus of study, to computer 
game, the literary study is remarkably unchanged. ‘Looking at themes, sources and 
how a text [in this case, a game-scenario mixed with actual game-experience] is 
constructed, whether it’s a novel or a game … [is] directly analogous to the way you 
might be looking at it in a poem’ (p 12). Beavis points out that ‘computer games are a 
lot less exotic than they’re sometimes shown’ (p 12). However, whether they deserve 
such study (except, as Beavis suggests, as academic bait for boys who might 
otherwise be weak and reluctant students), and whether they can stand up to the 
cultural comparison with accepted literature, remains to be seen. The point being 
made here is that the curriculum is essentially no different, only the grist for the 
curriculum mill. 
 
Computer/Technology Curriculum Impact: Example 3 
Consider a different classroom example. In the 1960s the curriculum content and 
purpose was, typically, dictated to teachers and students by an external governing 
body. By contrast the curriculum content of some current classes is developed by 
negotiation between teacher, student and school community. This de-
institutionalising, or freeing of who is in control had been one of the radical anti-
authoritarian changes argued for by Postman and Weingartner—one that has been, at 
least sometimes, introduced. However it has little to do with technology. It is a 
societal change. 
 
If Postman and Weingartner’s remark (aimed at a global, societal level) is translated 
to the level of the classroom, it implies that a computer is not a mere ‘add on’ to 
existing teaching, but is likely to bring with it some fundamental change. This needs 
to be carefully analysed. 
 
Computer/Technology Curriculum Impact: Example 4 
In the 1970s we allowed students to use their hand-held scientific calculators, as their 
calculation-facilitating tool of choice. Mathematics teachers were thus able to drop 
the use of logarithm tables and/or slide rules from Secondary mathematics. But this 
did not bring about a significant change in the mathematics content. Logarithms and 
trigonometric values are still taught, albeit for slightly different reasons as regards the 
continuing teaching of logarithms. Previously logarithms were introduced initially for 
the sake of easing computational difficulties. They were also introduced also as 
development of scientific notation and as a step towards a new kind of mathematical 
function. Logarithmic and exponential functions were different from linear and 
polynomial algebraic functions. They were used later in carrying out log-log 
simplifications of non-linear data, and also in differentiation and integration. Now 
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logarithms continue to be taught, but only for the purposes of mathematical functions 
and data simplification. But even though their teaching is facilitated by the log/antilog 
button on a calculator, they are still taught, around the same stage in the curriculum, 
and in about the same way.  
 
Does the addition of a new technology really change the old curriculum? 
Postman and Weingartner’s argument is not based on the nature of the technology 
(which in this paper is taken to be the computer, plus Internet: the relevant computer 
issues will be discussed shortly), but simply on the re-arrangement of the pre-existing 
technology of the classroom. Olson (forthcoming) has argued that 
In classrooms, computers encounter a pre-existing technology: the 
techniques and tools of classroom instruction and management 
which use familiar and predictable resources and routines lying 
readily to hand and embodying certain values about the work that 
is being done. Desks, boards, books, chalk, maps, and more are 
where they ought to be and do what they should … although 
teachers may not be able to give a full account of their technology, 
they are well aware of the risks of abandoning familiar 
technology. 
Thus, it is argued that the introduction of computers into a classroom represents a 
fundamental dislocation from the known environment, where new routines must be 
developed to manage the new range of available technologies. Educators need to 
discuss the physical environment of the mixing together of computer-laboratory and 
pre-computer-classroom, and the changes this will bring for teachers and for the 
pedagogy use within it. 
 
Incidentally this reference to Olson’s forthcoming article suggests a timely word of 
caution. We do well to distrust anything said about the impact of computers on 
education which was published earlier than the early 1990s. Any discussions earlier 
than that are commenting on a time when computers were so rare and so clumsy, by 
comparison with user-friendly ‘windows-style’ environments, that people at that time 
could only try to guess what might happen, if computers did become more widely 
used. At that time the evidence of what was actually happening applied to what could 
only be described as, at best ‘experimental’ situations, which were so unlike non-
experimental situations that the discussion of ‘computer impact on curriculum’, while 
interesting at the time, could only be speculative.  
 
It may be noted, in passing, that Seymour Papert (as in his epochal book Mind-Storms 
1971) is one of the few, from those early days whose vision seems to stand up to later 
scrutiny. But, notably, he created an open-ended interactive environment in which 
student action and thinking necessarily had to change—although what he offered was 
only an extremely user-friendly design-brief for the kinds of things that competent 
computer programmers were already doing with programming languages such as 
FORTRAN which were far from user-friendly. Just as interestingly, Papert’s model 
for user-friendliness was partly developed from Piaget’s ideas of child development 
and the flexible interaction between student, clinical interviewer and provocative 
instructional material. 
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Hand-writing curriculum and new technology 
However, as soon as we start to examine specific cases, the impact of computers on 
pre-computer curricula are extremely variable. The shift from handwriting with a pen 
on paper to typing with a keyboard is a massive change to the hand-writing 
curriculum. We may soon find, as increasing numbers of young children, who are 
already keyboard-literate, start school, that the reason for them to start acquiring 
hand-literacy skills may be a matter of aesthetics, craft-oriented conservatism or 
fundamental survival skills. For example, how do you ‘write’ a message when your 
computer is broken, or you left it at home? But the major impact is that computer-
skilled students who set out to learn to hand-write may already know how to 
keyboard-write. This means that much of the learning to-read skills and meanings 
which proceeded in tandem with the older hand-writing curriculum will have already 
been learned. 
 
Hand-drafting and the new technology 
This change in the traditional hand-writing curriculum may be contrasted with 
learning to express ones-self in writing—getting ideas out of the head and into a 
wordprocessing document. The writing-composition curriculum may undergo more of 
a cosmetic, less of a radical change, if the general process of ‘writing’, or written-self-
expression remains unaltered by the move to use wordprocessing as the self-
expressive tool of choice, albeit, improved in ease and efficiency. For some people, 
trained in the earlier hand-writing era, the process of written composition may be 
effectively unaltered, whether they draft by hand, by typewriter, or by wordprocessor.  
 
Of course, we still need, and will continue to need, all these skills: to be able to hand-
write, as well as to hand-compose, and to wordprocess.  
 
It is also unlikely that the imminent advent of universal voice-recognition software 
will alter this. It is well known, by anyone who has attempted to transcribe a tape-
recording of spontaneous speech, that the way we speak our ideas, off the cuff, always 
needs extensive editing before it can stand as written-expressed material. That is, 
unless computer software becomes so intelligent that it is able to edit our oral 
utterances into smoothly write-drafted prose, we will still need to have good hand-
drafting or text-drafting and editing skills. At this point we can anticipate a 
conservative approach to traditional curriculum, or curriculum of tradition, 
comparable to the conservative movements to preserve ancient hand-crafts (e.g. 
thatching, hedging, knitting, bobbin lace, calligraphy and hand-weaving), non-electric 
and live-music, and Slow Food. Like the world’s species gene pool, we need cultural 
and curricular diversity in the interests of richness, sustainability, and creativity. 
 
Note here the possibly clumsy way that newly-linked words need to be developed in 
the search to understand the impact of new technology. Aspects of the curriculum, 
such as ‘writing’ which had been well understood now need to be re-expressed, in 
order to distinguish the way things used to done, and new, similar, but subtly different 
ways we do the same kind of thing, using the technology, while also continuing to 
learn and use the pre-computer methods. That is, ‘writing’ is no longer just ‘writing’, 
and ‘hand-writing’ is only one way of getting letters onto paper. We need words that 
describe other ways of getting the words out of our heads and into print. 
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Dislocation at the Level of the Individual Learner 
Galbraith and Haines (1998 p. 279) comment that the physical separation of the 
learning components (pen and paper, computer screen) and the human brain add a 
particular dimension to the co-ordinating processes required for effective learning. 
They point to research which suggests that unfamiliar technology can cause special 
difficulties even when the tools are primitive (e.g. ruler and compass). Of course this 
is true. Pre-school students who have never used a pair of scissors may find them 
extremely difficult to handle. By contrast, in old age, Henri Matisse used scissors as 
fluently as he used more ordinary artists’ tools, as a means of ‘drawing’, that is 
cutting outlines of images, or ‘sculpting’ with two-dimensional colors. 
 
Temporarily ‘special difficulties’ arise because of the novelty of the tools, perhaps 
because the tools are themselves genuinely new, as tools. We only need to cast our 
minds back to our own first experiences with databases and spreadsheets—one of the 
newest tools which is genuinely different from almost anything which previously 
existed for carrying out similar data-handling tasks. Only those few among us who 
were already used to routinely manipulating card-systems of data, or to using 
programmable calculators, would have found databases and spreadsheets immediately 
sensible. By contrast, computer software which mimics tasks and tool-use which are 
already familiar are far easier to handle. Consider the comparative ease with which 
many of us were able to begin using wordprocessing or computer graphic packages, 
using the computer-mouse as a graphic-pencil. Compare this with the learning 
challenge presented by a first programming language, which is a kind of information 
processing tool, such as FORTRAN or COBOL. 
 
Alternatively the ‘special difficulty’ may be simply because the tools are ‘new’ for the 
learner. That is, the learner has not yet internalised and automated the processes of 
using the tool. Give a child a pogo stick, a two-wheeler bike, a Lego kit, a typewriter, 
a set of lino-engraving cutters, or any tool, and, initially, the student will handle the 
tool clumsily, with little fluency or insight, step by step, deliberately, hesitantly. But 
with practice the student will find easy ways of doing what the tools allow, 
intuitively, naturally. The tool becomes an extension of the hand, which is, itself, a 
fluent extension of the brain. The same thing is seen when a student starts to learn to 
play a new board game. At first each move is painfully laborious, and the student 
cannot see even the immediate next-step consequence of any move that the student 
might make. But with practice and enough experience the student begins to mentally 
plan ahead several alternative paths of action, anticipating the likely responses of the 
opponent.  
 
The Nature of the ‘New Thing’ in the Classroom 
It is important to recognise the move to a computer laboratory may be a fundamental 
dislocation from the known environment and resources. It is also important to 
consider the characteristics of this ‘new thing’, as it has some fundamental differences 
compared with desks, boards, books, chalk, maps and even overhead projectors, video 
players and other technologies. Dickey (1998) has said that 
one constantly hears the computer referred to as a tool, as though 
this were reassurance of some sort. It is reassurance only until one 
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remembers how the tool has shaped the human hand, and notes 
with a shock that this tool is shaping not the hand but the mind. A 
tool used as extensively as the computer cannot help influencing 
how we think (quoted by Williams, 1990, p. 18). 
 
What Dickey says sounds smoothly plausible. But is he right? Is he saying anything 
of any substance? In what way does ‘the tool shape the human hand’? If he means 
that the builder, plumber and gardener get callused palms from digging with pick and 
spade, and the dedicated hand-writer gets callused finger-joints from wielding a pen, 
this ‘shaping’ of the hand is trivial. This talk of shaping the hand is not what tool use 
is about. Instead what the tool does is to make it possible for the human hand to do 
something new or differently as easily as moving a human hand. Consider the use of 
levers and hydraulics to drive a bulldozer, crane or bobcat. The hands of a bobcat 
driver (and a bobcat driver’s child) are basically the same as anyone else’s hand, give 
or take a few calluses.  
 
What, then, about Dickey’s shocking claim that a tool changes the mind? First, is 
there any evidence, in human history, literature, or art, that something we think of as 
amazingly new has not been anticipated by creative minds decades or centuries earlier 
by people who did not have our tools available? The fax machine, for example, was 
patented in the mid-Nineteenth century, but was neglected because Samuel Morse’s 
new code for alphanumerics was a runaway success, when allied with the simple 
On/Off technology of telegraphy. What comes first: the tool, changing the mind? Or 
the mind, imagining the tool?  
 
Second, why not try to look for evidence that a new ‘tool’ has changed the human 
mind. Although it is impossible to present any hard evidence of the effect of the 
invention of writing (has there ever been a bigger more epoch-shaking invention?) on 
the human mind, we can speculate unscientifically. Doing so, it is unlikely that even 
something as significant as moving from oral pre-literate to literate culture changes 
the nature of human thinking, or what it means to be human. On the other hand, we 
are ourselves aware that the way an argument is presented, orally, may be different, in 
important genre features, from the way it would be presented in writing. But beneath 
the surface differences of the two modes of argument, the thinking remains effectively 
the same, because the tool, which represents the thinking, is language.  
 
Take a different example: a symbol-tool, such as algebra, can make different kinds of 
thinking possible, different, that is, from wholly verbal thinking, or the geometry-
based reasoning used by the Ancient Greeks. But this is hardly compelling evidence 
that Archimedes’ mind was different from ours, because he used geometry and we 
used algebra. However, at a trivial level, having a calculator available to handle pesky 
arithmetic, can mean that we no longer need to know as much about, say, logarithms. 
Similarly the multiplication tables, from 1 x 1 to 9 x 9, with place-value ideas, may be 
all we need in our decimalised post-pennies and shilling era. Similarly, a good 
wordprocessor can lessen the load on a writer’s mind. The writer can search for 
whatever is to be ‘said’ in a more relaxed way, knowing that whatever is typed, 
however roughly, can be edited at leisure. When you are able to see what you say, you 
know what you mean, perhaps (as Graham Wallas put it: quoted in Cohen and Cohen 
1960), and being able to see it more easily, or with less anxiety about being right, first 
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time, can be a help. This, perhaps, is the way that literacy skills alter oracy 
performance—the alphabet-as-tool changes the human mind. 
 
That is, Dickey sounds good, but means very little in practice. We need a reality-
check, against which to test the rhetoric. 
 
A wide body of literature relates to teachers’ deliberately choosing to use computers 
for various cognitive tasks (e.g. Logo, computers in maths, simulations, etc.). 
However, the literature on ‘text-drafting’ or the ‘psychology of composition’ (to 
borrow a phrase from Gibbons: 1988, although ‘composition’ is such a widely used 
term that research journals use the word in their titles)—the process and thinking 
when one use wordprocessing on a computer—suggests that the computer is a mind-
tool in a more fundamental way than choosing to use it for certain cognitive tasks. 
 
Indeed, this is an interesting speculation which could lead to valuable research into 
possible impact of computers on the ‘psychology of composition’. But it is also 
important to ask—composing what? Does Gibbons mean ‘drafting prose text’? What 
about composing music? Sketching? Sculpting? 
 
Here the phrase ‘psychology of composition’ arises from a consideration of 
wordprocessors and the writing curriculum, and a considerable early speculative 
literature discusses this type of software and its use. Daniel Chandler (1992, pp. 180-
181) argues that writing by hand is very different to writing on the screen. He argues 
that there are more steps involved in preparing to use a wordprocessor than there are 
in picking up a pencil, and therefore that the writer can feel managed by the 
technology, and as a result the quality of writing suffers because technique becomes 
more important than feeling.  
 
Against this, a word of caution: never trust anything said by anyone about the impact 
of computers earlier than, say, 1995. That was when Bill Gates bit the interface bullet 
and shifted the IBM platform to a ‘windows-style’, mouse-enabled, point-and-click 
working environment. Before then, Daniel Chandler may have been right, in part, 
although this seems unlikely. Many of us had begun wordprocessing in the early 
1980s. But this often occurred, for some of us, after first becoming reasonable adept 
at composing directly at a typewriter, and for others, after developing reasonable 
hand-drafting facility. It is possible that Daniel Chandler had a good secretary who 
did all his typing for him, possibly from Daniel’s tape-recorded dictation, and he had 
not developed any keyboard-related drafting or composing skills. If he had already 
become a fluent typewriting-drafter, then, like any other keyboard-using adept, he 
would have taken to even the clumsiest pre-’windows’ wordprocessor like a duck to 
water. If typing, that is, using the QWERTY keyboard, is the hurdle or barrier to 
fluent use, then researchers should say so. But good wordprocessing software requires 
little more than a shift in the process of fluent automation of letter-selection, from 
mind-hand-writing selection used in manually spelling, to mind-finger-keypressing 
selection used in typing. 
 
Yet, there are many scholars who would argue that the psychology of composition is 
changed for the better rather than the worse. Hartley (1993) considers that research 
into wordprocessor use predicts that there will be more drafting, longer texts and texts 
of better quality. At first glance Hartley’s arguments seem more reasonable than 
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Gibbons’. Certainly wordprocessing, well used, should result in better spelling, better 
grammar, and gloriously readable printing. Documents may be longer, but, in itself, 
this is not a measure of quality! However, whether wordprocessed or hand-written, 
the end result, behind the cosmetic features of spelling, grammar, and text-legibility, 
the real test of the compositional process is the expression of clear ideas. That 
depends on the human brain behind the composing. Being able to wordprocess will, in 
itself, do nothing to improve on what the brain can do. That is, wordprocessed 
documents will be technically more correct and cleaner, but they are unlikely to be 
better as pieces of written/composed expression by an author. 
 
Hartley notes that the literature is not conclusive, and that the effect due to computer 
use is hard to distinguish from effects due to other aspects of the instructional 
environment. Mullins (1988) argues that wordprocessing ought to structure the user’s 
attention so that a particular revision strategy is adopted and makes the non-linear 
evolution of piece of writing accessible. 
 
There is no shortage of empirical evidence of a change in the psychology of 
composition. In a study by Lutz (1987), it was found that the interaction between 
human and machine appears to influence the writing process itself—the cognitive 
strategies used by both professional and experienced writers differed when using pen-
and-paper compared with computer technologies. Daiute (1986) found that the writing 
instrument (in this case the wordprocessor) can effect the writing process. Jenkins 
(1989) observed changes in her (Secondary) students’ writing over the years in which 
she used a wordprocessor in her writing classes. Whilst the changes in the content, 
genre and organisational of the work might be attributed to other factors (e.g. students 
increasingly living in a ‘video age’), Jenkins makes the important observation that the 
word processor allowed her students to work with groups of words which are ‘chunks 
of meaning’ rather than individual words or letters. However, importantly, student 
access to computers for this work is a crucial factor, which is likely to have been 
comparatively limited in 1989. Compare the hand-drafting access of laptop-equipped 
students with those who rely on a computer at home, or in a school laboratory. 
 
Perhaps much of this pre-1995 research literature consists only of ad hoc analyses of 
introspective self-reporting by researchers and those few undergraduate and well-
endowed school student guinea pigs who had access to very early desk-top computers 
for perhaps one hour a day. We might well ask, now, where is the research on the 
impact (not simply descriptive accounts of the everyday use) of laptops on writing? 
Or is it too late to attempt to investigate the changes that result from implementing a 
laptop program? Is it all now so commonplace and taken for granted, and everyone 
thinks that research question was answered in the pre-’windows’ 1980s, so that now 
no-one is bothering? Importantly, for research, there are no longer any really adequate 
control groups. Even in schools without laptops, students at home have hours per day 
of access to their home computer, if they have a big enough and serious enough 
writing task to undertake. So we would be reduced to trying to make speculative 
comparisons between descriptions (a la Donald Graves) of the pre-computer hand-
made writing process, and the present universal reliance on wordprocessing for 
almost all pieces of writing except jotted notes and holiday postcards. 
 
Two types of software can be thought of as extensions of the use of wordprocessors 
for composition. Firstly, there is the use of electronic mail to support student’s 
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communication with distant audiences. Cohen and Riel’s (1989) research shows that 
this technology can support a functional writing environment, which in turn can lead 
to improvements in the quality of students’ writing. However, approaching this 
research, with retrospective curiosity, several important questions need to be asked. 
How user-friendly was the software? How globally wide-ranging were the addressees 
in this pool of e-mailing research subjects? How many hours per day on computers 
were spent by these early e-mailers of the mid-1980s? Similarly, what criteria were 
used in their comparisons that showed ‘improvements’. Do Cohen and Riel mean, 
‘improved and therefore better than’, or do they mean ‘these students weren’t so good 
and later, perhaps thanks to using e-mail, they were better’? Were there control 
groups? Did the control groups (or a hand-writing alternative treatment group) also 
engage in snail-mail or phone communication? This kind of early descriptive would-
be research needs a gruelling examination. Perhaps little of it would stand up! 
 
The second type is multimedia software. Tierney, Kieffer, Stowell, Desai, Whalin and 
Moss (1990), in a longitudinal study, noted shifts in the psychology of composition 
when students used multimedia software over a long period of time, including 
changes in:  
• approaches to the development of documents;  
• how knowledge may be represented via multi-layered and dynamic graphic 
interfaces; and 
• experimentation, for accessing ideas and thinking through topics.  
However it may be worth asking here, just what multi-layered dynamic graphic 
interfaces were available in the late 1980s for a longitudinal study: menu-driven 
software? touch-screen software as in the PLATO system? or Macintosh HyperCard, 
which in many ways was the shape of the future we have now inherited? 
 
There is a sense in which long-term exposure to wordprocessing (and similar) 
software gives rise to alternative cognitive processes. Whatever the agenda for change 
a teacher or school might have is relatively unimportant because such changes will 
tend to occur, to some extent simply through use. Moreover, because computers are 
also widely used in the adult community, the use of wordprocessing (unlike, say, the 
use of Cuisenaire rods for Primary mathematics learning during the 1960s in Victoria) 
in schools is supported by the general community, which is, itself, changing in 
response to computers. 
 
Interestingly, Galbraith and Haines (1998) studied computer use in the teaching of 
mathematics. They note that computer attitudes are more influential than mathematics 
attitudes in facilitating the active engagement of computer-related activities. Whether 
the usual algebra curriculum, for example, will need to be modified in response to the 
increasing use of mathematics processing software as a tool for learning, and a tool 
for doing mathematics, is already being discussed (Stacey 1998). But the future 
impact of computers on the mathematics curriculum is far from clear, and will not 
become clearer until a school-generation have worked with the tool.  
 
Challenges to Future Research 
Further research needs to consider, very carefully, what software is being used, within 
what aspect of an otherwise ordinary(?) school curriculum. Software possibilities 
include: 
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• Logo programming; 
• spreadsheets;  
• programmable calculators; 
• graphic calculators, or graphic calculator software on a full-size computer; 
• geometric processing software (such as Cabri Geometry); or 
• mathematics processing software (a.k.a. computer algebra systems or CAS—e.g. 
Maple, Derive, Mathematica). 
 
This research should also consider computer-curriculum linkage, such as: 
• computer-assisted instructional and practice software; 
• computer-based mathematics practice games; and 
• multi-media teaching and research and resource packages (e.g. CD-ROM 
‘museums’ and ‘laboratories’); 
and, also, using: 
• Internet as a static resource for learning materials; 
• Internet as a source of student / web-site interactive experiences; and 
• e-mail and listserv interest groups as motivation and support. 
 
Researchers will also be interested to know what computer-access the students had: 
• only at home, shared or personal; 
• laptop, taken anywhere; 
• stand-alone or singles in an ordinary classroom; or 
• working on mathematics (or other ‘typical’(?) school subjects) in a one-to-one 
student-computer computer laboratory. 
 
The final twist is that, if the Internet continues in the way it has recently begun to 
develop, Internet access, not just computer access, will also be a major factor with its 
own impact on curriculum, learning, and working methods. But can even a developed 
country, such as Australia, afford the real costs of ensuring that any student, 
anywhere, can use a computer and also dial up the rest of the world? Not only are 
recurrent hardware and software costs substantially higher than those of a textbook-
oriented curriculum, the continual user- costs of Internet-modem connections are 
substantial, and perhaps prohibitive. If they are prohibitive, at least within the public 
education sector, there is a danger that the impact of computers (and the Internet) on 
the school curriculum may split between those who pay for the full service, those who 
get a partial version of the service, at school, those who get a minimal service at 
school but privately supplement this to some extent at home, and those who get very 
little of the computer impact, at all. 
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MicroWorlds as a Learning Environment: Years 5 - 7: Tools 
Versus Thinking  
 
[Paper presented at the 1996 Symposium on Contemporary Approaches to Research in Mathematics, 
Science, Health and Environmental Education, Deakin University.] 
 
Synopsis 
This project is in proposal stage, with initial self-study and informal 
preparations underway since early 1995. It aims to investigate 
MicroWorlds (a recent hypermedia version of the educational computer 
programming language LogoWriter) as a support for learning across 
the curriculum, examining the tensions between learning computer 
programming,learning software skills, and use of "tools", "palettes" and 
"menu bar options". 
Key questions include: 
• What underlying mathematical learning is involved in developing 
computer skills within an interactive programming environment? 
this includes spatial thinking, logical processing, ordering and 
sequencing, numerical thinking, relationships, and scaling; 
• What meta-learning, and meta-linguistic development occurs when 
students use an English-based computer programming language, as 
well an English-based technical language to talk about the work they 
are attempting; and 
• To what extent does a menu-, tool- and palette-supported interface 
distract from problem solving thinking that might otherwise result 
from learning to program using a Logo-type language?  
 
_______________________________________ 
 
[Note: When I resumed working in Primary Education in Victoria College in 1988, Dr Graham Ferres, 
then coordinator of the Graduate Diploma in Computer Education, asked me to prepare to teach 
LogoWriter in the next available semester, and said that this would also be something I could 
contribute to my undergraduate curriculum and methodology work. I had already had some experience 
with Logo, and was certainly interested. However this was my first real opportunity to put my interest 
into practice. The initial disasters that followed were entirely my own responsibility. But I lived to tell 
the tale, and it is very much due to Graham's initiative and support that, nine years later, I am 
continuing to engage in research in this area. In many ways, what I report here is collaborative work 
undertaken with Graham and our students. Indeed, I had hoped to be able to undertake the next stages 
of research in direct collaboration with Graham, as we had jointly developed the research proposal 
outline that led to this report. I mention all of this here, now, as partial repayment of years of gratitude 
owed to Graham.]  
_________________________________________ 
 
Introduction: Comparing LogoWriter and MicroWorlds 
Here are some nuts-and-bolts comparisons between LogoWriter, as a programming 
world, and MicroWorlds as a hypermedia package. 
 
Let me begin by comparing the different screen appearances of the two pieces of 
software. This will be a critical analysis of user-oriented on-screen interfaces.  
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When Logo, in its earlier variants, was first loaded into a computer, all that was 
immediately visible was a "turtle" , like a visual "cursor", awaiting instructions, 
possibly with a text-cursor silently flashing where instructions could be typed in 
"immediate mode". The screen made no attempt to explain itself, or explain what to 
do or what could be done. Everything had be developed out of the Logoer's head, 
referring always to a "dictionary" of Logo commands, and to cryptic key-stroke 
commands that could shift from visual-display ("Full screen") to text-display ("Edit 
mode") to mixed -display ("immediate mode"). 
 
With the advent of LogoWriter, the special metaphor of LogoWriter as a "book" 
attempted to bridge this what-can-I-do-next? barrier. The process of loading 
LogoWriter moved screen-by-screen from a "Title Page", to a "Contents Page" and 
then to a "New Page", or some other page which was either automatically provided, 
or had already been made in previous work sessions. In either Apple IIe or IBM 
versions of LogoWriter, a Title-bar was visible at the top of the screen (possibly with 
the cryptic sign of ??? if the New Page was so far un-named), with a turtle sitting in 
the middle of the screen, a screen-text cursor unmoving in the top-left of the screen 
below the Title-bar, and a lower section of the screen, known as the Command Centre, 
where the active text-cursor was flashing, awaiting orders. With "dictionary" or 
worksheets in hand, the Logoer proceeded, otherwise unaided.  
 
By pressing the Apple (� )and the F key simultaneously (or on IBM the Control and F 
keys), it was possible to go to the other "side" of this screen or "page". On the 
Flipside there was no turtle (Edit mode), but it was possible to do serious 
programming. The programs were then run by flipping back to the front of the page, 
and typing command words in the Command Centre and pressing the Return key. In 
very short time, students happily understood this intuitively appealing metaphor, and 
programmed, and flipped, and trialled, and flipped back to edit "procedures" (as 
programs were called), and so on. Typing and editing were easily handled by simple 
word processing techniques—hence the word "Writer" in the name "LogoWriter". 
 
Things changed dramatically with the introduction of LogoWriter for Macintosh 
computers. Now there were the standard Macintosh-type Windows-style menu bar 
options at the top of the screen, scrolling bars at the right-hand side of the screen, and 
two small screen-buttons that could be clicked with the computer's mouse to "flip" or 
to stop any program that was running. 
 
But much of this was just visually cosmetic. The keyboard-oriented features of Apple 
IIe LogoWriter were all retained in this Macintosh version. The windows-style pull-
down menu options simply offered a different kind of access to ordinary features such 
as editing text, saving pages, and so on. The interface was more immediately 
attractive, but was essentially isomorphic to the first version of LogoWriter, itself a 
considerable advance on the very first interfaces for earlier Logo languages. 
 
But MicroWorlds? Very very different. While major aspects of the LogoWriter 
interface were retained, there were some very significant additions. This is the nub of 
my concern, as a programming teacher, and the focus of my proposed research. 
Indeed MicroWorlds is essentially LogoWriter with a collection of hypermedia add-
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ons, and some significant programming losses (including considerable complications 
in putting text onto the screen, and a loss in easy user-interaction, and an inability to 
use the mouse as a programmable object). In MicroWorlds the screen for a new page 
or project displays a fairly typical Macintosh-style menu bar, below this an 
upperscreen containing a turtle, and below that a Command Centre. But there is also a 
Tools palette... And therein lies the rub. 
 
Let's pause to compare the menu bar pull-down options of LogoWriter and 
MicroWorlds. 
 
LogoWriter pull-down menus 
Apple   File  Edit  Search  Font Utilities 
Help Primitives  New Page Undo  Search ... types Gadgets 
  (an on-line dictionary) Get Page Cut  Replace... sizes Pics 
Help Page   Name Page Copy     Sound 
   Save Page Paste     Print Color 
   Close  Clear     Print 
Enlarged 
   Print Screen Select All    Confirm 
Saved 
   Print Text Shapes 
   Page Setup 
   Quit 
 
MicroWorlds pull-down menus 
File   Edit  Font Pages  Gadgets Help 
New Project  Undo  fonts New Page Run  Vocabulary 
Open Project  Cut  Size Name Page Snaptext Last message 
Close Project  Copy  Style Duplicate Page Tool Palette Ideas 
Save Project  Paste  Color Procedures Tool Sounds ? ["balloon 
help"] 
Save Project As  Clear     Command Centre 
Page Setup  Find/Change    Record Sound 
Print Page  Cancel     Melody 
Print Project  Stopall 
Quit 
 
Immediately we can see in MicroWorlds that the interface metaphor of a "book" has 
been modified into some combination of "project" and "pages", whereas in 
LogoWriter the idea of "page" corresponded simply to typical software ideas of 
"document" or "file". We jump from a single idea to one which verges on needing 
organisational thinking to handle pieces of work and parts of pieces of work. This is 
"directory-think", not intuitive. Moreover, while a LogoWriter page has two sides, 
one with a turtle and one with programming, in MicroWorlds the equivalent to a 
single LogoWriter page is a project, which itself can have many pages with turtles, 
yet which has only one page for programming, known as the Procedures Page. 
 
We can contrast this with HyperCard, a Macintosh-based hypermedia authoring 
software package which uses the organisational metaphor of Index cards and Stacks 
of such cards – similar, but arguably more intuitive than the less formalised idea of 
"project". Sadly, many of the significant changes MicroWorlds has overlaid on the 
underlying base of LogoWriter can be seen to be imitations of HyperCard which is a 
very powerful and appealing package, with excellent potential for programming. But 
usually the MicroWorlds imitations are cheap hand-me-downs, poor relations, or 
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decidedly pale. And while LogoWriter is immediately accessible as a programming 
language for school students as young as Grades 2 or 3, HyperCard is decidedly 
challenging for students at lower Secondary level, and MicroWorlds is comparably 
challenging – another major  grievance of mine about MicroWorlds. 
 
What do we get in terms of hypermedia with MicroWorlds which is not available in 
LogoWriter? Consider the palettes of tools. 
 
MicroWorlds Tool Palette 
Command Centre access Shapes Centre  Drawing Centre  Procedure Page access 
Turtle Tool  Textbox Tool  Button Tool  Slider Tool 
 
Clicking on one of these tools gives a different display, revealing the Command 
Centre, or a collection of Turtle Shapes with other tools for drawing and working with 
these shapes, a Drawing Centre of Graphics palette of tools (including an arrow 
pointer, select-box, tools for drawing lines, rectangles, filled rectangles, ovals, filled 
ovals, erasing, a paintpot and a spraycan, and so on), and other tools for creating 
special screen objects such as buttons (that can be clicked with a mouse to run 
specially created programs), textboxes (that can display text), and sliders (that work 
like stereo-controls to adjust the values of specified variables). Under the menu bar 
pull-down option of Gadgets we can also access a Melody tool palette that lets use 
create and name a tune (one note at a time), by clicking with the mouse on a duration-
palette (where we can select quaver, crotchet and minim) and an instrument palette 
(violin, clarinet, mandolin and orchestra), and then click on keys of a piano keyboard. 
 
So much to choose from, so much to do, so little time to do it in. Such fascinating 
distractions! Ah, me! Pity the children faced with such potential bewilderment! 
 
Perhaps more specifically, we can consider the way MicroWorlds' Drawing Centre 
can create an interesting pattern, compared with the corresponding program which 
LogoWriter requires to obtain the same effect. Incidentally, can you tell which of the 
following diagrams was created using MicroWorlds' Drawing Centre and which was 
made with a LogoWriter procedure? 
 
this  or this ?  
Using MicroWorlds' Drawing Centre we need to point-and-click with the mouse on 
the Rectangle tool, then click at the desired starting point on the screen, and while still 
holding the mouse-button down we drag to open up the desired rectangle; and we 
repeat this four times. With LogoWriter we create a procedure, called box naturally 
enough, which will draw a box, and then we use box as a new command word in 
another procedure called box.turn which does, four times, a drawing of a box, a 
small move forward, and a right turn of 90 degrees.  
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to box 
repeat 2 [fd 20 rt 90 fd 50 rt 90] 
end 
 
to box.turn 
repeat 4 [box fd 10 rt 90] 
end 
 
Of course, we can make exactly the same program in MicroWorlds using its built-in 
equivalent of LogoWriter-the-language. The research question is whether or not 
school children would be willing to work to learn how to use the language, when they 
could just point and click a few times and get the same result? Does MicroWorlds 
offer too much, too easily, too attractively? 
 
Similarly we can consider putting shapes on the page using the Shapes  Centre and 
point-and-click mouse actions: 
• click on the turtle and drag it to the desired location, 
• click on the desired shape in the Shapes palette, 
• click on the turtle to assign it this selected shape, 
• click on the Stamp tool, 
• click on the turtle to stamp the currently selected shape in the currently selected 
position,  
• repeat these five steps as desired. 
 
Compare this with the corresponding approach using programming, which 
emphasises the coordinate location of the turtle's position, using setpos, and the 
assignment of a specified shape using setsh, and so on. Note the explicit use of 
mathematical coordinates! 
 
to do.Stamp  
pu setpos [-100 50] 
pd setsh 12 stamp 
end 
 
or  
 
to do.Any.Stamp :n :x :y 
pu setpos list :x :y 
pd setsh :n stamp 
end 
 
We can say exactly the same kinds of things about MicroWorlds' Melody palette, 
except that in this case there is nothing tangible to show for all the pointing and 
clicking, except a named sound resource. For example we can point and click and 
create a melody based on the first notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, and when we 
type run "beethoven we can hear this. We can even go back, through the melody 
palette, and edit this if we like. But I do not believe this compares with the thoughtful 
learning involved in creating the following procedure on a MicroWorlds Procedure 
page (equivalent to a LogoWriter Flipside, although LogoWriter has a slightly 
different, more Physics-realistic approach to creating notes using a command tone 
based on the frequency of each note.). (Nor does it compare with HyperCard where 
similar automated devices create sound resources with no need for the user to directly 
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program anything, but the devices do also provide a small editable program to handle 
the sound resource so created.) 
 
to beethoven.5 
note 64 2 
note 64 2 
note 64 2 
note 60 4 
repeat 3 [note 62 2] 
note 59 4 
end 
 
But what is Logo for? 
LogoWriter, and MicroWorlds also, are part of a large family of Logo languages 
which owe their existence to the educational vision of Seymour Papert. In his book 
Mindstorms (1980) Papert describes his childhood memory of playing with gears and 
cogs, and the mental models they provided him at key points in learning school 
mathematics. 'I became adept at turning wheels in my head and at making chains of 
cause and effect ... Gears, serving as models, carried many otherwise abstract ideas 
into my head ... I saw multiplication tables as gears, and my first brush with equations 
in two variables (e.g. 3x + 4y = 10) immediately invoked the differential' (p. vi). 
Papert goes on, linking personal experiences with gears, school mathematics, 
affective learning and Piaget's theory of cognitive development: 'A modern-day 
[Maria] Montessori might propose, if convinced by my story, to create a gear set for 
children ... But to hope for this would be to miss the essence of the story ... Something 
very personal happened, and one cannot assume that it would be repeated for other 
children in exactly the same form' (p. viii). Papert's project or thesis then was this: 
'What the gears cannot do the computer might' (p. viii). The result was Logo. 
 
Logo dialects generally, and especially LogoWriter, do achieve what Papert hoped for. 
The computer – that is, the experience of programming through a carefully designed 
learning-potent language – does carry otherwise abstract ideas into students' heads. 
LogoWriter provides a 'Mathland' we can travel in, which, as Papert suggests, 
corresponds for the learning of mathematics to the way that travelling to France is the 
best way to learn to speak French (Papert 1980, p . 6). 
 
In what way is doing LogoWriter programming a form of doing mathematics? It 
certainly embodies many basic mathematical features, such as coordinates, distance, 
angle, bearings, and so on. But the real proof of this comes from reflecting on the 
experience of starting to learn and use LogoWriter. Although we may not be 
conscious of doing so, we will be using many problem solving strategies as we try to 
work out what each primitive command means, what each one will do in this 
particular case, and what successive commands will do as each one runs after the 
other. When our programming goes wrong, again we will be using problem solving 
skills to try to identify and fix ('de-bug') the fault. We will think things like: I think it 
goes wrong here, so if I change it this way then it should work, and you will then 
perform a small-scale mathematics experiment as you attempt this correction.  
 
At the end of making a procedure we will have succeeded in creating a kind of total 
statement, using primitive commands (and possibly other names of other procedures 
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already made), which results in a certain collection of actions on the screen. This 
closely resembles the making of a mathematical argument, based on certain initial 
assumptions (and possibly other arguments already completed), which results in 
demonstrating that a certain mathematical statement is correct. Mathematicians speak 
of "proving" something. Each LogoWriter procedure is like a mathematical 'proof' of 
what the procedure does, but apart from its formal rigour this "proof" is always 
intuitively sensible. Indeed it was precisely for this mathematical potency that 
Seymour Papert first developed Logo. 
 
What now is at stake is whether or not MicroWorlds offers the same possibility. I 
have my doubts – not that I am entirely prejudging the question – and hope to be able 
to investigate this. 
 
Research Issues in ICT and Logo and other educational programming 
• different kinds of software - "book", "game", "obvious toolkit", obvious process, not 
so obvious thinking 
• different interfaces: Logo, LogoWriter (Apple IIe), LogoWriter (Macintosh), 
MicroWorlds (Macintosh, IBM) 
• what is Logo about? what did Papert intend for it? how is it used? 
• "immediate mode" versus procedures and programming 
• programming is mathematics 
 
Research Possibilities 
• observation of students in class 
• school teacher survey and interview with questionnaire 
• survey of relevant literature in conference proceedings and journals 
• individual case studies of student learning 
• anecdotal notes from my own teaching with LogoWriter and MicroWorlds 
• contact with interest-groups and user-groups through the Internet 
• contact with the software developers and publishers 
• responses to published articles on the issue 
• survey of sales of LogoWriter versus MicroWorlds 
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Notes on Research and Advice for Students in Deakin 
Education Masters Degrees  
Yet again I have become the supervisor for a Masters student doing (in this case) 
EXE740 Independent Reading Study (but the same issues arise with supervising 
students in EXR790 Research Design and Development), and found myself asking the 
student: 
 
— what are you doing this unit for? 
— are you considering doing a later research unit (e.g. EXR792 or EXER794)? 
— what other units have you already done that properly relate to any later research 
units (such as EXE780 Research Perspectives and Practices, or EXR790  
Research Design and Development)? 
— what do you know about applying for Ethics approval to conduct research? 
… and so on 
 
Yet again I have typed ad hoc informal notes for the individual explaining how the 
research-linked units are meant to link. 
 
The student later thanked me, and said no one had explained these matters before. 
 
I occasionally discuss these issues with other staff (in impromptu corridor meetings), 
and the same issues were discussed earlier this year (2004) in relation to EXR792 
Research Paper and the requirements of the Ethics committee. 
 
I know that with hundreds of Masters students it is impossible for any one person to 
give detailed individual course advice to all students. But I am not convinced that 
essential advice is provided in the Post-Graduate Handbook, nor in currently used unit 
materials. 
 
Typically, it is not until a student is paired with a unit-supervisor for EXE740 
Independent Reading Study, or EXR790 Research Design and Development, or 
EXR792 Research Paper, that the student finds out how other units can link with 
possible research within the Masters. 
 
This means that each of us, when we begin individual supervision, start drafting and 
delivering the same general messages. 
 
The move to provide a How-to-Apply-For-Ethics-Approval booklet with the posted 
materials for EXR792 is excellent! (I commend Ian Robottom, and Geoff White, and 
Peter Smith, and others for their work in developing this booklet).   
 
But the advice about Ethics is only part of what is needed. And the advice, within the 
Unit Guide for EXR792, comes rather late for students who have not yet begun 
personal supervision with a research-guiding lecturer.  
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In the interests of clarifying and fixing what is clearly a problem, let me suggest that 
some version of the following be turned into a flier, that ALL Masters students will 
routinely receive with their bundled materials for all units. 
 
I would be interested in any comments. 
 
If anyone wants to use any part of my pasted discussion below, edited in any way, 
please feel free to do so. 
John Gough 
 
******* 
 
Pathways Towards Your Own Research-work in a Deakin Master of 
Education Degree By Coursework  
INTRODUCTION: Starting a Masters Degree by Coursework — Do You Want 
Research With That? 
You are enrolling in a Deakin Masters degree with the faculty of Education. Your 
degree will be by coursework. The degree is worth EIGHT points of study. Typically 
most units at Masters-level are each worth 1 point. Hence a coursework Masters 
degree could consist of a maximum of EIGHT units. 
 
These eight units may, within the official constraints of the Post-Graduate Handbook, 
be freely chosen by students, like a smorgasbord. A little of this, a bit of that, and a 
spot of something else. As with any “smorgasbord”, it is possible that the eight units 
may have no direct relationship with one another. Instead each one would simply 
represent one of many unconnected interests a student may have.  
 
Against this free-choice “smorgasbord” it must be noted that, as the Post-Graduate 
Handbook explains, some of the Masters degrees have a special “appellation” or 
“labelling”, such as “Arts Education” or “Curriculum Studies”. Each appellation 
prescribes certain limits on which units a student may enrol in, thus restricting the 
available smorgasbord menu choices for a student. 
 
Leaving these appellation constraints aside, it is possible to complete all eight points 
WITH NO OVERT RESEARCH COMPONENT OR WORK AT ALL, apart from 
the sense of “research” meaning wide reading, critical analysis and reflection, and 
formal academic writing and related activities that are part of Masters-level study. 
 
Here, by “research”, I mean gathering information about a specific topic or question 
about which there is some uncertainty, or controversy within the world-wide 
educational community, with the aim of finding out more about the topic or question, 
so that the world-wide community might be better informed about the nature of the 
topic or question (if the person doing the research were later able to publish some 
version of the results of the research). By “researcher”, here, think of “experimental 
scientist”, “interviewer”, or “investigator”, and contrast this with “student” or 
“learner”. Typically, students learn by research-like processes. But what they learn 
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contributes (mainly) to their own personal knowledge of a particular topic. It does not 
contribute to what the world, at large, knows about a particular topic. By contrast, 
research, rather than study, does (potentially) contribute to what is known about the 
topic. 
 
Let us suppose, however, that you have in mind using your Masters degree to do more 
than just enrol in and study, as a student, eight (possibly isolated, or unconnected) 
smorgasbord units of coursework. Instead you expect, or plan, at some time in your 
degree, to complete your Masters with some form of educational research of your 
own.  
 
This can take at least four forms, some more overt than others. 
 
1. Research within a unit’s ordinary assignment(s) 
In several units the assignments provide small-scale opportunity to conduct research, 
which will be reported on in the form of an assignment or assignments, submitted for 
that unit.  
 
For example, in EXE733 Assessing Learning, the open-ended possibilities for the two 
prescribed assignments give a student scope for negotiating with the unit-chair to read 
published materials on a particular topic related to the unit’s broad concern for 
“assessing learning”, and perhaps survey work-place colleagues about their current 
assessment policies, methods, or interview them about their attitudes to assessment. 
Alternatively a student may use the demands of the unit’s assignment(s) to develop 
and trial a new assessment method, or to make an extended critical analysis of some 
assessment method that the student is currently using. 
 
Similar research-related possibilities arise naturally, independently, in many of the 
other units at Masters-level. Such research, forming a natural part of the study and 
assignment work of these units does NOT require any special ethical approval, 
although students will be expected to conduct their research in ethically sound ways.  
 
Similarly, this kind of small-scale assignment-like research will be negotiated with, 
and supervised by the unit-chair of the individual unit, or by another staff-member 
also teaching or involved with this unit. 
 
2. Research within EXE740 Independent Reading Study 
As the Post-Graduate Handbook entry for this unit explains, a student enrolled in this 
unit reads widely on a topic of the student’s choice. While reading, and towards the 
end of the unit, the student drafts and then submits a single large assignment as 
fulfilment of the assessment requirements of the unit.  
 
This assignment is essentially a major Literature Review and critical analysis 
(critique) of existing published research on the selected topic.  
 
The student’s reading and drafting is personally supervised by a member of Faculty 
staff who not only has some expertise and interest in the student’s topic, but also 
marks the final assignment. 
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3. Research within EXE790 Research Design and Development 
At the risk of duplicating the Post-Graduate Handbook entry for this unit, the study 
and assessment demands of this unit may be summarised as follows. By the end of the 
unit the student will have: 
• read widely on a specific topic, selected by the student, with supervision and 
negotiation with a member of Faculty staff (as with EXE740); 
• drafted (i.e. proposed) a clear research question, related to the selected topic, and 
possible sub-questions; 
• devised a suitable method (methodology) for conducting research that could 
gather data that would help investigate, and potentially provide answers for the 
proposed research question; 
• drafted an Ethics Application, which may later be used to apply for approval 
from the Faculty of Education’s Ethics sub-committee: this draft Ethics 
Application itself contains: 
— a draft Research Proposal 
— a draft research question (and possible sub-questions) 
— a brief outline of the background to, and justification for mounting the 
research (or its proposal) 
— a draft Plain Language Statement (or several statements), explaining the 
research proposal in simple English that will be understandable by those 
people who may (later) be invited to participate in the proposed research, 
and may provide data that would be used to investigate and perhaps 
develop answers for the proposed research question (such possible invited 
people could include, for example, other teachers, school students, and, in 
the case of under-age minors, the parents or guardians of under-age school 
students — hence the need for “plainness” and clarity in the Plain 
Language Statement. 
 
Note that normally a student enrolling in this unit will already have completed the 
unit EXR780 Research Perspectives and Practices, as well as at last 2 other units of 
Education Faculty course-work. 
 
Note also that the “R” in the letter codes for these units — EXR — denotes the 
“research” component or focus of each unit.  
 
In this unit the student’s study, generally, that is, reading and drafting, is personally 
supervised by a member of Faculty staff who has some expertise and interest in the 
student’s topic. The staff member also marks the final assignment. 
 
4. Research within EXR792 Research Paper (a 2-point unit), or EXR794 Minor Thesis (a 
4-point unit — equivalent to half of a complete 8-point Masters degree) 
 
The names of these two units clearly shows that they entail research. Importantly, 
however, bot units have pre-requisites. Any student enrolling in either of these units 
must already have completed BOTH of (or an alternative to): 
EXR780 Research Perspectives and Practices 
and 
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EXE790 Research Design and Development. 
 
Again, as with EXE740 and EXR790, students enrolling in either of these units will 
work under the supervision of a member of Faculty staff who has some expertise and 
interest in the student’s topic.  
 
But in the case of EXE792 and EXE794, the individual supervisor will NOT mark the 
final assignment, the Research Paper or the Minor Thesis, but will select a suitable 
examiner (for EXR792) or two suitable examiners (for EXR794). 
 
Note that students may enrol in EXE740 Independent Reading Study without serious 
demand for pre-requisite, except that the unit is generally intended for students who 
have: 
• already studied as far as they can in a particular topic of interest, by means of a 
unit (or units) that, in some way, may focus on this topic; or 
• some alternative topic of interest which is not otherwise catered for in any other 
existing unit available at Masters-level. 
 
Similarly the unit EXR780 may be undertaken at any point in the student’s Masters 
degree, without pre-requisites. 
 
However, the units EXR790, and EXR792 and EXR794 all require research-focused 
pre-requisites. But, importantly, students enrolling in EXR790, EXR792 or EXR794 
need not have completed EXE740 Independent Reading Study — the “Literature 
Review” unit. Despite this, both EXR792 and EXR794 will expect a student to 
include a Literature Review as a major “chapter” in the final Research Paper or Minor 
Thesis. Moreover, the development of a research proposal, and Ethics application, in 
EXR790, also requires considerable background in the proposed topic for research, as 
well as some rationale for the proposed research, and some argument for the use of 
proposed research method(s). 
 
This opens the following discussion of unit sequencing, from start of a Masters degree 
by coursework to some eventual extended research. 
 
Planning Ahead for Overt Research Within a Coursework Masters 
If any student plans to enrol in the unit EXR792 Research Paper, or the unit EXR794 
Minor Thesis, at some future time, this needs careful thought. 
 
The beginning of this must be, at some stage in the whole Masters sequence, EXR780 
Research Perspectives and Practices.  
 
The unit EXR780 explores possible methods of approaching research, as a subject for 
study in its own right, and alternative methods for doing research. This unit gives the 
student choices of “research-tools”, along with the underlying methodological theory 
and rationale(s) for choice of research method(s), which are needed, later, for 
developing any research proposal (as in the similarly preparatory unit EXR790, or in 
the actual units of active researching, namely, EXR792 and EXR794). 
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Next, consider the unit EXE740 Independent Reading Study. As already noted, it is 
possible for this unit to be a stand-alone unit, within the larger smorgasbord-like 
scheme of the eight units of a coursework-based Masters degree. 
 
But very importantly, many students use EXE740 as the time when they establish a 
strong Literature Review for their later Research Paper or Minor Thesis.  
 
If students complete EXE740 well they have established a strong draft of their 
Chapter 2: Literature Review (and maybe Chapter 3: A Critical Rationale for the 
Proposed Research, that will later emerge in their Research Paper, or Minor Thesis. 
Also, in conjunction with a well developed Literature Review, itself, the wide reading 
that occurs in EXE740 will also expose students to a wide-range of research methods, 
thus extending and focusing the general methodological background (already? or 
later?) explored in EXE780. Hence, aspects of EXE740 can combine with experiences 
arising in EXE780, to help students develop their research methodology (methods), 
which becomes Chapter 4: A Methodology for the Proposed Research. 
 
But this is only possible if students plan ahead for their enrolment in successive 
Masters units. 
 
Before a student undertakes the EXR792 Research Paper, if the student is intending 
that the proposed research would require gathering data (measurements, test results, 
questionnaire information, interview transcripts, classroom observations, etc.) from 
human research subjects (or participants), the student needs to develop an Application 
for ETHICS Approval that would be submitted to the Education Faculty Ethics sub-
committee.  
 
As already noted, a central, and absolutely essential component in any draft Ethics 
application is a PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT (PLS) which outlines in simple 
English as clearly as possible what the research is going to be – expressed in language 
that can be understood by the people who will be agreeing to participate in the 
proposed research, and hence who will be providing data for that research. 
 
The student also needs to develop a draft research project proposal. A central, and 
absolutely essential component in any draft research proposal is a RESEARCH 
QUESTION. 
 
Many students complete these two parallel tasks (the Ethics application and the 
Research proposal) as “assignments” while enrolled in the preparatory unit EXR790, 
which is itself a sequel unit to EXR780 which exposes students to varieties of 
research methodologies. 
 
Hence by the time the student enrols in EXR792, there are draft versions of major 
components of the actual Research Paper, and all that needs to be done is to: 
• DO the research (gather the data),  
• collate, summarise, and analyse the data and the results of the research 
• draft a final report on what the research found, or in what ways the research was 
able to answer the major research question. 
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When the student begins EXR792 the student will (often) already have completed 
draft versions of: 
• the research question (in EXE790) 
• the Ethics application and Plain Language Statement (also in EXE790) and 
• the Literature Review (in EXE740). 
 
In essence, seen within this larger context of any version of a Deakin Masters degree 
which culminates in a Research Paper, or a Minor Thesis, any version of EXE740 
Independent Reading Survey will not be independent, supervised reading, on a 
negotiated topic, undertaken for reasons of personal interest, or for the sake of doing 
something academic, and earning one credit point towards the whole Masters degree. 
Instead it will be a critically gathered and analysed Literature Review which provides 
a critically argued case for mounting the research which is to be proposed, separately, 
in EXR790, and undertaken, separately, in EXR792. 
 
Where Do Supervising Staff Members Come From? 
Typically students who approach the eventual EXR792 Research Paper in this 
coordinated way will also move from the very first research-methodology-focused 
unit, EXR780, through other units, with a germinating idea for research already in 
their mind, and also, CRUCIALLY, with an idea of WHO they would like to be their 
supervising staff member through EXR790 and later in EXR792. 
 
It is possible to have different staff members supervising each unit. But many students 
find it helpful to follow through the sequence of units I have been outlining with the 
same supervising lecturer through them all. Frequently this lecturer is one who has 
already revealed some interest in the student’s general area of interest for possible 
research. Usually this happens through the lecturer’s teaching of some other 
coursework unit(s), where the topic(s) of the unit(s) is(are) related in some way to the 
student’s topic(s) of interest. 
 
For example, a student who is interested in, and considering research theories of 
learning, and classroom applications, may encounter a lecturer working in EXE736 
Knowledge, Learning and Learners. Another student considering research in literacy 
may encounter a lecturer teaching a unit such as ECL767 Reader and Text or ECL756 
Text Analysis for Language Teaching. 
 
Can You Plan Ahead, Now, For Possible Research? 
Having explained all of this, where do you stand, in this larger sequence of units, 
EXR780, EXR790, and EXE740, and beyond — EXR792 or EXR794? 
 
— Have you enrolled yet in EXR780 Research Perspectives and Practices? 
 
— Have you enrolled yet in EXE790 Research Design and Development? 
 
— Do you have any early idea(s) about what research you might attempt in EXR792?  
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— Have you already encountered any indicative (interesting, challenging, 
inspirational, or guiding) research materials, journal articles, or other early appetite-
whetters? 
 
— Have you any experience of, or knowledge of possible methods of research? 
 
— Have you some (tentative) reason for wanting to conduct research, and/or some 
(tentative) rationale for proposing some research? 
 
— Do you have a draft research question, or a draft Plain Language Statement? 
 
— Have you considered issues of ethics in any possible research? For example, could 
your research pose any dangers or threats to possible research participants — the 
people who you would want to get information from, to help investigate an answer 
possible research questions? 
 
For example, regarding issues of ethics in educational research, if you are the teacher 
of Year 8 Geography students, and you want to research Year students’ ability to read 
technical maps, and you are considering using your own Year 8 students as the 
subjects of your research, there is an immediate danger for your students. This danger 
is an ethics issue or problem! 
 
If the students agree to participate in your research, is this likely, in some way, to 
positively color your teaching of them, and your assessment of their schoolwork in 
Year 8 Geography?  
 
Or, if they decline your invitation to become research participants, might this 
negatively color whatever you will continue to do with these students in your non-
research role as their Year 8 Geography teacher?  
 
If your research involves implementing some innovative curriculum materials, will 
students who are NOT part of your research suffer any adverse consequences from 
NOT experiencing these curriculum (or pedagogical) innovations?  
 
Similarly, if implementing such an innovation means that the research participants 
will NOT receive the otherwise standard or traditional presentation of the curriculum 
topic being taught differently through this innovation, will this gap in, or modification 
of their experience adversely affect their overall learning of this curriculum topic? 
 
— Are there potential conflicts of interest, between your role in your workplace, and 
the roles and positions of those possible research participants?  
 
For example, if you are the curriculum coordinator for a school, or the deputy 
principal, how will other teachers feel about being invited to become research 
participants, knowing that how they respond to the invitation may be, directly, or 
indirectly, related to other judgments you may make about their professional standing, 
performance, and possible promotion?  
 
Ethical issues (conflicts of interest, conflicts in professional expectation and 
performance) need to be anticipated, and managed, in clear and practical ways. The 
John Gough — Research Studies page  211 
goal is openness, and fair dealing, and to minimise and, if possible, avoid any harm to 
both those potential research participants who accept your invitation to be part of the 
research, as well as those you invite who choose to decline the invitation. 
 
Summary: Placing Preparatory Units Within a Research Paper or Minor 
Thesis 
A short way of seeing these issues is this: a Research Paper or Minor Thesis may, 
typically have a Contents-listing of chapters, such as: 
 
• Abstract: an extremely brief encapsulated or nut-shell account of the research: 
what it proposed, and attempted, and found, possibly with a brief statement 
about how the research was conducted.  
 
• Chapter 1: Introducing the Topic of the Research 
 1.1 The Research Question 
 1.2 The Rationale for the Research 
 
• Chapter 2: Critical Literature Review: The Background to the Research [based 
closely on EXE740 Independent Reading Survey] 
 2.1, 2.2, etc. — these sub-sections make sensible subject-compartments dealing 
with discrete sub-section aspects of the research and related background issues 
 
• Chapter 3: A Critical Rationale for the Proposed Research [based on Chapter 2, 
plus aspects of the Ethics application, developed in EXE790 Research Design and 
Development]:  
a critically argued case for conducting the proposed research in a specific way: for 
example, by Case Study, or by Participant Observer, or whatever research 
method(s) are argued to be most suitable for the researcher, the context and the 
research question.  
(As noted, this may develop directly from the unit on Research Methodology, 
EXR780, along with other wider reading, such as through Chapter 2, where the 
research methods of other published research have been examined critically.) 
 
• Chapter 4: A Methodology for the Proposed Research [derived from EXE740, 
and, essentially, EXR780 Research Perspectives and Practices], including Ethics 
issues: 
 4.1 Who was recruited as research participants, and how 
 4.2 An account of the handling of ethical issues arising during the research 
process 
 4.3 A description of the data-gathering methods used 
 
• Chapter 5: An Outline of the Implementation of the Research [this is a report on 
the main researching conducted during either EXR792 Research Paper, or EXR794 
Minor Thesis] 
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• Chapter 6: Results of the Research [again, this is a major aspect of either 
EXR792 or EXR794]: a Summary of what was found (answers to the research 
question) from the research data 
 
• Chapter 7: Discussion of Results and/or Conclusions: a critically analysed 
discussion of the major findings of the research 
 6.1, 6.2, etc.,  sub-section by this chapter outlines successive findings 
 6.4? A statement about the limitations of the research, as it was conducted (e.g. 
the smallness of the sample of participants, the lack of precision in some 
qualitative data, the fact that the research examined only teachers or teaching in 
one small part of one State, in an English-speaking country, and/or the fact that 
special issues [e.g. gender, indigenous or immigrant peoples, socio-economic, class 
or whatever] could not be addressed in the practicable research sample] 
 6.5? The need for further research, and possible areas of such further research, 
and/or fresh research questions now arising from the completed research, ... 
 
If you are likely to reach the end of your coursework Masters degree with such a 
Contents-listing for an extended piece of research, you need to understand how the 
preparatory units build towards the earlier chapters, while the culminating research 
unit puts all the preparation into practice, and is then described, analysed, and 
critically summarised in the final chapters. 
 
Do You Want a DOCTORATE With That? 
So far I have discussed research possibilities within a Deakin University Masters-
level degree in the Education Faculty. But some students entering a Masters degree, 
or currently in a Masters, also hope to move eventually from a completed Masters 
degree to a doctorate of some kind. 
 
There are essentially TWO kinds of doctorate: 
— a course-work-like EdD, or Doctorate in Education; and 
— a more research-emphatic PhD, or Doctor of Philosophy (so called — this is the 
technical term for a research doctorate). 
 
Why would any one subject themselves to the many years (usually a minimum of 3 
years full-time) of extremely demanding academic work and research? 
 
There are two main reasons, other than that of personal interest, and growth: 
• wanting to become a university lecturer; or 
• intending to do research.  
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Importantly, if you want to pursue a career as a university lecturer it is essential to 
have a PhD so that you can yourself supervise doctoral students. I doubt that anyone 
in Australia (or elsewhere) would be appointed, these days, to a lecturing position 
without already having a doctorate, or being within, perhaps, one year of completing a 
doctorate. 
 
It is important to note that the entry requirements to a doctorate (at Deakin) are: 
• a Bachelor-level Honours degree with an overall result of H2A (whatever that 
means, when translated from one Faculty, or one university, to another); 
or, equivalently 
• a (Deakin, or equivalent) Masters in Education, which includes results of 
DISTINCTION or better in the three research-focused unit (totalling 4-credit 
points in the whole degree): EXR780, EXR790 and EXR792; and, if possible as 
many DISTINCTION grades in the other units in the Masters degree. 
 
Students who have not received grades of DISTINCTION for all three of these units 
have been excluded from enrolling in doctoral studies (although it is then possible for 
them to pursue further Masters study, possibly elsewhere, in the hope of earning 
suitably high grades in equivalent units to compensate for the sub-Distinction grades 
in the Deakin units).  
 
Similarly, if anyone is interested in undertaking research, with or without being a 
university lecturer, this seems to be possible in only three ways, other than a do-it-
yourself back-yard home-office amateurism. These are as: 
• a hired researcher, working for a corporation, education authority, or similar 
organization; 
• a successful competitor who has submitted a detailed research proposal (as a 
tendering process) to a research funding authority, such as a national 
government, or agency; or 
• a university academic undertaking unfunded, or university-funded research (in 
this latter case, after successfully tendering for university research funds). 
 
In all three cases, it is extremely unlikely that anyone could be a successful tenderer, 
or be in a suitable position to be allowed, and be funded, to conduct research, 
UNLESS that person already had a track-record as a researcher.  
 
The usual first step in such a track-record is at least having a completed research-
based doctorate, and probably also having several published articles, or monographs, 
or conference presentations, based on the person’s research (such publication needs to 
be “refereed”, that is, in prestigious, editorially screened professional journals).  
 
By contrast, if such a person has, at most, only the research conducted within a 
Masters degree, even where that research essentially constitutes the entire degree 
(which is possible, at Deakin, as Masters-by-research, where all 8 credit points of the 
degree constitute the research and full or “major” thesis), this does NOT constitute 
that necessary first step, unless, almost accidentally, the quality of the research, or the 
topic of the research is for some extreme reason so substantial that it warrants 
comparison with a doctorate.  
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Ordinarily a good Masters research-supervisor would advise any Masters student that 
if the Masters-level research, while underway, seems of sufficient quality, the student 
should upgrade the enrolment from Masters to doctorate.  
 
Very rarely would a student complete any Masters research that anyone else would 
accept as being of doctoral scope or quality. 
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Appendices 
The following Appendices include materials used, and potentially useable, to collect 
research data for further analysis. 
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Computers, Writing, Thinking — Self-Inventory — November 1999 
 
Most adults and teenagers learned to write using a pencil or pen, and learned to read 
using paper-printed materials. A few learned to read independently of almost any overt 
instruction, especially now that see-and-hear TV ads make frequent dynamic links 
between spoken and written/printed language. But since 1995, when Microsoft introduced 
Windows 95, and IBM personal computers went ‘windows’, with point-and-click 
easiness, increasing numbers of young students’ initial experience of reading occurs with 
a computer screen, and ‘writing’ is a mix of mouse-actions and key-strokes. Moreover, 
many pre-school practice game programs ‘speak’ back what the user types! The times 
they are a changin’. What you knew, and experienced, may soon be very different from 
school and the curriculum of the future.  
 
The following questions relate to the use you make of computers, and your views on 
‘writing’ (by hand, and/or wordprocessing). Some of them may not fit your situation. 
Please answer as well as possible. If necessary add comments or explanations in the 
margin. You may feel it necessary to choose more than one of the alternatives to a 
particular question. 
 
1. Which of the following describes your access to computers: 
A I have a personal laptop which I use at home, school and study 
B I have a desktop computer at home which I use as much as I need 
C I use a desktop computer at home which I share with other users 
D I beg or borrow computer time on a friends’ / school’s / library’s computer 
E I use only, or mainly, the university computer laboratories 
F I have someone else type up any work I need wordprocessed 
 
2. If you have a computer which you are able to use a lot, please name it, as well as you 
can, and if possible indicate when you bought it, or how old it is 
 ........................... 
 
3. Presumably you were able to write reasonably well, by hand, before you developed any 
skill with wordprocessing. Which of the following describes your view of yourself as a 
pen-writer (ignore any limitations over spelling, grammar, or handwriting): that is, how 
well do you feel you can express your ideas when you write them out using pen and 
paper)? 
A I pen-write confidently 
B I pen-write competently, but am not always confident about being clear 
C I manage, but slowly and with difficulty and struggle to clarify what I think 
D I feel pen-writing is not a good way for me to communicate my ideas 
 
4. When you pen-write a new piece of work (e.g. a university essay), which of the 
following describes your approach (or the approach you used to use): 
A I make many rough notes and then re-write several times before it’s right 
B I make a few notes and write one rough draft, then make a fair copy 
C I make a few notes, and when drafting use lots of white-out, and physical copying 
and pasting of pieces of draft, to assemble the ideas I want to express 
D I make a few notes, then usually manage to make one fair draft on the first attempt, 
which I submit, after simple proof-reading and minor corrections 
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E I work out what I want to say, in my head, then write it out, through successive drafts, 
until it’s right 
F I work out what I want to say, in my head, then make one fair draft on the first 
attempt, which I submit, after simple proof-reading and minor corrections 
 
5. Once you had learned the basics of writing by hand, you may have experienced a 
transitional stage of using a typewriter (not a wordprocessor) before moving to 
wordprocessing (indeed, you may still be just typing). Which of the following 
describes your experience (if any) with a typewriter: 
A I type slowly, with frequent errors, lots of white-out, and re-typing 
B I type reasonably fast, but need to draft first by hand 
C I type my first and only draft directly on the typewriter, with some later small scale 
corrections, using only a few hand-jotted notes 
D I can think and compose on a typewriter about as fast as I can hand-write as I express 
new ideas 
 
6. Presumably you now use wordprocessing for all / almost your formal ‘written work’. 
Which of the following describes your approach to WP: 
A I WP only at the last stage after the hand-drafted version is as good as I can get it 
B I make extensive hand-drafted jotting-notes, and make a first hand-draft, before I start 
WP the essay 
C I make extensive hand-drafted jotting-notes, and then WP all subsequent drafting 
D I make a few hand-drafted jotting-notes, and then WP all subsequent drafting 
E I make a few mental notes, and think a bit, then start WP 
F I start jotting ideas directly on the computer, and do WP drafting all the way 
 
7. Consider your different experiences of hand-drafting and wordprocessing. Which of 
the following describes your views: 
A I express myself more easily using hand-drafting than WP 
 If so, why? E.g. lack of computer access &/or time, weak typing skills, negative 
attitude to computers, preference for direct hands-on crafting 
 .................. 
B I express myself more easily using WP than hand-drafting 
 If so, why? 
  .................. 
C WP has obvious technical advantages in being able to correct, cut, copy, shift, and 
check, but apart from that I feel I can hand-draft as well as I can WP 
 
8. Which of the following describes your experience: 
A I learned to touch-type to a comfortable speed 
B I can only hunt-and-peck slowly when I type or use a keyboard 
C I am a fast-enough two-finger typist 
D I can type (somehow) about as fast as I need to keep up with my flow of ideas 
E my handwriting is clear and easy to read even at speed 
F my handwriting is OK when it’s slow but is hard to read when I have to go fast 
 
9. Do you feel wordprocessing significantly changes your confidence and ability in 
expressing yourself in writing?  YES / NO 
Any comment about this?.............. 
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10.What advice would you now give teachers or parents about wordprocessing versus 
hand-writing? 
.............. 
 
****** 
 
Now, draft your own set of questions about the following. 
 
• Using e-mail for personal communication, contrasted with hand-written or typed paper-
based letters, telephone conversations, and, possibly, faxes. 
 
• Using the Internet as an information resource, contrasted with using a shelf of 
encyclopedias and reference books, or a good municipal library. 
 
• Using a hand-held calculator to do everyday arithmetic computations, contrasted with 
pencil-and-paper written computations.  
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“Disaster Studies” and Other Learning Bugaboos from Robert B. Davis’s 
Learning Mathematics (1984) 
In the late 1990s, Science Education moved from its early embracing of a version of 
constructivism, as its explanatory theory (or metaphor) of learning, to exploration of 
what is sometimes called Alternative Conceptions, or Conceptual Change. The central 
argument was that, because Science was a conceptualising of real-world physical 
phenomena, the classroom challenge to form so called scientific concepts was always 
jeopardised by the fact that school students, and even pre-school children, had already 
created PRE-scientific concepts to explain their own, informal everyday experiences 
of the real-world and its diverse phenomena. Moreover, this real-world is dominated, 
for example, by FRICTION. That is, unless an object is being pushed by a force, the 
object will not move. If an object is observed to be moving, it must be due to the 
effect of some force being applied to the object. In short, before school students are 
taught Newtonian physics (where Newton’s First Law of Motion — or Law of Inertia 
— states that an object in a state of rest or continuous motion will continue in that 
state, unless a force is applied to change its speed or its direction), students are natural 
Aristotelians. Moreover, until Newtonian concepts are thoroughly internalised, 
students will persist to fall back on Aristotelian ideas of physics. 
 
When university Physics students are presented with a novel situation, they are likely 
to forget Newton’s physics and give answers to questions according to Aristotle’s 
(friction-based)  theories of motion. In terms of effective teaching and learning of 
Newtonian physics this is, conceptually, a “disaster”. However, in those late 1990s, 
few of the Science educators who were concerned with Conceptual Change and the 
resistance of informal non-scientific concepts to science instruction realised that 
“disasters” had been studied extensively in the late 1970s and had been compellingly 
discussed by one of the pioneering constructivist theorists, Robert B. Davis. 
 
The following three examples, from Davis’s discussion, can be taken as a challenge to 
the reader: how do YOU answer these questions? 
 
1. Andrea A. Di Sessa’s “Dynaturtle” 
Imagine a rocket-powered space-ship. This can be modelled in Logo programming as 
a moving blip on a computer screen. It starts in the bottom-left corner of the screen. 
It is pointed vertically up the screen, in the direction of the y-axis of implicit 
Cartesian coordinates. The aim is for the student to steer the rocket to the top-right 
corner of the computer screen. The student can press three keys on the computer 
keyboard: 
K — fires the rocket, and adds a vector increment to the space-ship’s velocity; the 
increment is directed in the same direction as the space-ship’s current 
orientation 
R — causes the rocket to rotate 30 degrees to the right (clockwise) from its current 
heading 
L — causes the rocket to rotate 30 degrees to the left (widdershins) from its current 
heading 
If the rocket has not been fired (K has not been pressed), then pressing R or L will 
rotate the rocket on the spot but not otherwise move it.  
Note that it is impossible to turn the rocket in an angle of 45 degrees (assuming the 
computer screen is square). Typically, students from Grade 6 through to 
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undergraduate engineering and physics, start the space-ship moving by pressing K. 
They wait until the space-ship has nearly reached the top of the screen and then 
quickly press R three times. 
(Davis pp. 350-354). 
 
2. John Clement, James Kaput, Peter Rosnick et al.’s “Students and Professors” 
Problem: In a college there are six times as many students as there are professors. Use 
S to shoe the number of students, and P for the number of professors, and write a 
mathematical expression that shows this relationship”. 
(Davis pp. 116-124, 318). 
 
3. Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (1980) — “Two Pyramid Problem” 
Problem: Take two equilateral solids, where each edge has length L units. One is a 
pyramid with a square base, and the other has is a tetrahedron (a “pyramid” with a 
triangular base). Join the two by gluing together two geometrically congruent faces. 
How many faces does the resulting geometric solid have? (Also how many edges does 
the resulting geometric solid have?) 
 
(Davis pp. 219-236) 
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Learning to Write [Academically]: A Conversation 
 
From: Student S 
To: <jugh@deakin.edu.au> 
Subject: Writing Assignments 
Date: 9 Oct 2005  
 
Good morning John, Thank you for your suggestions about academic study, and 
feedback on my first assignment.  
 
I sometimes find it MOST frustrating that I can't put things together in an academic 
style of writing. Throughout the years I have tried and tried. I am not sure it is 
something I can learn to do. I wish I could submit a tape to tell you what I know. 
 
I also think it would be beneficial to get someone else to write it for me but using my 
words. How far can you go before it is collusion or against university principles? 
Your comments on my assignment are exactly correct. It is overtly chatty, loose, 
unstructured, etc., etc.  
 
Unfortunately that is how my brain is when I try to put it all together. I'm not sure 
what to do about it and it worries me. 
 
I am reading Writing at University, written by Les Puhl and Bill Day (both of Edith 
Cowan University). Do you know anything about it? I hope it can help me, but as I 
said I do know what to do it is just hard getting it all together. Many thanks 
Student S 
 
***** 
 
10 October 2005 
Thanks, Student S. 
 
Your question about collusion is tricky. You can, I think, get a great deal of help in 
the form of FEEDBACK and PROOFREADING, with NO risk of collusion, as long 
as the feedback and correction is (mainly) on YOUR ideas. However, if the feedback 
CONTRIBUTES to what you are thinking, so that, in effect, the person providing 
feedback might be regarded, loosely, as a CO-AUTHOR or as a CO-contributor to the 
ideas you end up using, then this may be a form of collusion. 
 
You can cover yourself fairly easily. You are EXPECTED to get ideas from OTHER 
people. When you get the ideas from books and journal articles and web-sites and 
conferences, you are required to say so, and cite sources. On the other hand, if you get 
ideas from colleagues, as unpublished oral sources, you can acknowledge this as 
"PERSONAL COMMUNICATION". 
 
The point is that "COLLUSION" occurs when you have worked with other people 
and NOT acknowledged this. It is similar to "PLAGIARISM", which occurs when 
you use other people's ideas and do NOT acknowledge this. Both are forms of 
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intellectual THEFT, and intellectual DISHONESTY. Neither accusations apply when 
you acknowledge your sources of information and guidance. 
 
Of course, it is NEVER appropriate to have someone else WRITE an essay and for 
you to claim that it is YOUR work. (I know you are not even suggesting this. I am 
arguing hypothetical cases.) The exception here is one that would rarely apply in our 
(mainly) literate age. IF a person is INCAPABLE of writing, then it is acceptable to 
have their ORAL expression SCRIBED by another person. In the process of such 
scribing or TRANSCRIBING the "scribe" may lightly edit the speaking-author's oral 
account, adding punctuation, eliminating pauses and self-corrections, and fixing part-
sentences, and so on. But the scribe is not allowed to add his or her own ideas to the 
transcription (except where this is acknowledged as an "EDITOR'S NOTE", or 
something similar). 
 
In rare extreme cases of certified DYSLEXIA, in some Year 12 and university 
examinations and assessment, a scribe may be allowed to write out what the dyslexic 
student dictates. But this must be done under strictly controlled conditions that 
legitimise and constrain the role of the scribe.  
 
(I don't think this is what you have in mind. But knowing that you work in Special 
Education, I mention it, because you need to be aware of these possibilities.) 
 
No, I am not familiar with Puhl and Day's advice for writers. But I expect it will say 
all the obvious things, as so many other books do. I probably say the same things, also. 
 
Note, at the outset, that the word "chatty" is crucial. We ALL think, and speak, in a 
way that is, initially "chatty". That is natural: there is nothing wrong with it. But it is 
NOT an effective, that is, efficient, form of WRITTEN communication (and may not 
be effective, sometimes, as oral communication, either). 
 
I can't claim to be a teacher of writing. But from what I have learned, myself, and read 
(e.g. Donald Graves discussing what is called "process writing" -- PETA, the Primary 
English Teachers Association [of Australia], the national leaders in Language 
Education method and theory, have promoted Graves for a long time as a "guru" on 
how to teach writing) the TRICK or KNACK is to imitate a suitable model or the 
style of an appropriate model. In this case, you should aim to model your own writing 
on the style of a "standard" journal article. 
 
I would, I must add, say exactly the same thing about your suggestion of drafting your 
ideas as an audio tape. There is a huge difference between listening to someone 
saying, in any way and in any order that springs to mind, what ever improvisatory 
ideas they have on a topic, contrasted (and it is a huge contrast) with listening to 
someone speaking in a controlled, considered, structured way. 
 
The key, in both cases, writing or speaking, is in the REDRAFTING. It makes sense 
to start with a fairly free ramble around a topic. But once you have jotted down 
everything you want to say (and possibly other things that are less directly relevant, 
but which at the time seem connected, but in hindsight might not be obvious to a 
listener or reader, and might be judged as NOT sufficiently on the topic), you need to 
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consider, from the point of view of your listener or reader (your AUDIENCE), how 
you can most effectively, and convincingly, present your arguments. 
 
At this point it may be helpful to use a TITLE as a way of identifying as clearly and 
precisely as possible, what you now think your topic is: the MAIN argument, or main 
focus of attention.   
 
Then ask yourself what are the main ideas you are going to consider, and summarise 
those, in an introductory way. 
 
You could also reconsider the accumulated jottings, and ask yourself, what 
QUESTIONS are these jottings ASKING and then ANSWERING? Use the questions 
as headings and sub-headings, making sure that each question leads logically to, or is 
followed logically, by the next one. 
 
The process of setting yourself a guiding topic, and then asking, and answering, a 
string of connected questions, gives the argument a shape that would not have been 
obvious, in the first free association jotting down of ideas on a loosely focused topic. 
 
Along the way, as you draw on material you have read (quoting, paraphrasing, and 
mentioning or naming), you ensure you include the appropriate references, and 
simultaneously compile (at the end of the draft you are developing -- all of this in 
wordprocessing, where editing is easiest!) an alphabetical list of References, fully and 
consistently cited according to the reference style required by your current academic 
target. 
 
Similarly, whenever you use a technical term, or mention some resource, provide a 
clear definition, and explanation, and some indicative examples. 
 
Through this redrafting, you are working with, and reshaping, the material you 
accumulated in the original draft: rewriting, clarifying, expanding, relocating to a 
suitable position in the flow of ideas, and so on.  
 
You are, also, continually rethinking, and using your fresh thinking to draft and 
redraft as you work. The point is that until you are WRITING, it will actually NOT be 
genuinely clear in your own mind WHAT you actually THINK about the topic you 
are working on. 
 
Here the major self-awareness CATCH, for unwary thinkers, is that you can FEEL 
you know what you think BEFORE you start writing. BUT in my experience, and that 
of most other people, it is DURING the reflective drafting of actual WRITTEN words 
that you DISCOVER what you think. You literally SEE what you are saying, and also 
seeing what you CAN "say", with your writing.  
 
Before you can see actual words on paper, you only have NON-VERBAL and PRE-
verbal INTUITIONS. These can FEEL clear, and sensible. But in my experience they 
can be extremely deceptive. There is, and most experienced writers agree on this (as 
do most artists, and musicians), a GAP between what we think we know and mean to 
say, and what we find we actually DO say.  
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To the extent that, when we have finished polishing the final draft, we still feel that 
we have not yet captured what we really meant, the experienced 
writer/artist/composer has some remaining motivation to return, later, and develop 
fresh thinking and another "TAKE" on the same, or related topic. Apart from the 
commercial motivation behind the endless writing of novels, plays and songs (for 
example), this sense that there is MORE to say, or that the earlier ideas may have 
been wrong, or flawed, and need to be clarified and corrected, explains why so many 
writers do so much writing on their themes of interest. 
 
Do all of this until you feel you have covered, and clarified, and structured to the 
point where you have said what you want to, as well as you can. 
 
Then, if there is still time, try to leave the polished draft for a day or two (or longer), 
and then very carefully PROOFREAD it, reading it slowly, ALOUD, to yourself, 
checking the words at a technical-format level of spelling, grammar, punctuation, and 
layout.  
 
While doing this technical proof-reading, simultaneously resist the temptation to skim 
over the actual words, because you KNOW (that is, you ASSUME) they are correct 
and clear, and say what you mean (because it is always possible that we may not have 
written-verbally "said" what we mean, but only assembled some words that loosely 
relate to the vaguer ideas we had in our head), while also leaving some room 
(mentally) to reflect on the ideas themselves. 
 
The point is that, through these final stages of proofreading, you should give MOST 
attention to the technical checking (spelling, punctuation, grammar, consistent 
citations, and so on: the formal apparatus of writing). But you will, naturally, also be 
continuing to think about the ideas you are trying to convey. Don't let this natural 
thinking about the ideas distract you too much from the technical checking. But do let 
yourself benefit, in as controlled a way as possible, from this continuing opportunity 
to reconsider what you are trying to say. 
 
Later, much later (in the case of assignments, after they have been marked and 
returned), reconsider your polished draft. It is NOT too late to redraft, and correct, 
and polish. (Of course it is too late to resubmit the assignment. But I have in mind the 
large goal of learning to express yourself in writing.) The point is that we can develop 
our expressive writing ability IF we give ourselves enough practice of drafting and 
RE-drafting, and, CRUCIALLY, what helps us redraft most effectively is  being able 
to see our draft as OBJECTIVELY as possible.  
 
Here is another CATCH. While we are in the early stages of drafting and thinking, we 
are so immersed in our own ideas, intuitions, and drafts of words on paper, that it is 
difficult for us to READ the actual words on paper, and see and consider them 
OBJECTIVELY, that is, with the fresh objective eye of someone who is NOT 
immersed, as we are. 
 
But, if we can make a revised draft, and set it aside for some time (at least ONE day, 
but one week, is better, and one month is better still, and maybe even longer), then 
when we return to reconsider and redraft, we are NOT as immersed as we had been. 
We see the actual words on paper in a way that is closer to the fresh way that they are 
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seen by someone who has not been thinking (mentally) about these ideas as we have. 
That is, some while after making the revised draft, we forget the potentially confusing 
intuitions and non-verbal and pre-verbal ideas we had experienced while we had been 
making the revised draft. Having forgotten these informal, intuitive, not-quite-verbal 
ideas, we read the actual words on paper, and THEY stimulate ideas afresh. These 
words-on-paper are what we think about, not the much vaguer thoughts we had begun 
with.  
 
Having said all of this about WRITING, I want to add, as emphatically as I can, that 
SPEAKING is NOT a solution. While I accept that some people are GOOD at 
impromptu speeches, in my experience, the same kind of drafting and redrafting, 
ORALLY and possibly LITERATELY (on paper), lies behind the best improvisatory 
speakers. We may believe (but we probably deceive) ourselves that we speak clearly 
and coherently, on topics if we just "say what we think". I would challenge you to try 
to use a TAPE-RECORDER, and consider (in as objective a way as possible -- tape 
one day, and listen to the tape a week later, for example) your ORAL-DRAFT, 
assessing its clarity and focus. 
 
It is extremely challenging to try to use SPEECH to convey ideas directly, clearly, 
and efficiently. Unfortunately, we are usually NOT the best people to judge how well 
we communicate orally, because we are too close to what we are thinking and saying 
simultaneously, and hence judge ourselves SUBJECTIVELY. 
 
The same catch applies: being immersed in our own pre-verbal (pre-oral) and non-
verbal THINKING, we struggle to judge objectively the ORAL words we use to 
capture and express our informal, intuitive, vague thoughts. 
 
The central point here is a fundamental one in any attempt at human communication. 
Specifically, THINKING is NON-verbal and PRE-verbal, and vague, UNTIL we 
express (however crudely and approximately) what we think we are thinking in 
objectively examinable words. 
 
This is NOT easy to learn, in that, simply reading my notes and tips, above, will not 
miraculously turn a week writer (or speaker), into a clear verbal communicator. But, 
according to Graves (and others), with extended experience of drafting and redrafting, 
and with critical analysis and feedback (from ourselves, and other "audiences"), we 
slowly improve. 
 
I hope this is clear, and that some of this is helpful, 
John 
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(Returning to) Advanced Academic Study: A Conversation 
 
From: Student S 
To: "John Gough" <jugh@deakin.edu.au> 
Subject: Re: Assessing learning EXE733 
Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2005  
 
Hi John. I am in a bit of bother and need assistance. I am very upset at the moment as 
I may have left my run for Assignment 1 too late. I have a problem with leaving 
things to the last minute. I will admit I have been putting this off as I have a real fear 
of study. This is not an excuse it is real and it is my own fault I know because I know 
I have to be more organised and even though I do take medication some times it all 
gets on top of me and I can't function as I should. To this end I really do want to study 
my degree and have made a resolve to get some assistance with planning study and 
actually following through. 
 
I would like some assistance in how to set up study for myself where it is not 
overwhelming. 
 
I do not want to lose the opportunity to study my degree as it has taken me a lot to get 
to where I am. 
 
I have not engaged in the on-line discussion and have only been reading the materials. 
This is typical of me, just reading snippets here and there and not focussing on what is 
required from the very beginning. When I read your email and got onto the unit’s on-
line web-discussion I was mortified to see how much on-line discussion had gone on 
and what I had missed all because I didn't read the bits about having to be involved in 
the discussion. Purely my fault and I take full responsibility. Please advise me of what 
you think I should do as I am beside myself with worry at the moment. 
 
Student S 
P.S. I have a learning difficulty but don't like to say too much about it because all my 
life it has been " Student S has the potential but not the motivation", etc.  
 
I was finally diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (passive) (ADD) when I was 
in my late 20s. I find it gets so much bad press and many people don't believe in it 
that I tend to clam up. Please help me as I really do want to do this. I do have the 
ability: I am just a bit scared and obviously I have left it too late to engage in the on-
line discussion. I have never studied like this before and have only done external 
study where you read the materials and then right the essay. I could write the essay 
but I haven't been on-line. 
Student S 
 
****** 
 
29 August 2005 
Dear Student S, 
let me start by offering some reassurance. You are not the only one who has NOT 
been digging into the unit’s on-line DSO web-discussion.  
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Naturally we encourage students to do so, as it can be very helpful. But on the other 
hand we do not penalise students who are either unable to do so, or who, for whatever 
reasons, choose not to do so, or who even, as in your case, accidentally overlook the 
recommendations to do so, and then discover to their dismay that there is a hole in 
their study. 
 
That is: you will NOT be penalised for your (so far) non-contribution to on-line 
discussion. It is NOT tool late to contribute. Feel free to respond to messages, or post 
your own messages, without having to be embarrassed by introducing yourself so late 
in the semester. No one will say anything about your late entry. Nor do you need to 
say anything about ADD (although you are probably not the only one with that 
condition). 
 
Let also emphasise that the major focus for this unit centres around the two 
assignments. I assume that, however patchy your other reading may have been, you 
have identified this focus early, and have been, in your own way, as well as you are 
able (given the occasional limitations of your learning difficulty or "style"), working 
towards this focus. 
 
Even snippet-like reading can be pulled together to build larger and more coherent 
views. I am sure you are familiar with your own ways of studying, and can work with, 
or around, the varying levels of attention you can bring to your study. Few of us are 
book-worms able to plough through massive volumes from cover to cover. I know I 
don't. Certainly I do, occasionally, read whole books. But a lot of my academic 
studying has always relied on snippet-like sampling, and (luckily) a retentive memory 
that can fit separate fragments into seemingly sensible larger structures.  
 
Ignore the bad press of ADD. In educational circles it is a familiar condition, and 
there is no stigma to be frank in acknowledging you are different in this way. 
 
Now for your big question. 
 
I am not an expert on ADD. However it seems to me to be commonsense that if you 
have difficulty focussing on work, and maintaining attention, then one simple solution 
may be to break the work down into manageable small parts. 
 
For example, faced with a large and potentially bewildering Unit Guide or Study 
Guide or textbook (as in our unit), read this as well as you can to find the major focus, 
and/or contact the unit-chair (or coordinator — the person in charge of the unit, as I 
am, for this unit) and ask that person to advise you about the focus. Once you identify 
the MAIN POINT of the unit (in our unit it is "assessment as it operates in and affects 
my own work") all the other details of Unit Guide and Study Guide and other unit 
materials will be seen as incidental, or sub-components of the major task at hand.  
 
That is, see the main outline of the wood, despite the potential confusion of all the 
trees. (Is this metaphor clear?) 
 
My advice, as you now know, is that the focus is the two assignments. There is much 
more that I could say about this focus (and the Unit Guide says a lot more), but if you 
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grasp the way the assignments shape everything you do in the unit (and in most 
Deakin units, where the students' major experiences centre around the assessment 
demands of the unit) then you can read, in snippets or in any way you can manage, 
with this central focus guiding your reading and helping you fit the bits of reading 
together.  
 
Another tip for maintaining attention and focus. 
 
From the outset, as soon as you receive the study materials for the unit, make yourself 
a time-line for ALL the remaining time for study, including any remaining weeks up 
to the actual formal beginning of the semester, onwards through the semester to the 
end of the formal study period. 
 
Then enter on this personal study-schedule the assessment deadlines. 
 
Then plan backwards, in reverse chronological order, the tasks needed to achieve the 
deadline. 
 
For example, you might allocate one week of the study-schedule to each of these tasks 
that build an assignment. 
 
— SUBMIT the assignment. 
— REVISE the final draft, and check referencing formats. 
— WORK on early drafts. 
— START first draft. 
— MAKE detailed notes about ideas to include in the discussion. 
— FINALISE the TOPIC of the assignment: make this in the form of a question 
which is later to be answered by the discussion which will be drafted. 
— READ widely on topics of interest, and general background for the unit. 
— CONSTRUCT a study-schedule, including identifying the official statement 
about the "assignment" prescribed by the unit materials. 
— FAMILIARISE yourself with the unit materials. 
 
If each of these points takes a whole week, this may be longer than you have available, 
within the semester. But usually Deakin tries to mail out unit materials several weeks 
earlier than the official beginning of a unit. 
 
Of course, you should treat any study-schedule flexibly.  
 
Make your draft schedule, and the available time, work for YOU, rather than making 
IT work you, or dictate to you. (Is my intended emphasis clear, here?)  
 
If you finish one of the steps earlier than the whole week, then proceed immediately 
into the next stage. If you need extra time to complete a stage, do so, but don't panic 
about doing this, and be willing to modify the schedule, while maintaining the focus 
on the END-POINT and the deadline for submission. 
 
It is also helpful to try to have a specified TIME for studying. This might, for example, 
be 8 p.m. to 10 p.m., seven days a week (or as many days as you can manage). Or it 
might be ALL of Sunday, or all of Saturday and Sunday afternoon, 1 p.m. to 6 p.m.  
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Try to stick with your self-determined time-table for working. But be willing to be 
flexible (to accommodate social occasions, changes in weather, or similar 
unpredictable and incidental events). But don't feel guilty if you stray, occasionally 
from the time-table: that is, don't let your guilt about NOT being well organised 
become an emotional cause of further disorganisation. Tamp down any tendency to 
panic, and work as coolly and steadily as possible. 
  
Moreover, as soon as you know what units you are enrolled in, you can use the 
Handbook Entry for each unit as a guide to general background reading for the unit, 
and begin this introductory and largely self-directed reading, weeks earlier than the 
actual arrival of posted unit materials. 
 
For example, for each unit, as soon as you know you are enrolled in the unit, use the 
broad outline of the unit, as given in the Handbook (the unit title is often a handy 
guide, as well as the outline of the content of the unit), as a guide for the following 
tasks:  
• GATHER any materials that are broadly on the unit topic that you already own 
(from undergraduate study, teacher-training, professional development, or other 
study); 
• CONSULT with colleagues about what they think might be relevant to the unit 
topic, and especially seek BRIEFING by colleagues who have studied this unit 
or similar units in other institutions; 
• BORROW any materials on the topic, using general professional resources of 
your school or institution, and any materials your colleagues can lend you; 
• REVIEW (however snippety) all the materials you can gather; 
• REFLECT on your own existing ideas and experiences of the unit's topic, 
drawing on your own life when you are a student as well as your working life as 
an educational professional. 
 
All of this can be going on through Deakin's summer break, or between the end of one 
semester and the start of another. This may mean you spend some of what would 
otherwise be "holiday" time on what would ordinarily be regarded as "work". But you 
are doing this because it will help you cope better during the official "work" or 
"study" period of the unit.  
 
Use notebooks, or any similar devices, including wordprocessing, as ways of shifting 
any occasional incidental ideas and experiences OUT of your head, where the ideas 
occur, and into written prose that captures your ideas.  
 
Good note-taking, while reading, in whatever snippetty fashion you usually manage, 
will help you RECALL the striking ideas you encounter, as you read. (DON'T fall 
into the misguided trap of HIGHLIGHTING everything you read, or trying to 
painstakingly make notes of every point you come across. Let your note-taking be a 
natural guide to the genuinely interesting and important ideas you encounter -- those 
rarer, but special moments in the reading.)  
 
As I said, I am not an expert on ADD. I assume my suggestions are either similar to 
what you already naturally do, anyway, or may be unhelpful. But you may also be 
guided by general tips on how to study, with and without ADD (via books, self-help 
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materials, internet resources, or chatting with colleagues about their own work-habits). 
Schools tend NOT to teach students HOW to organise themselves to work efficiently. 
Hence, students invent their own hit-or-miss methods. It is valuable to pause, and 
consider HOW you ordinarily work, and discuss with other people how they work, 
and then consider, in the light of this reflection and consultation, how you might 
modify your own work-habits to make them more effective, for you. 
 
As for on-line discussion, and the demands of computer-based writing, the following 
comments may be relevant. 
 
I must confess that I started teaching myself two-finger typing on a very worn-out 
Corona (or Royal?) manual typewriter when I was about 10 years old, around 1960 
(yes: I am that old!).  
 
Later, as a young university lecturer, having spent my entire time as a school and 
university student, and a classroom teacher using nothing more sophisticated than 
handwriting and spirit-duplicators, I started using electronic typewriters, including 
CORRECTABLE typewriters (they had a roll of white-out ribbon that could be 
activated by back-spacing to a typo, and typing over it – it meant that EDITING had 
to fit in the space of any text that was being deleted and replaced; or that editing had 
to be based on physical cutting and pasting of correctly typed portions of text, or 
involved completely retyping). 
 
I mention all this because I now find myself with sufficient typing speed, and 
experience, that I can compose fresh prose almost as fast as I can type.  
 
I can also read fairly comfortably by simply looking and scrolling through the 
computer screen. 
 
Hence, as a fast-enough typer and capable screen-reader, and a BOOK-MINDED 
person, I feel that I can virtually “SPEAK” to you, in a virtual-face-to-virtual-face-
way. 
 
Teaching on-line is a NEW way of teaching. But to me it feels very similar to actually 
listening and speaking in an ordinary classroom. 
 
BUT — and this is an enormous “BUT”— EVERYTHING THAT IS VIRTUALLY-
SAID can be EDITED, and SAVED. Hence everything that is typed can potentially 
contribute to academic work, at my end, as well as at yours. 
 
Compare this with a real-life face-to-face classroom.  
 
People can speak all they like in a classroom. But at the end of the day, or lesson, they 
rely on their MENTAL MEMORY, or on their HANDRITTEN MEMORY, or they 
leave the classroom remembering very little. The sad reality is that most students who 
sit in a real classroom listening, will retain in their memory maybe ONE fresh idea 
from that class — UNLESS they keep good hand-written notes of the MANY things 
that are SAID, and DONE, and DRAWN or DISPLAYED in that class. 
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Thanks to my trusty hard-drive, I can leave a lot of my remembering to my computer. 
It frees me to think, and to use what I virtually-say, and to teach, 
 
I hope this is clear, and that some of it may be helpful, 
John 
